494 research outputs found
Perspectives for proof unwinding by programming languages techniques
In this chapter, we propose some future directions of work, potentially
beneficial to Mathematics and its foundations, based on the recent import of
methodology from the theory of programming languages into proof theory. This
scientific essay, written for the audience of proof theorists as well as the
working mathematician, is not a survey of the field, but rather a personal view
of the author who hopes that it may inspire future and fellow researchers
Turing jumps through provability
Fixing some computably enumerable theory , the
Friedman-Goldfarb-Harrington (FGH) theorem says that over elementary
arithmetic, each formula is equivalent to some formula of the form
provided that is consistent. In this paper we give various
generalizations of the FGH theorem. In particular, for we relate
formulas to provability statements which
are a formalization of "provable in together with all true
sentences". As a corollary we conclude that each is
-complete. This observation yields us to consider a recursively
defined hierarchy of provability predicates which look a lot
like except that where calls upon the
oracle of all true sentences, the recursively
calls upon the oracle of all true sentences of the form . As such we obtain a `syntax-light' characterization of
definability whence of Turing jumps which is readily extended
beyond the finite. Moreover, we observe that the corresponding provability
predicates are well behaved in that together they provide a
sound interpretation of the polymodal provability logic
Hilbert's Program Then and Now
Hilbert's program was an ambitious and wide-ranging project in the philosophy
and foundations of mathematics. In order to "dispose of the foundational
questions in mathematics once and for all, "Hilbert proposed a two-pronged
approach in 1921: first, classical mathematics should be formalized in
axiomatic systems; second, using only restricted, "finitary" means, one should
give proofs of the consistency of these axiomatic systems. Although Godel's
incompleteness theorems show that the program as originally conceived cannot be
carried out, it had many partial successes, and generated important advances in
logical theory and meta-theory, both at the time and since. The article
discusses the historical background and development of Hilbert's program, its
philosophical underpinnings and consequences, and its subsequent development
and influences since the 1930s.Comment: 43 page
Relevant Arithmetic and Mathematical Pluralism
In The Consistency of Arithmetic and elsewhere, Meyer claims to ârepealâ Goedelâs second incompleteness theorem. In this paper, I review his argument, and then consider two ways of understanding it: from the perspective of mathematical pluralism and monism, respectively. Is relevant arithmetic just another legitimate practice among many, or is it a rival of its classical counterpartâa corrective to Goedel, setting us back on the path to the (One) True Arithmetic? To help answer, I sketch a few worked examples from relevant mathematics, to see what a non-classical (re)formulation of mathematics might look like in practice. I conclude that, while it is unlikely that relevant arithmetic describes past and present mathematical practice, and so might be most acceptable as a pluralist enterprise, it may yet prescribe a more monistic future venture
Fourteen Arguments in Favour of a Formalist Philosophy of Real Mathematics
The formalist philosophy of mathematics (in its purest, most extreme version) is widely regarded as a âdiscredited positionâ. This pure and extreme version of formalism is called by some authors âgame formalismâ, because it is alleged to represent mathematics as a meaningless game with strings of symbols. Nevertheless, I would like to draw attention to some arguments in favour of game formalism as an appropriate philosophy of real mathematics. For the most part, these arguments have not yet been used or were neglected in past discussions
- âŚ