Proper names

Traditionally, the conflict over the question what is the role of proper names in ordinary language has centred around two proposals: a sense-reference account, where the meaning of a name is given by some favoured description of the bearer, or a designatory account, where the bearer is the meaning of the name. There is a predisposition towards the former account. largely apparent ease in dealing with a supposedly central question: what is the role of "Pegasus" in the sentence "Pegasus does not exist". If we consider sane more standard cases of proper names two facts are clear: speakers use a name from one occasion to the next with one and the same meaning, and what two men may know of a particular individual may not be the same thing. These facts not only undermine the traditional accounts but they also prohibit a uniform account of all names, bearerless or otherwise, in terms of the bare intentions of speakers irrespective of what populates the universe. These failures indicate the need for a different approach to the issue. The search for a direct answer to the question "what is the meaning of a name", prescribed by a sense-reference approach, should be replaced by seeking the conditions which must be satisfied by someone who knows the contribution a name makes to determining the truth grounds of statements. The role of standard proper names can then be explained without appeal to something which is the meaning; and further an account of why "Pegasus" is still with us can be given, which explains our intentions on the matter without unduly detracting from an ontology of middle sized hardware.<p

The architecture and acuity of critical systems thinking

This thesis looks at two critical urges in Critical Systems Thinking that both complement and critique each other. Firstly, there is an urge to construct in a critical manner. Secondly, there is an urge to be critical about such constructions. They complement and critique each other in the manner in which the second urge requires the first urge in order to understand what it means when one begins to create by construction, and also in which the first urge requires the second in order to understand the privileged position that construction is given in epistemology. These two urges give two stages.Construction relates to four clear conditions that develop from an Architectural study. This study offers two definitions of Architecture : structural longevity and relational modification. Consequently, a Structure and Process are established (first two stages) which together content an Architecture of Critical Systems Thinking (third stage). This Architecture is then applied to Systems Thinking through a study of five Systems Thinkers, this application offers an Architecture as commensurability (fourth stage). The Architecture is thereby offered as author.De-construction relates to four clear conditions that develop from the Architecture of Critical Systems Thinking. Each condition questions the Architectural authority to construct. The Process (reversed to complement and critique) questions the Structural consistency of the Architecture (first). A Structure of Acuity develops that maintains meaning where the Architecture neutralised meaning (second). A Contentless Acuity follows (third), thereby allowing the contentlessness of paradigm (in)commensurability to be discussed as an application of the Acuity of Critical Systems Thinking. The Acuity is thereby offered as reader.To balance these two urges is to read with authority

Heidegger's early ontology and the deconstruction of foundations

This dissertation is a polemical exegesis of Heidegger's 1920's position with respect to the foundational, extracting from his thought an original pre-conception of the foundational which does not conform to current patterns of Heidegger interpretation. This might be expressed as a rescuing of foundations from metaphysics. The first half of the dissertation concentrates on methodological idiosyncracies in the semantic, syntactic and macrostructural organisation of foundational ideas, an analysis which begins to yield a number of "patterns" embedded in the language and thinking of Heidegger, patterns which, for example, subvert the propositional and reverse the normal processes of understanding. These patterns are "paratypes", the tools of "disas-sembling" (the latter term describes that in Heidegger's thought which provides the original motivation for the later development of deconstruction). The second half of the dissertation applies and extends these findings in two directions: firstly, with respect to the internal development of the Sein und Zeit project, by exploring the coalescence of temporality and foundations; secondly, with respect to the direction and fate of the Sein und Zeit project, by exploring a limited number of "foundational" aspects (fugue, Kehre, Abgrund, Ereignis) of a single but singularly important writing from the 1930's: Beiträge zur Philosophie. In so doing the dissertation aims to bring out the Copernican thought-revolution in the early work, and to provide both the conceptual motivation and the methodological tools for a more farreaching reappreciation of Heidegger's early work. Thus the dissertation has consequences, not only for the foundational, but also for the language-thought problematic, for the possibility of overcoming metaphysics, for Heidegger's general development, and for the appraisal of the position of time in his work

Realism and idealism in the theory of value

This thesis defends an account of value which emphasizes the central place occupied by experiences among the objects of evaluation, a point that is particularly stark in the case of aesthetic value, to which a chapter is devoted that adumbrates the wider understanding of value subsequently defended. More generally it is argued that values do not transcend the attitudes and institutions in which they are embodied. They nonetheless enjoy in virtue of their structuring by norms of consistency, stability and deference enough in the way of objectivity to do justice to various phenomenological considerations often thought to favour realism. It is argued however that this level of objectivity is compatible with the rejection of any form of reductive naturalism and, more generally, of cognitivism- views which should indeed, it is argued, be rejected in favour of an expressivistic understanding of value