Deepening democracy within Ireland's social partnership

Ireland's social partnership process, now under attack from a number of quarters, has repeatedly been charged with being 'undemocratic' in that it undermines the sovereign position of elected political representatives, with key policy formulation and decision-making taking place in fora outside the institutions of representative democracy. These critiques echo those against new forms of networked governance more globally. A key question therefore is how (and if) democracy may be deepened within social partnership or its potential successor(s). This article addresses this question by employing a post-liberal democratic framework to examine social partnership in practice, and by drawing lessons from another partnership process, Malawi's PRSP. Drawing from Malawi's experience, it is argued that democracy can be deepened within social partnership when governance deliberations and negotiations are conducted under conditions of vibrant public debate and genuine perspective-based representation, and when the communicative and discursive norms are widened to allow for such representation

On the Problem of Breathing, Eating, & Drinking Poison: An introduction to problem solving, nobility of purpose under adverse circumstances, and the search for truth with Sir Karl Popper on Prince Edward Island

This paper introduces Karl Popper's approach to problem solving in the social sciences. These methods fundamentally represent the scientific method of the natural sciences. Popper's problem solving technique is outlined in six steps, including an introductory treatment of his solution to Hume's Problem of Induction. These six steps are then applied in the form of a test and logical deduction of our illustrative theory: Cancer rates on Prince Edward Island have dramatically increased as a result of an extraordinary increase (900% in the past decade) in potato production, and a corollary increase of secondary agricultural inputs, namely an increase of chlorothalonil (trade name: Bravo) applications in less than ten years. We conclude our theory is true and, in order to complete our demonstration of Popper's methods, open this theory to criticism and refutations. APPENDIX A offers a brief review of relevant literature on the philosophy of science, and APPENDIX B offers readers a brief introduction to the fundamentals of relevant island-based methods.scientific method; karl popper; truth; falsity; probability theory; the problem of induction; industrial agriculture; prince edward island; insularity; manufacture of consent; the tragedy of the commons

The Transition to Democracy : Collective Action and Intra-elite Confict

This paper studies how intra-elite confict results in transition to democracy, characterized as both franchise extension to, and lowering the individual cost of collective political action for, an initially disorganized non-elite. Two risk averse elites compete for the appropriation of a unit of social surplus with initial uncertainty about their future relative bargaining power. Both elements of a democracy are necessary to ensure that the two elites credibly commit to a mutually fairer share of the surplus and we derive sufficient conditions for democracy to emerge in equilibrium. Our formal analysis accounts for stylized facts that emerge from an analysis of Indian and West European democracies.

Noncooperative Foundations of Stable Sets in Voting Games.

This note investigates the noncooperative foundations of von Neumann-Morgenstern (vN-M) stable sets in voting games. To do so, we study subgame perfect equilibria of a noncooperative legislative bargaining game, based on underlying simple games. The following results emerge from such an exercise: Every stable set of the underlying simple game is the limit set of undominated pure-strategy Markov perfect equilibria, and of strategically stable sets of undominated subgame perfect equilibria of the bargaining game with farsighted voters.Legislative bargaining, committee, strategic stability, stable set.

Emergence and Persistence of Inefficient States

Inefficiencies in the bureaucratic organization of the state are often viewed as important factors in retarding economic development. Why certain societies choose or end up with such inefficient organizations has received very little attention, however. In this paper, we present a simple theory of the emergence and persistence of inefficient states. The society consists of rich and poor individuals. The rich are initially in power, but expect to transition to democracy, which will choose redistributive policies. Taxation requires the employment of bureaucrats. We show that, under certain circumstances, by choosing an inefficient state structure, the rich may be able to use patronage and capture democratic politics. This enables them to reduce the amount of redistribution and public good provision in democracy. Moreover, the inefficient state creates its own constituency and tends to persist over time. Intuitively, an inefficient state structure creates more rents for bureaucrats than would an efficient state structure. When the poor come to power in democracy, they will reform the structure of the state to make it more efficient so that higher taxes can be collected at lower cost and with lower rents for bureaucrats. Anticipating this, when the society starts out with an inefficient organization of the state, bureaucrats support the rich, who set lower taxes but also provide rents to bureaucrats. We show that in order to generate enough political support, the coalition of the rich and the bureaucrats may not only choose an inefficient organization of the state, but they may further expand the size of bureaucracy so as to gain additional votes. The model shows that an equilibrium with an inefficient state is more likely to arise when there is greater inequality between the rich and the poor, when bureaucratic rents take intermediate values and when individuals are sufficiently forward-looking.bureaucracy, corruption, democracy, patronage politics, political economy, public goods, redistributive politics.

Democracy, Collective Action and Intra-Elite Conflict

This paper studies the conditions under which intra-elite conflict leads to a democ- racy. There are two risk averse elites competing for the appropriation of a unit of so- cial surplus, with an ex-ante uncertainty about their future relative bargaining power, and a large non-elite class unable to act collectively. We characterize a democracy as consistng of both franchise extension to, and lowering the cost of collective political activity for, individuals in the non-elite. In the absence of democracy, the stronger elite is always able to appropriate the entire surplus. We show that in a democ- racy, the newly enfranchised non-elite organize and always prefer to form a coalition with weaker elite against the stronger resulting in a more balanced surplus allocation between the two elites. Accordingly, the elites choose to democratize if they are sufficiently risk averse. Our formal analysis can account for stylized facts that emerge from a comparative analysis of Indian and Western European democracies.

The Multiple Hierarchical Legislatures in a Representative Democracy: Districting for Policy Implementation

We build a multiple hierarchical model of a representative democracy in which, for instance, voters elect county representatives, county representatives elect district representatives, district representatives elect state representatives, and state representatives elect a prime minister. We use our model to show that the policy determined by the final representative can become more extreme as the number of hierarchical levels increases because of increased opportunities for gerrymandering. Thus, a sufficiently large number of voters gives a district maker an advantage, enabling her to implement her favorite policy. We also show that the range of implementable policies increases with the depth of the hierarchical system. Consequently, districting by a candidate in a hierarchical legislative system can be viewed as a type of policy implementation device

'Democracy begins in conversation’: the phenomenology of problem-based learning and legal education

Learning is complex for any number of reasons. One of these is that it doesn’t take place in a laboratory: it happens in real places, within and between real people, and as a consequence it takes place in multi-factorial environments. At every stage of learning in Higher Education (HE), from student choice of institution and programme, to the transfer of learning from theory to practice, to a single institution’s or a teacher’s evaluation of teaching and learning, there are many causal factors that affect educational process and outcome. The complexities and variables created by the interaction of such multiple factors, well known in the field of education, make learning a highly complex phenomenon to analyse and understand

Evaluation of the generations together programme: learning so far. Research report DFE-RR082

"This report presents the findings from the evaluation of the Generations Together Demonstrator programme. This study was undertaken by York Consulting LLP on behalf of the then Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF); this is now the Department for Education (DfE)... The overarching aims of the evaluation were to: undertake a robust assessment of the effectiveness of intergenerational practice in improving individual’s attitudes and behaviours towards other generations; provide a greater understanding of the key challenges and critical success factors for the effective implementation and delivery of intergenerational practice, particularly in terms of partnership working; undertake a cost effectiveness assessment of each of the projects." - Page i