67,728 research outputs found

    A Lower Bound on Opaque Sets

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    It is proved that the total length of any set of countably many rectifiable curves, whose union meets all straight lines that intersect the unit square U, is at least 2.00002. This is the first improvement on the lower bound of 2 by Jones in 1964. A similar bound is proved for all convex sets U other than a triangle

    A lower bound on opaque sets

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    It is proved that the total length of any set of countably many rectifiable curves, whose union meets all straight lines that intersect the unit square U, is at least 2.00002. This is the first improvement on the lower bound of 2 by Jones in 1964. A similar bound is proved for all convex sets U other than a triangle. © Akitoshi Kawamura, Sonoko Moriyama, Yota Otachi, and János Pach

    A lower bound on opaque sets

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    It is proved that the total length of any set of countably many rectifiable curves whose union meets all straight lines that intersect the unit square U is at least 2.00002. This is the first improvement on the lower bound of 2 known since 1964. A similar bound is proved for all convex sets U other than a triangle. (C) 2019 Published by Elsevier B.V

    The opaque square

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    The problem of finding small sets that block every line passing through a unit square was first considered by Mazurkiewicz in 1916. We call such a set {\em opaque} or a {\em barrier} for the square. The shortest known barrier has length 2+62=2.6389\sqrt{2}+ \frac{\sqrt{6}}{2}= 2.6389\ldots. The current best lower bound for the length of a (not necessarily connected) barrier is 22, as established by Jones about 50 years ago. No better lower bound is known even if the barrier is restricted to lie in the square or in its close vicinity. Under a suitable locality assumption, we replace this lower bound by 2+10122+10^{-12}, which represents the first, albeit small, step in a long time toward finding the length of the shortest barrier. A sharper bound is obtained for interior barriers: the length of any interior barrier for the unit square is at least 2+1052 + 10^{-5}. Two of the key elements in our proofs are: (i) formulas established by Sylvester for the measure of all lines that meet two disjoint planar convex bodies, and (ii) a procedure for detecting lines that are witness to the invalidity of a short bogus barrier for the square.Comment: 23 pages, 8 figure

    Progressive Transactional Memory in Time and Space

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    Transactional memory (TM) allows concurrent processes to organize sequences of operations on shared \emph{data items} into atomic transactions. A transaction may commit, in which case it appears to have executed sequentially or it may \emph{abort}, in which case no data item is updated. The TM programming paradigm emerged as an alternative to conventional fine-grained locking techniques, offering ease of programming and compositionality. Though typically themselves implemented using locks, TMs hide the inherent issues of lock-based synchronization behind a nice transactional programming interface. In this paper, we explore inherent time and space complexity of lock-based TMs, with a focus of the most popular class of \emph{progressive} lock-based TMs. We derive that a progressive TM might enforce a read-only transaction to perform a quadratic (in the number of the data items it reads) number of steps and access a linear number of distinct memory locations, closing the question of inherent cost of \emph{read validation} in TMs. We then show that the total number of \emph{remote memory references} (RMRs) that take place in an execution of a progressive TM in which nn concurrent processes perform transactions on a single data item might reach Ω(nlogn)\Omega(n \log n), which appears to be the first RMR complexity lower bound for transactional memory.Comment: Model of Transactional Memory identical with arXiv:1407.6876, arXiv:1502.0272

    Inherent Limitations of Hybrid Transactional Memory

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    Several Hybrid Transactional Memory (HyTM) schemes have recently been proposed to complement the fast, but best-effort, nature of Hardware Transactional Memory (HTM) with a slow, reliable software backup. However, the fundamental limitations of building a HyTM with nontrivial concurrency between hardware and software transactions are still not well understood. In this paper, we propose a general model for HyTM implementations, which captures the ability of hardware transactions to buffer memory accesses, and allows us to formally quantify and analyze the amount of overhead (instrumentation) of a HyTM scheme. We prove the following: (1) it is impossible to build a strictly serializable HyTM implementation that has both uninstrumented reads and writes, even for weak progress guarantees, and (2) under reasonable assumptions, in any opaque progressive HyTM, a hardware transaction must incur instrumentation costs linear in the size of its data set. We further provide two upper bound implementations whose instrumentation costs are optimal with respect to their progress guarantees. In sum, this paper captures for the first time an inherent trade-off between the degree of concurrency a HyTM provides between hardware and software transactions, and the amount of instrumentation overhead the implementation must incur

    Competitive Imperfect Price Discrimination and Market Power

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    Two duopolists compete on price in the market for a homogeneous product. They can “profile” consumers, that is, identify their valuations with some probability. If both firms can profile consumers but with different abilities, then they achieve positive expected profits at equilibrium. This provides a rationale for firms to (partially and unequally) share data about consumers or for data brokers to sell different customer analytics to competing firms. Consumers prefer that both firms profile exactly the same set of consumers or that only one firm profiles consumers as this entails marginal cost pricing (so does a policy requiring list prices to be public). Otherwise, more protective privacy regulations have ambiguous effects on consumer surplus
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