12,359 research outputs found

    Backwards is the way forward: feedback in the cortical hierarchy predicts the expected future

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    Clark offers a powerful description of the brain as a prediction machine, which offers progress on two distinct levels. First, on an abstract conceptual level, it provides a unifying framework for perception, action, and cognition (including subdivisions such as attention, expectation, and imagination). Second, hierarchical prediction offers progress on a concrete descriptive level for testing and constraining conceptual elements and mechanisms of predictive coding models (estimation of predictions, prediction errors, and internal models)

    Bayesian Learning Models of Pain: A Call to Action

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    Learning is fundamentally about action, enabling the successful navigation of a changing and uncertain environment. The experience of pain is central to this process, indicating the need for a change in action so as to mitigate potential threat to bodily integrity. This review considers the application of Bayesian models of learning in pain that inherently accommodate uncertainty and action, which, we shall propose are essential in understanding learning in both acute and persistent cases of pain

    Literal Perceptual Inference

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    In this paper, I argue that theories of perception that appeal to Helmholtz’s idea of unconscious inference (“Helmholtzian” theories) should be taken literally, i.e. that the inferences appealed to in such theories are inferences in the full sense of the term, as employed elsewhere in philosophy and in ordinary discourse. In the course of the argument, I consider constraints on inference based on the idea that inference is a deliberate acton, and on the idea that inferences depend on the syntactic structure of representations. I argue that inference is a personal-level but sometimes unconscious process that cannot in general be distinguished from association on the basis of the structures of the representations over which it’s defined. I also critique arguments against representationalist interpretations of Helmholtzian theories, and argue against the view that perceptual inference is encapsulated in a module

    An interoceptive predictive coding model of conscious presence

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    We describe a theoretical model of the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying conscious presence and its disturbances. The model is based on interoceptive prediction error and is informed by predictive models of agency, general models of hierarchical predictive coding and dopaminergic signaling in cortex, the role of the anterior insular cortex (AIC) in interoception and emotion, and cognitive neuroscience evidence from studies of virtual reality and of psychiatric disorders of presence, specifically depersonalization/derealization disorder. The model associates presence with successful suppression by top-down predictions of informative interoceptive signals evoked by autonomic control signals and, indirectly, by visceral responses to afferent sensory signals. The model connects presence to agency by allowing that predicted interoceptive signals will depend on whether afferent sensory signals are determined, by a parallel predictive-coding mechanism, to be self-generated or externally caused. Anatomically, we identify the AIC as the likely locus of key neural comparator mechanisms. Our model integrates a broad range of previously disparate evidence, makes predictions for conjoint manipulations of agency and presence, offers a new view of emotion as interoceptive inference, and represents a step toward a mechanistic account of a fundamental phenomenological property of consciousness

    The Neural Particle Filter

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    The robust estimation of dynamically changing features, such as the position of prey, is one of the hallmarks of perception. On an abstract, algorithmic level, nonlinear Bayesian filtering, i.e. the estimation of temporally changing signals based on the history of observations, provides a mathematical framework for dynamic perception in real time. Since the general, nonlinear filtering problem is analytically intractable, particle filters are considered among the most powerful approaches to approximating the solution numerically. Yet, these algorithms prevalently rely on importance weights, and thus it remains an unresolved question how the brain could implement such an inference strategy with a neuronal population. Here, we propose the Neural Particle Filter (NPF), a weight-less particle filter that can be interpreted as the neuronal dynamics of a recurrently connected neural network that receives feed-forward input from sensory neurons and represents the posterior probability distribution in terms of samples. Specifically, this algorithm bridges the gap between the computational task of online state estimation and an implementation that allows networks of neurons in the brain to perform nonlinear Bayesian filtering. The model captures not only the properties of temporal and multisensory integration according to Bayesian statistics, but also allows online learning with a maximum likelihood approach. With an example from multisensory integration, we demonstrate that the numerical performance of the model is adequate to account for both filtering and identification problems. Due to the weightless approach, our algorithm alleviates the 'curse of dimensionality' and thus outperforms conventional, weighted particle filters in higher dimensions for a limited number of particles

    The cybernetic Bayesian brain: from interoceptive inference to sensorimotor contingencies

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    Is there a single principle by which neural operations can account for perception, cognition, action, and even consciousness? A strong candidate is now taking shape in the form of “predictive processing”. On this theory, brains engage in predictive inference on the causes of sensory inputs by continuous minimization of prediction errors or informational “free energy”. Predictive processing can account, supposedly, not only for perception, but also for action and for the essential contribution of the body and environment in structuring sensorimotor interactions. In this paper I draw together some recent developments within predictive processing that involve predictive modelling of internal physiological states (interoceptive inference), and integration with “enactive” and “embodied” approaches to cognitive science (predictive perception of sensorimotor contingencies). The upshot is a development of predictive processing that originates, not in Helmholtzian perception-as-inference, but rather in 20th-century cybernetic principles that emphasized homeostasis and predictive control. This way of thinking leads to (i) a new view of emotion as active interoceptive inference; (ii) a common predictive framework linking experiences of body ownership, emotion, and exteroceptive perception; (iii) distinct interpretations of active inference as involving disruptive and disambiguatory—not just confirmatory—actions to test perceptual hypotheses; (iv) a neurocognitive operationalization of the “mastery of sensorimotor contingencies” (where sensorimotor contingencies reflect the rules governing sensory changes produced by various actions); and (v) an account of the sense of subjective reality of perceptual contents (“perceptual presence”) in terms of the extent to which predictive models encode potential sensorimotor relations (this being “counterfactual richness”). This is rich and varied territory, and surveying its landmarks emphasizes the need for experimental tests of its key contributions

    Active inference and oculomotor pursuit: the dynamic causal modelling of eye movements.

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    This paper introduces a new paradigm that allows one to quantify the Bayesian beliefs evidenced by subjects during oculomotor pursuit. Subjects' eye tracking responses to a partially occluded sinusoidal target were recorded non-invasively and averaged. These response averages were then analysed using dynamic causal modelling (DCM). In DCM, observed responses are modelled using biologically plausible generative or forward models - usually biophysical models of neuronal activity
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