

University of Warwick institutional repository: <http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap>

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick

<http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap/2349>

This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.

Please scroll down to view the document itself.

Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to cite it. Our policy information is available from the repository home page.

HEIDEGGER'S EARLY ONTOLOGY
AND THE DECONSTRUCTION
OF FOUNDATIONS

by

James Grant Lovejoy

submitted to
the University of Warwick
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in respect of research conducted in
the Department of Philosophy

February 1992

Contents

Abstract.....	iii
Introduction: Heidegger and the Problem of Foundations	1
1) Ground in Heidegger's earlier writings.....	3
2) Ground in secondary literature on Heidegger	5
a) Materials dealing exclusively with the foundational	7
b) General assumptions about the foundational	15
i) A conservative view	17
ii) A radical orthodoxy.....	22
3) Aims and limitations	25
Part A. Heidegger's Thinking and Writing about Ground: some Methodological Peculiarities	33
Ch.1. Semantic Interpenetrations in Foundational Language	38
1) The problem.....	38
2) Textual analyses	46
3) A solution.....	59
Ch.2. Logical Irregularities in Foundational Language.....	73
1) The significance of paradox and tautology	73
2) The principles of identity, contradiction and sufficient reason	78
3) Equiprimordiality.....	88
Ch.3. Incongruencies in Foundational Macro-structure.....	92
1) Tetrapolarity.....	94
2) Wrap-into clustering	102
Ch.4. Anticipations of a Turn in Foundational Understanding.....	109
1) The <i>sens</i> and duplicity of being	110
2) Projective understanding, circularity and dialectic.....	118
3) A short note on metaxy and the end of circling	136
Summary of Part A.	140
Part B. Connections: <i>Grund - Zeitlichkeit - Ereignis</i>	145
Ch.1. Temporality: Coalescence of Time and Ground.....	145
1) Time in the Language and Problematic of Foundations.....	148
a) Apriori	148
b) Transcendence.....	152

c) <i>Zeitigung</i>	157
2) The Limits (Horizon) of the Foundational Project in <i>Sein und Zeit</i>	160
a) Time as the Horizon for the Understanding of Being.....	160
b) Finitude: Openness and Closure	167
c) Question-worthiness	172
3) Transition: Links between Temporality and <i>Ereignis</i>	176
Ch.2. The Turn: A Leap into the Abyss?	181
1) Structural-foundational eccentricities in <i>Beiträge zur Philosophie</i>	182
a) Fugue.....	185
b) <i>Kehre</i>	191
2) Does the term <i>Abgrund</i> signify a nihilistic anti-foundationalism?	201
Summary of Part B.....	215
Conclusion.....	219
Appendix: guide to German terms.....	iv
List of abbreviations	vii
Bibliography.....	viii

Abstract of Dissertation

This dissertation is a polemical exegesis of Heidegger's 1920's position with respect to the foundational, extracting from his thought an original pre-conception of the foundational which does not conform to current patterns of Heidegger interpretation. This might be expressed as a rescuing of foundations from metaphysics. The first half of the dissertation concentrates on methodological idiosyncracies in the semantic, syntactic and macro-structural organisation of foundational ideas, an analysis which begins to yield a number of "patterns" embedded in the language and thinking of Heidegger, patterns which, for example, subvert the propositional and reverse the normal processes of understanding. These patterns are "paratypes", the tools of "disas-sembling" (the latter term describes that in Heidegger's thought which provides the original motivation for the later development of deconstruction). The second half of the dissertation applies and extends these findings in two directions: firstly, with respect to the internal development of the *Sein und Zeit* project, by exploring the coalescence of temporality and foundations; secondly, with respect to the direction and fate of the *Sein und Zeit* project, by exploring a limited number of "foundational" aspects (fugue, *Kehre*, *Abgrund*, *Ereignis*) of a single but singularly important writing from the 1930's: *Beiträge zur Philosophie*. In so doing the dissertation aims to bring out the Copernican thought-revolution in the early work, and to provide both the conceptual motivation and the methodological tools for a more far-reaching reappreciation of Heidegger's early work. Thus the dissertation has consequences, not only for the foundational, but also for the language-thought problematic, for the possibility of overcoming metaphysics, for Heidegger's general development, and for the appraisal of the position of time in his work.

INTRODUCTION: HEIDEGGER AND THE PROBLEM OF FOUNDATIONS.

Reading Jacques Derrida's "Letter to a Japanese Friend",¹ in which he discusses how to translate the French *déconstruction* into Japanese, it occurred to me that if there is a word in Heidegger's writing which really deserves the translation *déconstruction*, it is not *Destruktion* or *Abbau*, but *Freilegung* (lit.: free-laying, liberation).² Which is not to read Derrida back into Heidegger, but perhaps briefly to re-liberate Derrida's original de(-)liberation of *déconstruction*. The title of this thesis refers to the *Freilegung* of *Grund*, and does not intend to invoke any advanced theory of criticism from Derrida or de Man. The word "deconstruction" is used in the title because, literally taken, it describes a pattern governing the foundational in the early Heidegger, and because it would probably attract the kind of reader who would be interested in this thesis. Flirting with this word further could lead to misunderstanding, though, because of what recent philosophy has made of it, and having waved it as a flag in the title, a new and perhaps better word will be substituted. *Déconstruction* (in its use associated with Derrida) describes a complete strategy or method (even if intrinsically incompletable), but *Destruktion* is self-confessedly only a part of Heidegger's phenomenological method of reduction-construction-destruction, so if one is to capture the entirety of Heidegger's method, one must turn to a different word: *Freilegung*, or perhaps "disas-sembly" (with a hyphen - which I rather violently interpret as the taking apart of a construction of semblances or pretences).³ The meaning of *Freilegung* is not made explicit by Heidegger, but here it is taken to mean the

¹ J.Derrida, "Letter to a Japanese Friend", tr. by D.C.Wood & A.Benjamin in D.C.Wood & R.Bernasconi eds. *Derrida and Différance* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988).

² e.g. SZ, p.8; the liberal translation is intentional.

³ On the etymology: "assembly", in its contemporary English usage, strictly derives from the Latin *simul* - "together", and does not contain any nuance of "pretending" or "feigning". However the various English words with -sembl- roots have two Latin sources: *simul* and *similis* ("similar"). Words derived from the latter have developed the possible nuance of feigning and pretending, as in "dissemble" and "semblance". Thus there is only a slight etymological violence involved in

strategic disas-sembling (*déconstruction*) of the semblances by which metaphysics hides the hiding of its own foundations (of the as-sembling by which being hides itself), that is, the violent reversal (*Kehre*) of the normal processes of understanding to reveal that from which understanding naturally lures one away.⁴ Thus, not deconstruction, but disas-sembling.

To show the disas-sembling of ground (the genitive here is ambiguous) in the early Heidegger, a single guiding question will be followed as narrowly as possible: what is the foundational, or what do foundational notions signify, in Heidegger's writings of the late 1920's? Such a "what is...?" question is, of course, problematic for the Heideggerian. While the last paragraph of this thesis does indeed give a heavily qualified answer of the "ground is..." form, "what is...?" questions are useful primarily in the way in which phenomenology shows them to break down, to cease functioning properly. Pursuing this guiding question is thus, primarily, pursuing this breakdown - a breakdown which is a disas-sembly. As such, this thesis does not consciously bring any pre-fabricated method to the analysis of Heidegger. Neither does it attempt to extract and recommend any methodology for more general application. It is a detailed analysis and interpretation of Heidegger.

To draw back a moment from Heidegger, what is a philosophical ground, a philosophical foundation in general? The answer is, unfortunately for the layman, vague and many-sided. A ground may be what is prior to something else, in the sense of a cause or reason. It may also be the motivation offered by a purpose - thus something which exists not in the past but in the future. Or it may be a guiding principle (of action, of thought) extending from the past into the future. Of particular interest is "the ultimate" ground. For many theists this is a supernatural being ("God") which creates or sustains the world, a being which can even be identified with a person. For Plato, the ultimate "ground" was the first principle or the form of the good. For Descartes, the *cogito* - the fact that one thinks. For Kant, the synthetic unity of apperception - in other words, the tendency of the mind to

taking "as-sembly" to mean the a joining together which feigns or pretends or disguises. I have kept the hyphen to distinguish this meaning.

⁴ These points are discussed in more detail in the third section of the introduction. On the violent reversal of understanding, see pt.A, ch.4, section 2.

make sense of everything by drawing its data into a unity. For empiricists, generally, something experiential. For rationalists, something mental or linguistic - but a concept, an idea, or a proposition or set of propositions? Taking an overview, then, is a ground past, present or future? Is it a supernatural being transcending comprehension, or a person, or a thought, or an experience? From this array of claims one might try to separate out the issue of the identification of the ultimate ground (God, the cogito, the form of the good, the synthetic unity of apperception) from that of the nature or character of such a ground - i.e. what it is that makes it a ground. Operating with this distinction one could say with some justice, both that ground is identified by Heidegger - of course - as *Sein* (being), and that what is characteristic of Heidegger, over against previous philosophers, is that the issue of identification is virtually suspended for the sake of the issue of the nature of ground. Dropping the distinction, one must add that a source of particular difficulty in the study of Heidegger is that the two issues come to the same, and are each in different respects both intensively investigated and indefinitely suspended.

1) Ground in Heidegger's earlier writings

"Ground" is more than a merely frequent concept within Heidegger's earlier writings. The many morphological variations and synonymous expressions pervade his language almost obsessively. Likewise "foundational" is not a term which merely describes the architectonic of the earlier writings, but by being so applied, the term threatens the content of those writings - especially their anti-foundationalist, post-metaphysical aspirations. The problem which quickly emerges from rigorously pursuing the question "what is the foundational in Heidegger's 1920's writings?" is that the answer is anything but clear. In *Sein und Zeit* (SZ) the frequency of occurrence of foundational ideas clashes with the lack of an explanation for them. A comment such as "Grund-seiend, das heißt als geworfenes existierend..."⁵ ostensibly explains what it is to be a ground, but is hardly helpful. Although the general appearance of SZ and those writings in which the SZ project is developed generally appear foundationalist, some comments suggest an anti-

⁵ SZ, p.284: "being a basis - that is, existing as thrown."

foundationalism: "Der Grund ist... ein Abgrund".⁶ If one turns from the few explicit comments to the way in which Heidegger uses foundational notions, the situation becomes even more complex (see part A of this thesis). Clear only is that Heidegger must have thought deeply about the nature of ground, and must already have been operating with a complex, revised and unexplained notion of the foundational. Only in about 1928, two years after writing SZ, does Heidegger become more explicit. Indeed, looking at the main developments of the years immediately following the publication of SZ (e.g. in "Vom Wesen des Grundes" (VWG) and *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik* (MAL)), the large theme which emerges is finally the foundational theme latent in SZ. To what extent can these subsequent analyses of ground be read back into the SZ project? One argument is that, in this respect, VWG and MAL are largely consistent with the use of foundational language in SZ. Another turns on a contemporary comment by Heidegger about his development in these years. In 1928 Heidegger wrote to Jaspers the following line, which he did not explain further:

"Das Neue ist lediglich, daß ich mich in meinem Philosophieren *nicht mehr* »verstecke«. Es hat irgendwo einen Ruck gegeben."⁷

The letters to Jaspers have a frankness missing from many of Heidegger's later self-interpretative comments, and so this line should be treated at its face value. The main novelties in the writings of 1928 are the more radical style and the theme of ground, so one should probably interpret the above passage as indicating these features to be the cards which Heidegger withheld a few years earlier (and at that, perhaps the most valued cards). Given that the 1928 writings can be grouped with the writings of the SZ project, do they help with the question of ground? In fact they only deepen the problems. Heidegger seems to want to take away any clear answer to the question, and to leave instead a constellation of pregnantly vague assertions - ground is, *inter alia*, freedom, temporality, transcendence, *Umwillen* (lit. for-the-sake-of). How can it be that this is no longer hiding?

⁶ GA20, p.402: "The ground is... an abyss." See further pt.B, ch.2, section 2.

⁷ Letter to Jaspers of 10.xi.1928, in Biemel & Saner ed. *Martin Heidegger/Karl Jaspers: Briefwechsel 1920-1963*, p.110. Heidegger's emphasis and scare-quoting. Tr.: "The news is simply that I *no longer* 'hide' myself in my philosophizing. Somewhere there has been a push."

The problem of foundations is thus aggravated by the clash between, on the one hand, the centrality of the foundational to an understanding of Heidegger and, on the other hand, the contradictoriness and elusiveness of his assertions about ground. This raises an urgent case for studying the foundational in the earlier Heidegger. How has the secondary literature so far responded to this demand?

2) Ground in secondary literature on Heidegger

In view of the facts that SZ is self-confessedly an exercise in fundamental ontology, and contains a significant amount of foundationalist language, it is strange how little major work has been done on the innocent words "ground" and "foundation". Moreover, many interpretations and criticisms of Heidegger merely assume that they know what the foundational is about. Thus while there is a lack of material directed straight at the problem, there is a corresponding oversupply of indirect comments. This situation may in part be because there is reigning orthodoxy of post- or anti-foundationalism in many circles where Heidegger is taken at all seriously, and in those circles where the Heidegger of SZ is accepted as departing from his later fathering of that orthodoxy, his foundationalism is regarded as an embarrassing mistake (partly through dubious interpretation of Heidegger's later comments on his earlier work). Thus it may be that many do not regard "ground" in the earlier Heidegger as a worthwhile subject. But as Heidegger himself wrote in 1962:-

"Ihre Unterscheidung zwischen "Heidegger I" und "Heidegger II" ist allein unter der Bedingung berechtigt, daß stets beachtet wird: Nur von dem unter I Gedachten her wird zunächst das unter II zu Denkende zugänglich. Aber I wird nur möglich, wenn es in II enthalten ist."⁸

"The distinction you make between Heidegger I and Heidegger II is justified only on the condition that this is kept constantly in mind: only by way of what Heidegger I has thought does one gain access to what is to-be-thought by Heidegger II. But [the thought of] Heidegger I becomes possible only if it is contained in Heidegger II."

⁸ Letter to Richardson, in W. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), at p.xxiii.

Even some 30 years of Heidegger interpretation later, this comment remains to be worked through and realised by many commentators. The passage does not justify the distinction between early and late phases of thought in Heidegger; it diplomatically distances itself from this distinction as daringly as it can, given that it is a preface to a book which rests on such a distinction. The condition given has a structure reminiscent of Heidegger's "destructions" of received texts.

Particularly as regards the issues of foundationalism, little has been done to reunite the phases of Heidegger's thought. And yet this may be one of the core strands of a reunification.

"...for the question of the relation of the late to the early Heidegger is precisely the question of the sense in which post-metaphysical hermeneutics can stand free of a foundational account of the structure and dynamics... of our own being. Put in Heideggerian terms, the question is one of projecting such conceptual foundations as "*Ereignis*" (the event of appropriation) and "*Es gibt Sein*" (the giving of being) back upon the horizon of the *Daseinsanalytik* given in *Sein und Zeit* as an analysis of the fundamental conditions of selfhood preparatory to the raising of the question of being."⁹

Stephen Tyman's opinion quoted here is that the foundational issue does indeed lie at the heart of the problem of Heidegger's development, and he speaks of a "projection" onto one another of apparently differing conceptions from earlier and later writings. In this thesis, I do not intend to complete the entire programme of reunifying the different phases of Heidegger's thought on foundations - this would be too ambitious. The work here is restricted to a preparation for such a reunification (effected by a reinterpretation of Heidegger's writings on foundations in the 1920's), and an indication of the direction such a reunification would take (by considering *Ereignis* in Heidegger's 1936 book *Beiträge zur Philosophie*).

The following report on the state of the secondary literature is divided into two: (1) an exhaustive study of materials dealing exclusively with the foundational; (2) a selective

⁹ S.Tyman, "Heidegger and the Deconstruction of Foundations", *International Philosophical Quarterly* 24 (1984), p.348.

study of prevailing assumptions about the foundational, both in conservative orthodoxy and in "radical" orthodoxy.

a) Materials dealing exclusively with the foundational

The following is an overview of those materials (mainly articles and dissertations) which have direct relevance to the problem. If one may judge by the explicit references and bibliographies, most of the materials were written in a relative lack of knowledge of the earlier publications. (1) I.Koza: *Das Problem des Grundes in Heideggers Auseinandersetzung mit Kant* (book, 1967).¹⁰ (2) J.Buchanan: "Heidegger and the Problem of Ground" (article, 1973).¹¹ (3) J.Caputo: a variety of material, including the articles "Being, Ground and Play in Heidegger" (1970)¹² and "The rose is without why" (1971)¹³, and his doctoral dissertation¹⁴ - but most of the important material is incorporated in his book *The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought* (1978).¹⁵ (4) S.Tyman: "Heidegger and the Deconstruction of Foundations" (article, 1984).¹⁶ (5) U.Wenzel: *Die Problematik des Gründens beim späten Heidegger* (doctoral dissertation, 1986).¹⁷ (6) D.Panis: a number of short articles: "Heidegger et le soupçon du fondement" (1985)¹⁸, "La question de l'être comme fond abyssal d'après Heidegger" (1986)¹⁹ and "Vers une pensée plus

¹⁰ Ratingen bei Düsseldorf: Henn Verlag, 1967.

¹¹ *Philosophy Today* 17 (1973), pp.232-245.

¹² *Man & World* 3 (1970), pp.26-48.

¹³ *Philosophy Today* 15 (1971), pp.3-16.

¹⁴ *The Way back into Ground: An Interpretation of the Path of Heidegger's Thought*, Brynn Mawr College, 1968.

¹⁵ Ohio University Press, 1978.

¹⁶ in *International Philosophical Quarterly* 24 (1984), pp.347-372.

¹⁷ presented to Freiburg University, Germany, in 1986; published in same year by Schäuble Verlag, Rheinfelden.

¹⁸ *Cahiers Internationaux de Symbolisme* 51/52 (1985): 103-114.

¹⁹ *Les Etudes Philosophiques* 1986: 59-78.

originelle du pourquoi" (1991).²⁰ (7) R.Crease: *Heidegger, Leibniz and the Principle of Sufficient Reason* (doctoral dissertation, 1987).²¹ (8) J.A.Purcell: *Heidegger's Early Ontology: Rethinking the Ground* (doctoral dissertation, 1989).²² These will be discussed in the order listed - i.e. chronologically.

Ingeborg Koza's early and little known offering is a useful one. Having noted the early Heidegger's interpretation of ground as transcendence (in *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* and VWG), and the later Heidegger's identification of ground and being (for example, in *Der Satz vom Grund* (SG), e.g. pp.93, 184, 179f.), her thesis is that these early and late conceptions of ground, apparently different, are in fact intimately connected. The argument proceeds by way of close and lengthy textual analysis which occupies pretty well the entirety of the book. The weaknesses or limitations of her book are as follows: (i) the textual analysis is so strictly dedicated to "interpreting" ground, first as transcendence, then in its "belonging-together" with being, that something of a reduction of ground to transcendence/being is achieved; Heidegger's other "interpretations" of ground are subjected to these overall "interpretations" at the expense of a more constellational or pluralistic approach - so, for example, Koza's fascinating remarks that the early Heidegger interprets ground as time is a point which goes undeveloped other than to serve the idea of "ground as transcendence";²³ (ii) there are no methodological or linguistic interests - i.e. it is never appreciated that "how Heidegger expresses himself" is actually a fruitful problem for the topic; (iii) the implications of the thesis or its two constituent parts are not really worked through - Koza places herself in the camp of those who do not believe in the biographical *Kehre*, and otherwise lacks a conclusion. The strength of the book is that Koza has presented the *Grund-Transzendenz* link as a contribution to appreciating the diachronic unity of Heidegger's thought.²⁴

²⁰ *Heidegger Studies* 7 (1991): 111-124. First appeared in 1986 as "Heidegger et la question du fondement" in a bulletin of the faculty of philosophy at the University of Liège entitled *La Philosophie d'Aujourd'hui*. Further references in this thesis are to the earlier appearance.

²¹ Columbia University, USA, 1987.

²² Purdue University, USA, 1989.

²³ on the ground/time point: Koza, op.cit., e.g. pp.51, 85.

²⁴ The *Grund-Transzendenz* link is not difficult for a reader of VWG (or MAL) to spot, however. See, e.g., J.J.Kockelmans, *Heidegger's 'Being and Time'*. Washington DC: University Press of

James Buchanan's brief article makes no real contribution: it accepts a standard biographical *Kehre*, and repeats the doctrine that the early Heidegger's metaphysical foundationalism was abandoned after the 1920's for something that was quite the opposite or reverse.

John Caputo's dissertation of 1968, while obviously dated, remains valuable. There is more here on the earlier Heidegger than in his published work. It is ambitious in its range (Caputo says that he really wanted to cover the whole of Heidegger, but as this was not possible he settled for the vast theme of ground instead). Basically he compares VWG and SG, taking it rather for granted that a biographical *Kehre* took place in the early to mid-1930's. Of particular interest is the importance he attaches to the interpretation of ground as temporality,²⁵ yet while he makes a substantial diversion to summarise the whole of SZ in order to explain how time fits into Heidegger's thought, there is no discussion of the purpose or significance of ground as temporality. What is important here is to see how what Habermas denigrated as a "temporalisierte Ursprungsphilosophie" (temporalised foundational philosophy)²⁶ actually contains something valuable.²⁷ In Caputo's later published work, his interests shift toward language and the later Heidegger, centering on the paradoxical and other paronomasic features of Heidegger's language of ground - particularly on the way in which Heidegger attempts to write about the inexpressible. To this extent some of my own interests with the early Heidegger parallel Caputo's interests with the later. Where relevant Caputo's work will be returned to.²⁸

Stephen Tyman's 1984 article ("Heidegger and the Deconstruction of Foundations") is the approach relating most closely to my own. Its introduction to the problem is its greatest strength: Tyman eloquently (but briefly) situates the foundational problem in the context of contemporary interpretation (and, to some extent, current philosophical debate), and

America, 1989, at p.330. The real problem is what to make of it, and how to integrate this with the rest of Heidegger's thought. Kockelmans, like Koza, seems to reduce *Grund* to *Transzendenz* - I disagree with this. See pt.B, ch.2, section 1b.

²⁵ J.Caputo, *The Way back into Ground: An Interpretation of the Path of Heidegger's Thought*, p.105.

²⁶ J.Habermas, *Der Philosophische Diskurs der Moderne*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1985.

²⁷ See below at pt.B, ch.2.

likewise briefly paints in the immediate historical background of Husserl.²⁹ He sets a program as follows:-

"The respect in which Heidegger himself is to be counted among the other deconstructivists... and anti-foundationalists generally becomes tangled and troublesome. It is therefore necessary to begin with (I) an overview favoring an anti-foundationalist interpretation of Heidegger... (II) an analysis of the function of foundations in the early writings, and (III) an assessment (using temporality as a clue) of the extent to which the horizon of the *Daseinsanalytik* opens onto the later discussion, before concluding with (IV) a revision of the concept of foundation itself, and a determination of whether this new sense permits the discovery of a decisive and fundamental continuity in Heidegger's thought."³⁰

Expressed thus, Tyman's program is very similar to my own, but it differs significantly in its realisation, and is more limited in its conclusions. As to its realisation: the use of temporality is in fact disappointing, turning only on its triadic articulation in SZ, and failing to notice a coalescence of the foundational and the temporal; otherwise he skates too quickly over material that must be examined more carefully. The conclusion is relatively limited: the foundational (in early Heidegger) is an active dimensional openness; in other words, founding means participation.³¹ This participational founding Tyman (briefly) links to a suppressed strand of the metaphysical tradition, and, criticising Heidegger for operating with too narrow a definition of metaphysics, he takes a mildly deconstructive tilt at Heidegger for closet-metaphysicality. It should be noted, though, that Tyman does not regard the deconstructive *coup de grace* (strata-egic incompatibility) as reason for rejection or devaluation, regarding the reemergence of this suppressed element in the metaphysical tradition as worthwhile.³²

The 1986 dissertation by Uwe Wenzel has the following limitations and/or weaknesses: (1) as its title indicates it is concerned almost exclusively with the later Heidegger (in this case, that means the post-war writings); reference to the earlier thinking is almost non-existent; (2) Wenzel devotes a considerable part of the book to the *Grund-Sein* relation

²⁸ See pt.A, ch.1, section 3.

²⁹ S.Tyman, op.cit., pp.351-355.

³⁰ *ibid.*, pp.348f.

³¹ *ibid.*, pp.371ff.

³² Tyman's conclusion is discussed in more detail pt.A, ch.1, section 3.

(and this with respect to the same text which interests Caputo and many others so much: *Der Satz vom Grund*); in so doing, Wenzel simply assumes that the relation of *Grund* and *Sein* differentiates early and later Heidegger (such that early Heidegger is metaphysical, while the later is non-metaphysical), and is apparently quite ignorant (surprisingly so) of Koza's thesis that ground as being is actually the clue to a link with the earlier thinking on ground; he likewise fails to take proper account of the on-going publication of the complete works of Heidegger; (3) consistent with this, Wenzel hangs on to a biographical interpretation of the *Kehre*³³ - the Heideggerian concepts of *Sprung* and *Kehre* are interpreted as "from... to..." movements, for example, from a metaphysical understanding of ground in the early Heidegger to a non-metaphysical in the later. Although Wenzel briefly notes comments of Heidegger's on *Sprung* which should ward him away from such simplicity, nevertheless he never ceases to regard the non-metaphysical understanding of ground as a pole of the leap or turn; a metactically displacive appropriation by the turning leap of its various poles, such that ground "is" a turning never comes into consideration.³⁴ The strengths of Wenzel's analyses are: (1) the recognition that ground, in Heidegger, is constellational - i.e. it cannot be reduced to anything simple or unified; (2) the recognition that ground, in Heidegger, is not only an ontic, ontological, or epistemological issue, but also a semantic one (to which end he explores language as a site of grounding); (3) his main argument that ground, in the later Heidegger, is non-metaphysical grounding (*ein anderes Gründen*). This "other" grounding is non-metaphysical by virtue of three main features: (a) ground holds together both being and nothing - this he interprets as the problem of *Grund-Abgrund*,³⁵ which concerns Tyman, Panis and Vattimo³⁶; (b) grounding is dialogical (but in contrast to my analysis of a "dialectic" feature³⁷ of ground, Wenzel intends this in a much more restricted sense - namely, that the objectification of the object occurs in a dialogue between thing and world,

³³ See esp. Wenzel, op.cit., pp.72-79.

³⁴ For the meaning of "metactic", see pt.A, ch.4, section 3.

³⁵ On *Abgrund* see pt.B, ch.2, section 2.

³⁶ i.e. the works by Tyman and Panis discussed here, and the ideas advanced by Vattimo and discussed in the next section.

³⁷ On dialectic see pt.A, ch.4, section 2.

or between the poles of the fourfold³⁸); (c) that grounding is characterised by an *Anderssein* (other-being-ness) - possibly he means a continual movement of self-differentiation. (Although these three features are intended to establish the non-metaphysical character of ground, the connection here is not well explained.)

Daniel Panis considers the idea of ground as abyss (in German: *Grund als Abgrund*, or in Panis' French: *le fondement sans fond*). While (e.g.) Vattimo (see below) posits a substitution between *Grund* and *Abgrund*, Panis maintains their synchronicity. The notion of *Abgrund* appears so soon after SZ that this topic cannot be said to belong to the "later" Heidegger.³⁹

Robert Crease's 1987 doctoral thesis is one of the better contributions in the area. It notes that *Grund* is a constant concern during the lexical windings of Heidegger's development, and that Heidegger repeatedly uses Leibniz on the principle of sufficient reason as a starting-point. Crease's central thesis is that "Heidegger's conception of how *Sein* has changed is best viewed through the evolution of his conception of ground."⁴⁰ Thus he identifies subtly differing conceptions of ground in three phases of Heidegger's career. Although the lexical associations of *Grund* in this development (i.e. 1920's - *Transzendenz*; 1930's - *Ereignis*; post-war - *Spiel*)⁴¹ are quite marked, the formal aspects of the change (which are Crease's primary interest) are much smaller.⁴² In its range, Crease's thesis is quite ambitious: thus he devotes much space to the history of the principle of sufficient reason (Kant, Aquinas, but especially Leibniz); in addition to this he tries to span the whole of Heidegger's career. As he says,⁴³ this rather restricts the depth of his analysis, and in fact as regards Heidegger he has to concentrate narrowly on what Heidegger says about ground in relation to Leibniz. The thesis is also marked by a concern to make Heidegger palatable to an "analytical" tradition (i.e. non-"continental") -

³⁸ For the latter, see Wenzel, op.cit. at pp.99-151 and Heidegger's lectures "Das Ding" and "Bauen, Wohnen, Denken" in *Vorträge und Aufsätze*.

³⁹ See pt.B, ch.2, section 2.

⁴⁰ R.Crease, op.cit., p.190.

⁴¹ *ibid.*, p.243.

⁴² *ibid.*, p.237-240.

⁴³ *ibid.*, p.17.

thus there is primarily formalising approach and a (recessive) attempt to integrate the results with a framework and other comments from Robert Nozick.⁴⁴ Thus, for example, consideration of Heidegger's foundational methodology and the relation of ground and time are quite absent.

The title of Purcell's doctoral thesis (*Heidegger's early ontology: rethinking the ground*) could even have been a title for the present thesis, but there is nevertheless an important difference, which lies in who is doing the "rethinking" of ground. For me (and Tyman) this would be Heidegger.⁴⁵ For Purcell, Heidegger does not rethink ground - the rethinking is a critique of Heidegger based on an idea from Deleuze. Purcell acknowledges Heidegger's early anti-metaphysical stance, but regards this as a limited success and ultimate failure:-

"Heidegger's early philosophy effectively overcomes certain conceptual determinations within the standpoint of metaphysics, namely, the subject-object distinction, the problem of reflection, and the notion of being as presence... [BUT] the project of metaphysics is to provide a conceptual grounding which legitimates the discourse of metaphysics.... Because Heidegger still operates within this framework, his project remains within the discourse of metaphysics - a discourse he sought to overcome."⁴⁶

Purcell operates with a strict distinction of methodological framework and conceptual determinations: as regards the latter, Heidegger is accorded some limited success against metaphysics; as regards the former, Heidegger fails. My own thesis is concerned primarily with the method of the earlier Heidegger (insofar as this could ever be distinguished from content), and holds that it is here that ground is rethought. The bulk of Purcell's thesis is a recapitulation of the main ideas of SZ (including the time material) in order to bring out

⁴⁴ The book to which Crease repeatedly returns is R.Nozick, "Philosophical Explanations", Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981.

⁴⁵ Purcell has little excuse for not reading Tyman's article, published five years earlier in the *International Philosophical Quarterly*; Purcell's general philosophical orientation would make him receptive to Tyman, and had he read Tyman, he would surely never have proceeded on the assumption that Heidegger did not rethink ground.

⁴⁶ Purcell, *op.cit.*, p.iv.

their adherence to a traditional (or "arboreal") foundationalism.⁴⁷ The rethinking of ground produced by Purcell uses Deleuze and Guattari's model of a "rhizome".⁴⁸ As appropriated by Purcell, this appears to be no more than a minor qualification of the arboreal model - substituting a multiplicity of little trees for one big one. The term "qualification" is used on the grounds that the rhizome model can be understood without any change in method, mode of discourse, or manner of thinking. I would suggest that multiplicity and horizontality can indeed be found within the early Heidegger - although according to a model different from that of the rhizome.⁴⁹

* * * * *

What can be concluded from this survey of literature? What possibilities and paths remain unexplored or unappreciated? The good quality material from Caputo and Wenzel is mainly on Heidegger's 1950's thinking, and they assume that their interesting insights have no parallel in the 1920's thinking - nevertheless the present thesis goes well beyond a mere argument that such parallels exist. Koza's book is strictly limited to ground as transcendence (1920's) and as being (1950's), and offers one of the two explicit theses that Heidegger's early and later conceptions of ground are not really so different.⁵⁰ Panis may be sympathetic to such a thesis, but his articles are limited and exploratory in nature (i.e. the juxtaposition of negative and positive in ground). Tyman provides the second explicit attempt to link earlier and later thought on ground, and this time with an attention to "rethinking" that is lacking in Koza; Tyman's thesis is limited to an examination of the participatory character of ground, and otherwise its shortcomings are due to the sheer ambition of carrying out the program he sets himself within the space of one article. Crease, like Caputo and Tyman, must take a place in the essential literature in this area;

⁴⁷ Purcell takes the term "arboreal" from Deleuze and Guattari (*A Thousand Plateaus*); it means "having a tree-like structure". Interestingly Purcell concludes that Derrida, as well as Heidegger, is an arboreal metaphysicist (stated at p.213, argument on pp.204-215).

⁴⁸ Deleuze & Guattari, op.cit.; a rhizome is a horizontally spreading root-system, sending up a multiplicity of potentially independent shoots; it is used as a contrast to the arboreal model. Deleuze & Guattari have discussed rhizomes elsewhere; the following book is devoted exclusively to the subject (not mentioned by Purcell): *Rhizome*, Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1976.

⁴⁹ See pt.A, ch.1 (semantic interpenetration), pt.B, ch.1, section 2 (horizon), pt.B, ch.2, section 1a (fugue).

⁵⁰ Koza's results are ignored by all the other writers; even Caputo only gives a bibliographical mention.

his contribution is limited in that it is tied to the Leibniz connection. Buchanan and Purcell both hold a traditional view of Heidegger's early foundationalism and fail to address those elements in the earlier writings which point in a different direction. Here it should be pointed out that Purcell's dissertation is the only full length work on ground in general in the early Heidegger. Among these sources a wide variety of ideas about Heidegger's foundationalism are scattered - but in a quite independent fashion - most of the sources are unaware of each other. Among the ideas which will be taken up again are: (1) the similarity and relative unity of the early and later thinking on ground (Koza/Tyman, Crease(?)); (2) links between ground, time and transcendence (Koza/Caputo);⁵¹ (3) the importance of paradoxical and paronomasic features of Heidegger's language of ground for an appreciation of what Heidegger is up to (Caputo);⁵² (4) the constellational or multi-dimensional character of ground (Wenzel/Tyman);⁵³ (5) the participatory, active, open character of ground (Tyman);⁵⁴ (6) the synchronicity of the *Seinshaftigkeit* and *Nichtshaftigkeit* of ground as *Abgrund* (Wenzel, Panis);⁵⁵ (7) the dialogical character of ground (Wenzel).⁵⁶

b) General assumptions about the foundational

Current and recent work on Heidegger is too varied for any classification into schools or trends.⁵⁷ If secondary literature could be categorised at all, one might look for the way in which certain strands combined in each author's work: for example, to what extent an author is influenced by deconstruction, to what extent an author has the pure and narrow aim of Heidegger interpretation, the way in which the author reacts to the all-pervading problems of language and history. National culture also has a role to play: it is not unfair

⁵¹ See pt.B, ch.1.

⁵² e.g. pt.A, ch.2, section 1.

⁵³ See pt.A, ch.1.

⁵⁴ See pt.A, ch.1, section 3.

⁵⁵ See pt.B, ch.2, section 2.

⁵⁶ See pt.A, ch.4.

to say that Germany tends to divide between scholarly, conservative respect to the master and a tradition of sometimes startling aversion (based on Heidegger's political affiliations). Non-German culture is more open to novel and "contemporary" approaches. Perhaps the major aspect of Heidegger scholarship, however, is its size,⁵⁸ with the consequence, for example, that many authors have only a partial knowledge of developments, even within their own speciality.⁵⁹ The production of secondary literature has suffered an explosion (perhaps a doubling) in the decade since the bibliography⁶⁰ of Hans-Martin Saß appeared, and it seems possible for almost opposing orthodoxies⁶¹ to co-exist within the field, and for the radicalism invited by Heidegger to be itself an orthodox approach collapsing into the stereotypical.

With these comments on the heterogeneity of the secondary literature in mind, two views have been selected to represent the poles of (i) foundationalist, and (ii) anti-foundationalist interpretations of Heidegger's 1920's writings. The first of these comes from Werner Marx (crudely characterised as conservative), the second from Gianni Vattimo (crudely characterised as radical orthodoxy). The general principle aimed at during the exposition and criticism of these two views is that the polarity between (i) and (ii) arises out of a common failure to rethink the foundational with Heidegger.

The perceived relation between Heidegger's earlier and later writing (traditionally referred to as the *Kehre*) affects the perception of Heidegger's earlier (anti-)foundation-alism. How this is so begins to emerge in the following analyses. There is one idea which will go unchallenged: that the fate of foundational language is the *Kehre*. But this can have different meanings: (a) that the *Kehre*, as a critical category within which Heidegger's

⁵⁷ See D.J.Schmidt, "In Heidegger's Wake", *Heidegger Studies* 5 (1989), pp.210-211 for critical comments on dividing secondary literature into left- and right-wing approaches.

⁵⁸ See the comments on "bibliographical sources" in the bibliography.

⁵⁹ It was noticeable during particularly careful bibliographical researches for the themes of (i) ground and (ii) time, that mutual lack of awareness was a major hindrance to progress.

⁶⁰ *Martin Heidegger: Bibliography and Glossary*, Bowling Green, Ohio: Philosophy Documentation Center, 1982.

⁶¹ "Orthodoxy" in the sense of an accumulation of no-longer seriously questioned doctrines or methods.

development unfolds, marks the disappearance of foundational language from his writings: (b) that the *Kehre*, as a concept internal to Heidegger's philosophy, is a structure within the rethought conception of ground.

i) A Conservative View

In his memorial address of 1976, presented some months after Heidegger's death, Werner Marx attempted to sum up, in a non-partisan manner, what he saw as the most important and comprehensive points in Heidegger's thought. He asked three main questions:-

- "1. How did Heidegger characterise previous, that is to say, metaphysical thought?
2. In what sense was Heidegger's own thought already "transformed" or "other" than previous metaphysical thought?
3. What constituted for him the task and issue of thought, i.e., of that thought which has undergone transformation?"⁶²

In the questions he asks, Marx takes the most important thing in the whole of Heidegger to be the transformation of metaphysics into thought. Marx is undoubtedly correct in the significance he gives this issue. It is in his answers, his interpretation of the transformation, that his view becomes controversial despite his attempt to be non-controversial. He produces a stereotypical version of Heidegger criticism, seen elsewhere for example in Richardson's classic book.⁶³ According to patterns of this kind, Heidegger's thought is perceived here as a movement, a movement from a traditional mode of philosophy (metaphysics, phenomenology), a movement to something called "thinking". How does Marx answer his three questions? To the first question, he answers

⁶² Werner Marx, "Thought and Issue in Heidegger", p.13-14; ET in J.Sallis ed. *Radical Phenomenology* (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1978); although originally delivered in German, the only publication seems to be in English.

⁶³ W.J.Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963) (passim); the same view is in: J.J.Kockelmans, *Heidegger's 'Being and Time'*, p.8; R.Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), e.g p.5f.; J.Habermas, *Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1985), p.181. The view is of course widespread; the object here is to present it as an orthodoxy.

that Heidegger characterizes metaphysics as the interpretation of being (*Sein*) as ground (*Grund*).

"According to Heidegger, all metaphysics regards the Being of that which is, of beings, as obviously ground. Being as ground has appeared in many distinct forms in metaphysics: as the transcendental condition of the possibility of the objectivity of objects, as the dialectical mediation of the movement in absolute spirit, and even as the historical process of production." ⁶⁴

With the second question ("In what sense was Heidegger's own thought already "transformed" or "other" than previous metaphysical thought?"), Marx turns to the issue of the *Kehre*, the so-called turn in Heidegger's thinking. The turn or transformation in Heidegger's thinking is variously dated from around 1930 to around 1945, and is commonly interpreted as a turn from metaphysics to thinking, in the sense that in his earlier thought Heidegger was preparing for and attempting this turn, and that in the later thought he had (or thought he had) effected this turn.⁶⁵ Does Marx agree that there is a turn?

"There can, at all events, be no doubt that Heidegger's thought underwent an early transformation." ⁶⁶

As he is deliberately attempting to be non-partisan, Marx avoids a dating of the turn, but he does give a characterisation of the turn; although he acknowledges the controversial character of the turn's success, this characterisation is left unquestioned.

"Heidegger actually passed beyond metaphysics." ⁶⁷

⁶⁴ Marx, op.cit., p.15; Marx quotes no particular source, but refers vaguely to "numerous sources". He is in fact virtually quoting from the essay "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking" (tr.J.Stambaugh in *On Time and Being* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972)), at p.56.

⁶⁵ This is an unapologetically crude summary of one of the most vexed issues of Heidegger interpretation. The *Kehre* is discussed more fully a few paragraphs below, and in pt.B, ch.2, section 1b. (NB: datings of the turn for before 1930 exist; e.g. F.Vezin, "Translation as Phenomenological Labour", *Heidegger Studies* 3/4 at p.129 places the abandonment of metaphysics as pre-*Sein und Zeit*).

⁶⁶ Marx, op.cit., p.16

⁶⁷ *ibid.*, p.17

In a chain of points arguing for the success of Heidegger's attempted turn, Marx characterises the transformation as "passing beyond metaphysics", "self-liberation from the ontological concepts of metaphysics", "severance from metaphysics", "dissociation from metaphysics".⁶⁸ The third question discussed by Marx was: "What constituted for him the task and issue of thought, i.e., of that thought which has undergone transformation?" In his answer to this third question, Marx discusses concepts such as *Zeitlichkeit* (temporality), *Anwesenheit* (presence), *aletheia* (truth), *Lichtung* (clearing) and *Ereignis* (event).⁶⁹ His overall answer is that the issue of thought is "das Ungedachte der Metaphysik", the unthought in metaphysics.⁷⁰ For Marx, the use of these concepts by Heidegger marks the successful severance, liberation and dissociation from metaphysics. In his "Brief über den »Humanismus«", Heidegger footnoted that *Ereignis* had been the key term, or guiding term, of his thought since 1936.⁷¹ Marx says of *Ereignis*:-

"..."Ereignis"... has the non-metaphysical significance which makes it possible to conceive of clearing and of the occurrence of Being within it as a "groundless bringing about" of particular being... a groundless disclosing.... This exposition of the basic characteristics of letting be in terms of *Ereignis* determines henceforth the direction of the "task and issue" of thought of the later Heidegger. The terms employed to designate it ward off all searching for grounds in the metaphysical sense."⁷²

In these sentences, Marx makes very plain where he places *Grund* and all associated foundationalist language or structures in the philosophy of Heidegger: in the "early" Heidegger, as distinct from the "later" Heidegger, before the "turn"; the turn marks a severance, dissociation and liberation from this early metaphysical thinking; the essentially

⁶⁸ It would be preferable to have Marx's original German terms to check the nuance, but these do not seem to be published; however the oversupply of different terms all carrying the same message seems to rule out any intrusion of the translation.

⁶⁹ Marx, op cit., pp.19-20 (*Ereignis*: pp.25-26)

⁷⁰ *ibid.*, p.14; Marx relies on Heidegger's essay "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking".

⁷¹ GA9, p.316 (footnote to 1st ed. of BH in 1949); Heidegger is probably referring to *Beiträge zur Philosophie*, subtitled *Vom Ereignis*, which was completed 1936-38 (but unpublished until 1989).

⁷² Marx, op.cit., p.25

different thinking after the turn is marked by a different lexis (e.g. *Zeitlichkeit*, *Anwesenheit*, *Lichtung*, *Ereignis*).

* * * * *

Two preliminary critical remarks of Marx's position will be made here. The criticisms can only be preliminary, since this thesis as a whole reinterprets the foundational in opposition to such orthodox views.

The first critical remark concerns the temporal structure of the *Kehre*. Marx and many others have used the word *Kehre* with a biographical time-structure: the 1920's are a period of preparation for the turn, in the 1950's the turn is supposedly completed. The biographical time-structure accompanies the idea of the completion of the *Kehre*, and thus the issue of the success of the *Kehre* (i.e. did Heidegger really manage to escape metaphysics?).⁷³ Is a biographical time-structure correct or justified? What alternatives might there be?⁷⁴ Particularly in *Beiträge zur Philosophie* (BP), Heidegger offers an alternative model for a transformation of thinking. The precise interpretation of this model is obscure⁷⁵, but the main features are (1) a first beginning, (2) an "other" beginning, (3) a transition between these (*Übergang*). It is not wholly wrong to associate the first beginning with "metaphysics" as interpreted by Marx's Heidegger, and the other beginning with *Denken*. What is interesting here is Heidegger's self-interpretation (in BP) with respect to the *Übergang*: he describes himself as preparing the way for others to attempt the *Übergang*; the achievement of the other beginning of thought, and what such an achievement might be like, is left far in an open future. This gives the following model (not necessarily correct, just an alternative): Heidegger repeatedly and in different ways prepared the ground for a transformation. The movement of the *Kehre*, its time-structure, might then be seen on either of two different levels: (1) there is a separate and parallel movement towards the *Kehre* within each work of Heidegger, such that the time-structure

⁷³ i.e. a linear time-structure. That time-structure can be more complex than a mono-directional measurable linearity is something one should have learnt from Heidegger (as a matter of practical philosophical method rather than as if assenting to news of outer Mongolian potato prices).

⁷⁴ On this subject, see esp. R.Hosokawa, "Heidegger und das Problem der Kehre", in *Studies in Philosophy* 5 (1989). (This periodical is a bulletin of the Faculty of Literature, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan).

is that of the narrative progression of each work (*Kehre* within Heidegger, but as a repeated narrative form rather than a once-achieved biographical development); (2) Heidegger can be placed as a small point within the historical *Kehre* of thinking, such that the time-structure is *seinsgeschichtlich* (Heidegger within *Kehre*).⁷⁶ Marx makes the interpretation of the *Kehre* an issue of where foundational language and thought (metaphysics) gets left behind. If we reject the biographical interpretation of the *Kehre*, it would seem that Heidegger does not leave behind such language and thought.

Why might the biographical interpretation of the *Kehre* have been so popular? As was seen with Marx, one primary encouragement for a biographical interpretation of the *Kehre* are the changes in Heidegger's vocabulary and styles during his life-time: these changes are such that there is a tendency for the later works to show less of the "traditional metaphysical" linguistic ornamentation (or at least, to treat it in a more critical, distanced fashion). Is there a necessary connection between vocabulary and style, and the underlying thought? These vocabulary and style changes might not reflect deeper changes, but to establish this would mean a study of the relation between thinking and linguistic presentation in Heidegger.⁷⁷ A second main reason for the biographical interpretation concerns certain self-interpretative comments by Heidegger,⁷⁸ and the use, in particular, of words such as *grundlos* (groundless) and *Abgrund* (abyss, groundlessness).⁷⁹

The second criticism of Marx's interpretation concerns proximity and distance. To what extent does Marx's model of severance, dissociation and liberation make sense of Heidegger's description of his project as a "Rückgang in den Grund der Metaphysik", a re-turn or regression into the ground of metaphysics?⁸⁰ Marx's model implies distance and

⁷⁵ See pt.B, ch.2.

⁷⁶ *Seinsgeschichte*: "history of Being"; *seinsgeschichtlich* means "pertaining to, or having the character of, the history of Being".

⁷⁷ See pt.A of this thesis.

⁷⁸ These are fully reinterpreted by R.Hosokawa, op.cit. See also J.Grondin, "Prolégomènes à l'intelligence du tournant chez Heidegger", *Les Etudes Philosophiques* 3 (1990).

⁷⁹ See the discussion of *Abgrund* in pt.B, ch.2, section 2.

⁸⁰ e.g. "Einleitung zu: »Was ist Metaphysik?«", GA9, p.365. Pöggeler's classic interpretation makes better sense of this (as it does of the entire problem of the unity of Heidegger's thought). O.Pöggeler, *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers*, 3rd ed. (Pfullingen: Neske, 1990).

non-relation. Heidegger's own description and practice suggest not a distancing, but an approach to metaphysics so close as to be a violation. Marx recognises this proximity, but regards it as a mere preliminary to the distancing *Kehre*. Where Marx uses words such as severance, dissociation and liberation, Heidegger typically has *Überwindung* (overcoming). But does *Überwindung* imply distance and non-relation? Normal categories of thinking and criticising may find it difficult to cope with the juxtaposition of proximity and distance in Heidegger. Of course, the existence of such juxtapositions and interplays in Heidegger has long been recognised. The problem is one of the extent to which such irregularities are appropriated: whether they are regarded as curiosities which may be commented upon briefly, confined and forgotten; or whether they are recognised as belonging to the essential fabric of Heidegger's thought - as iterating infrastructures.⁸¹

ii) A Radical Orthodoxy

Gianni Vattimo⁸² interprets Heidegger as a "philosopher of post-modernism", which effectively means a kind of nihilist or anti-foundationalist. For him, the Heidegger of SZ was already turning against metaphysics and abandoning foundations. Despite the somewhat dramatic or radical tone in which Heidegger is appropriated for post-modernism, there is nothing new here. Tyman remarks, "it does not take profound powers of discernment to spot anti-foundational indications even in Heidegger's earlier thought".⁸³

"Precisely the notion of foundation, and of thought both as foundation and means of access to a foundation, is radically interrogated by Nietzsche and Heidegger."
84

⁸¹ See pt.A, ch.2 and ch.4.

⁸² The intention is not to label Vattimo as radically orthodox; rather, his repetition of an anti-foundationalist interpretation of Heidegger.

⁸³ S.Tyman, op.cit., p.349. Tyman explores *prima facie* evidence for Heidegger's early anti-foundationalism on pp.349-352.

⁸⁴ G.Vattimo. *The End of Modernity* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1988), p.2; ET of *La Fine della Modernità* (Milan: Garzanti, 1985).

Vattimo sees this "radical interrogation" not as an interrogation within which Heidegger remains, but one through which Heidegger has passed, with results.

"Both philosophers find themselves obliged, on the one hand, to take up a critical distance from Western thought insofar as it is foundational; on the other hand, however, they find themselves unable to criticize Western thought in the name of another, and truer, foundation. It is this that rightly allows us to consider them to be the philosophers of post-modernity."⁸⁵

The results of Heidegger's radical interrogation are seen by Vattimo as a distance from foundational thinking, and the absence of anything as a replacement for the foundational in thinking. Here we see the same "distance" model presupposed by Marx. Vattimo identifies two main "nihilistic" traits in Heidegger:-

"The first nihilistic element in Heidegger's hermeneutic theory may be found in his analysis of Dasein as a hermeneutic totality.... The hermeneutic totality that is Dasein may not be in fact identified with some Kantian *a priori* structure."⁸⁶

True, Dasein may not be identified with an *a priori* structure in the Kantian sense; nevertheless it is some kind of *a priori* structure. Vattimo fails to pursue the issue of the nature of this *a priori*; doing so is one approach to appreciating Heidegger's rethinking of the foundational.⁸⁷ The second nihilistic element indicated by Vattimo is the conception of *An-denken* (thinking).⁸⁸ In discussing *An-denken*, Vattimo says that the hermeneutic totality (*Dasein*) is such that its "foundation consists of a lack of foundation",⁸⁹ writing as if there is an black-and-white difference in Heidegger between what is a foundation and what is not. This fails to appreciate Heidegger's use of paradox and interplay of bipolar oppositions.⁹⁰ It is likewise essential to Vattimo's views that he has not thought his way out of the possibility of an infinite regression of grounds (other than by abandoning the

⁸⁵ *ibid.*, p.2-3.

⁸⁶ *ibid.*, pp.115-6.

⁸⁷ See pt.B, ch.1, section 1a.

⁸⁸ G.Vattimo, *op.cit.*, p.118.

⁸⁹ *ibid.*, p.119.

⁹⁰ See pt.A, ch.2, section 1 (paradox), pt.A, ch.4, section 2 and pt.B, ch.2, section 1b (bipolar oppositions), pt.B, ch.2, section 2 (*Abgrund*).

foundational altogether). Finitude is a fundamental motivation in Heidegger's reconceptualisation of foundations.⁹¹

Vattimo's misinterpretation also has a source in textual exegesis. On the whole Vattimo interprets Heidegger with little textual reference; actual quotes are thus all the more significant. There is one text in particular (from Heidegger's 1962 lecture "Zeit und Sein") which Vattimo quotes repeatedly in support of his interpretation of Heidegger. It is this:-

"Das Sein es selbst eigens denken, verlangt, vom Sein abzusehen, sofern es wie in aller Metaphysik nur aus dem Seienden her und für dieses als dessen Grund ergründet und ausgelegt wird. Das Sein eigens denken, verlangt, das Sein als den Grund des Seienden fahren zu lassen zugunsten des im Entbergen verborgen spielenden Gebens, d.h. des 'Es gibt'." ⁹²

"To think Being itself explicitly requires disregarding Being to the extent that it is only grounded and interpreted in terms of beings and for beings as their ground, as in all metaphysics. To think Being explicitly requires us to let Being go as the ground of beings in favour of the giving which prevails concealed in unconcealment, that is, in favour of the It gives." ⁹³

Vattimo's use of this passage is questionable. In *La Fine della Modernità* the main quotations suppress the final phrase "zugunsten des... 'es gibt'" ("in favour of... the 'it gives'"), and in general the words which Vattimo actually takes account of in all his interpretations of this passage are "[...] Das Sein eigens denken, verlangt, das Sein als Grund [...] fahren zu lassen [...]". He fails to consider carefully the importance of the previous sentence, and of the qualification "des Seienden", and of the positive substitute offered in the final phrase. The first sentence, and the qualification "des Seienden", could be taken to restrict the sense of *Grund* in which it is here rejected (but even "rejection" may be wrong - "letting go" better translates the original "fahren lassen", and it is quite possible that a play is intended, taking "letting go" in the sense of upping anchor, releasing oneself from fixed, static determinations of ground). *Grund*, so far as it is

⁹¹ See pt.A, ch.4; pt.B, ch.1, section 2b.

⁹² Heidegger, "Zeit und Sein", pp.5-6; quoted in Vattimo, op.cit., p.30 (footnote 1) & p.118; Vattimo, "Dialectics, Difference, and Weak Thought" (ET in *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal* 10/1 (1984), p.159); Vattimo, "An-denken, Denken und Grund" in U.Guzzoni, ed. *Nachdenken über Heidegger* (Hildesheim: Gerstenberg Verlag, 1980).

⁹³ I have changed the ET in one crucial respect: "fahren zu lassen" has been translated "to let go" rather than as "to relinquish"; this is to retain the possibility of a word-play intended in the original. Vattimo's Italian is "lasciar perdere" (*La Fine della Modernità*, Italian ed. at p.37),

"rejected", is only rejected in the context of the postulation of a foundational relationship between entities and being entitatively conceived: that is, *Grund* as a relation between two entitative poles.⁹⁴ Earlier Vattimo was quoted as saying Heidegger was unable "to criticize Western thought in the name of another, and truer, foundation", and yet the occasionally suppressed final phrase offers something which should at least be considered as a candidate for the "other" "truer" foundation (the "es gibt"). This provides only an initial criticism of Vattimo's position: the various themes touched on here (the static-dynamic problem, the model of a relation between entitative poles, and the "es gibt", where Heidegger's interpretations of the "es" as *Ereignis* and *Zeitlichkeit* will be explored for their foundational significance⁹⁵), will be returned to.

Leaving aside the interpretation of this passage, there is the more general questionability of taking a text from towards the end of Heidegger's career (the 1960's) and applying it to the thought of the 1920's and 1930's. As Walter Biemel has pointed out:

"One danger certainly present consists in the fact that we often jump to the last, most difficult phase of Heidegger's thought and cling to concepts there without having carried out the work of reasoning (*Denkarbeit*), which in Heidegger's own case precedes these concepts...."⁹⁶

Vattimo has surely taken a text from the latest phase of Heidegger's thought, and applied it to earlier phases, completely bypassing the *Denkarbeit*.

3) Aims and limitations

This dissertation is exegetical. It is not the chosen form of this dissertation to argue for the truth of a closed proposition (or thesis) about the foundational in the early Heidegger. The

meaning "to forget", literally "to allow something to get lost", which loses the possible ambiguity of the original.

⁹⁴ See pt.A, ch.4, section 3.

⁹⁵ See pt.B, ch.1, section 3.

⁹⁶ W.Biemel, in the panel discussion published in Kockelmans ed. *On Heidegger and Language*, at p.273.

subject matter of this dissertation is such that I think such a form would be detrimental to the contribution which it can make. The form is rather to take a question ("what is the foundational in the early Heidegger?"), justify it, and pursue the possibility and impossibility of answering this question - in the process of doing so shedding new light on some parts of Heidegger, provoking fresh thought, offering new connections - with, as a result, an improved appreciation of the foundational in Heidegger. It is both difficult and inadvisable to force such an appreciation of the foundational into inflexible propositional forms; this has the unavoidable disadvantage that many overall matters will remain unclear for a number of pages and chapters.

This dissertation concentrates on one theme only, in one author - and at that, narrowly and selectively. The justification for this is that the theme of foundations in Heidegger is large enough, important enough, and deeply misinterpreted. Such a restriction is particularly difficult with Heidegger, since at all points his themes merge with one another and engage inextricably with the history of philosophy. Themes such as language, time, and metaphysics clamour along with the works of (*inter alia*) Aristotle, Leibniz, Kant and Husserl. The themes of language and time are more fully integrated into this thesis than those of history and metaphysics, because it is in the area of ground-language-time that I want to contribute to research. As regards (i) historical contextualisation of Heidegger on foundations, and (ii) framing the work of this dissertation in a thesis about "overcoming metaphysics", I am very wary, for the following reasons.

Heidegger's relationship to his forebears is both close and distant. Terence Malick has an account of Husserl's reactions to SZ: he initially thought that Heidegger had simply dressed up his own doctrines in a different language; then slowly came to feel that Heidegger had betrayed phenomenology.⁹⁷ A few years before Heidegger had already warned of oversimplifying his debt to his historical forebears.⁹⁸ This warning should be heeded. Heidegger's appropriation of the tradition is complex. As regards foundations, Crease points out the constant return to Leibniz, while Tyman indicates similarities with

⁹⁷ See Malick's brief introduction to his translation of Heidegger's "Vom Wesen des Grundes", at pp.xi-xiii, esp. footnote 3 on p.xii (*The Essence of Reasons*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969).

⁹⁸ GA63 (lectures of summer 1923), p.5, mentioning Luther, Aristotle, Kierkegaard and Husserl.

Husserl.⁹⁹ But as these cases show, particular relations can only be shown with respect to small parts of the theme: Leibniz and the principle of sufficient reason; Husserl and equiprimordiality. Against whom or what is Heidegger reacting, from whom is he borrowing, if his concept of ground is taken at its widest? Heidegger was conversant with an extremely wide range of the history of philosophy, and his thought, although inextricably linked to that history, nevertheless violently interprets that history by reducing it and then constructing a more unified derivative - all this prior to (and not particularly explicit in) Heidegger's own text. At its widest, Heidegger's historical debt is to a series of abstractions: grounding as a linear, uni-directional dependence relation, analogous to local experience of gravity on the Earth's surface; ground as something firm and final; ground as *selbstverständlich* (approx.: self-evident); grounding as principled; ground as giving rise to the problems of transcendence and of infinite regression; ground so conditioned as to create the problem of whether there "is" any ultimate ground. Heidegger's thought is inextricably linked to the history of philosophy in a way that goes beyond the mere fact that history always conditions us, since he consciously reappropriates and exploits that fact; but at the same time Heidegger relates himself to that history by several removes - which makes possible a relatively non-historical approach. It is possible that the ideas against which Heidegger reacts are to be found more in a mimicry of that history in his own texts, than in the texts of other authors. For these reasons I am extremely wary of sketching a historical background to "the foundational in Heidegger" in a few paragraphs or even a chapter; it is better to warn.

More specifically than "foundations", however, this dissertation has to do, as the title says, with the "deconstruction of foundations". This has a rather more specific historical background. What I have rather loosely and broadly called "deconstruction", using the terminological vogue of the late 20th century, could be associated with the radically decentering ideas of Copernican and Newtonian revolutions (as applied to 16th, 17th and 18th century thinking), revolutions which, for scientific thinking, in a sense ripped the ground from beneath people's feet. Most philosophy of course, to an extent, reacts like other artistic expressions of a civilisation to the range of that civilisation's scientific, geographical and cross-cultural awareness. To this extent there is a small, perhaps often subconscious reflection of such a revolution in most philosophical writing. What I think

⁹⁹ See above, section 2a.

distinguishes Heidegger, and along with him Kant, is the extent to which these philosophers consciously attempt to do for philosophy what Copernicus and Newton (for example) did for natural science, by subverting and renovating the most basic ontological assumptions of thought processes.¹⁰⁰ Thus as regards the subject matter of this thesis, there is a historical background which lies outside philosophy. Heidegger's primary motivation from the history of philosophy may have been to radically improve on Kant's attempt to effect this ontological revolution.

The much-abused term "metaphysics" likewise haunts the discussion of Heidegger's conception of foundations. Heidegger's relations to metaphysics could as little be summarised here as those (similar) ones to history.¹⁰¹ As used in this thesis, metaphysics has two closely associated meanings: (i) that (incompletely explicit) tradition as perceived by Heidegger in his reactions against it; (ii) a carefully conceived notion which probably approximates to Heidegger's conception in the period under study. Metaphysics, in this latter sense, is not associated with any concept or vocabulary, or with any thinker or school, or with preoccupation with any particular themes. It is marked by a particular pattern governing its own origin (ground). Metaphysics involves a conceptual framework that is derivative, but such that the original derivation and the origin of the derivation are not comprehensible within metaphysics, and are thus hidden to the metaphysical perspective. The derivation is simultaneously a self-concealment of its origin and originating by virtue of its being a privileging, a bracketing-out. The privileging brackets out by drawing attention away from something, and thus hides something. That metaphysics, thus conceived, consists in omission, explains why it is "bad": the conceptual framework which it creates is dogged by inadequacies, whether it is the inability to account for, e.g., epistemological access to what it originally omitted (what Kant called the scandal of philosophy), or whether it is the inability to answer properly the needs¹⁰² which drive humanity to questioning the limits of their existence. The privileging derivation is thus not any privileging or derivation, but a self-concealing omission with

¹⁰⁰ In the case of Kant, see especially the preface to the second edition of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*.

¹⁰¹ For a complete book on this subject, see, e.g., G.Haeffner, *Heideggers Begriff der Metaphysik*. This study had the explicit approval of Heidegger himself.

¹⁰² See the closing passages of pt.B, ch.2, section 2.

pernicious consequences for thinking at its extremes. Thus metaphysics does not turn on what is privileged, but how. From this, one can abstract three salient features of metaphysics: (1) It involves the imposition upon... (being) of an original derivation or privileging or bracketing-out or schematising; (2) it is auto-affirmatory, concealing not only its origins, but also its originating; (3) it is inadequate to the needs of thinking at its extremes, and therefore undesirable.

Other definitions of metaphysics have been put forward, but many of these can be explained on the basis of the above. Logocentrism, for example, is a form of privileging, but there are other forms. Metaphysics as the philosophy of "presence" privileges a particular concept ("presence"), but receives its validation as metaphysics, not by virtue of presence, but by virtue of the way in which presence is privileged against other modes of time. Thus Heidegger tries a prioritising of the future in escaping from the domination of presence, but by conceiving of the future as "ecstatic" he attempts to replace the "bracketing-out" character of the privileging by a "bracketing-in". Purcell¹⁰³ states that "the project of metaphysics is to provide a conceptual grounding which legitimates the discourse of metaphysics", and claims that Heidegger failed because his project fell within this definition. This definition states only the second of the three features described above (auto-affirmation). Although Purcell is free to define metaphysics as he chooses, nevertheless he fails to say why metaphysics as he defines it is "bad" (i.e. he leaves out the third of the above three features, which is linked inextricably to the notion of bracketing-out, the first feature). Purcell's thesis may be right in its own terms, but as such it misses the point.

¹⁰³ J.Purcell. op.cit., p.iv.

Given then that this definition of metaphysics is useful and relatively faithful to Heidegger, how may one overcome metaphysics in so far as it is something undesirable? The key difficulty is that we are already historically situated in metaphysical thinking, and according to the definition, this thinking (conceptual framework, "as-sembly") is closed and locked with respect to the possibility of detecting or tracing its derivation. This hiding of the hiddenness of its origin can be termed a semblance, a seeming. Thus metaphysics could be termed an as-sembly, a sembling structure, sembling in the very origin of its structure. The overcoming of metaphysics, as defined, is then a disas-sembly (i.e. the word I have put in contact with *déconstruction* and *Freilegung*). The task is then the laying free (*Freilegung*) of the self-concealed ground of (= to) metaphysics, the same as the disas-sembly of the concealing "ground" of (= in) metaphysics.¹⁰⁴ Within the self-concealing closure of metaphysics, the task is to find some clue which will enable the recovery of what has been bracketed out.

Heidegger's SZ project is susceptible to interpretation according to this framework (which does not mean that it can be restricted to this framework). Thus the first half of the published portion of SZ (§§9-44) takes up the classic metaphysical topics such as the nature of the object, the world, space, other minds, language, reality and truth, and attempts to rework them from within the metaphysical perspective until they reveal some crack or failure in their auto-affirmatory character. As Heidegger theorises, it is when something strikes an impasse or breakdown that its truer nature is revealed,¹⁰⁵ and if metaphysics is a bad thing in the sense described, then surely it would have its breakdowns? Thus it is that Heidegger's metaphysical reworking of the metaphysics of *Dasein* eventually reveals its *Verfallenheit* (fallenness, derivation). Having achieved a break in the auto-affirmatory character of metaphysics, SZ then turns to exploiting this to bring to light what the metaphysical derivation had bracketed out: time.

The question which the fate of the SZ project itself raises is whether or not such a project is actually completable. Is it possible to overcome metaphysics?

¹⁰⁴ A local distinction is intended between ground and "ground".

¹⁰⁵ SZ, §16.

Taking metaphysics as a semantic rather than as a methodological error certainly brings a prematurely negative answer to this question. If metaphysics maintains itself in the same way that nuances of meaning continue to taint our language (or certain parts of it), the question of ridding oneself of metaphysics becomes rather like that of ridding ourselves of history - impossible, and just as absurd as thinking that a few millenia of intellectual history are so worthless that they should be abandoned. This only provides a good reason for defining metaphysics in as a-historical and non-semantic a way as possible. Staying with metaphysics as a methodological error, one may ask, where is it that the structure of metaphysics (as defined above) comes from? What is the origin of its concealment of its concealing of its origins? Metaphysics arises in the site opened in the negotiation between being and text. Might it not be the case that any such traffic between being and text is doomed to decay into metaphysics? In which case two alternatives would be left for avoiding metaphysics: either abandon writing for the contemplation of being (Bigelow's suggestion¹⁰⁶), or abandon being for textual idealism. Alternatively, it might be the case that late twentieth century thought has still not exhausted the possibilities put at its disposal by Heidegger for continuing the struggle to open a non-metaphysical space for negotiation between being and writing. Particularly on so abstract a matter, one may only delude oneself by speculating on the chances of success before one actually gets down to the detail of trying it out for oneself.

Despite these extended comments on metaphysics, this is not a framework within which this thesis was conceived, nor into which it will be retrospectively forced. Yet another contribution on the possibility of overcoming metaphysics, and on the actuality of Heidegger's having done so, would be tiresome. Although intimately connected to the metaphysical issue, this is primarily a thesis on the interpretation of ground in the earlier Heidegger - an interpretation which I think is interesting and valuable enough in itself, and of a significance to philosophical methodology extending beyond its implications for a particular definition of metaphysics.

¹⁰⁶ P. Bigelow, *The Cunning, The Conning of Being*, (the preface, the pre- or non-preface, and the postface). NB: page references to the prefaces are difficult because Bigelow deliberately restarts the page-numbering.

Interpretations of ground in Heidegger's earlier writings up to now are, as I claim, either demonstrably wrong (and as such seriously underestimate Heidegger), or limited. A recovery of the actual place of the foundational in Heidegger's earlier thought can lead to a recovery of the unity of his thought. This place of the foundational in Heidegger's earlier thought is inherently, and deliberately, unstable. The foundational is found in a multi-level *Grund-Freilegung* or disas-sembly (on the levels, for example, of the concept,¹⁰⁷ the proposition,¹⁰⁸ of the system¹⁰⁹, and of idiom¹¹⁰) of received foundational notions. Although what emerges from this disas-sembly is radically different from the received conceptions, naming it "ground" is justified, not only because Heidegger persists in calling it such, but because it responds to the same needs which generate foundational issues in philosophy. The analysis of this disas-sembly is divided into two parts: the first concerns methodological peculiarities which appear when one looks closely at the way Heidegger uses the foundational in his writings; the second examines some apparently eccentric connections of the foundational, namely, the coalescence of ground and time, and the integration of the foundational problematic into the thinking of (= from) the *Ereignis*.

¹⁰⁷ See pt.A, ch.1.

¹⁰⁸ See pt.A, ch.2 and ch.4.

¹⁰⁹ See pt.A, ch.3.

¹¹⁰ See pt.B, ch.1 and ch.2.

PART A. HEIDEGGER'S THINKING AND WRITING ABOUT GROUND: SOME METHODOLOGICAL PECULIARITIES

The question here must be carefully restricted: what is the foundational, or what do the foundational notions signify, in Heidegger's earlier writings? ("Earlier" here means the writings of the 1920's, but with occasional glances ahead as far as *Beiträge zur Philosophie* of 1936-38). This seemingly innocent question is more difficult to answer than it appears, and generally the strategy of this part of the thesis is a twofold one: first, to take this question in several directions, all of which lead to apparent breakdowns, aporias, fissures, or simply unusual structures in the coherence and intelligibility of Heidegger's foundational thought; second, to revalue the problematic in these aporias as a starting-point for a rethinking of the foundational. One of the issues which arises with respect to this second step is the extent to which such a revaluation of the problematic and such a rethinking of the foundational can be attributed to Heidegger, and to what extent his writing nevertheless necessitates the reader to revalue and rethink in this way.

This part of the thesis is divided into four chapters as follows:-

- 1) Semantic Interpenetrations in Foundational Language
- 2) Logical Irregularities in Foundational Language
- 3) Incongruencies in Foundational Macrostructure
- 4) Anticipations of a Turn in Foundational Understanding

The findings of these chapters are only summarised at the end of part A. Since many of the considerations brought up are extended during part B, which deals with the connections of ground to temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) and the event (*Ereignis*), extended comment on the results must wait.

* * * * *

Initially, a rather more prosaic examination of the basic foundational notions will be made.

The word *Grund* is the most common foundational notion used by Heidegger, and is the primary keyword of *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik* (MAL, 1928) and "Vom Wesen des Grundes" (VWG, 1928) - in the later writings also *Der Satz vom Grund* (SG, 1955/56).¹ In Heidegger *Grund* simultaneously designates at least a combined conception of ontic foundations and cognitive origins (i.e. reasons), but what *Grund* is understood to mean should simultaneously extend at least to the entirety of finely distinguished origins, causes, principles, substrates and reasons produced in the history of Western Philosophy. *Grund*, in Heidegger, is at least a historical synthesis. Even a multi-dimensional conception fails to do Heidegger the least justice, and one should try to develop *Grund* further to a conception of the unity and totality within which this multiple reference is possible. Yet these developments of *Grund* to the unity and totality within which its multiple reference is possible are only very preliminary moves which fail to go beyond the boundaries of the word itself, ignoring the relations of *Grund* to other words. The way in which Heidegger exploits the relations of words does not allow any internal meaning to survive untouched. A yet further shortcoming of the conception of *Grund* gained so far is that what has been said presumes a static and consistent signification. Is this a justified assumption? Perhaps the conception of *Grund* is intended to change as one reads, for example, MAL. Or perhaps different conceptions of *Grund* are appropriate for different modes and styles of writing, or for different regions and extremes of thinking.

The word *Ursprung* (origin) is used synonymously with *Grund*. However there are differences of use and exploitation. With the word *Grund*, Heidegger restricts himself to the use of a number of morphological variations (the nouns *Gründen*, *Gründlichkeit*, the verb *gründen*, the participle/adjective *gründend*, the adjective *gründlich*) and compounds (around 40 different compounds in SZ, excluding the considerable number of morphological variations of these compounds). The morphological variations significantly increase after SZ - the most important post-SZ variation being *Gründung*. As regards the use of *Ursprung*, it covers not only the ontic foundation normally signified by *Grund*, but

¹ The substantial section of *Beiträge zur Philosophie* (1936-38) entitled "Die Gründung" should also be mentioned.

also expresses historical origins. The etymology of *Ursprung* is also exploited. The "Ur" prefix, itself exploited by Heidegger in compounds such as *Urgrund*, *Urelement*, *Urstand*, *Urphänomen*, *Ursache*, *Urwahrheit*, *Urtranszendenz*, *Urgestein*, denotes something "original" or "old". The "-sprung" element of the compound denotes a leap or jump, a movement at or away from the source. Normally this latter dynamic connotation lies dormant in the word *Ursprung*, but Heidegger plays on it, bringing it back to activity.

The use of various morphological variations on the root *-fund-* likewise form part of the standard repertoire of foundational notions (e.g. *Fundament*, *fundieren*, *fundamental*). These and further expressions do not invite further comment for the moment.²

In need of comment, however, is the difficulty of identifying lexical expressions of foundations. It has already been mentioned how freely Heidegger shifts between morphological variations on the same root (e.g. *-grund-* or *-spring-*) in his expression of foundations. Likewise there was an example of a prefix used to add a foundational significance to a root (*ur-*). The prefix *vor-* (in English, usually "pre-") is also added for a similar effect.³ The prefix *vor-* is, as a matter of German grammar, separable: this means that in many sentences "vor" may appear as a particle placed some distance from the verb, although essentially modifying the verb. In such a case it may be difficult for the English native-speaker to spot the foundational allusion. This is only the beginning of the problem: Heidegger had a predilection for compound-words and phrases, the parts of which he would disperse around the sentence. Sometimes this is combined with deliberate ambiguity - there is not only a foundational interpretation, but also another meaning. The dispersion of the elements of the foundational idea is at its most difficult when Heidegger tries sensitising the reader to the directionality of ground - since here he resorts to a variety of prepositions and particles, the combined effect of which may be difficult to grasp in the German and virtually impossible to translate.⁴ Foundational expression, therefore, even at the simplest level of lexis, can sometimes be difficult to detect.

² Among those foundational expressions to be discussed later: *Bedingung der Möglichkeit*; *a priori*.

³ There is a difference between the two prefixes: *ur-* suggests absolute origin, while *vor-* is relative.

⁴ On the directionality of ground, see ch.4, section 2 below on dialectic.

These comments on the basic lexis of ground have yielded an open-ended result: foundational ideas are dispersed in a variety of expressions, and these expressions themselves contain a multiplicity of reference and a structural subtlety and self-consciousness. Moving on from these preliminary observations, what does Heidegger make explicit about the nature of foundations? Certainly we can find statements in Heidegger which purport to say what ground "is". SZ itself has few statements bearing directly on ground, although there is the following:

"Grund-seiend, das heißt als geworfenes existierend...." ⁵ "In being a basis - that is, in existing as thrown...."

Here it says that to be a ground is to exist as thrown, which does not seem very helpful.⁶ In 1928, Heidegger tells us that the basic phenomenon of ground (*Urphänomen des Grundes*) is something called *Umwillen* (a purposive phenomenon),⁷ that the origin of ground is freedom,⁸ that ground pertains, in some very important sense, to being.⁹ and that the origin of ground is freedom as transcendence,¹⁰ or, more or less, that ground is transcendence, with various triadic analyses of this: ground is *<Stiften, Boden-nehmen, Begründen>*,¹¹ or *<Möglichkeit, Boden, Ausweis>*.¹² Here we also find the quasi-

⁵ SZ, p.284

⁶ Nevertheless see next paragraph.

⁷ MAL, pp.276 & 282

⁸ MAL, p.276

⁹ MAL, pp.138 & 284

¹⁰ VWG, p.60; the association of *Grund* and *Transzendenz* has much to do with the temporal character of foundations, and is therefore returned to in pt.B, ch.1, section 1b. One among various possible translations: *<endowing, taking-a-basis, justifying>*.

¹¹ VWG, pp.60f. Note: for the sake of clarity, when a formal triadic (or quadratic) formulation of Heidegger's is referred to in the text, the marks *<...>* are used. Possible translation: *<possibility, basis, self-identification>*.

¹² VWG, p.66

paradoxical idea of ground as *Abgrund* (abyss).¹³ In 1936 we find ground described, inter alia, as *kehrig* (versive, turning).¹⁴

The list could go on, but some things should already be pointed out. The answers Heidegger gives are semantically (and philosophically) outrageous: to identify ground with freedom and transcendence can seem an "everything into the liquidizer" approach to philosophy. In fact Heidegger's comments should be taken seriously - and not merely at the semantic level.¹⁵ The purpose of the freedom-transcendence interpretation is, among other things, structural (so far as this can be distinguished from "semantic"): the idea is to destabilize and refashion certain structural properties of the conception of ground. With the triadic analysis of ground in VWG we should once again become suspicious of Heidegger's method, and ask whether the method is actually more significant than the interpretations of ground produced. Ground is analysed into an unstable triad, the terms of which change and interweave as one turns over the pages: perhaps the purpose of the triadic analysis was to produce something internally changing and unstable. Such triads are commonplace in Heidegger's early writings (and not absent from the later), and it may be that their problematic character indicates something about the nature of Heidegger's foundational structures.¹⁶ To return to the quotation from SZ, here *Grund* was elaborated in terms of a combination of *Existenz* and *Geworfenheit*. In SZ, *Existenz* is a future-associated concept, *Geworfenheit* a past-orientated concept. Buried in this elaboration of ground, there are not only the semantic elements of ground as purpose (rationale, *arche* - future-orientated), and of ground as determinative history, but also the non-semantic, pre-logical issue of the unity of these two opposing or complementary parts.¹⁷

¹³ VWG, p.69; for an analysis of (quasi-)paradoxical forms in Heidegger, see pt.A, ch.2 on logical irregularities in foundational language.

¹⁴ BP, p.261; the matter of the relation between *Grund* and *Kehre* is returned to in pt.A, ch.4, section 2 and pt.B, ch.2, section 1b.

¹⁵ For an analysis of the semantic problem, see the following chapter on semantic interpenetration.

¹⁶ This problem is the subject of pt.A, ch.3, section 1 on triadic and quadratic patterns.

¹⁷ Bi-directionality in foundational language is the subject of pt.A, ch.4, section 2.

CH.1 SEMANTIC INTERPENETRATIONS IN FOUNDATIONAL LANGUAGE

1) The problem

In 1928 Heidegger explicitly addressed the question of foundations in his contribution to the *Festschrift* for Husserl's 70th birthday. This article, entitled "Vom Wesen des Grundes" (VWG) was the first published treatise of *Grund* - contemporaneously composed with the more extensive and only recently published lecture series *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik* (MAL) which in its main theses is very similar. How helpful is this promisingly entitled article for the question pursued in this dissertation? When Heidegger sets himself the task of eliciting the essence of ground, what is his own reply? The following passages come from the closing pages of VWG, and contain some of the most explicit comments Heidegger makes on the nature of *Grund*.

"Demnach besagt Grund: *Möglichkeit, Boden, Ausweis.*"¹

"Accordingly ground means: *possibility, [basis/floor], self-identification.*"

"*Das Wesen des Grundes ist die transzendental entspringende dreifache Streuung des Gründens in Weltentwurf, Eingenommenheit im Seienden und ontologische Begründung des Seienden.*"²

"*The essence of ground is the transcendently source-ing threefold dispersion of grounding in world-projection, enthrallment with the entity and ontological justification of the entity.*"

"...deshalb erweist sich schon das früheste Fragen nach dem Wesen des *Grundes* als verschlungen mit der Aufgabe einer Erhellung des Wesens von *Sein* und *Wahrheit.*"³

"...thus the earliest inquiring after the essence of *ground* reveals itself to be enmeshed with the task of an elucidation of the essence of *being* and *truth.*"

¹ VWG, p.66 (GA9, p.170); own translation. My own translations intentionally veer on the side of the literal, often serving more as guides to the German than as translations.

² VWG, p.67 (GA9, p.171); own translation.

³ *ibid.*; own translation.

"Der Grund hat sein Un-wesen, weil er der endlichen Freiheit entspringt. Diese selbst kann sich dem, was ihr so entspringt, nicht entziehen. Der transzendierend entspringende Grund legt sich auf die Freiheit selbst zurück, und sie wird als *Ursprung* selbst zum »Grund«. *Die Freiheit ist der Grund des Grundes*.... Als *dieser* Grund aber ist die Freiheit der *Abgrund* des Daseins."⁴

"Ground has its un-essence, because it sources from finite freedom. Freedom itself cannot take back what sources from it in this way. Transcending sourcing ground leans back onto freedom, and freedom itself becomes, as *source*, 'ground'. *Freedom is the ground of ground*.... But as this ground freedom is the *abyss* [lit. down-ground] of Dasein."

These not untypical passages can be taken to show two things which are useful at this point: first, that *Grund* is closely associated with numerous other concepts (e.g. *Möglichkeit*, *Ausweis*, *Boden*, *Weltentwurf*, *Streuung*, *Begründung*, *Eingenommenheit vom Seienden*, *Sein*, *Wahrheit*, *Freiheit*, *Abgrund* - to put aside for a moment the crucial problems of *Transzendenz* and *Zeitlichkeit* which arise in VWG); second, that Heidegger's style does not make things clear and unambiguous. As quoted, the passages create more of a problem than they solve, nor is it likely that this is contrary to Heidegger's intentions.

VWG and the other early writings on ground are returned to frequently in this dissertation, but I do not intend to examine them systematically. The reasons are these: VWG has in any case already been thoroughly examined in this respect;⁵ further, I doubt whether a systematic examination, or an examination of what Heidegger says on the essence of ground would actually solve the problem or contribute significantly to the secondary literature: VWG raises far more problems than it solves, and indeed, it should lead the investigation of *Grund* into considerations of method and style. For these reasons, reference to the earlier writings on *Grund* is selective, concentrating narrowly on raising those methodological issues which can contribute to a solution of the problem.

To return to the character of the passages from VWG, the following comment from Patrick Bigelow is appropriate.

"But if we are to meditate on the formula *ti to on e on*; and endeavour thereby to disengage the interior structure of metaphysics we find an *essential* ambiguity: we fall into the amphiboly of being, a secret trapdoor in the beguiling disingenuousness

⁴ VWG, p.69 (GA9, p.174); own translation.

⁵ e.g.: I.Koza, *Das Problem des Grundes in Heideggers Auseinandersetzung mit Kant*.

of language through which we are hurled down into the metaphysical vocation and venture, hurled down until we teeter-totter on the brink of a thinksink."⁶

The subject of this thesis is the simple question: what does *Grund* mean in its early Heideggerian usage? Perhaps nowhere other than in such a question is one closer to the interior structure of metaphysics, and as Bigelow aptly remarks, such a question disguises a trapdoor in(to) the beguiling disingenuousness of language. Instead, then, of beginning with the question with which I would like to begin, I begin with the beguiling disingenuousness of foundational language, and hope to trace my way back through the trapdoor - just perhaps - to the beginning of a "meaning" for *Grund*. Manfred Thiel writes of falling into this same thinksink during his first lecture experience with Heidegger:-

"From lecture to lecture Being - initially opened - increasingly closed itself in an impenetrable tangle of verbal distortions."⁷

While it should be mentioned that Thiel seems to regard himself almost as a crusader against Heideggerian witchcraft,⁸ his comments about Heidegger's language and his linking of the language question to the political question (Nazi associations) are typical for

⁶ P.Bigelow, *The Conning, The Cunning of Being - Being a Kierkegaardian Demonstration of the Postmodern Implosion of Metaphysical Sense in Aristotle and the Early Heidegger* (Tallahassee: Florida State University, 1990), p.108. On his concept of the "amphiboly of being", see pt.A, ch.4, section 1 of this chapter. The italicised letters are Greek, meaning "what is being as being?".

⁷ "Von Vorlesung zu Vorlesung verschloß sich das anfangs aufgetane Sein mehr und mehr in einem undurchdringlichen Gewirr von Wortverdrehungen," from: M.Thiel, *Heidegger: Sein Werk - Aufbau und Durchblick* (Heidelberg: Elpis, 1977), p.9 (own translation).

⁸ While this is a fair comment on Thiel's attitude towards Heidegger, nevertheless the content of some of his comments deserve more attention than his attitude would attract. He provides a useful list of the typical objections to Heidegger's handling of his material: contrariness to reason, mistranslation and misquotation of philosophers criticised, violation of original texts through capricious misinterpretation, misrepresentation through selective quotation, reliance on empty style to make his points. See M.Thiel, *Der Nihilismus: Heidegger und die Sophistik*, (Elpis Verlag, Heidelberg, 1986), esp. pp.1180-2. Whether, and in what sense, Heidegger was "against reason" (Thiel's accusation) is one way of seeing the issue of this thesis. Thiel's point about "mere" style fails to take account of the long-acknowledged connection between form and content in Heidegger. While Thiel's points about Heidegger's use of the great historical texts of philosophy are, as regards their descriptive content, largely true, his evaluation that this use of the great philosophers arises out of a disrespect for them is another matter. The most serious criticism of Heidegger is missed by Thiel: namely, that he has perhaps encouraged more sloppy philosophy in others than he is guilty of himself. Heidegger's eccentricities would be quite simply "bad" if divorced from an appreciation of the purpose which they serve; the task therefore is to elicit what lies behind the eccentricities.

opponents and critics of Heidegger.⁹ Nevertheless the problem of the closure of being in an impenetrable tangle of verbal distortions is a legitimate criticism of Heidegger with which even the most casual reader must come to terms. It is the case that if one clings to "norms" of reading and fails to develop new ways of accepting and understanding a text, one is going to have a hard time with Heidegger. But what are these "norms" of reading, and what are these "new ways" of accepting and understanding a text? In reading Heidegger language is a problem which arises immediately and in many different guises, and which never leaves. The only way to cope with Heidegger is to learn how to live within language as a problem. While to say this is by no means new or controversial, and while much has been written on Heidegger and language, nevertheless, in writing this thesis it became apparent that secondary literature on Heidegger was devoid even of a partial consensus sufficient to provide a basis on which to present the main ideas about ground. Many of the most essential features of Heidegger's language have been recognised and written about; for example, the constellational¹⁰ and kinetic¹¹ characters of language. Often, however, the insights have been fragmentary or too preliminary; otherwise they have tended to miss the point altogether - for example, by taking Heidegger as "just" a poet, a mystic, a (failed) metaphysician "turned" (failed) mystic. At least as regards the earlier Heidegger(s) (that is, up to the 1930's), there is not yet any comprehensive, adequate analytical work or consensus on the "how" of his writing.¹² Responding to these problems and filling the gaps

⁹ A canonical work in this respect: T.Adorno, *Jargon der Eigentlichkeit* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1964). There does not yet seem to be a full length, studious and non-partisan work on the possible political implications of Heidegger's (ab-)use of language, although the less studious accusations repeatedly levelled against Heidegger clearly call for such a work. A recent book claiming to fill this gap is: H.Meschonnic, *Le Langage Heidegger* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1990) (though this book seems too steeped in Meschonnic's own ideas about poetry to be of great use).

¹⁰ e.g. U.Wenzel, *Die Problematik des Gründens beim späten Heidegger* (Schäuble Verlag, Rheinfelden, 1986), see esp. p.206, ("konstellativ").

¹¹ e.g. R.Ansén, »Bewegtheit«: *zur Genesis einer kinetischen Ontologie bei Heidegger* (Junghans Verlag, Cuxhaven, 1990).

¹² In agreement with this point: D.J.Schmidt, "In Heidegger's Wake", *Heidegger Studies* 5 (1989), p.203. One of the better and more comprehensive attempts to date to categorise Heidegger's use of language is: E.Schöfer *Die Sprache Heideggers*, Verlag Neske, Pfullingen, 1962 (originally written as a dissertation at the University of Bonn in 1960). This book nevertheless has its limitations. Parts are discussed in pt.A, ch.2, section 1 below (on logical irregularities in foundational language). The chapter of greatest interest here is entitled "Metalogische Denkformen und grammatische Besonderheiten" ("Metalogical Forms of Thought and Grammatical Peculiarities"), where Schöfer discusses the following: paradox, circularity, tautology,

is too formidable a task for this thesis. In this respect Henri Meschonnic speaks of the necessity of a "renovation of the theory of language" simply in order to accommodate Heidegger.¹³ The aim here is only to bring the problem to a stage where the main task of this thesis can be performed satisfactorily. There is no attempt, for example, to theorise about language independently of Heidegger.

What is meant by this vaguely indicated language problem? Language problems in Heidegger are in fact multiple.¹⁴ Carnap was drawn primarily by Heidegger's abuses of logic and syntax.¹⁵ The question of the non-logical manner of Heidegger's thinking is addressed in the next chapter. Thiel's reference to *Wortverdrehungen* (verbal distortions) is primarily a complaint about semantics, however, and it is this semantic problem which is addressed in this section. There is a certain danger in describing problems in advance (as Heidegger points out at the beginning of SZ, and as is particularly the case when dealing with his texts); nevertheless I will try to describe the problem in question as governing the separability and stability of semantic items.¹⁶ The problem is approximately that described, for example, by John Sallis in his appropriately entitled article "Meaning Adrift".¹⁷ In the following it is especially the separability and stability of those semantic items expressing the foundational which are analysed. The existing secondary literature does not offer suitable analyses of the problem of the separability and stability of those semantic items expressing the foundational. However, near and of relevance are two articles by George Ghanotakis

predication, *figura etymologica*, neologism, paranomasia, punctuation (colons, dots), comparative and superlative forms. Part of this chapter (pp.196-217) has been translated into English: J.J.Kockelmans ed. *On Heidegger and Language* (Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1972), at pp.281-301.

¹³ H.Meschonnic, op.cit., p.6.

¹⁴ The two mentioned here by no means exhaust the catalogue.

¹⁵ i.e. Carnap's celebrated comments on Heidegger excerpted and translated in: M.Murray ed. *Heidegger and Modern Philosophy* (Yale University Press, 1978), pp.23-34. Also drawing attention (rather more sympathetically) to the structural curiosity of Heidegger's syntax is D.J.Schmidt, who likens Heidegger's syntax to a Moebius strip (op.cit., p.203).

¹⁶ A word of caution may be appropriate for the reader who wants immediately to reduce or interpret this description. The problem described is susceptible to a number of characterisations. To think that this problem was merely one of "hermeneutics" or interpretation would be to reduce it, to prejudice it. Interpretation (where the separability and stability of semantic items is sacrificed, one semantic item being brought into contact with another in order to modify it semantically) is at best only one part of a wider phenomenon in Heidegger's language.

and Alfons Grieder on the concept *Wesen*. Their observations find parallels in the language of *Grund*.

In the 1984 article by Ghanotakis,¹⁸ the following points are relevant:-

1. The "predominantly verbal (temporal) connotations" of *Wesen* "mark it off from the traditional static *essentia*".¹⁹
2. *Wesen* has a "non-metaphysical status".²⁰
3. *Wesen* has a "multiplicity of connotations and significations",²¹ that is, the "co-extensiveness and often interchangeability" of *Wesen* with other key notions, such as truth, horizon, "projective context of intelligibility", ground, possibility, meaning (*Sinn*), gathering, enduring, and, not least, *Sein*.²²
4. This "multiplicity of significations is not random", but reflects the "dimensions of the ways Being... manifests itself".²³

While all these points are stated in his article, Ghanotakis is so brief that they receive no development. The article has much in common with the longer article by Grieder, published in the same journal in 1988.²⁴ The main points of relevance from Grieder's article are as follows:-

¹⁷ *Heidegger Studies* 1 (1985).

¹⁸ G.A.Ghanotakis, "Unscrambling Heidegger's notion of 'essence': a consideration of some topographical and thematic difficulties", *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 15/1, pp.22-33.

¹⁹ *ibid.*, p.22

²⁰ *ibid.*, p.22

²¹ *ibid.*, pp.24 & 26

²² *ibid.*, pp.25-26

²³ *ibid.*, p.26

²⁴ A.Grieder, "What did Heidegger mean by 'essence'?", *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 19/1; the Grieder article does not refer to the Ghanotakis article, despite some overlaps.

1. The traditional meaning of *essentia* is suspended while the term *Wesen* is recovered for a new use; this new conception nevertheless remains completely indeterminate in the 1920's.²⁵
2. In general, "there is little hope... of elucidating Essence without getting entangled with a number of other Heideggerian notions";²⁶ and in particular, *Wesen* is "inseparable" from *Sein* and *Wahrheit*.²⁷
3. The indeterminacy of *Wesen* in the 1920's gives way in subsequent decades to a partially determinate, constantly changing and ever ambivalent notion; Grieder's strategy is to contrast the centrality and frequency of the term in the metalanguage with the synchronous ambivalencies and uncertainties of the notion.

Ghanotakis' article is limited mainly by its brevity; Grieder provides a more successful account, particularly as regards the development and ambivalence of *Wesen*; however Grieder's weakness is a semantic concern which fails to appreciate the methodological or tactical dimensions. Both writers appreciate the "close affinity" of *Wesen* and *Grund*, referring to Heidegger's "definition" of *Wesen* in "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" (1930):-

"»Wesen« ist dabei verstanden als der Grund der inneren Möglichkeit dessen, was zunächst und im allgemeinen als bekannt zugestanden wird."²⁸

"`Essence' is thereby understood as ground of the inner possibility of that which is immediately and generally conceded as known."

They likewise both recognise that this problem of "close affinities", "inseparability", "entanglement", "co-extensiveness" and "interchangeability" covers a wide range of other key terms (e.g.: being, truth, gathering, horizon, meaning).

Taking these observations as a starting-point, and now placing *Grund* at the centre of attention, a series of texts from Heidegger will be analysed. It is taken as obvious from the start that *Ursprung* and *Fundament* belong to the network of associations, along with

²⁵ *ibid.*, p.81

²⁶ *ibid.*, p.68

²⁷ *ibid.*, p.64

²⁸ GA9, p.186; own translation.

morphological variations of these (e.g. *gründen, entspringen, gründlich, fundieren...*). The textual analyses selected extend the network to the following (for each root only one form is given; morphological variations are assumed as understood): *Bedingung der Möglichkeit, Verwurzelung, Ermöglichung, Öffnung, Lichtung, aussprechen, liegen, geben, ermöglichen, Horizont, Sinn, erwachsen, bestimmen, Transzendenz, Freiheit, Umwillen, Dasein, Zeitlichkeit, zeitigen.*²⁹ The absence from this list of *Sein, Wahrheit* and *Ereignis* - which are among the most important of many missing items - is only provisional.³⁰ If the extent of this as a meaning-network of foundational-dependence-type-relations seems excessive, the reader is referred back to the observations of Ghanotakis and Grieder. One final point: in the course of the analyses it is sought also to comment on the how and why of the lack of separability and stability of semantic items.

Semantic interpenetration in Heidegger may be said to occur in any of the following ways. (1) Apposition: centrally, simply listing alternative words at the same place in the text; effected by (e.g.) brackets, footnotes, perenthetic dashes, "or" connectors, "i.e." connectors. (2) Interchanging: centrally, during what is a repetition or structural parallel of an earlier formulation, certain lexical items are changed for others. (3) (Quasi-)identification: the text in one way or another places an identification or quasi-identification between two lexical items (in its simplest form, "X is Y", where an identity is intended; but Heidegger uses a variety of connectives). (4) Metaphor and simile. (5) Hermeneutical association (explicit interpretation, e.g. with an *als* connector). (6) Etymological association (morphological variation on the same root, even where the meanings are normally quite different). (7) Alliterative association. These categories give an idea of the range of

²⁹ For translations of terms in this list, see the appendix. In many cases the idea of foundational dependence does not allow itself to be lifted easily from the text in the form of one or two lexical items; thus the list has been formed with some textual violence; the justification is giving the reader a preliminary overview of the range of the network. However it should be pointed out that even this list little more than scratches the surface. The following terms (among others) could also have been worked in, but the textual analyses required would have been tedious: *einschließen, prägen, gehören, zugrundeliegen, vorangehen, früher sein, konstituieren, verstehen* (tr.: to include, to mould, to belong, to lie-as-basis, to precede, to be earlier, to constitute, to understand).

³⁰ VWG, pp.31f.(GA9, pp.135f.): Heidegger speaks of the *Verklammerung* (bracketing together) and the *Wesenszusammenhang* (essential connectedness) of *Grund, Sein, Wahrheit* and *Transzendenz*.

semantic associations referred to here. However such associations cannot be fully categorised in this way. Many examples of semantic shifting lie indeterminately among the above categories. In other cases it is not clear whether or not an association is intended (for example, because there is no sufficient unified background against which the change could be measured).

One point that should become increasingly clear over the following pages is that the language problems referred to here cannot and should not be reduced to a matter of (multiple) "interpretation". Certainly Heidegger uses forms of expression which can be described as interpretative, but I think these are better viewed as one among many devices used to create semantic interpenetration. The danger of reducing semantic interpenetration to interpretation is that the latter may be taken as signifying a substitution of one meaning for another, or at least, as a privileging of one meaning over another. Such privileging entails a loss of whatever non-metaphysical advantages semantic interpenetration may have possessed. Patterns of substitution and privileging resurrect the idea that *Grund* is indeed abandoned or subordinated, and thus nurture the interpretation of the *Kehre* as a biographical "from... to..." progression. Above all, it is what I have labelled "interchanging" which shows that a substitutive or privileging model does not apply to semantic interpenetration, since the interchanges never prefer one lexical set over another but mix them equally. A study of the texts suggests a model where incompletely assimilable meanings are synthesised or held together in an absence of privileging.

2) Textual Analyses

The first text for analysis comes from SZ, and links together the traditional foundational structure of rootedness (*Verwurzelung*) with the supposedly post- or anti-foundational

conceptions of clearing (*Lichtung*) and opening (*Öffnung*).³¹ At the beginning of SZ §69 there are the following sentences.

"Die ekstatische Einheit der Zeitlichkeit... ist die Bedingung der Möglichkeit dafür, daß ein Seiendes sein kann, das als sein »Da« existiert... Das Seiende, das den Titel Da-sein trägt, ist »gelichtet«.... Was dieses Seiende wesenhaft lichtet, das heißt es für es selbst sowohl »offen« als auch »hell« macht, wurde vor aller »zeitlichen« Interpretation als Sorge bestimmt.... *Die ekstatische Zeitlichkeit lichtet das Da ursprünglich.* Sie ist das primäre Regulativ der möglichen Einheit aller wesenhaften existenzialen Strukturen des Daseins. Erst aus der Verwurzelung des Daseins in der Zeitlichkeit...."³²

"The ecstatical unity of temporality... is the condition for the possibility that there can be an entity which exists as its `there'. The entity which bears the title `Being-there' is one that has been `cleared'.... That by which this entity is essentially cleared - in other words, that which makes it both `open' for itself and `bright' for itself - is what we have defined as `care'.... *Ecstatic temporality clears the `there' primordially.* It is what primarily regulates the possible unity of all Dasein's existential structures. Only through the fact that Being-there is rooted in temporality...."

This passage, beginning §69, has the function of exploring further the meaning of its first sentence. The sentences move through a variety of expressions, yet all say much the "same" thing. To make the repetitions clearer, the following rewrites the first and last three sentences:-

1. Die ekstatische Einheit der Zeitlichkeit ist die Bedingung der Möglichkeit dafür, daß ein Seiendes sein kann, das als sein »Da« existiert.³³
2. Die ekstatische Zeitlichkeit lichtet das Da ursprünglich.

³¹ Cf. the comments of Werner Marx quoted in the introduction, section 2bi, in which Marx tries to characterise the turn as an abandonment of traditional foundational vocabulary for a lexis in which (e.g.) *Lichtung* and *Öffnung* are typical.

³² SZ, pp.350-351.

³³ The relevant parts of the sentence are underlined. In many of the analyses below, I have followed the same method of reorganizing the essential parts of the text in German. The purpose of such reorganization is to make the patterns and parallels in the Heidegger text as clear as possible. Since the German is often lexically more economical and precise than the English, translation in many cases would only revive the confusion. Translations are footnoted, but the text of the dissertation does and must work with the German. The translations here are: 1. the ecstatic unity of temporality is the condition of the possibility for an entity being able to be which exists as its `there'; 2. ecstatic temporality clears the `there' primordially; 3. temporality is what primarily regulates the possible unity of all Dasein's existential structures; 4. Da-sein is rooted in temporality.

3. Die Zeitlichkeit ist das primäre Regulativ der möglichen Einheit aller wesenhaften existenzialen Strukturen des Daseins.
4. Das Da-sein ist in der Zeitlichkeit verwurzelt.

The relations through which this passage shifts in the relation of *Zeitlichkeit* and *Da(-sein)* are: (a) *ist die Bedingung der Möglichkeit für*, (b) *lichtet ursprünglich*, (c) *ist das primäre Regulativ der möglichen Einheit der Strukturen des*, (d) *verwurzelt in*. In the original passage, *lichten* is interpreted as carrying the meaning of "opening" as well as "illuminating". Thus, interwoven in this passage, we find: (a) a form evocative of Kant's foundationalism; (b) a form found in the (supposedly non-metaphysical, non-foundational) later Heidegger; (c) a seemingly technical, logical, or structural form; and finally, (d) a metaphor of rootedness which would seem to reinstate everything which a "good anti-metaphysician" would wish to escape. Given the order in which these relations occur, there is certainly no room for suggestion here that the language of opening and illuminating supercedes or replaces the lexical forms which appear more foundationalist and metaphysical. The context suggests they are alternative, parallel modes of expression, although it would be to go too far to interpret them as identical or synonymous. Nevertheless, a replacement model can be firmly excluded; and, with a degree of probability, so can an interpretation which seeks to place fine distinctions between the interwoven relations.

As a final note it should be pointed out that in the third sentence of the original quotation, a "*das heißt*" clause interpretatively adds *offen* to *gelichtet* (corresponding substantives: *Öffnung, Lichtung*).

* * * * *

The next analysis turns on a series of sentences excerpted from MAL. Here the more obviously foundational notions of origin (*Ursprung*) and originating-from or leaping-out (*Entspringen*) are associated with the less obviously foundational notions of speaking-out (*Aussprechen*), giving (*Geben*) and lying (*Liegen*). In these lectures of Summer 1928, the following concatenation of relations between *Gewärtigen* (expecting) and *Dann* (the "then") are to be found.

"Das Gewärtigen gibt selbst aus sich, als Gewärtigen, das Dann her. Das Dann ist das, als welches das Gewärtigen sich ausspricht - was also in ihm selbst liegt. Das Dann ist das, als welches das Gewärtigen sich ausspricht - was also in ihm liegt. Im Gewärtigen und nur in ihm schlummern gleichsam die Dann.... Das Dann erhebt sich aus und in einem Gewärtigen.... [Das Dann] entspringt dem Gewärtigen als solchem und ist weder eine Objekt- noch eine Subjekteigenschaft.... Das im Gewärtigen aufspringende und aussprechbare Dann...." ³⁴

"Expecting gives out of itself, as expecting, the then. The then is that as which expectation speaks itself out - is thus something in expectation itself. In expecting, and only in it, slumbers, as it were, the thens.... The then arises from and in an expecting.... [The then] springs from expecting as such and is neither a property of objects nor of subjects.... The then which springs up and can be spoken out in expecting...." ³⁵

As if he has not yet made the point quite clear enough, Heidegger later repeats it as follows.

"Um es nochmal zu sagen: Gewärtigen, Behalten und Gegenwärtigen sind nicht etwa nur die Art des Erfassens der Dann, Damals und Jetzt, die Weise des Bewußtseins davon, sondern selbst der Ursprung." ³⁶

"To repeat: expectancy, retention and making-present are not merely the way we grasp the then, the formerly, and the now, not merely modes of being conscious of them; they are rather the very origin of the then, the formerly, and the now."

To make the parallels clearer, the relations can be rewritten as follows.

1. G gibt selbst aus sich D her. ³⁷
2. G spricht sich als D aus.
3. D liegt im G.
4. D schlummert im G.
5. D erhebt sich aus G.
6. D erhebt sich in G.
7. D entspringt G.
8. D springt im G auf.

³⁴ MAL, pp.260-261.

³⁵ Heim's translation slightly corrected and literalised. (As regards corrections, it is assumed that the German is the more reliable version, which may not always be the case).

³⁶ MAL, p.263.

³⁷ Translations: 1. G gives D hither from itself; 2. G speaks-out itself as D; 3. D lies in G; 4. D slumbers in G; 5. D raises itself from out of G; 6. D raises itself in G; 7. D springs from G; 8. D springs up in G; 9. D can speak-out itself out in G; 10. G is the origin of D.

9. D kann sich im G aussprechen.

10. G ist der Ursprung des D.

Thus in only three pages, Heidegger runs through ten different ways of expressing the relation between two concepts. Why? "Substitution" and "interpretation" are hardly adequate to the situation, for what is being substituted for what? what is being interpreted as what? The basic relation here is a foundational one, but Heidegger avoids pinning himself to any particular lexis in the expression of this relation. The variety of relations also contain some mildly disruptive features: for example, in (1) and (2) *Gewärtigen* is the agent of the derivation, but in (5)-(8) the agent is clearly *Dann*; there is a play on internality and externality going on - (1), (2), (5) and (7) posit a separation of *Gewärtigen* and *Dann*, while (3), (4) and (6) suggest that *Dann* remains internal to *Gewärtigen*; further, there is variation between static, dynamic and formal characterisations of the relation: (10) is a formalisation, (3) and (4) are static - (4) particularly emphasises the static, while (1) and (5)-(8) are dynamic. It is quite impossible from the context to ascribe any of these poles (agent-patient, internal-external, static-dynamic, formal-natural) priority over its opposite. Thus, while it would appear that the same foundational relation is the subject of all the various expressions, to unify them in a single written form would lose something vital, namely the tensions between the various expressions.

In the second of the parallels analysed above, it was seen how *Aussprechen* (speaking-out) was made to carry a foundational role. One of the significant areas in the intertwined foundational fabric of Heidegger's earlier writing is that of meaning (*Sinn*) and understanding (*Verstehen*). This is examined more carefully in chapter 4, but for the moment the following passage can be noted which links "making possible" with "giving a sense/meaning to". (The former, "making possible" (*Ermöglichung*) is again linked into the foundational network further below).

"Wie die Zukunft primär das Verstehen, die Gewesenheit die Stimmung ermöglicht, so hat das dritte konstitutive Strukturmoment der Sorge, das *Verfallen*, seinen existenzialen Sinn in der *Gegenwart*." ³⁸

"Just as understanding is made possible primarily by the future, and moods are made possible by having been, the third constitutive item in the structure of care - namely, *falling* - has its existential meaning in the *Present*."

In the first part of the comparison, future and past are related to mood and understanding by *ermöglichen* (to make possible). In the second part of the comparison, a parallel relation between present and falling is set up, but now the connective is changed to "seinen existenzialen Sinn haben" - in other words, making possible is paralleled with containing or providing existential sense or meaning.

* * * * *

The matter in hand now turns to a comprehensive study of the variety of connections posited between the trio *Transzendenz*, *Zeitlichkeit*, *Seinsverständnis* (transcendence, temporality and understanding-of-being). First a passage from Heidegger is taken as an example of how lexical variation operates in practice. Then a comprehensive summary is given of the range of expression used by Heidegger to relate the three concepts.

"Wenn Transzendenz des Seinsverständnis ermöglicht, Transzendenz aber in der ekstatisch-horizontalen Verfassung der Zeitlichkeit gründet, dann ist diese die Bedingung der Möglichkeit des Seinsverständnisses." ³⁹

"If transcendence makes possible the understanding of being and if transcendence is founded on the ecstatic-horizonal constitution of temporality, then temporality is the condition of the possibility of the understanding of being."

Formally expressed:-

1. *Transzendenz* τ . *Seinsverständnis* (τ : *ermöglichen*)

and

2. *Zeitlichkeit* τ . *Transzendenz* (τ' : *gründen in*)⁴⁰

therefore

³⁸ SZ, p.346.

³⁹ GP, p.429.

⁴⁰ τ' means the inverse of τ .

3. *Zeitlichkeit* r. *Seinsverständnis* (r: *Bedingung der Möglichkeit*)

The form of the whole is that of a formal argument from premises to conclusion, yet this can only be the case if the various expressions of the foundational relation (r) are the same.

In the following list of additional relations of *Zeitlichkeit*, *Transzendenz* and *Seinsverständnis* in Heidegger, rather than lengthily quoting the original texts and then extracting subject, object and verbal relation from complex German sentences, the bare essentials have been reformulated (in German, with the verbal relations translated in the footnotes).

1. *Zeitlichkeit* ist die *Bedingung der Möglichkeit* der *Transzendenz*.⁴¹
2. *Zeitlichkeit* ermöglicht *Transzendenz*.⁴²
3. *Transzendenz* ist möglich aufgrund der *Zeitlichkeit*.⁴³
4. *Zeitlichkeit* ist die innere *Möglichkeit* der *Transzendenz*.⁴⁴
5. *Zeitlichkeit* ist das *Geschehen* der *Transzendenz*.⁴⁵
6. *Transzendenz* ist in der *Zeitlichkeit* verwurzelt.⁴⁶
7. *Transzendenz* wurzelt im *Wesen* der *Zeit* (this is reexpressed in a footnote as "die temporale Interpretation der *Transzendenz*).⁴⁷
8. *Transzendenz* fundiert zeitlich.⁴⁸
9. *Transzendenz* zeitigt sich in der *Zeitlichkeit*.⁴⁹
10. *Seinsverständnis* ist *Transzendenz*.⁵⁰

⁴¹ GP, p.452; "...condition of the possibility for..."

⁴² SZ, p.364; "...makes possible..."

⁴³ GP, p.444; "...is possible on the basis of..."

⁴⁴ MAL, p.252; "...is the inner possibility of..."

⁴⁵ VWG, p.69 (GA9, p.173); "...is the happening of..."

⁴⁶ GP, p.460; "...is rooted in..."

⁴⁷ VWG, p.62 (GA9, p.166); "...takes root in..."

⁴⁸ SZ, p.389; "...founds temporally."

⁴⁹ MAL, p.273; "...temporalizes itself in..."

⁵⁰ MAL, p.280; "...is..."

11. Zeit als Horizont des Seinsverständnisses...⁵¹

12. Transzendenz bildet Seinsverständnis aus.⁵²

Sentences (1) to (4) are very similar - lexical variations of the idea of "making possible"; (6) and (7) repeat the naturalistic metaphor of "taking root" (the footnote to (7) then takes the relation in a hermeneutic direction!); (5) is interesting, since it brings in a dynamic note (*das Geschehen*), which in Heidegger has textual associations with history (historical origins) and semantic associations with the *Ereignis*; (9) uses *sich zeitigen* for the foundational relation (see pt.B, ch.1, section 1c for more on this); (10) is typical of the replacement of a foundational relation with one of apparent identity (cf. Heidegger's comments on the identity of *Sein* and *Grund*); (11) raises the issue of convergence between Heidegger's conceptions of *Grund* and *Horizont* (this point is expanded below and examined in detail in pt.B, ch.1, section 2). While (1) to (11) are all typical, (12) is an unusual metaphor.

While this has briefly covered the foundational relations posited between (for the most part) *Transzendenz* and *Zeitlichkeit*, it must be said that the poles of these foundational relations are themselves foundational in essence (e.g. *Transzendenz* is described in VWG⁵³ as the *Urgeschehen* and as *Freiheit zum Grunde*). The interpretation of these poles is discussed further in pt.B, ch.1, section 1. The coincidence between pole and relation is discussed further in pt.A, ch.4, section 3.

In the context of the eleventh of the above sentences, a direct association of *Grund* and *Horizont* was indicated. One of the patterns which appear within the initial linguistic confusion is that of words which change the structure of founding. Founding is perhaps traditionally perceived as a linear mono-directional dependence relation. A conflation of *Grund* and *Horizont* (if there is one in Heidegger) would severely threaten such a structural perception of foundations. The following provides a further example of how *Horizont* is worked into the text.

⁵¹ SZ, p.1 & 17; "...as horizon..." (not actually a proper sentence, but the relevance is the same).

⁵² VWG, p.65 (GA9, p.170); *ausbilder*: cultivates/shapes/forms/develops

⁵³ p.70f.(GA9, p.175)

"Dieses [leibhaftige] Begegnenlassen [von Seiendem] gründet in einer Gegenwart. Sie [die Gegenwart] gibt überhaupt den ekstatischen Horizont, innerhalb dessen Seiendes leibhaftig *anwesend* sein kann." ⁵⁴

"Letting them [i.e. entities] be thus encountered [bodily] is grounded in a Present. This Present gives us in general the ecstatic horizon within which entities can have bodily *presence*."

The capacity of entities to have bodily presence (2nd sentence) and letting them be bodily encountered (1st sentence) amounts to much the same thing; the two sentences connect this to "eine Gegenwart", the first with "gründen in", the second with "den ekstatischen Horizont geben". Horizon here has the same function as a foundation, but this interchanging is structurally violent. The horizontal reconstruction of ground is examined in greater detail in pt.B, ch.1, section 2.

The passages in MAL and VWG which discuss *Transzendenz* and *Zeitlichkeit* also bring the concepts of *Umwillen* and *Freiheit* into the network. MAL gives the following connections (Heidegger concludes the third of these from the conjunction of the first and second):-

1. Das Umwillen ist das Urphänomen von Grund.⁵⁵
2. Das Umwillen zeitigt sich in der Freiheit.⁵⁶
3. Die Freiheit ist der Ursprung von Grund.⁵⁷

The conjunction of these in a syllogistic pattern suggests that *sich zeitigen in* (temporalising itself in) is quasi-synonymous with *Urphänomen sein* (being the original phenomenon) and *Ursprung sein* (being the origin). *Sich zeitigen* not only has the meaning of "temporalising", but also (archaically) of ripening, of growing to maturity. This same idea of growth can be seen in the following association. In SZ Heidegger analyses *Aussage* as *<Aufzeigung, Prädikation, Mitteilung>*.⁵⁸ During his exposition he states:-

⁵⁴ SZ, p.346; the words in square brackets add in information from the preceding sentences which make it clearer how the second of the quoted sentences relates to the first.

⁵⁵ MAL, p.276 & p.282; note that these four sentences are, like the previous ones, simplifications, not quotations. Tr.: "the for-the-sake-of is the basic phenomenon of ground."

⁵⁶ MAL, p.276; "the for-the-sake-of temporalises itself in freedom."

⁵⁷ *ibid.*; "freedom is the origin of ground."

⁵⁸ SZ, pp.154f.; *<pointing-out, predication, communication>*.

"Die zweite Bedeutung von Aussage [i.e. Prädikation] hat ihr Fundament in der ersten [i.e. Aufzeigung]. Die Glieder der prädizierenden Artikulation, Subjekt-Prädikat, erwachsen innerhalb der Aufzeigung." ⁵⁹

"The second signification of 'assertion' [i.e. predication] has its foundation in the first [i.e. pointing out]. Within this pointing-out, the elements which are Articulated in predication - the subject and predicate - arise."

The second of these two sentences either restates or renders more precise the first. The lexical shift which occurs is "hat ihr Fundament in" ---> "[Die Glieder] erwachsen innerhalb". *Erwachsen* (translated rather flatly by Macquarrie & Robinson as "arise") carries the sense of growing to maturity. What is important is that within the network of associations around the foundational, certain patterns and trends are to be found, one of which is the predilection for slipping in dynamic metaphors of growth and natural development. The association of foundational relations with *sich zeitigen* is examined further in pt.B, ch.1, section 1c.

The next example builds further on the network of associations, linking conceptions of temporality, determination, horizontality, freedom and transcendence (among others).

"Die Zeitlichkeit zeitigt sich primär aus der Zukunft. Das besagt: die ekstatische Ganze der Zeitlichkeit und damit die Einheit des Horizontes ist primär aus der Zukunft bestimmt. Das ist der metaphysische Ausdruck dafür, daß die Welt, die eben in nichts anderem gründet als in der ekstatischen Ganzheit des Horizontes, sich primär aus dem *Umwillen* zeitigt. Dieses Umwillen ist je das Umwillen des Willens, der Freiheit, d.h. des transzendierenden Zu-sich-selbst-seins." ⁶⁰

"Temporality temporalizes itself primarily out of the future. This means that the ecstatic whole of temporality, and hence the unity of the horizon, is determined primarily out of the future. That is the metaphysical way of saying that the world, which is grounded in nothing else than the ecstatic totality of the time horizon, temporalizes itself primarily out of the for-the-sake-of. This for-the-sake-of is, in each case, the for-the-sake-of of willing, of freedom, i.e., of the transcending being-toward-oneself."

This passage exhibits a number of types of semantic shift. The associations can be detected because the passage is structured according to a number of repetitions. The idea of the first sentence is repeated in the second, introduced by the words "das besagt:...". The same idea is repeated again, from a different perspective, in the third sentence, as can be seen from the introductory words "das ist der metaphysische Ausdruck dafür, daß...". In the fourth

⁵⁹ SZ, p.155.

⁶⁰ MAL, p.273

sentence, there are shifts structured according to simpler connectors: "ist", apposition, a "d.h." connector. Between the first and second sentences, one of the shifts is "sich zeitigt" -> "ist bestimmt". While the structure of the passage suggests the same idea is being presented, the words are slightly different, and in particular, "sich zeitigt" has changed to "ist bestimmt". In the third sentence, the verb of this same idea shifts back again to "sich zeitigt". In the second sentence, we have the phrase "das ekstatische Ganzheit der Zeitlichkeit und damit die Einheit des Horizontes". What is the strength of "und damit"? Why is it the case that if the idea holds true of "das ekstatische Ganzheit der Zeitlichkeit", it also holds true of "die Einheit des Horizontes"? Here again, there is a certain sameness posited between two different lexical items. In the third sentence, we find these two same phrases fused together into one phrase: "die ekstatische Ganzheit des Zeithorizontes". Here a different kind of sameness is posited between the lexical items. In the final sentence in the passage there are appositions of "der Wille", "die Freiheit", "das transzendierende Zu-sich-selbst-sein".

* * * * *

The final passage for analysis looks a step beyond the work of the 1920's, at *Beiträge zur Philosophie* (BP). Although slightly different in character, one can see that the technique of building parallel structures with nevertheless constantly changing lexis is an art which Heidegger by no means abandons. In BP Heidegger offers the following remarkable elaboration of the Ereignis.

"Das Sein ist das *Er-ignis*.

Ereignis ist:

1. die *Er-ignung*....
2. Das Ereignis der *Er-ignung* schließt in sich die *Ent-scheidung*...
3. Die *Er-ignung* als Entscheidung bringt den Geschiedenen die *Ent-gegnung*...
4. Die *Ent-gegnung* ist der Ursprung des Streitens, der west, indem er das Seiende seiner Verlorenheit in die bloße Seiendheit entsetzt. Die *Ent-setzung*...
5. Die *Ent-setzung* aber ist aus der Lichtung des Da begriffen zugleich der *Ent-zug* des Ereignisses...
6. So reich gefügt und bildlos das Seyn west, es ruht doch in ihm selbst und seiner *Einfachheit*.... ...seine Einfachheit..., die aus der *Ent-gegnung* als Streit entspringt.

7. Das Einfache des Seyns hat in sich das Gepräge der *Einzigkeit*...
 8. Die *Einzigkeit* des Seyns begründet seine *Einsamkeit*....⁶¹

At the end of the exposition, Heidegger comments on the whole:-

"In keiner diese Nennungen wird das Wesen des Seyns voll gedacht und doch wird es in jeder »ganz« gedacht.... Ereignis meint immer Ereignis als Er-eignung, Ent-scheidung, Ent-gegnung, Ent-setzung, Entzug, Einfachheit, Einzigkeit, Einsamkeit. Ungegenständlich ist die Einheit dieser Wesung...."⁶²

Heidegger simultaneously imposes a rigid framework and attempts to breach its borders by conducting a seamless narration. This simultaneity of formal construction and destruction was also to be found in the 1920's writing: phenomena would be described with a list of words (often triadic, also often longer); formal, sometimes very complex relations would be set up within this multiple elaboration; but the narrative continuity of the text would often partially re-disguise the formal structure. Not only narrative continuity, but lexical variation of coordinating concepts would add to the smoke-screen effect. In the passage quoted from BP, lexical variation of coordinating concepts is also to be seen. Numbering off the coordinating concepts according to Heidegger's own numbering, they are as follows:-

1. [Ereignis]...ist...[die Er-eignung]⁶³
2. ...schließt in sich...

⁶¹ BP, pp.470f.; the emphases are Heidegger's - he uses them to mark out from the narrative the parts of the concatenation of concepts; it should also be noted that this is NOT a linear concatenation, but a branched or forked concatenation: the branch occurs at *Ent-gegnung*, the first branch continues <*Entsetzung* - *Entzug*>, the second branch is <*Einfachheit* - *Einzigkeit* - *Einsamkeit*>. Translation cannot meet the German. A guide: "Being is the e-vent. Event is 1. e-venting.... 2. The event of e-venting encloses in itself the de-cision [di-vided]... 3. E-venting as decision brings to the divided the re-tort... 4. Re-tort is the origin of the struggle which essences by ap-palling the entity in its lost-ness in pure entitiveness.... 5. But ap-palling is at the same time, conceived from [in terms of] the clearing of the there, the with-drawal of the event... 6. However richly put together and imageless being may essence, nevertheless it is at peace in itself and its simplicity.... its simplicity..., which sources from the re-tort as struggle. 7. The simple of being has in itself the mould of singularity... 8. The singularity of being grounds its aloneness...."

⁶² *ibid.* Guide to meaning: "In none of these namings is the essence of being fully thought and yet in each it is indeed 'wholly' thought... Event always means event as e-venting, de-ciding, re-torting. ap-palling, withdrawal, simplicity, singularity, aloneness. The unity of this essencing is non-entitative...."

⁶³ See the last footnote but one for translations.

3. ...als... ...bringt...
4. ...ist der Ursprung des...
5. ...ist aus der Lichtung des Da begriffen zugleich...
6. ...entspringt...
7. ...hat in sich das Gepräge der...
8. ...begründet...

It has already been shown how variation between some of these (1,4,5,6,8) is typical of Heidegger's expression of foundational relations.

Turning to Heidegger's comment on the whole exposition, he says: "Ungegenständlich ist die Einheit dieser Wesung."⁶⁴ The *Wesung* (essencing) refers to the narrative-concatenation, and its unity is regarded as "non-entitative" or "non-objectivised". Two techniques were used to avoid entitativisation: a continuously narrative form on which the formal framework was only superimposed, and lexical variation of coordinating concepts. From this one can conclude then that one of the purposes of lexical variation is avoidance of *Gegenständlichkeit* (objectivisation, entitativisation).

The final question about the last passage is this: what do these lexically varied coordinating relations express? Many of these coordinating relations (e.g. *begründen*, *Ursprung*, *entspringen*) had long been associated with the expression of foundational dependence; likewise, BP sees one of Heidegger's greatest indulgements in the language of ground;⁶⁵ paradoxically, it would be inappropriate carelessly to attribute a foundational meaning here. Nor is it simply that the lexis of ground has found a reinterpretation; the lexis actually works in a different way in the conveyance of meaning. The relation between meaning-unit and written word has developed far from the one-to-one connections of Locke or the early Wittgenstein, nor can it be accommodated within any modern semantic theory of which I know. Nevertheless it may be to misunderstand Heidegger to think that he has created his own rules out of caprice; more reasonable would be the suppositions either that he is exaggerating and accelerating the historically dynamic relation of meaning-unit and written word, or that the "rules" he creates are responses to philosophical needs perceived by him.

⁶⁴ Quoted and translated above. "The unity of this essencing is non-entitative."

In the following section it is sought to characterise this "different way" in which Heidegger's language works in such cases as those cited above.

3) A Solution

The foregoing observations were by no means exhaustive, and they only touch one of many kinds of language-play in Heidegger. They were selected according to their relevance to the subject of this thesis, not in order to try to solve the more general problem of language in Heidegger.

To recapitulate: foundational ideas and relations are conveyed by a wide lexis, centering on words built from the root forms *-grund-*, *-spring-*, and *-fund-*; the foundational lexis comprises not only individual words, sometimes it is conveyed by units below that of the word (e.g. prefixes, such as "*ur-*"), sometimes by units higher than that of the word (e.g. phrases⁶⁶). The lexical variation is much greater than this, however: the network extends to words which normally have quite different meanings (e.g. *lichten*, *aussprechen*, *Sinn haben*), so that here we can speak of semantic interpenetration. Ghanotakis and Grieder agree with this "co-extensiveness and often interchangeability" of key notions, citing a *Wesen*-centered network linking ground, meaning (*Sinn*), being, truth and horizon (among others). That the links or semantic interpenetrations do indeed occur has been shown by examining texts where interchanges occur: that meaning should remain similar despite the lexical shift is proved by the formal frameworks (e.g. ostensible repetition, listing, comparison, syllogism) within which the shifts occur. Of course there may be many instances of such shifting and semantic interpenetration in Heidegger - but in most instances we are not fortunate enough to have a formal textual framework to demonstrate its occurrence. Those locations where a clear framework exists nevertheless show that the shifts and interpenetrations are not occasional idiosyncrasies, but so constant that they form

⁶⁵ The subject of foundations in BP will be returned to in pt.B, ch.2.

⁶⁶ A short list of examples: "hat seine ontologische Möglichkeit in" (SZ278), "wesenhaft liegen" (SZ285), "ist die existenziale Bedingung der Möglichkeit für" (SZ286), "zugrunde liegen" (SZ336), "auf dem Grunde möglich sein" (SZ339), "durch... (mit)bestimmt/konstituiert" (SZ, pp.43, 110, 133, 220).

the rule rather than the exception. If we extend this finding to all of Heidegger's writing, one may then wonder how anything can properly be distinguished or discerned. If semantic interpenetration is so wide, and semantic differentiation is a precondition of meaningful discourse, then one may wonder with Paul Hühnerfeld whether Heidegger operates a "Vokabular ohne Inhalt" (a vocabulary without content).⁶⁷ In response to this several points should be made. Firstly, many distinctions of a normal type are commonly made and exploited by Heidegger - but their significance is often local and temporary. Secondly, semantic interpenetration extends to two word-types: (i) keywords; (ii) words expressing the structural fabric of what might otherwise have been a system. Thirdly, the phrase "semantic interpenetration" is taken rather than "semantic mergence", since "differences" of a non-normal type remain within the network: as was seen in some of the examples, no member of the network could be ascribed priority, and tensions remained within the semantic field as regards (for example) static-dynamic, internal-external, formal-natural, and agency. In particular, it could not be maintained that there was substitution of certain terms for others (such as replacement of traditional or arborial terms for the terminology of time, clearing, opening and speaking). The significance of this will emerge only slowly in the following sections.

The loss of a degree of semantic stability and separation not only raises the question of the meaningfulness of Heidegger's discourse. There is, likewise, the question of what he is trying to gain at this cost. Clearly Heidegger believes there is something to be gained.

"Die Mehrdeutigkeit ist vielmehr das Element, worin das Denken sich bewegen muß, um ein strenges zu sein."⁶⁸

"Rather, multiplicity of meanings is the element in which all thought must move in order to be strict thought."

The following passage bears on the same multivocalness, and is from the so-called *Aristoteles-Einleitung* (AE) of 1922, one of the earliest documents in which the development of the thought of SZ can be seen.

⁶⁷ P.Hühnerfeld. *In Sachen Heidegger. Versuch über ein deutsches Genie* (München: Paul List Verlag, 1961), p.126; quoted in J.D.Caputo, *The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought* (New York: Fordham University, 1978), p.34.

⁶⁸ WD, p.68; in fact here Heidegger is talking about multiple interpretations of Plato, but to transfer the quote to a different context does not seem wrong.

"Die Vieldeutigkeit des Terminus wird in dem bedeuteten Gegenstand selbst ihre Wurzeln haben.... Die Einstellung auf Vieldeutigkeit (*pollachos legomenon*) ist kein bloßes Herumstochern in isolierten Wortbedeutungen, sondern Ausdruck der radikalen Tendenz, die bedeutete Gegenständlichkeit selbst zugänglich und die Motivquelle der verschiedenen Weisen des Bedeutens verfügbar zu machen."⁶⁹

"The multivocalness of the term will have its roots in the signified object itself.... Focussing on multivocalness (*pollachos legomenon*) is not a mere poking around at isolated meanings of words, but rather the expression of the radical tendency to render accessible the signified objectivity itself and make available the motivational source of the various ways of meaning."

Two elements from this passage should be emphasised: first, the idea of the *Wurzel* (root) and *Quelle* (source) of multivocalness - multivocalness raises a foundational issue - the issue of the origin of this multiplicity;⁷⁰ second, the idea of objectivity. Perhaps a few years later Heidegger would have been more circumspect in his use of such a word as "objectivity". Nevertheless, in this early writing, it seems that multivocality is intended to indicate something outside the text, and to keep it outside the text. This, perhaps, is the thought from which semantic interpenetration originates.

* * * * *

So far it has rather been assumed that as the problem is special to Heidegger's texts, Heidegger bears responsibility for setting meaning adrift⁷¹ in this way. The assumptions about where the drifting is occurring, and who or what is responsible for playing games with words, are upset by some remarks by Heidegger.

⁶⁹ AE, p.6 (the page-numbering is the original from the manuscript, reproduced in the margins in Lessing's edition). Heidegger is in fact talking about the term "Leben" (life), but the reference to Aristotle's manifold ways of the meaning of being (*pollachos legomenon*) shows that the comments are intended to have a more general application.

⁷⁰ Cf. pt.A, ch.2, section 3.

⁷¹ The phrase is taken from J.Sallis, "Meaning Adrift", *Heidegger Studies* 1 (1985), pp.91-100.

"Wenn hier schon von einem Spiel die Rede sein darf, dann spielen nicht wir mit Wörtern, sondern das Wesen der Sprache spielt mit uns, nicht nur im vorliegenden Fall, nicht erst heute, sondern längst und stets. Die Sprache spielt nämlich so mit unserem Sprechen, daß sie dieses gern in die mehr vordergründigen Bedeutungen der Worte weggehen läßt. Es ist, als ob der Mensch hätte, die Sprache eigentlich zu bewohnen."⁷²

"If we may talk here of playing games at all, it is not we who play with words, but the nature of language plays with us, not only in this case, not only now, but long since and always. For language plays with our speech - it lets our speech drift away into the more obvious meanings of words. It is as though man had to make an effort to live properly with language."

This remark from 1952 should be compared with a metaphor from 1921.

"Diese Situation ist nicht die rettende Küste sondern der Sprung ins treibende Boot, und es hängt nun daran, das Tau für die Segel in die Hand zu bekommen und nach dem Wind zu sehen."⁷³

"This situation is not the rescuing coast, rather the leap into the drifting boat, and now it is a matter of taking the sail-rope in one's hand and looking for the wind."

Heidegger's point may be this: that as regards the abstract reaches of philosophy, secure, objective and unambiguous meanings are a mirage, a fantasy, and perhaps even dangerously so. While individuals, or particular societies within rather short historical, geographical and cultural boundaries may be able to use language with relative certainty, when one moves (as philosophy does) in the realm of millenia of thought spread over a continent or so, there can be no such thing as even approximately objective meaning (as far as abstract thought is concerned). This mirage is the outcome of illegitimately extending the necessary presuppositions about language required for everyday interaction within our immediate environments to a near global reach. Such an extension may even be dangerous, since by supposing the objectivity of meaning to have a wider reach than it does, one sheds one's own responsibility, placing it instead in the mirage. Heidegger's use of language is perhaps intended to mimic, not the style of everyday discourse, but the style of trans-millennial and trans-cultural discourse, and in so doing, bring home to the reader that in the situation of drifting so widely in the abstract reaches of human existence, a reliable and secure truth remains the terrifying and non-rescindable responsibility of *Dasein*.

This marks the first aspect of the solution offered.

⁷² WD, p.83. The same text is partially quoted by J.Sallis, op.cit., p.91.

⁷³ PIA, p.37; own translation.

* * * * *

The issue in hand, to repeat, is how to interpret the near-interchangeability of a number of Heidegger's key terms, how meaning of some kind survives these radical semantic interpenetrations, why Heidegger should indulge in such devices. And thus, in the light of this, how we are to understand the concept of "ground". To put a name to the solution, we can turn to Heidegger's own word *Zusammengehörigkeit* (belonging-together). *Zusammengehörigkeit* provides less of a solution as a heading under which further theorising has been done. One of the first appearances of the term is in *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (GP).

"Am Ende ist Hegel einer fundamentalen Wahrheit auf den Spur, wenn er sagt: Sein und Nichts sind identisch, d.h. gehören zusammen. Die radikalere Frage ist freilich: Was macht eine solche ursprünglichste Zusammengehörigkeit überhaupt möglich? Wir sind nicht vorbereitet genug, um in dieses Dunkel vorzudringen."⁷⁴

"In the end, Hegel is on the track of a fundamental truth when he says that being and nothing are identical, that is, belong together. Of course, the more radical question is, What makes such a most original belonging-together at all possible? We are not well enough prepared to penetrate into this obscure region."

Hegel's "identisch" is provided with the gloss "gehören zusammen". Heidegger does not really hold the thesis that being and nothing are identical. They "belong together" in the same way that other key terms do. *Zusammengehörigkeit* retains this place in the later Heidegger's thought. In *Der Satz vom Grund* (SG), Heidegger writes:-

"Seinsgeschicklich anfänglich `sind' Sein und Grund das Selbe, bleiben es auch, aber in einer Zusammengehörigkeit, die in eine geschichtlich wandelhaftes Verschiedenheit auseinandergeht."⁷⁵

"As a matter of the initiating of the fatefulness of being, being and ground `are' the same, and remain so, but in a belonging together which diverges in a historically changing diversity."

Here *Zusammengehörigkeit*, a compromise between identity and difference, is understood historically; in other terms, a time structure holds them together. It should be emphasised that the historical dimension in question is not human-historical but *seinsgeschichtlich*. The possibility of confusion here is further promoted by Heidegger's exploitation of the human-historical dimension (the history of philosophy) as a reflection of the *seinsgeschichtliche*

⁷⁴ GP, p.443.

dimension. The general idea (in both historical dimensions) is that the earlier conceptions (i.e. those less refined and determined by history) are closer to some original pre-conceptual, pre-metaphysical access to being, and that history (with its proliferation and semantic dispersion of metaphysical keywords) represents a falling of language from being.⁷⁶ Moreover, it is in this falling direction that understanding normally tends to operate. Heidegger operates a number of devices which, if not actually attempting to reverse this process, nevertheless seek to recreate language conditions tending towards the recovery of being. One of these devices is the synthesis (*Zusammengehörigkeit*) effected by semantic interpenetration.⁷⁷

This, the attempted reversal of the *seinsgeschichtliche* dispersion of being, provides the second aspect of the solution on offer.

* * * * *

In SG the site of *Zusammengehörigkeit* is identified as the *logos*. Like *Zusammengehörigkeit*, *logos* provides less a solution as another label for the problematic.

"Sein und Grund gehören im *logos* zusammen. Der *logos* nennt diese Zusammengehörigkeit von Sein und Grund.... Der *logos* nennt zumal in Einem Sein und Grund."⁷⁸

"Being and ground belong together in the *logos*. The *logos* names this belonging together of being and ground.... The *logos* names at once in One being and ground."

Worth noting in passing are the different positions *logos* acquires in relation to *Sein*, *Grund*, and *Zusammengehörigkeit*: first it is the site of *Zusammengehörigkeit*; then it is the *Zusammengehörigkeit* of *Sein* and *Grund*; then it actually names both *Sein* and *Grund*. Here the possibility is raised, for the first time but not the last, that the language problem not only applies to *Grund*, but in part constitutes it; in other words, in accounting for semantic

⁷⁵ SG, p.184; own translation. The relevance of this and the next quotation is owed to I.Koza, op.cit. Koza mentions *Zusammengehörigkeit* on p.7.

⁷⁶ Thus one finds a tendency in Heidegger to turn to the ontological concepts of antiquity as one approach to the thinking of being. There is a significant study of this aspect of Heidegger's finding/founding of the origins of thinking: M.Zarader, *Heidegger et les paroles de l'origine* (Paris: Vrin, 1986).

⁷⁷ Another is a "dialectic" pattern or device; see below at pt.A, ch.4, section 2.

interpenetration we are already encountering the essence of Heideggerian foundations. Simply to rename the problem of semantic interpenetration as *logos* does not help.⁷⁹ One author who recognises something of the problem is Herman Rapaport. On the *logos* he writes:

"The *logos* is itself a saying wherein other words can be heard, as if the *logos* were not a term but a sound structure against which other words come out of what Heidegger calls concealment.... *Logos*... has to be comprehended in terms of gathering or collecting, and for Heidegger the word *logos* is itself a site where other terms are brought together or gathered even as they fall away as one term comes to stand for another."⁸⁰

Rapaport appears to have seen at least part of the phenomenon which I have analysed in the above passages - but only part. Probably he is aware of the passages on the *Zusammengehörigkeit* of being and ground. But when he speaks of "verbal slippages" (where I use terms such as semantic interpenetration and lexical shifting), it seems he has in mind primarily morphological variations (e.g. *grund* ---> *gründlich*) and alliterative and etymological slippages. Of course, morphology, alliteration and etymology do frequently provide frameworks for semantic slippage. Other frameworks unmentioned by Rapaport are interpretative (...*als*...) and metaphorical in appearance, plus those of the type analysed above. In all, Rapaport is very much better at finding names for the problem (and accounting for it) than analysing textual occurrences. Thus he speaks of Heidegger's language as a "manifold of undecidable proximities" and "essentialism... replaced by an interrogation of proximities pulled out through discourse".⁸¹ His identification and analysis of the problem suffers from the same undecidable proximity of names. Thus using the name "paranomasia" he says:

⁷⁸ SG, p.179f.; own translation. The connection of *logos* and *Grund* is also found in the early Heidegger, e.g. PGZ, p.365.

⁷⁹ The *logos* is frequently discussed in Heidegger's earlier (as well as later) writings: see the following list of references. PGZ, §9(a)(β); GA21, §§11-12; SZ, §7B, §34; GP, §17; MAL, pp.1-6, 156f. It is not the purpose of this thesis to analyse exhaustively Heidegger's theory of language, but only to bring the problem to a point where the issue of ground can be pursued.

⁸⁰ H.Rapaport, *Heidegger and Derrida - Reflections on Time and Language* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), p.105.

⁸¹ H.Rapaport, op.cit., pp.109 & 111.

"...for Heidegger paronomasia may well be a key to an understanding of temporality."⁸²

And later:

"Paronomasia is, therefore, a crucial temporal clue for an understanding of language as that which radically breaks with our everyday sense of experienced time."⁸³

The *Zusammengehörigkeit* of multiply interpenetrating keywords in the originary *logos* is thus given a temporal interpretation. But what kind of temporal interpretation is this? Certainly not that of everyday time, that is, of a mono-directional sequence of "nows". In fact Rapaport seems to mean a kind of textual temporality: reading and writing texts take place in time, and certain devices may be used to disrupt the linear continuity of the text.⁸⁴ Rapaport finds that various devices used by Heidegger have a "metaleptic" form (that is, going beyond while remaining where they started from, synchronous moving and staying still). When Heidegger ventures through a lexical multiplicity, he both goes beyond where he started from, and remains there - and this is supposedly isomorphic to a temporal pattern (e.g. synchronisation of present and future). Rapaport's identification of metalepsis⁸⁵ as a paratype⁸⁶ in Heidegger is a valuable insight. Rapaport's weaknesses are an unjustified

⁸² *ibid.*, p.118; Rapaport gets the word "paronomasia" from E.Schöfer, *op.cit.* - H.Rapaport, *op.cit.*, p.107; Schöfer certainly fails to identify the problem as extending beyond morphological, alliterative and etymological variations. The idea of paronomasia as temporality he owes to Derrida and Blanchot - H.Rapaport, pp.113ff.

⁸³ H.Rapaport, *op.cit.*, p.127.

⁸⁴ For a more methodical and comprehensive study of such temporality, see D.C.Wood, *The Deconstruction of Time* (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1989), pp.319-360, esp.pp.330-332 & 335ff.

⁸⁵ Rapaport's "metalepsy" is, according to the OED (2nd ed.), a slight misspelling and abuse of its original meaning; I have corrected the spelling and kept the meaning Rapaport ascribes to the word.

⁸⁶ "Paratype" is, I hope, a neologism. Its meaning is discussed further in the conclusion, but a preliminary definition can run "a device or pattern which disassembles" (see the passages on disassembly in the introduction, especially at section 3). The word has been chosen in order to avoid theoretically loaded terms, particularly words evocative of structuralism or system-building. Originally I was using rather dissatisfactory terms drawn from a number of sources: "infrastructure" from Gasché (*The Tain of the Mirror*), "Tiefenstruktur" from Rombach (*Die Gegenwart der Philosophie*), "metalogical form of thought" from Schöfer (*Die Sprache Heideggers*). As a disassembling device or pattern, the paratype iterates indefinitely but non-systematically - in different ways the text tends to mould itself to the pattern of paratypes. The paratype is what, if anything, saves the text from devolving into a system - it is a kind of anti-category. This is not to

restriction of everything to the text,⁸⁷ and (associated with this) a blind eye cast at Heidegger's use of such linguistic devices for a *para*-liptic intimation of being.⁸⁸

To restate: Rapaport recognises a problem like that identified as "semantic interpenetration": namely, a holding together or gathering of keywords, in a way in which their difference is denied by the gathering, yet at the same time a non-identity is maintained. Non-identity or difference is likened to a "going beyond" while denial of difference is likened to "staying put". The juxtaposition of such moving beyond while staying still is a paratype called *metalepsis*. *Metalepsis* has a temporal aspect, which may be understood as the synchronisation (identity) of the disparate (difference) moments of time. This forgets that the *metaleptic* synthesis is also *paralipic*, i.e. that it emphasises something by avoiding it - a device used by Heidegger to intimate what is irretrievably outside the text. While Rapaport slides horizontally through textual parallels of (dis-)similarity, Heidegger indicates a foundational problem:

"Die radikalere Frage ist freilich: Was macht eine solche ursprünglichste Zusammengehörigkeit überhaupt möglich?"⁸⁹

"Of course, the more radical question is, What makes such a most original belonging-together at all possible?"

Heidegger asks after the condition for the possibility for such *Zusammengehörigkeit* of keywords. The dramatically presented question is left hanging, however. *Paralipically* so.

This marks a third aspect to the solution on offer: namely, that the problem of semantic interpenetration has its origin in the nature of both foundations and time, with certain

say that it is what Heidegger calls an existential - an existential may have paratypal properties, or function in a paratypal way - the paratype is the more general and abstract pattern permitting the generation and functioning of existentials.

⁸⁷ Or an extension of the text to "everything"; Wood's borrowing of the word "hydrosemantics" from J.L. Austin to describe a trend of recent philosophy comes to mind. D.C. Wood, *op.cit.*, p.332.

⁸⁸ Rapaport does in fact mention a form of *paralipsis* (though not calling it such); he interprets it temporally, speaking of slowing down as one approaches the question of being, of making time; nevertheless it is only a passing mention, and he will not acknowledge that such a device aims at intimating something irretrievably outside the text. H. Rapaport, *op.cit.*, p.120.

⁸⁹ GP, p.443.

paratypes marking the relations here of language, time and ground - metalepsis and paralipsis.

* * * * *

At this point a brief recapitulation would be appropriate. A start was made simply by asking what *Grund* meant in Heidegger's earlier work. The problem of language raised itself acutely at this point, since the meaning of *Grund* became dispersed in a multiplicity of semantically interpenetrating keywords. The semantic interpenetration maintains an interplay of difference and identity, and in a number of respects the semantic items in the network are incompletely assimilable. Due to this non-assimilability, it could not be said that semantic interpenetration collapsed the text into meaninglessness; nevertheless the question remained, what does it communicate? (For the moment this question must remain unanswered). It was seen how the phenomenon of semantic interpenetration might be an iterating paratype with a temporal interpretation (both a historical and a textual temporality were mentioned), and it was seen that Heidegger tries to turn attention towards the condition for the possibility (ground) of such a discourse. Thus the problem returns to that of ground - but now as something which may point paraliptically beyond the text.

Paralipsis has it in common with mysticism that they deal with that which is not articulated in speech. Heidegger's use of paralipsis has it further in common with mysticism that attention is focussed at something which *cannot* be articulated. The charge of "mysticism" can be and has been applied pejoratively against Heidegger.⁹⁰ One must be careful here what one means by "mysticism".⁹¹ "Mysticism" is commonly used in the pejorative sense of rendering the obvious obscure - Heidegger indeed uses it in this sense in *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles* (PIA) in his phrase "bodenlose Wortmystik" ("foundationless verbal mysticism").⁹² But as Caputo⁹³ points out, Heidegger was well versed in the mystical tradition, and knew its value in the sense of rendering the

⁹⁰ L. Versényi, *Heidegger, Being and Truth* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), p.162f.

⁹¹ The seminal work is: J. Caputo, *The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought* (Ohio University Press, 1978 & New York: Fordham University Press, 1986). Subsequent references are to the 1986 reprint, which contains additional material by way of an extended introduction.

⁹² PIA, p.126.

⁹³ op.cit.

inarticulable or transcendent in speech. It is interesting to note that when Heidegger finds mysticism objectionable, it is on the basis of its *foundationlessness*. The mystical element in Heidegger is used, neither to obscure foundations nor to pitch them into an abyss, rather, to attempt to articulate a foundation that lies beyond the reach of normal language (i.e. closer to language than can be captured by its gaze). To turn to Caputo, what are the main results of his work on mysticism in Heidegger? Do his results help towards a solution to the problem of semantic interpenetration? Caputo seeks chiefly to limit the application of the word "mysticism" to Heidegger's writing. This is the significance of the word "element" in the title of his book *The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought*.

"The disconcerting thing about Heidegger... is not that he is a mystic, as the sneering references to *Seinsmystik* made by his critics imply, but the fact that he is not, that the path he stakes out is ominous, uncertain, exposed on all sides to the 'danger'. And that, I think, is something about Heidegger which we today, in the epoch of *différance*, are likely to miss."⁹⁴

The limited mystical element which Caputo finds is the following:-

"Heidegger has appropriated the structural relationship between soul and God... in order to articulate the relationship in his own work between thought and Being."⁹⁵

As an example of the structural relationship in question in the above quotation, one can refer briefly to St. Augustine's comment that God is closer to the soul than the soul to itself. Here we find Rapaport's metaleptic figure reproduced, although this time stepping (and not stepping) beyond the text. To add a historical dimension to this mystical explanation of semantic interpenetration, one might cite the myth of the fall of the soul (thought) from its union with God (being).⁹⁶ Here we find the figure discussed earlier of a *seinsgeschichtliche* dispersion of being into a multiplicity of metaphysical keywords. Other sources include attempts to express the ineffable three-in-one character of the Trinity and the dual (god-man) nature of Christ, attempts which parallel the problem here of the synchronicity of multiplicity and unity in meaning.

⁹⁴ J.D. Caputo, op. cit., p. xxi.

⁹⁵ J. Caputo, op. cit., p. 239.

Of course, none of these theological precedents are confined to the mystical tradition, but rather they feature in the philosophico-theological mainstream of Christian doctrinal development. The philosophical developments which grew out of the fusion of ancient intellectual traditions with the faith-movement of Christianity in the first millenium are developments which receive comparatively little attention in modern secularized philosophy. Yet it was especially the centuries of still unfinished attempts to render intellectually acceptable the faith-insights of the tri-unity of God and the divinity of Christ which formed a driving power for ontological thought. Both of these problematics are relevant to any discussion of multiplicity and unity, since they involved the leading thinkers of many centuries in the development of general ontologies whose eccentricity exceeds the now generally acknowledged bounds of the received metaphysical tradition.

This is a direction which Stephen Tyman takes in his deconstructive appreciation of Heidegger.⁹⁷ In fact Tyman refers only to Plato, but his reference to this as a "recurrent strain" suggests he may not have forgotten the contributions of early Christian thought. Tyman completes his analysis of the foundational in (the early) Heidegger by identifying a revision of the foundational as "active dimensional openness", which he then restates as participation.⁹⁸ The terminology of participation makes clearer the relevance to the problem of semantic interpenetration (a problem which has already been shown to reflect a deeper problem with foundations). Tyman comments:-

"Drawing upon the still largely enigmatic Platonic doctrine of *methexis*, let us call this suppressed tradition the metaphysics of participation. Whether this constitutes merely an occasional recurrent strain within the dominant tradition of metaphysical explanation, or a minor tradition of its own, what is significant about the metaphysics of participation is not so much its explanatory power as its recognition of the need to focus primary attention upon the highly self-referential act of cognizing aright the precognitive sources of cognition.... Thus it must be, for example, that the Platonic problem of the one and the many is derivative from the conscious participation in the beyond-consciousness rather than vice versa.... Furthermore, participation is differently named, differently thematized, and seemingly even differently experienced in different philosophies. Consequently, as a

⁹⁶ There may be another infrastructure at work here: a mediative or bi-directional - "dialectic" (see ch.4, section 2 below).

⁹⁷ S.Tyman, "Heidegger and the Deconstruction of Foundations", *International Philosophical Quarterly* 24 (1984), pp.347-372.

⁹⁸ S.Tyman, *op.cit.*, p.371.

'doctrine,' it does not enjoy the closure demanded of a systematic explanation. It does not explain anything at all, it answers only to a need."⁹⁹

What other sources are there for the methectic tradition? The Greek concept of *koinonia* (mutual communion or indwelling) has frequently appeared in Heidegger literature, and has its source in early Trinitarian doctrine. Later Trinitarian developments produced the concept of *perichoresis*, mentioned by C.L.Lutz in connection with Heidegger.¹⁰⁰ The Latin word for *methexis* is the root, not only of "participation", but also of "participle" - i.e. that grammatical category which combines noun and verb, static and dynamic. This strand is taken up by Bigelow into what he calls the "amphiboly" of being.¹⁰¹ Gasché, in a chapter on the "interlacings of heterology", discusses Derrida's appropriation of another Platonic concept, that of *symploke* (interweaving, *entrelacement*).¹⁰² Gasché appropriates these sources as syntheses which are "irreducibly aporetic", containing a "radical alterity".¹⁰³

It is a witness to the intangibility of the problem and the multiplicity of ways in which it appears in Heidegger's writings, that (e.g.) Lutz, Bigelow and Gasché should independently offer accounts, all referring to Heidegger, which while coinciding in their basic principle, nevertheless differ wildly in terminology, approach and analysis. Lutz and Bigelow will be returned to later in this chapter, but a few more words on Gasché are appropriate here.

Gasché is concerned mainly with Derrida, and as regards interlacings of heterology, particularly with Derrida on Plato. But he also discusses Heidegger in this connection. Here he fails to appreciate the appearance of the methectic tradition in the earlier Heidegger, and

⁹⁹ S.Tyman, *op.cit.*, pp.371f.

¹⁰⁰ C.Lutz, *Zwischen Sein und Nichts*, doctoral dissertation, Bonn University, 1984, p.11. *Perichoresis* originally meant "rotation", but its appropriation into Trinitarian doctrine produced what has been called one of the most obscure and incomprehensible of all theological concepts.

¹⁰¹ P.Bigelow, *op.cit.*, p.111.; Bigelow in fact associates the Latin *participium* with the Greek *metoche* - Lutz, however, with *methexis*. In any case, the literature seems to associate *metoche* and *methexis*. For more on Bigelow's "amphiboly of being", see pt.A, ch.4, section 1.

¹⁰² While these Platonic concepts may have had different applications for Plato, their contemporary recovery circles around the same problematic. The relevant sources are: R.Gasché, *The Tain of the Mirror* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), pp.79-105; Plato, *Statesman* (267b-311c); Gasché refers to a number of places in Derrida, but particularly: J.Derrida, "La Dissémination", (ET, e.g. pp.122,166).

¹⁰³ R.Gasché, *op.cit.*, p.104.

depends on (yet again) a biographical interpretation of the *Kehre* to explain how it appears in the later Heidegger. He says:-

"Heidegger's later philosophy reaches out under the name of Being towards structures of thought that are not easily recuperable in terms of semantics and that are, indeed, more originary than the classical objects of thought. Instead of synthesizing the manifold, the contradictory, the aporetic into one speculative whole or totality, these structures (such as *Zug*, *Fuge*,¹⁰⁴ *Geviert*, *Unter-schied*, and so on) serve as path-breaking traces, according to which the manifold, the contradictory, is laid out (and held together)."¹⁰⁵

Gasché places the early Heidegger outside the methectic tradition (contrary to the opinions of Tyman and Bigelow) on the grounds that the syntheses of the manifold, the contradictory and the aporetic are totalising syntheses - perhaps he means by this, homogeneous rather than heterogeneous. Gasché comes to this conclusion because he follows the "content" of what Heidegger says (whereas I have looked primarily at the style and method), and because he looks particularly at the notion of totality in SZ. I do not feel qualified to digress in detail on totality here, but there seem to be two ways to escape Gasché: (1) one refuses to take early Heidegger's totalising strands at their face value, for example, by taking the line that in the visible portion of SZ Heidegger was mimicking the metaphysical tradition in preparation for a destruction of these same totalising demands in the unwritten two-thirds of SZ; (2) or one says that there is a conflict of strata in the earlier Heidegger, between a totalising theme which is being steadily undermined by considerations of method and the nature of foundations - in other words that the totalising theme is subjected to a heterogeneity, a conflict with an anti-totalising direction of thinking.

These considerations mark a fourth aspect to the solution on offer: namely, that Heidegger stands in a long and continuing onto-theological tradition ("methectic"), bordering on the mystical tradition, which asserts the heterogeneity of the origin contrary to any conceptuality derivable from our normal environments.

¹⁰⁴ On fugue structure, see pt.B. ch.2, section 1a.

¹⁰⁵ R.Gasché, op.cit., p.85.

CH.2. LOGICAL IRREGULARITIES IN FOUNDATIONAL LANGUAGE

That there is a general language problem in Heidegger, particularly with respect to foundational language, was discussed at the beginning of the last chapter. There it was pointed out that the language problem has many dimensions, and only one of these (semantic interpenetration) was examined. Examination of the problem posed by semantic interpenetration led to the beginnings of a revaluation of the foundational. Here a similar method will be pursued with respect to the logical dimensions of the problem. An adequate account of the foundational in Heidegger's earlier writings must be able to account for such formulations as "der Grund gründet"¹ and "der abgründige Grund".² Heidegger's use of paradoxical and tautologous formulations is well-known and well-documented, but good explanation of its significance is lacking.³ In the following section, the best account available - that of Erasmus Schöfer - will be examined; subsequently Heidegger's discussion of the principles of identity, contradiction and ground in the lecture series MAL will be looked at in order to develop a better account.

1) The significance of paradox and tautology

Schöfer's principal examples of the use by Heidegger of paradox are the analyses of truth⁴ (the un-essence of the essence of truth) and *Zeitlichkeit* (namely, the repeated formulations in which the future is paradoxically said to be "no later" than the past, and the past is said to take its origin in the future).⁵ A supplementary list of other paradoxical formulations is also given by him, for example: the birth-character of death, the flight of Dasein from itself, the conflation of "whence" and "whither", the word-plays on bipolar oppositions such as "near" and "far", "whole" and "nothing", "first" and "last"; the silent speech of

¹ BP, pp.29 & 307.

² BP, passim; the idea also appears in VWG.

³ The following comments are based on E.Schöfer, *Die Sprache Heideggers* (Verlag Neske, Pfullingen, 1962); ET of relevant chapter in J.J.Kockelmans ed. *On Heidegger and Language* (Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1972), at pp.281-301.

⁴ In addition to Schöfer's references, also, e.g., BP, pp.347ff.

⁵ Schöfer, op.cit., pp.186-191.

conscience; the courage to fear; the bright night of nothing.⁶ Not mentioned by Schöfer, and of relevance to this thesis, are the formulations in *Beiträge zur Philosophie* of the abyssal ground⁷ and the need of needlessness.⁸

How does Schöfer assess Heidegger's use of paradox? He draws several elements of explanation together: (1) paradox as a shock tactic, the justification of the use of which lies in the effect on the reader; (2) paradox as, taking the Greek origin literally, "*para-doxos*" - against doctrine, contrary to the expectations of traditional opinion; (3) paradox as a possible form of expression among other forms, such that an idea of itself not paradoxical could be presented, *inter alia*, as a paradox; (4) paradox as the juxtaposition of two ideas from two different levels of discourse, reconcilable when recognised as belonging to different levels of discourse, but which, in the context of the paradox, the reader is invited to take as belonging to a single level at which they are not reconcilable.⁹ Generally, Schöfer wishes to weaken and explain away Heidegger's use of paradox, and reveal a conventionally consistent expression behind the paradox. Maintenance of the strength of the paradox by a "dialectical" interpretation in the Hegelian manner is avoided.¹⁰

While there is nothing "wrong" with Schöfer's assessment of paradox, it is limited by its failure to learn from Heidegger. Schöfer looks out at Heidegger from the shelter of a non-Heideggerian framework for the appraisal of paradox. To improve on Schöfer, we need at least to think of the paradox in terms of Heidegger's work on time and ground. The work in question here is Heidegger's analysis of the three principles of identity, contradiction

⁶ Schöfer, op.cit., pp.192f, 195.

⁷ BP, pp.371-388.

⁸ BP, p.107.

⁹ The appeal to different textual levels as justifying apparently paradoxical formulations has been 'around' for some time; e.g. in the context of theological criticism of statements about the nature of god. Such a justification appears to conflict with the methods of deconstructionist criticism, which actually seeks out non-homogeneity between different textual strata and applies a negative evaluation on this basis. (Here I use Gasché's distinction between deconstructionist criticism and deconstructivism: R.Gasché, *The Tain of the Mirror*, Cambridge: Harvard University, 1986, p.3.)

¹⁰ Schöfer, op.cit., pp.183-7, 193-6.

and ground in MAL, and since these have consequences not only for Heidegger's use of paradox (breach of the principle of contradiction), but also for his use of tautology (breach of the principle of identity), Schöfer's comments on tautology will be brought into the discussion first.

As with paradox, tautology is not an occasional and well-marked departure from an otherwise logically well-behaved text. The tautologies and paradoxes more commonly quoted from Heidegger simply lie at the more readily identifiable end of a range of quasi-tautologous and quasi-paradoxical forms. The most readily identifiable kind of tautology regularly found in Heidegger's writings is that of the "etymological tautology", referred to by Schöfer as the *figura etymologica*.¹¹ An etymological tautology is the repetition of morphological variations of the same root both in the subject and in the predicate of some proposition (e.g. unity unifies), whereas a standard tautology involves the repetition of ideas in subject and predicate (e.g. the event occurred). Some examples of etymological tautology given by Schöfer are: *das Nichts nichtet*,¹² *die Welt weltet*,¹³ *das Ding dingt*,¹⁴ *die Zeitlichkeit zeitigt sich*,¹⁵ *die Angst ängstet sich*,¹⁶ *das Wesen west*¹⁷ (the nothing nothings, the world worlds, the thing things, temporality temporalizes, worry worries, the essence essences). Further important examples are: *der Grund gründet*¹⁸ (ground grounds), *der Sprung erspringt*¹⁹ (the leap leaps), "*vom Ereignis er-eignet...*"²⁰ (not to be translated lightly).

¹¹ Schöfer, op.cit., pp.202-217 (pp.287-301).

¹² VWG, p.21 (GA9, p.123), WIM, p.11 (GA9, p.114).

¹³ VA, p.172; first occurrence of the neologism "welten" is 1919, GA vol.56/57 at p.73.

¹⁴ VA, p.173.

¹⁵ SZ, p.328.

¹⁶ SZ, p.186.

¹⁷ frequently; for further examples cited by Schöfer: op.cit., p.203f.

¹⁸ BP, p.29 & 307; cf. also the description of *Dasein* on p.239 as "der gegründete Gründer des Grundes" (the grounded grounder of grounds).

¹⁹ BP, p.9.

²⁰ BP, p.3.

In the case of etymological tautology, Schöfer seems to arrive at a better explanation than in the case of paradox, and an explanation that partly takes account of the content of Heidegger's thought. However some points need bringing out more strongly. To account for Heidegger's etymological tautologies, Schöfer draws on the following:-

"Welt west, indem sie weltet. Dies sagt, das Welten von Welt ist weder durch anderes erklärbar noch aus anderem ergründbar."²¹

"World essences in that it worlds. This means that the world's worlding can be neither explained by something else nor fathomed from something else."

Schöfer comments that between the subject and its activity, its doing, there is "no difference", although he then interprets the identity/difference issue as one solely of "intensity".²² To put the point differently, several things seem to be achieved by the tautology: (1) it is made clear that the activity is unique to the subject - no other subject does the same thing; (2) the activity as described is the entirety of the subject's activity - everything the subject does is contained in the predicate - the subject does nothing else; (3) the reader is required to see the activity of the subject as a unity - the subject does not do many different things, just one thing.

Schöfer also makes the point that nothing can be inserted between the subject and its activity, which is more in line with Heidegger's own comment; in other words: a third thing is excluded.²³ The English translation of "ergründen" as "to fathom" draws the attention away from something that Schöfer also fails to emphasise: the exclusion of the third is the exclusion of a foundational move, of a step back in the chain of principles, grounds, substrates or justifications. What is at stake in the problem of tautologous expression is, for Heidegger, the issue of the regression of grounds. The issue is this: to what extent can the thinker avoid falling into patterns of infinite regressions and vicious circles through the use of foundational concepts?

²¹ VA, p.172.

²² Schöfer, op.cit., pp.208f.

²³ The exclusion of a catalyst is also achieved by the use of reflexives in an attempt to copy the Greek middle-voiced mood.

Modern western disdain of tautology (whether on grounds of style or of linguistic inefficiency) has this disadvantage: that in any proposition purporting to express a "fundamental" metaphysical principle or fact, something can always be driven between subject and predicate - something which can demand a further explanation or justification, something which undermines the status of the proposition as "fundamental". However, does it help simply to rehabilitate the tautology in the face of literary disdain - i.e. simply to remove its negative evaluation? The rehabilitation of the tautology is no better than the use of (e.g.) conceptions of God as the unmoved mover or the *natura naturans*, or the logician's appeal to the self-evidency of certain truths. All these tactics share this: that they simply evade the problem of infinite regression rather than looking to the origin of the problem and genuinely solving it. Does Heidegger simply evade the problem?

Beyond Schöfer's explanation of tautology in Heidegger as (1) maintaining the intensity of the agent's activity in the realisation of its potential, and (2) the exclusion of a third element, a catalyst for this realisation, lie further possible explanations. Schöfer speaks also of the unifying of subject and predicate in a non-empty sense, and moves to the problem of Heidegger's challenge to subject-predicate structure. What he says, however, is vague and brief. The following explanation may be a derived or quite different idea. One of the predicaments faced at the meta-philosophical level of discourse adopted by Heidegger is the prejudice concepts are subjected to in their presentation according to received grammatical categories (nouns, verbs, etc). Whether a concept is presented in a verbal form or a substantivised form affects the way in which the concept is understood by the reader. More generally, all the received grammatical categories (not only noun and verb) prejudice thinking. These predicaments lead into the dilemma: how to remove the prejudice of received grammatical structure (i.e. de-categorise language) without losing successful communication altogether. With the violation of grammatical borders, rigid structuring of language becomes fluid. Here we have, not semantic interpenetration (i.e. breakdown of semantic borders), but a breakdown of syntactic structure, raising a problem of difference and identity similar to that of the last section.

Leaving Schöfer, it can be said that his book - thorough and unambitious - nevertheless has its limits: the date of writing leaves him unable to take into account the subsequently

published works, many of which are vital to the theme; his categorisation of features of Heidegger's language use often has the character of a museum - its greatest strength is the collection and listing of peculiarities from the texts, while the philosophical comment on these lacks persistence and an appreciation for the unity, purpose or development of Heidegger's use of language; further, Schöfer's framework for appreciating Heidegger remains not only largely "outside Heidegger", but also relatively unaffected by Heidegger, which means that Schöfer misses many links between the form and content of Heidegger's work.

2) The principles of identity, contradiction and sufficient reason

This section looks in particular at the discussion of the three principles of identity, contradiction and ground in MAL; Heidegger's discussion centres around the expression of these principles in Leibniz. (The same historical starting point is taken in *Der Satz vom Grund*, which is an associated but different approach to the problem).²⁴ Heidegger's deliberations on the relative priority among these three principles enables the development of an explanation for the use of paradox and tautology discussed in the last section. This explanation brings the issue of the character of the foundational into the problem of paradox and tautology. The section begins with an identification of the main thesis in MAL about the principle of ground (it is not immediately obvious what the main thesis is, nor what kind of attitude Heidegger adopts towards it); the section then moves on to examine Heidegger's textual destruction of Leibniz so far as this touches on the principle of ground; finally the validity of the findings and their significance is discussed.

* * * * *

²⁴ On the Leibniz-Heidegger connection, see: R.Crease, *Heidegger, Leibniz, and the Principle of Sufficient Reason* (dissertation, Columbia University, 1987); R.Cristin, *Heidegger e Leibniz: il sentiero e la ragione* (Milan: Bompiani, 1990). More has been written about the later approach in SG: e.g. J.Caputo, *The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought*, U.Wenzel, *Die Problematik des Gründens beim späten Heidegger*; also I.Koza, *Das Problem des Grundes in Heideggers Auseinandersetzung mit Kant*. On early Heidegger and the principles of logic: D.A.White, *Logic and Ontology in Heidegger* (Ohio State UP, 1985), Ch.1.; F.Dastur, "Logic and Ontology: Heidegger's 'Destruction' of Logic", in *Research in Phenomenology* 17 (1987), pp.55-74 (followed by a discussion with, *inter alia*, Derrida, Krell and Sallis).

Widely recognised in the secondary literature on Heidegger is his challenge to subject-predicate structure in Western languages.²⁵ An example from the later Heidegger is the strategy of parataxis waged against subject-predicate structure in *Was heißt Denken?*²⁶ The general claim in both early and later stages of Heidegger's thought, crudely summarised, is that the contingent appearance of subject-predicate form in Indo-European languages is the origin of characteristic forms in Western logic. Showing the dependence of supposedly self-evident principles of logic on contingent structures appearing in natural languages is a preliminary to freeing oneself from the hold of these principles and making a new beginning to thinking. The relativisation of subject-predicate based logic is a goal towards which Heidegger moves by using a number of different strategies. One of the earlier strategies involved, superficially interpreted, a reordering of three principles of logic. The "accepted" (*übliche*)²⁷ order (principle of identity ---> principle of contradiction ---> principle of ground) is changed so that the principle of ground becomes the first principle of logic. The lecture series of Summer 1928 (MAL) is the most important of Heidegger's early writings on this subject.

Before discussing MAL, a brief warning should be given: it should not be thought that the main thesis of MAL marks any radically new departure or change following the publication of SZ. Material on the principles of contradiction and identity was already intended in the lecture series of Winter 25/26,²⁸ although the proposed section (section B.1d) was neither delivered nor published.²⁹ The basic intention of the undelivered section was summarised in the introduction as follows:-

²⁵ See Schöfer, op.cit., p.210; J.Lohmann, "M.Heideggers »Ontologische Differenz« und die Sprache", *Lexis* I, 1948, at pp.49-106; ET of Lohmann's article in J.J.Kockelmans ed., op.cit., pp.303-363; D.A.White, op.cit.

²⁶ WD, p.111f., SG, p.105.

²⁷ MAL, p.282.

²⁸ *Logik - Die Frage nach der Wahrheit*, GA21.

²⁹ See the outline of the lectures, GA21, p.26.

"...wohl aber muß gefragt werden, ob nicht der »Satz« vom Widerspruch nur ein bestimmter Ausdruck ist für ein ursprüngliches Grundverhältnis, das primär nicht in der Dimension des Spruches und des Satzes liegt...." ³⁰

"...but rather it must be asked whether the 'principle' of contradiction is not simply a particular expression for a primordial ground-relation, which lies primarily elsewhere than in the dimension of diction and principle...."

This significantly anticipates MAL. To turn to MAL, how is this subordination of the principle of contradiction to issues of founding worked out in 1928?

In the first half of MAL (pp.1-133) there is continual discussion of the origins and interrelations, in the history of philosophy, of the three principles of identity, contradiction, and sufficient reason. With particular reference to Leibniz, Heidegger notes that these three principles have been accorded an order of priority, such that the principle of identity is first, and the principle of ground is third. Heidegger summarises his own counter-thesis at the very end of MAL:-

"Unser These lautet: der erste Grundsatz der Logik ist der Satz vom Grunde."³¹

"Our claim is that the first grounding statement [Grundsatz - principle] of logic is the statement of ground."

It would be tempting to take this counter-thesis at the same level and in the same way as the theses Heidegger mentions from Leibniz, Wolff and Baumgarten.³² This interpretation should be avoided. The previous quotation continues:-

"Aber diese These ist nicht einfach die Umkehrung der überlieferten Ordnung, sondern sie ist gesprochen aus der Radikalisierung der Logik zur Metaphysik."³³

"This claim, however, is not simply the reversal of the traditional order, but is spoken out of the radicalisation of logic toward metaphysics."

During the discussion of Leibniz (MAL §§1-3), Heidegger avoids an explicit reversal of the principles. His purpose there is otherwise, namely: (1) to undermine the tendency of logicians to justify logic on its own basis; (2) to discredit any kind of linear ordering of logical principles; (3) to suggest a new direction for philosophical logic. All this is a part of the radicalisation (*radix* - root - ground) of logic into metaphysics. A note here is

³⁰ GA21, p.23.

³¹ MAL, p.282.

³² MAL, p.64ff.

required on the meaning of "metaphysics" in this context, since the passage may initially seem to be an admission of indulging in just what 20th century philosophy has been so concerned to save itself from. Consistently with Derrida's comment that there are no metaphysical concepts in and of themselves,³⁴ in KM and MAL Heidegger seems to want to retrieve even the word "metaphysics" from the metaphysical tradition.

Although Heidegger plays with the possibility of the priority of the principle of ground in the earlier parts of MAL, he does not seriously announce this thesis until after the second main part (*Zweites Hauptstück*, pp.135-281). The main achievement of this second half of the lecture series is the development or reconstruction of the notion of "ground", and by the time the thesis that "the principle of ground is the first principle of logic" is produced, "ground" has a quite different kind of meaning from that which it had earlier. So as before, it cannot be said that in reversing one metaphysical thesis Heidegger has simply produced yet another metaphysical thesis. The radicalisation of logic into metaphysics (a foundational move) may reveal a quite different metaphysics to the traditional one - but the centre of interest here must remain with the foundational.

The MAL thesis that "the principle of ground is the first principle of logic" has this relevance: that it provides an explanation for Heidegger's use of tautology and paradox (and more general logico-syntactic irregularities). If the principle of identity is not the first and most "self-evident" principle of logic, this is because certain simple identities and tautologies are not so innocently trivial as they seem. Likewise, Heidegger's counter-thesis would have it that the principle of contradiction is more than the simple converse of the principle of identity. In Heidegger's interpretation of Leibniz, he strips away the innocence of the principles to reveal foundational presuppositions of a more nebulous and primordial character than any fine-cut propositions and axioms. The claim that the first principle of logic is the principle of ground is less a metaphysical counter-thesis to Leibniz, as a destruction or disas-sembly revealing foundational presuppositions.³⁵ The

³³ MAL, p.282.

³⁴ J.Derrida, *Positions* (ET trans.A.Bass. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), at p.57 of ET. (quoted in R.Gasché, op.cit., p.165).

³⁵ Heidegger describes his analysis of Leibniz as a "Destruktion": MAL, pp.35 & 37.

subject of this section now turns to tracing these foundational traits as they appear in the course of the destruction.³⁶

* * * * *

The destruction is initiated with an interpretation of the historical background to Leibniz's conceptions. Abbreviated, the line of thought runs thus: (1) Western logic is subject-predicate based.³⁷ (2) The subject-predicate relation was, originally, a relation where the subject is the *Zugrundeliegende* (lying-as-a-basis-for, by which Heidegger translates the Gk. *hypokeimenon*).³⁸ (3) A key intermediate step in the history of predicate theory was the inclusion theory of predication, whereby the predicate is regarded as "included within" the subject.³⁹ (4) Heidegger uses the conception of "inclusion" as a historical bridge between the original Greek conception of predication as a kind of grounding (in a *hypokeimenon*) and the later conception that all true predications were analysable in terms of identity relations: *zugrundeliegen* ---> inclusion ---> identity.⁴⁰ This is the core of Heidegger's explanation how the principles of identity and contradiction gained primacy over the principle of ground by historical accident. To explain this primacy historically is to undercut the tendency to try and justify logic on its own basis - i.e. as consisting of self-evident truths.⁴¹ Behind the discussion of the ordering of principles of ground, identity and contradiction, lies the more important theme of the relation of history and logic: does logic, as a set of timeless truths, stand self-evidently on its own basis, or is its content and justification only to be fully grasped through its history? Behind this lies the issue of the conception of time in thinking: logical principles have a history, and the supposedly non-temporal character of logical principles cannot be used to justify regarding them as superior to and separable from their historical origins. Whether Heidegger's interpretation is true as a matter of human history from Plato onwards is of secondary importance: cutting out some of the possibly mythical material in the interpretation, it

³⁶ Cf. VWG pp.26f (GA9, pp.129f) for a very abbreviated version of the MAL destruction.

³⁷ MAL, p.1.

³⁸ MAL, p.39.

³⁹ MAL, pp.37-47.

⁴⁰ MAL, pp.48f.

retains serious worth as a matter of *Seinsgeschichte* - of a different historical dimension constituted by the falling differentiation of being and thought.

The second part of Heidegger's destruction to be examined here looks at his questioning of Leibniz's hierarchy of principles. Of greater significance here is the style and method, rather than the content. The method involves finding points or breaks in Leibniz's system where unacknowledged foundational presuppositions are revealed. For example, Heidegger says that Leibniz's *veritates rationis* (the principles of identity and contradiction) are in no lesser need of a *Grund* than the *veritates facti*, the difference lying in whether or not the *Grund* needs to be shown (i.e. in their *Beweisbedürftigkeit*).⁴² A detailed interpretation of the following passage will be used to show what is typical in Heidegger's method.

"Rückführbarkeit auf Identitäten besagt: *Widerspruchslosigkeit*. Was einen Widerspruch einschließt, das ist, was überhaupt nicht sein kann, da ja *esse inesse* und dieses *idem esse* besagt. Was vom Grund aus nicht sein kann, ist das unmögliche. Allein, sofern gerade diese notwendigen Wahrheiten dem Prinzip der Widerspruchslosigkeit als dem Prinzip ihrer Rückführbarkeit - d.h. Begründbarkeit unterstehen, gehört zu ihnen auch das *principium reddendae rationis* - ja, man kann und muß umgekehrt sagen: dieses ist ursprünglicher als der Satz vom Widerspruch."⁴³

"Reducibility to identities denotes *non-contradiction*. Whatever contains a contradiction is what cannot at all be, since *esse* denotes *inesse* and this denotes *idem esse*. What basically cannot be is the impossible. Yet insofar as these necessary truths are subject to the principle of non-contradiction as principle of their reducibility, i.e. of their demonstrability, the *principium reddendae rationis* also belongs among them. Indeed one could and must say, conversely, that the latter principle is more primordial than the principle of non-contradiction."

In this passage, careful attention needs to be paid to the interplay of concepts expressing (i) identity/contradiction, and (ii) ground. In the latter group (concepts expressing ground) the following should be noted: *Rückführbarkeit*, *vom Grund aus*, *Begründbarkeit unterstehen*, *principium reddendae rationis*, *ursprünglicher*. Care also needs to be taken over Heidegger's endorsement of these sentences: the first three are loosely attached to Heidegger's Leibniz interpretation; the fourth and last sentence is Heidegger himself, but whether this is a genuine view rather than a critical tactic is questionable.

⁴¹ At MAL, p.70, Heidegger comments on this tendency.

⁴² MAL, p.65f.

⁴³ MAL, p.66; Heim's translation slightly altered.

To interpret the passage: in the first three sentences, Heidegger can be seen adopting the tactic of trying to insert at any point possible "grounding concepts" into expositions of Leibniz on identity and contradiction (one could say that he attempts to locate foundational fissures, Freudian slips, in Leibniz's text). Between the second and third sentences, Heidegger shifts from the strengthening particle "*überhaupt*" to the normally synonymous but foundationally provocative expression "*vom Grund aus*": this must rate as a fairly frivolous shift. Less frivolous is the introduction of the concept of *Rückführbarkeit* into the interdefinition of identity and contradiction in the first sentence. *Rückführbarkeit* is Heidegger's interpretative translation of Leibniz's words *resolutio*, *resolvi* and *reduci* (loosely quoted by Heidegger). The Latin *reducere* is the origin of the English "to reduce"; Heidegger's German translation (*rückführen*) is etymologically correct but semantically questionable: unusual in German, but not quite a neologism, *rückführen* recovers the Latin origin of *re-ducere*, a returning or leading back. While a conventional logician might prefer to discuss the Leibniz texts in terms of "analysis" and "reduction", Heidegger uses a term expressing motion (*-führ-*) back (*Rück-*). In the fourth sentence Heidegger again slightly shifts the concept: "Rückführbarkeit - d.h. Begründbarkeit", making the foundational connection more obvious. This foundational character Heidegger has revealed within the relation of identity and contradiction. He then exploits the foundational element opened up between them in order to provoke the reader with the idea that the principle of ground may be placed, in order of priority, between the principles of identity and contradiction: "dieses [das *principium reddendae rationis*] ist ursprünglicher als der Satz vom Widerspruch".⁴⁴

* * * * *

What is the significance of this claim that the principle of ground is prior to the principle of contradiction? How should we assess the validity of this claim? To what extent is a truth-value attributable to this claim?

The significance is this: the priority of the principle of ground over the principle of contradiction would entail that the principle of ground is not subject to the principle of contradiction, and that therefore contradictory expressions are not outlawed in texts which

⁴⁴ *ibid.*, translated above.

elaborate the principle of ground. This provides a possible understanding of the use of paradox. However it does not yet explain why paradox is positively helpful to a text. Earlier Heidegger's historical myth of the development of predicate theory was summarised, and there it was said that the shifting of predicate theory from being a matter of foundations to one of identities was presented by Heidegger as a matter of historical accident. Is "accident" the right word here, or might it be the case that Heidegger regarded such an evolution of thought as a permanent temptation and tendency (not a historical necessity, though)?⁴⁵ Reasserting the priority of foundational issues over matters of the logic of difference and identity then becomes a matter, not of a one-off correction, but a permanent stylistic need.⁴⁶ The use of paradox and other logical and syntactic irregularities, if they could meet this need, would then be justified as positively beneficial.

The second question was how one should assess the validity of the suggestion that the principle of ground is prior to the principle of contradiction. What can one make of the shift-series: *reduci/resolvi* ---> *Rückführbarkeit* ---> *Begründbarkeit* ---> requiring the demonstration of a ground? Surely Heidegger's argument for this is no philosophical argument at all, but worthless rhetoric, a semantic *trompe l'oeil*? While the text may choose the form of language-play, there is a serious aim behind it. The definition of true predication in terms of its "reducibility TO identities" draws the philosopher to concentrate on the identities as objects of the search; the definition draws attention away from what the philosopher is doing in establishing the identities. Heidegger aims to correct this distortion, exploring the nature of what the philosopher is doing (*reducere* - *rückführen*). He suggests that the *reductio* is another manifestation of grounding. The questions which need to be extracted and maintained here are these: what are we doing when we recognize identities and contradictions, tautologies and paradoxes? Are we doing something which is correctly identified as a process of grounding? The language play draws attention to the foundational in the pre-cognitive.

⁴⁵ Note Heidegger's comment at MAL, p.70, on logic's constant tendency to deny its metaphysical origins.

⁴⁶ Cf. the interpretation of *Entwurf* in pt.A, ch.4, section 2.

To what extent is Heidegger committing himself to the thesis that the principle of ground is prior to the principle of contradiction? The phrasing "ja, man kann und muß..." with which he introduces the suggestion evasively circles round a personal endorsement, and the thesis is immediately dropped from the discussion. The point Heidegger really wants here is something else: namely, that the principle of ground cannot be separated from the principles of identity and contradiction in the manner of Leibniz's distinction between truths of reason and truths of fact; rather, there is an interdependence of all three principles.

Concluding §3 a couple of pages later, Heidegger says:-

"...- ja vielleicht besteht gar keine Ordnung in dem Sinne, daß eines aus dem anderen »geradlinig« ableitbar wäre. Und in der Tat ist keines dieser Grundphänomene ursprünglicher als das andere - sie sind gleichursprünglich." ⁴⁷

"Indeed, perhaps there is no order in the sense that one would be 'linearly' deducible from the other. And in fact none of these basic phenomena is more primordial than the other. They are equiprimordial."

Here he is referring, not to the principles of identity, contradiction and ground per se, rather to the basic phenomena in terms of which the principles have been thought out, such as identity, ground and truth. Here we find more clearly the rejection of any linear ordering; the relation consists rather in the enigmatic brand of interdependence which Heidegger calls *Gleichursprünglichkeit*. In §1-3, Heidegger does not so much "stop short" of the thesis that "the principle of ground is the first principle of logic"; rather he has "gone beyond" this thesis. The discussion of §3 has focussed on the history of ordering the principles. Heidegger's strategy has been to question the particular orders produced, with the purpose of raising the general problem of ordering the principles. Having raised the problem, he now puts it directly: linear ordering of the principles is in general not possible. Heidegger ends up with the problem of the *Gleichursprünglichkeit* of the phenomena in terms of which the principles are stated, and this is a step beyond placing the principles in any particular hierarchy.

The passage last quoted continues:-

⁴⁷ MAL, p.69.

"Aber gerade darum ist ein zentrales Problem 1. die innere Verfassung dieser Gleichursprünglichkeit und 2. der Boden, der solches möglich macht." ⁴⁸

"But precisely on that account there is a central problem concerning: 1) the inner constitution of this equiprimordiality, and 2) the ground which makes it possible."

Why does Heidegger describe (1) and (2) as one central problem? It should be remembered that among other semantic interpenetrations in Heidegger, there is the partial conflation of *Wesen* and *Grund* intended to disrupt an inner-outer distinction in the determination of concepts. And how does this central problem arise? The subject of §3 has been the ordering of the principles; it was an issue, for example, whether the principle of contradiction was prior to the principle of ground, or vice versa. At the end of §3, the issue is recognised as a non-issue, and a new issue is produced from the debris of the old. The new issue concerns the structure of the old: namely, its attempt to establish relations of priority. For example, Heidegger referred to Wolff and Baumgarten's attempt to derive the principle of ground from the principle of contradiction: Heidegger's interest lies not so much with the correct hierarchical position of the principle of ground, as with the fact that they tried to derive one basic principle from another - the issue is what were they doing in "deriving"? Was it some kind of "grounding"?

Two similar theses here need to be distinguished:-

1. The principle of ground is prior to the principle of contradiction.
2. The problem of "grounding" (in a sense as yet undefined in Heidegger's text) takes precedence over conventional themes in philosophical logic.

Heidegger means to accept the second of these, not the first.

* * * * *

To conclude this sub-section, where does the discussion stand? what has been gained? Although possibilities for a justification of the use of logical and syntactic irregularities have arisen during the course of the discussion, their validity turns on clarifying the

⁴⁸ MAL, p.69.

conception and status of the foundational in Heidegger. At every point, the issue of the foundational arose, but was not solved. At this point in the discussion, the issue of the foundational has centred on the notion of *Gleichursprünglichkeit* (equiprimordiality). To what extent does this lead finally to the sought-after clarification?

3) Equiprimordiality

In the last section the main theme was Heidegger's discussion in MAL §§1-3 of the historical origins and relative logical priority of the three principles of identity, contradiction and ground. Two lines of attack were identified: the questioning of the self-evidency of a logical ordering (i) by tracing the historical origins of the ordering, and (ii) by suggesting an alternative order. The goal served by this disas-sembly of Leibniz was to bring into question the wisdom of any attempt to order basic principles or concepts of thinking in a linear hierarchy, and this was presented by Heidegger as a problem about the nature of the foundational. The alternative to a linear hierarchy was *Gleichursprünglichkeit* (equiprimordiality).⁴⁹ However this remained an unexplored name.

Is *Gleichursprünglichkeit* a problem? Perhaps it means quite simply no more than a horizontal structure as distinct from a vertical one, such that the phenomena do not line up in a vertical chain, each dependent on the one above, but rather that no phenomenon is nearer an ultimate origin than the others and all are on the same level. However Heidegger's actual use of this word suggests there is nothing so simple as this, and he draws attention to the nature of *Gleichursprünglichkeit* as a problem.

⁴⁹ R.Gasché, op.cit., p.181f., notes the use of the concept *Gleichursprünglichkeit* in Husserl, and footnotes D.Henrich's point that Fichte first used the word. Gasché briefly discusses Heidegger, concluding with the criticism that Heidegger fails to abandon the idea of *Gleichursprünglichkeit* forming a unity and totality (within which the coming together of a plurality is possible). The little that Heidegger says about *Gleichursprünglichkeit* is indeed multiply unsatisfactory.

"Und in der Tat ist keines dieser Grundphänomene ursprünglicher als das andere - sie sind gleichursprünglich. Aber gerade darum ist ein zentrales Problem 1. die innere Verfassung dieser Gleichursprünglichkeit und 2. der Boden, der solches möglich macht."⁵⁰

"And in fact none of these basic phenomena is more primordial than the other. They are equiprimordial. But precisely on that account there is a central problem concerning: 1) the inner constitution of this equiprimordiality, and 2) the ground which makes it possible."

Gleichursprünglichkeit suffers the same weaknesses as a number of Heidegger's more deeply methodological notions: although its importance is emphasised, and although it can be seen in operation, only scattered and incomplete accounts of its nature are given. Enough can be gathered from Heidegger's use to know that as early as 1921 it was a relatively well-developed notion.⁵¹ It is particularly associated with the interrelation of the triadic structures which pervade (e.g.) SZ,⁵² but it is not restricted to this: it also characterises the interrelation of some binary oppositions ("Das Dasein ist gleichursprünglich in der Wahrheit und Unwahrheit"⁵³), and larger concept-groups.⁵⁴ Despite the precedents in Husserl and Fichte,⁵⁵ Heidegger probably used the word as parallel to *Gleichzeitigkeit* (simultaneity); the relation between *Gleichursprünglichkeit* and *Gleichzeitigkeit* may be more than mere parallel construction if one takes into consideration the coalescence of time and ground discussed in pt.B, ch.1.⁵⁶ The chief characteristic of *Gleichursprünglichkeit* may be said to be its evasiveness: above all it is used to avoid relating keywords in hierarchies of derivation while maintaining (unifying?) a multiplicity of keywords. This can be seen, for example, in the following passage.

⁵⁰ MAL, p.69.

⁵¹ PIA, pp.102f.

⁵² e.g. SZ, pp.114, 133, 137, 161, 200, 220, 297, 329, 365, 372.

⁵³ SZ, p.223 ("Dasein is equiprimordially both in the truth and in untruth").

⁵⁴ SZ, p.385: the five keywords death, guilt, conscience, freedom and finitude are grouped as equiprimordial.

⁵⁵ See footnote 49 above.

⁵⁶ Also relevant to the connection between *Gleichursprünglichkeit* and time: at SZ, p.159 there is an interchange between *zugleich* (at the same time) and *gleichursprünglich* (see section on semantic interpenetration for the notion of interchanging); cf. also the use of *gleichzeitig* in VWG, p.62.

[Die Absicht der vorliegenden Untersuchung] "ist eine fundamentalontologische. Wenn wir sonach dem In-Sein thematisch nachfragen, dann können wir zwar nicht die Ursprünglichkeit des Phänomens durch Ableitung aus anderen, d.h. durch eine unangemessene Analyse im Sinne einer Auflösung vernichten wollen. Die Unableitbarkeit eines Ursprünglichen schließt aber eine Mannigfaltigkeit der dafür konstitutiven Seinscharaktere nicht aus. Zeigen sich solche, dann sind sie existenzial gleichursprünglich. Das Phänomen der *Gleichursprünglichkeit* der konstitutiven Momente ist in der Ontologie oft mißachtet worden zufolge einer methodisch ungezügelter Tendenz zur Herkunftsnachweisung von allem und jedem aus einem einfachen »Urgrund«." ⁵⁷

"The aim of our investigation... is one of *fundamental ontology*. Consequently, if we inquire about Being-in as our theme, we cannot indeed consent to nullify the primordial character of this phenomenon by deriving it from others - that is to say, by an inappropriate analysis, in the sense of dissolving or breaking up. But the fact that something primordial is underivable does not rule out the possibility that a multiplicity of characteristics of Being may be constitutive for it. If these show themselves, then existentially they are equiprimordial. The phenomenon of the *equiprimordiality* of constitutive items has often been disregarded in ontology, because of a methodologically unrestrained tendency to derive everything and anything from some simple 'primal ground'."

In this passage Heidegger seems to be arguing against a tree-structure for ontology. ⁵⁸ The tree-structure is based on some simple, single *Urgrund*, and all other ontological concepts are required to fit into a framework spreading out from the *Urgrund* by relations of derivation. *Gleichursprünglichkeit* marks an attempt to maintain the unity of being and the multiplicity of ontological concepts without constructing a tree of derivations; but as we saw from MAL, it by no means entails a departure from the foundational. How could *Gleichursprünglichkeit* achieve such a feat? While for the most part there is no clue to this in Heidegger's writing, nevertheless it does seem that mutual dependence and interdefinability play a role (perhaps one may speak of semantic interpenetration). The following passage is a particularly good example of this. Here Heidegger is speaking of the equiprimordiality of *Neigung* (propensity) and *Abstand* (refraining, restraint).

"Gleichursprünglich mit der Neigung, besagt hier: daß der Charakter ein solcher ist, den die Neigung gerade verdeckt, abdrängt und in die Zerstreuung hineinreißt, so daß er nun, durch diese Abdrängung hindurchgegangen, als zerstreut in der Welt begegnet.... Abstand, der Neigung mitermöglicht, wird von ihr gerade mitgerissen." ⁵⁹

"Here equiprimordial with propensity means: that its character is such that propensity actually disguises it, expels it and drags it into dispersion, so now that it has gone through this expulsion, it is encountered as dispersed in the world.... Restraint, which co-enables propensity, is actually co-torn from the latter."

⁵⁷ SZ, p.131.

⁵⁸ Cf. G.Deleuze & F.Guattari, *Rhizome* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1976).

⁵⁹ PIA, p.102f. (own translation)

There is not so much a compromise of unity and multiplicity in *Gleichursprünglichkeit* as a maintenance of their intimate tension in a foundational relation other than one of a deriving kind. Further to this, it may be that *Gleichursprünglichkeit* is intended to contain the possibility of its own decay into different hierarchies of derivation.

"Ist die Sprache mit dem Menschen gegeben oder mit dem Menschen die Sprache? Oder wird und ist das Eine durch das Andere gar nicht *zwei* verschiedene? Und weshalb? Weil beide gleichursprünglich dem Seyn zugehören." ⁶⁰

"Is language given with human being, or is human being given with language? Or isn't the One, doesn't the One actually become by virtue of the Other *two* different things? And why? Because both *belong* equiprimordially to being."

In this passage Heidegger seems to present a hierarchical dilemma, and rather than solving the dilemma, he explains it on the basis of the *Gleichursprünglichkeit* of the phenomena in question - perhaps because this combines the possibilities of both horns of the dilemma. However the final word on *Gleichursprünglichkeit* has to be that here the path which led from the consideration of logical and syntactic irregularities ~~final~~ peters out: unsatisfactory as it might be, the evidence for the character of this vital phenomenon is too scant and ambiguous to allow further progress. How clear an idea of *Gleichursprünglichkeit* might Heidegger actually have had? Was he himself writing with only partially conceived methods? Between the last two passages on *Gleichursprünglichkeit* cited, there is a gap of 15 years: can it be that in this time Heidegger still failed to work out the concept properly for himself? Or does he just keep his most valued methodological cards closest to his chest? Or is it even that there is a permanent failure to make progress with this particular strand of foundational methodology? *Gleichursprünglichkeit* is, first and foremost, the way in which the key existentialia interrelate; it names the primary manner of interrelation in the architectonic of SZ. So rather than pursuing the word *Gleichursprünglichkeit*, the search will move instead in the direction of the foundational architectonic or macro-structure of SZ.

⁶⁰ BP, p.497 (own translation).

CH.3. INCONGRUENCIES IN FOUNDATIONAL MACROSTRUCTURE

The question which is being pursued to its limits is this: what is the foundational, or what do the foundational notions signify, in Heidegger's earlier writings? In the final section to his 1928 article VWG Heidegger provides a triadic analysis of *Grund*, or perhaps several slightly differing but interrelated triadic analyses. The triad is variously expressed as < *Stiften*, *Boden-nehmen*, *Begründen* >,¹ < *Möglichkeit*, *Boden*, *Ausweis* >,² < *Weltentwurf*, *Eingenommenheit*, *Begründen* >,³ < *Stiftung*, *Boden-nehmen*, *Rechtgebung* >.⁴ Do these triadic analyses in VWG provide the answer to the question (once interpreted in the light of the last two sections)? It is true that the triadic analyses occupy more than half of the final section of VWG, but they do not mark the end or the climax. Rather, Heidegger uses the interplay of unity and multiplicity in the threefold determination of ground to take the discussion in a new direction (that of freedom and temporality).⁵

"Aber läßt sich nicht doch immer noch fragen, warum diese drei zusammengehörigen Bestimmungsstücke der Transzendenz mit dem gleichen Titel »Gründen« bezeichnet werden? Besteht hier nur noch eine künstlich erzwungene und spielerische Gemeinsamkeit des Wortlauts? Oder sind die drei Weisen des Gründens doch noch in *einer* Hinsicht - obzwar dies je wieder anders - identisch?"⁶

"But isn't the question still outstanding, why these three belonging-together determining-pieces of transcendence are dubbed with the same title 'grounding'? Is there nothing more here than an artificially forced and playful community of word-sounds? Or are the three ways of grounding nevertheless identical in *one* respect - although in each case in a different way?"

¹ VWG, p.60 (GA9, p.165); note that for the sake of clarity triadic (and quadratic) constellations are cited using <...>; original German is used in the text, as often the English translations (footnoted) are so tortuous as to lose a sense of the structural peculiarities. Strictly speaking, Heidegger provides this triad as an analysis of *Gründen*, which is the relation of *Freiheit* and *Grund*, but he does not stick with this fine distinction - nor is this likely to be accidental, since it is common for Heidegger to conflate a relation with its poles (see section on metaxy: pt.A, ch.4, section 3). Tr.: <endowing, taking-a-basis, justifying>.

² VWG, p.66 (GA9, p.170): <possibility, basis, self-identification>.

³ VWG, p.67 (GA9, p.171); <projection-of-world, prepossession, justifying>; as a member of this triad, *Begründen* is also expressed (i.a.) as "*Ermöglichung der Warumfrage*" (enabling of the why-question) - p.64.

⁴ *ibid.*; <endowing, taking-a-basis, legitimisation>.

⁵ Such a tactic is again common to SZ.

⁶ VWG, p.67 (GA9, p.171); own translation.

It is at this point that the moral, the hidden purpose, of the triadic analysis comes to the fore. Heidegger continues:-

"Diese Frage ist in der Tat zu bejahen. Die Aufhellung *der* Bedeutung aber, hinsichtlich deren sich die drei unzertrennlichen Weisen des Gründens einheitlich und doch gestreut entsprechen, läßt sich in der »Ebene« der jetzigen Betrachtung nicht durchführen."⁷

"This question is in fact to be answered affirmatively. But at the 'level' of the present consideration, it is not possible to carry through the illumination of the meaning with respect to which the three indivisible ways of grounding correspond to one another in a unitary and yet dispersed fashion."

Here there is a similar move to the one which was witnessed in MAL towards the end of the destruction of Leibniz: namely, the problematic of the structures hitherto revealed is used to take the foundational issue in a new direction, and into a new idiom.⁸ In MAL, a key to the solution was named as *Gleichursprünglichkeit*, which as was noted above is also commonly used to denote the internal structure of the triadic constellations.⁹ Another line of response in both MAL and VWG is the following.

"Die Freiheit ist der Grund des Grundes.... Das Grund-sein der Freiheit hat nicht - was zu meinen sich aber immer nahelegt - den Charakter *einer* der Weisen des Gründens, sondern bestimmt sich als die gründende Einheit der transzendentalen Streuung des Gründens."¹⁰

"Freedom is the ground of ground.... The ground-being of freedom does not have the character of *one* of the ways of grounding (but always runs close to this), rather it determines itself as the grounding unity of the transcendental dispersion of grounding."

Taking the problematic of unity and multiplicity in the foundational to a new level and a new idiom reveals a deeper essence of ground, one that accounts for the problematic; this essence of ground is freedom. But in the new idiom such a statement has a volatile instability: ground, freedom and origin drift immediately into issues of temporality, transcendence and finitude.

* * * * *

⁷ *ibid.*; own translation.

⁸ In SZ such moves can also be demonstrated; for example, SZ, p.396: Heidegger criticizes Nietzsche's triadic analysis of history as failing to examine the *Grund* of the unity of the three modes.

⁹ Though not, oddly, in VWG.

¹⁰ VWG, p.69 (GA9, p.174); own translation. Cf. also MAL, pp.282ff. & 276.

The discussion of ground in VWG can be taken in many directions. The purpose of the selective analysis above was to make the point that the internal structure and role of the triadic constellations so frequently encountered in Heidegger's early writings is relevant to the problem of foundations. In the case of VWG, it happened to be an analysis of ground that raised the foundational problematic contained in Heidegger's triadic analyses; but the same foundational problematic (i.e. one that can be labelled *Gleichursprünglichkeit*) arises in the case of other triadic analyses. Generally, the point of this chapter is to exploit the structure of these triads to extract what further clues these may contain as to the nature of the foundational in Heidegger's earlier writings. What will become apparent is that when an analysis of the so-called "triads" is pushed to its limits, a major structural dislocation appears. This dislocation is an indeterminacy of the nevertheless interdependent constellations between tripolarity and tetrapolarity.¹¹ This structural dislocation is a clue along the path to demonstrating a yet less systematisable architectonic (wrap-into clustering - a kind of onion structure) of the conceptual constellations or clusters in Heidegger.¹² The perception of the earlier Heidegger as a crude foundationalist probably rests partly on (i) the lexis of SZ,¹³ and partly on (ii) the belief that the intermittent formalisms of that work (such as triadic analyses) were either intended to, or could in theory, be reconciled into a system with an arborial-foundational structure. The analysis below of the indeterminacy between tripolarity and tetrapolarity and the wrap-into character of conceptual clustering provides evidence to show that (ii) could not be the case.

1) Tetrapolarity

Two of Heidegger's more conservative interpreters have engaged in a well-known argument aimed at maintaining the structural homogeneity of SZ. The argument in question is that between Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann and Otto Pöggeler on the triad

¹¹ Cf. J.Derrida, *La Dissémination* (Paris: Seuil, 1972), pp.29-32, 347, 386-394 (on 3's and 4's and numbers in general). Reference owed to J.Sallis, *Delimitations* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), p.141. To what extent does Heidegger anticipate Derrida?

¹² Some onions are also multi-centered.

< *Befindlichkeit* - *Verstehen* - ? >, as to whether the third element is *Verfallen* or *Rede*.¹⁴ It initially appears that in Ch.5A of the first section of SZ (§§29-34), Heidegger provides a triadic analysis of *Erschlossenheit* as < *Befindlichkeit* - *Verstehen* - *Rede* >, and the relation of *Verfallen*, discussed separately in Ch.5B, remains obscure. However in Ch.4 of the second section (§68), it seems that the main triad is < *Befindlichkeit* - *Verstehen* - *Verfallen* >, with *Rede* trailing like a relic of earlier times which Heidegger could not quite bring himself to discard completely. In 1963 Pöggeler argued that Heidegger had quite simply replaced *Rede* with *Verfallen* while writing the book.¹⁵ Against this, Von Herrmann defended Heidegger's consistency, maintaining that the real triad all along is < *Befindlichkeit* - *Verstehen* - *Verfallen* >, while *Rede* plays a higher order role in determining the *Gleichursprünglichkeit* of the triad.¹⁶ Then in 1982, Günter Wohlfahrt briefly suggested an alternative in his book *Der Augenblick*,¹⁷ namely, that the triad was not a triad at all (a point simply assumed by Pöggeler and Von Herrmann), but rather a "Vierteilung" or "Quadruplizität,"¹⁸ i.e. that *Verfallen* and *Rede* both belonged to the constellation. In a lengthy afterword to the second edition of his book (1985), Von Herrmann strongly attacked both Pöggeler and Wohlfahrt with a considerable textual exegesis.¹⁹ There is no intention to engage with Von Herrmann's arguments here; the strongest point against Von Herrmann is that his argument rests on the possibility of a global maintenance of fine distinctions among the terms used in the structural fabric of SZ, and on the basis of what was said in the section on semantic interpenetration (above),

¹³ i.e. the frequency of foundational terms; discussed in pt.A, ch.1.

¹⁴ In addition to the sources cited below, see also: P.Emad, "The significance of the new edition of 'Subjekt und Dasein' and the fundamental ontology of language", in *Heidegger Studies* 2 (1986), pp.144ff. On the translation of many of the terms in this section, see the appendix.

¹⁵ O.Pöggeler, *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers* Pfullingen: Neske (1st ed.'63, 2nd ed. '83 with additions, 3rd ed.'90 with a large afterword), at p.210 (of the 3rd ed.).

¹⁶ F-W.von Herrmann, *Subjekt und Dasein* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1974 & 1985), pp.103-144.

¹⁷ G.Wohlfahrt, *Der Augenblick* (Freiburg: Alber, 1982), at pp.140f.

¹⁸ The idea of < *Befindlichkeit* - *Verstehen* - *Rede* - *Verfallen* > as a tetrad has not been uncommon, though neither has it received serious attention. Wohlfahrt mentions Walter Biemel as having suggested it. The idea is also in Tyman's "Heidegger and the Deconstruction of Foundations", *International Philosophical Quarterly* 24 (1984), p.361. Tyman cites a number of sources on this problem (though oddly fails to mention the most important: Von Herrmann).

¹⁹ F-W.von Herrmann, *op.cit.*, 2nd ed. 1985, pp.198-224.

it seems that such distinctions could at best be local, and that generally Heidegger cannot be read in the way Von Herrmann reads him.

One thing that seems to have been omitted in these arguments is an examination of other conceptual constellations or clusters in Heidegger, to see what general patterns there are. This is one direction in which the debate could move instead of stagnating in a battle of textual attrition.²⁰

To justify the framework for interpretation which will be used below, it must first be established that quadratic as well as triadic clusters exist in Heidegger. This can be done with the following examples: < *Versuchung, Beruhigung, Entfremdung, Verfängnis* >,²¹ < *Beredete, Geredete, Mitteilung, Bekundung* >,²² < *Datierbarkeit, Weltlichkeit, Gespanntheit, Öffentlichkeit* >,²³ < *herkünftig, fortwirkend, innerzeitig, überliefert* >,²⁴ < *Angerufene, Aufgerufene, Gerufene, Rufer* >.²⁵ True, clustering is predominantly triadic, but there is a not insignificant minority of quadratic forms which some

²⁰ Rainer Bast moves in this direction in his very brief article "Ist Heideggers »Sein und Zeit« ein patchwork?", *Information Philosophie* 4 (1986), pp.18-30. Macro-structural incongruencies get two paragraphs on pp.20 & 22 (including a few remarks on the < *Befindlichkeit - Verstehen - ???* > problem). Bast's article indicates a direction for reinterpretation of SZ (rather than performing the reinterpretation), and this direction involves the creation of genetic structures to explain the internal irregularities. On the whole I think Bast retreats to quickly from noting the irregularities into creating a theory of the genesis of SZ to explain them. My own approach is to work through these irregularities as far as possible, to see what can be inferred from them about the character of the foundational. Two other commentators broadly support an approach similar to that of Bast: H.Rapaport, *Heidegger and Derrida - Reflections on Time and Language*, pp.18, 79-82, 92f.; T.Kisiel, "The Missing Link in the Early Heidegger", in J.J.Kockelmans ed. *Hermeneutic Phenomenology* (Washington DC: Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology, 1988), at pp.18f.

²¹ The analysis of *Verfallen* at SZ, p.180, which is very similar to the fourfold analysis of *Ruinanz* in PIA (p.140) as < *Verführerische, Beruhigende, Entfremdende, Vernichtende* >. Tr. of the SZ cluster: < temptation, tranquillizing, alienation, entanglement >.

²² The analysis of *Rede* at SZ, §34; *Rede* is also given a fourfold analysis in PGZ (p.363). Tr. of the SZ cluster: < what-is-talked-about, something-said-in-the-talk, communication, making-known >.

²³ The analysis of *Jetzt* at SZ, p.424. Tr.: < datability, worldhood, spannedness, publicness >. It is important to note that the Macquarrie & Robinson translation makes this look like a triad. Only from the German text is it clear that there is a quadratic cluster.

²⁴ SZ p.378f. states clearly that a fourfold analysis of *Geschichte* is intended; it is difficult to extract the names of its members from the text since the dispersion and intertwining are quite severe here.

commentators have misguidedly misquoted or overlooked to maintain a non-existent structural homogeneity.²⁶

The framework for interpretation works on the provisional assumption (supported by the precedents above) that *< Befindlichkeit - Verstehen - Verfallen - Rede >* is a quadratic cluster which is sometimes defectively cited by Heidegger. Putting this together with the fact that many of the SZ clusters are interdependent such their members have one-to-one mappings onto each other, so far as a system can be deduced from SZ it looks like the following.²⁷

²⁵ The analysis of *Ruf* in SZ, §§56-57.

²⁶ e.g. C.Lutz, *Zwischen Sein und Nichts* (doctoral dissertation, Bonn 1984), at p.112 (no.12).

²⁷ See the tables (German, then English) on the next two pages.

Table A (German)

concept analysed	1.	2.	3.	4 (?)	SZ ref.
Zeitlichkeit	Zukunft	Vergangenheit Gewesenheit	Gegenwart		p.326
(authentic modes of Zeitlichkeit)	Vorlaufen	Wiederholung	Augenblick		section 68
(Inauth. modes of Zeitlichkeit)	Gewärtigen	Vergessenheit	Gegenwärtigen		section 68
Dasein (Sorge)	Existenz Existenzialität	Faktizität	Verfallen Verfallenheit Verfallensein		p.249 p.316 p.191
In-der-Welt-Sein	Existenz In-sein " "	Welt " " "		Mitdasein Mitsein Mirdasein Selbst(sein)	pp.53, 137, 190, 161f., 200, 220, 297
Sorge	Entwurf	Geworfenheit	Verfallen		p.284
Erschlossenheit	Verstehen	Stimmung Befindlichkeit	Verfallen	Rede	pp.133, 180, 269
Sorge	Sich-vorweg-sein Tod Sein-zum-Tode	Schon-sein-in Geburt Schuld	Sein-bei Alltäglichkeit Zwischen des Lebens		p.192 sections 72ff., p.233
Aussage	Aufzeigung	Prädikation Bestimmung		Mitteilung	section 33
Entschlossenheit	Sichentwerfen auf das Schuldigsein	Angst		Verschwiegen- heit	section 60
Auslegung	Vorhabe	Vorsicht		Vorgriff	p.150
(Horizontal schemata)	Umwillen seiner	Wovor der Geworfen- heit	Um-zu		p.365

Table A (English)

concept analysed	1.	2.	3.	4 (?)	SZ ref.
temporality	future	past having-been	present		p.326
(authentic modes of temporality)	anticipation	recalling repeating	moment (of vision)		section 68
(inauth. modes of temporality)	awaiting	forgottenness	making-present		section 68
Dasein (care)	existence existentiality	facticity	falling fallingness being-fallen		p.249 p.316 p.191
being-in-the-world	existence being-in " "	world " " "		Dasein-with being-with Dasein-with (being-)self	pp.53, 137, 190, 161f., 200, 220, 297
care	projection	thrownness	falling		p.284
disclosedness	understanding	mood disposition	falling	discourse	pp.133, 180, 269
care	being-ahead-of-itself death being-towards-death	already-being-in birth guilt	being-among everydayness between-of-life		p.192 sections 72ff., p.233
Aussage	pointing-out	predication determining		communication	section 33
resoluteness	self-projection-upon- being-guilty	anxiety		reticency	section 60
interpretation	fore-having	fore-sight		fore-conception	p.150
(Horizontal schemata)	for-the-sake-of-itself	in-the-face-of-which- of....	in-order-to		p.365

The table needs a few notes of explanation. (1) Multiple entries are often given, because Heidegger varies his expression considerably (see section on semantic interpenetration; the variation is in fact far wider than the table shows). (2) The analyses giving rise to this table come exclusively from SZ, and all the references are to SZ; this is because the constellations vary considerably between the otherwise rather more homogeneous writings of the later 20's. (3) The third and fourth columns cannot be properly merged, nor properly separated, in a textually faithful analysis - more comment on this below. (4) The table covers those groupings for which a reasonable systematisation can be made (which includes the most important groupings); there are a very large number of groupings of secondary importance which are not shown because systematisation was not possible. The exclusion of such a large number of groupings needs further explanation: (a) sometimes the elements of triadic or quadratic analyses are not completely clear from the text, although it is clear that such an configuring is intended (e.g. the triadic analyses of *Tod*²⁸ and *Befindlichkeit*²⁹); (b) even when mappings onto the core structure (given in the table) are announced, the mappings are incomplete, unclear, lacking or contradictory.³⁰ For example, consider the relation of *<Gerede, Neugier, Zweideutigkeit>* to *<Befindlichkeit - Verstehen - Rede - Verfallen>*: *Zweideutigkeit* is derived from *Auslegung*, which is primarily derived from *Verstehen* but also has connections with *Rede*; *Neugier* is derived from *Sicht*, which is again derived from *Verstehen*; while *Gerede* is associated with *Rede*.³¹ The situation can adopt an appearance of even further complication, because the one-to-one mappings of the core structure are only primary determinations. The (foundational) associations of different constellations (e.g. *<x,y,z>* and *<a,b,c>*) are such that a is primarily determined by x, but partially determined by y and z. For Heidegger it is important that in a foundational relation between concept

²⁸ SZ, §§46ff.

²⁹ SZ, §29.

³⁰ Such is the case with the analyses of *Verfallen* (SZ178, 180), *Rede* (SZ, §34), *Furcht* (SZ, §30), *Zuhandenheit* (SZ144), *Öffentlichkeit* (SZ127), *das Man* (SZ, §27), the triads *<Gerede, Neugier, Zweideutigkeit>* (SZ175, 180) and *<Aufälligkeit, Aufdringlichkeit, Aufsässigkeit>* (SZ, p.74).

³¹ Also noticed by R.Bast, op.cit., p.20. In addition to further examples cited by Bast, see SZ, pp.272 & 277 for the attempted mappings of the moments of *Ruf* onto those of *Rede* and *Sorge*.

clusters, the full structure of the original should be reflected in all the members of the dependent cluster, and he often fails to make it clear which determination is primary.³²

These qualifications and observations made, the subject can turn to that of the tripolarity or tetrapolarity of the core structure. As the table shows, Heidegger had no difficulty separating and defining the first two terms of the structure - broadly speaking, those terms corresponding to future-past, or to the traditional distinction of reason (cf. *Verstehen*) and emotion (cf. *Befindlichkeit*). The difficulty comes with the third (and fourth) terms, and here it can be seen that the nature of the problem is very different from that perceived by Pöggeler and Von Herrmann. The modes of temporality associated with the present have been placed indeterminately between the columns, as SZ §68 leaves it ambiguous whether the present is mapped onto *Verfallen* or *Rede* (though *Verfallen* is slightly preferred). Further down the table, *Sein-bei* has also been placed indeterminately. This is because there is a permanent indecisiveness whether the third moment of *Sorge* is a *Sein-bei-innerweltlichem-Seienden* (being-among-intrawordly-entities) or a *Sein-bei-anderem-Dasein* (being-among-others) - i.e. a dilemma whether *Sein-bei* relates to inanimate entities, or (crudely put) human being.³³ In the former case, *Sein-bei* aligns with *Verfallen* in the third column; in the latter case, with *Rede* and *Mitsein* in the fourth column. One could say that Heidegger is in fact operating with an unacknowledged quadratic expansion of *Sorge*. The general characters of the third and fourth columns can now be seen: the third column has to do with falling, everydayness and inanimate objects, while the fourth column has to do with interpersonal relationship and communication. For some reason (not the topic of this thesis) Heidegger refuses to merge these conceptual sets, and is reluctant to commit himself to an association of the present with one or the other. The result is that the tripolar core-structure constantly risks decaying into a tetrapolar one. Certainly this creates great problems for a reading of Heidegger. But it is not clear that this was actually a problem for Heidegger: is it perhaps the by-product of anti-formalist concerns, rather than a dilemma over the relation of certain phenomena?

³² A further complicating factor is that different clusters sometimes have members in common: note the recurrences of *Existenz* and *Verfallen* in the table; also *Mitteilung* occurs in both the *Rede*- and *Aussage*- clusters.

³³ e.g. SZ, pp.55, 193, 268.

A dilemma over the relation of presence, falling and intrapersonal relationship would not be relevant to this thesis. Relevant is the issue of formal foundational structuring. And in fact there is something even more radically unconventional going on here than a simple ambiguity between tripolarity and tetrapolarity. This is what I have termed *wrap-into clustering*.

2) Wrap-into clustering

Heidegger's presentation of conceptual clusters invariably follows the same pattern: the first member is considered in itself, then the second is related to the first; subsequently the third is related to both. Usually this process presents a conflict of formalism and anti-formalism. The triadic analysis of *Grund* in VWG (see above) is a classic example of this. The following features in the development of the triadic analyses of VWG should be noted: there is a constant shifting of the expressions used for each member of the triad - not only to semantically similar expressions, but also between different grammatical categories, and likewise dispersion of the concept into phrases which inextricably link themselves into phrasal elaborations of the other members; the textual "analysis" takes the form of a seamless progression through the members, such that each subsequently introduced member almost grows out of the previous ones - the textual form attempts to unify the triadic multiplicity by sacrificing structural formalism to seamless semantic development. How should one interpret the conflict of formalism and anti-formalism here? Is it that Heidegger is in the first place reliant on a formal system, and that the best he can do to escape this is to add on, by way of apology, some stylistic superficialities?

In *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs* (which is plainly a earlier version of the first 230 pages or so of SZ)³⁴, there is a rather more extended example of the same pattern of conceptual development, which involves the much fought-over phenomena of *Befindlichkeit*, *Verstehen*, *Verfallen* and *Rede*. Comparing PGZ to SZ, what emerges as surprising is not how numerous the system-confounding dislocations and inconsistencies of

³⁴ PGZ (GA20), lecture series of summer 1925.

SZ are, but rather, how few they are.³⁵ PGZ can be used as evidence for the claim that the anti-formalistic device of wrap-into clustering has priority over triadic systematisation.

The analysis here is confined to §§28-31 of PGZ, which are devoted to a progressive development of the phenomena *Entdecktheit*, *Verfallen*, *Unheimlichkeit* and *Sorge*. Heidegger notes that the interconnection of these phenomena³⁶ is both ordered and foundational.

"Die genannte Phänomene hängen unter sich zusammen, und in der Ordnung, wie sie hier gegeben sind, zeigt sich zugleich ein gewisser Fundierungszusammenhang unter ihnen."³⁷

"These phenomena are connected among themselves; and the order in which they are advanced here at the same time serves to manifest a certain founding relation among them."

The general pattern of the subsequent development has something of an onion structure (wrap-into), in that succeeding sections wrap layers of new concepts around and into the concepts of the previous sections. An onion is ultimately far too ordered a structure to describe what is going on, but it provides a useful starting model. The most important qualification is that outer layers of an onion leave the inner layers undisturbed, while Heidegger's new layers tend to link and lock into the old irrespective of their structure. Thus wrap-into, not wrap-around. To return to the development of PGZ, this starts off with *Entdecktheit*, and spins a couple more keywords into this (*Erschlossenheit*, *Befindlichkeit*). In the subsequent pages, comparisons, analyses and parallels slowly build up the stockpile of keywords, and this stockpile is carried over into and enlarged in each subsequent section and sub-section. Each subsequently introduced keyword is woven into the stockpile by relating it to a number of the previous concepts. Such introductions are without regard for the interrelation or structural location of those concepts already in the stockpile. The multiply cross-connecting and short-circuiting relations produced present a foundational paradox as well as a systematic impossibility: namely, that while foundational lexis abounds, hierarchical orderings according to inferiority and superiority are not only

³⁵ Thus I disagree with the perspective of Bast (op.cit.) and Rapaport (op.cit.) on the problem.

³⁶ Heidegger uses "phenomenon", "concept" and "structure" relatively interchangably (see section above on semantic interpenetration); in discussing Heidegger the same interchangability has been followed.

³⁷ PGZ, p.348.

lacking, but impossible to impose. This gives a general idea of wrap-into clustering, but what of the detail?

§28 begins with *Entdecktheit*. In the course of discussing *Entdecktheit*, *Erschlossenheit* makes an appearance, and is eventually related formally to *Entdecktheit* as *gleichursprünglich*.³⁸ *Befindlichkeit* is wrapped in next.

"*Befindlichkeit ist das Apriori für Entdecktheit und Erschlossenheit, sie ist ein gleichursprünglicher Charakter neben der Erschlossenheit und macht mit ihr das aus, was wir die Entdecktheit nennen.*"³⁹

"*Disposedness is the apriori for discoveredness and disclosedness. It is a co-original [equiprimordial] character along with disclosedness and constitutes with it what we call discoveredness.*"

It is at the beginning of the onion-development that the interrelations are at their clearest and most unambiguous; but here too the stockpile is still relatively small, and the opportunities for structural subversion therefore remain low. *Gleichursprünglichkeit* is not attributed to any of the interrelated concepts other than $\langle \textit{Entdecktheit} - \textit{Erschlossenheit} - \textit{Befindlichkeit} \rangle$, nevertheless there is close interweaving during the subsequent introductions of concepts. *Verstehen* is the first major concept to join the stockpile after *Befindlichkeit*, and the interweaving of *Verstehen* with the existing members can be seen in the following passages.

"*Verstehen als befindliches Erschließen und Erschlossenhaben von Welt ist als dieses ein erschließendes Sichbefinden.*"⁴⁰

"*Understanding as disposed disclosure and having disclosed the world is as such a disclosive self-finding.*"

"*Das Verstehen ist die Entdecktheit des Woran-seins mit etwas.*"⁴¹

"*Understanding is the discoveredness of the whereat-being with something.*"

Subsequently *Auslegung* is added to the stockpile as a mode of *Verstehen*,⁴² and then, still part of the section analysing *Entdecktheit* (§28), comes the integration of *Rede*. *Rede* is


³⁸ PGZ, p.350: "Die Mit-entdecktheit des In-Seins selbst... ist keine Folge der Welterschlossenheit, sondern ist mit ihr gleichursprünglich." - "The co-discoveredness of in-being itself... is not a consequence of the disclosedness of the world, but is co-original [equiprimordial] with it."

³⁹ PGZ, p.354


⁴⁰ PGZ, p.356

⁴¹ PGZ, p.357

integrated into the stockpile in different and mutually non-assimilable ways. Firstly, Heidegger relates it to a concatenation which runs more or less $\langle In\text{-sein}, Entdecktheit, Verstehen, Auslegung, Sprache \rangle$, but not such that *Rede* is tagged on to the end.⁴³ If any formal relation is possible, it would be as in the following diagram.



Rede is also integrated into the stockpile via its fourfold analysis as $\langle Beredete, Geredete, Mitteilung, Kundgabe \rangle$.⁴⁴ Again, so far as a formalisation of the integration is possible, it appears thus:-



As if this was not enough, *Rede* is later described as "Seinsmodus des Verstehens"⁴⁵ and as "Modus der Zeitigung des Daseins".⁴⁶ The integration of *Rede* into the stockpile is structural simplicity compared to the accommodation of *Verfallen* in §29. The diagram which follows attempts to formalise what can be formalised, but by this stage so little of


⁴² PGZ, pp.359-360

⁴³ PGZ, p.361

⁴⁴ PGZ, p.362-363.

⁴⁵ PGZ, p.366.

the systematic remains that the diagram represents textual development rather than any system.⁴⁷



The following section on *Unheimlichkeit* (§30) continues in a similar vein. The fourth keyword in the original *Fundierungszusammenhang*, *Sorge*, is analysed in §31. At the beginning of this final analysis, the stockpile is initially abandoned for an independent development, but then (pp.411-417) *Sorge* is vaguely linked to *Entdecktheit*, *Verstehen*, *Auslegung* and *Rede*. The systematic integration discernible from SZ (see the earlier table) is entirely lacking.

This analysis of PGZ is intended to provide evidence for the priority of an anti-systematic procedure called wrap-into clustering over systematic procedures framing the phenomena into (e.g.) clearly inter-mappable triads. Against this, it might be said that the relevant sections in PGZ are only preparatory for SZ, and that therefore SZ better shows Heidegger's intentions. To reply to this objection: it is tenable (and probable) that this applies to §31, on *Sorge*, but it does not appear to be a reasonable hypothesis for the anti-

⁴⁶ PGZ, p.376.

⁴⁷ This is not a weakness; the general point is that system is sacrificed to seamless textual development. However, it should be remembered that in SZ and PGZ, <Gerede, Neugier, Zweideutigkeit> and <Versuchung, Beruhigung, Entfremdung, Sichverfangen> are formal constellations.

systematic form of §§28-30. Especially in the case of §§28-29, considerable care must have gone into creating the complex sentences which interweave the accumulating phenomena. Further evidence comes from VWG, where there is a non-systematic progression through *<Entdecktheit, Erschlossenheit, Sichbefinden (= Befindlichkeit), Verstehen, logos (=Rede)>*, which is of a style closer to that of PGZ than to that of SZ.⁴⁸ Given, then, that my claim is correct, how can the move towards system in SZ be explained? It is possible that such wrap-into clustering tended towards the triadic in SZ because Heidegger's intention of recapitulating the *Daseinsanalytik* in terms of temporality (which at that stage he could only conceive of as tripartite: past - present - future) forced him to reduce the size of larger clusters and impose a more homogeneous framework. In PGZ the temporal recapitulation is absent and perhaps its detail had not yet been worked out in Heidegger's mind. The tripolar-tetrapolar dislocation in SZ may then be interpreted as the incompleteness of this response demanded by the temporal recapitulation.

The question remains, what is the significance of all this for the conception of foundations?

That there is at least a relevance should be clear: the development in PGZ described as an example of wrap-into clustering is referred to by Heidegger as a *Fundierungszusammenhang*⁴⁹ and the passages constituting the development are rife with foundational lexis; further, wrap-into clustering is associated with *Gleichursprünglichkeit*, which in MAL named the gateway to a reconstruction of ground; finally, the whole matter of this section has been the macro-structure of SZ, which (despite its incompleteness and unsatisfactory nature) is probably one of the main causes for a foundational interpretation of the earlier Heidegger. The significance for the conception of foundations can be expressed thus: when concepts are analysed according to a "wrap-into cluster" method, traditional distinctions disappear between what are essential features, accidents, derivatives and origins; what is determinative of a phenomenon (essential, foundational) lies in a non-

⁴⁸ VWG, pp.27-29 (GA9, pp.130-132).

⁴⁹ PGZ, p.348.

hierarchical, unsystematisable, non-coherent interplay.⁵⁰ Wrap-into clustering (at least in PGZ) even deprives the interplay of a centre.

The contribution made by this chapter on the incongruencies of foundational macro-structure is this. As has been said before, there are probably two main motives for regarding SZ as a foundational work: lexical, and macro-structural. The lexical motive was examined in the first chapter of this part of the dissertation. To turn to the macro-structural motive: superficially, at least, SZ moves through a series of foundational structures, each being deeper than the one before. Everything is traced back into a final dependence on *Zeitlichkeit* as a kind of Heideggerian *cogito*. At each level a constellation of derivatives and modifications is mapped out. The often eccentric expression of these structures seemingly leaves a concise statement of the foundational system to interpreters, but when one tries to put such a completion and formalisation into practice, it founders. The main problem is that the power and status of the triadic constellations and their foundational interrelations is greater than their tangibility (susceptibility to accurate expression). SZ could hardly be summarised without referring to the threefold ecstatic analyses of time as temporality, and the preparation for this by an isomorphic non-temporal analysis of Dasein in the first half of the book: thus the role of these constellations is powerful and prominent. Yet there are radical problems with the articulation and interrelation of these constellations as has been shown above. Thus: the interplay between structural power and structural intangibility in SZ may be said to provide the seeds of a self-destruction of its purported foundationalism.⁵¹

⁵⁰ But it should never be forgotten that the interplay of phenomena constantly points, paralitically, towards being as the condition of its possibility.

⁵¹ Cf. D.C.Wood, *The Deconstruction of Time*, footnote to p.223 on p.401.

CH.4. ANTICIPATIONS OF A TURN IN FOUNDATIONAL UNDERSTANDING

To return once again to the 1928 essay on the essence of ground (VWG), in 1949 Heidegger added a forward to the essay, in which he described the essay as naming the ontological difference. At first glance this seems to conflict with the essay title ("Vom Wesen des Grundes" - "On the essence of ground"). What is the connection? The ontological difference is described as the "difference of being and entity"¹ and as the "nothing between entity and being".² How is it that this difference amounts to nothing? Heidegger also describes the issue as the *Aufbrechen* (breaking open) of the difference, and as *Unterscheidenkönnen* (ability to differentiate).³ In other words, the issue is the origin of difference. To go a little beyond what Heidegger makes explicit, the issue is perhaps better stated: what kind of structure must a pre-differential origin of differentiability have, in order to act as the condition for the possibility of identity and difference? A homogeneous, simple origin would not provide the possibility of its own degeneration into difference. Thus the answer to the question is a difference that is a virtual nothing - a minimal difference - a difference that breaks the grammar of difference as a bipolar relation. This difference is the ontological difference. Describing the ontological difference in VWG takes Heidegger in the direction of transcendence.

"Der Grund der ontologischen Differenz nennen wir vorgreifend die *Transzendenz* des Daseins."⁴

"By way of anticipation we will call the ground of the ontological difference the transcendence of Dasein."

Heidegger continues by describing the traditional structure of *Transzendenz*.

¹ VWG, p.30 (GA9, p.134).

² VWG, p.21 (GA9, p.123).

³ VWG, p.31 (GA9, p.134).

⁴ VWG, p.31 (GA9, p.135); own translation.

"Transzendenz bedeutet Überstieg.... Formal läßt sich der Überstieg als eine Beziehung fassen, die sich »von« etwas »zu« etwas hinzieht."⁵

"Transcendence means overstepping.... Formally the overstepping can be grasped as a relation which pulls itself `from' something away `towards' something."

Traditionally transcendence is a uni-directional movement from (subject) to (object). (Whether the subject-object relation here is interpreted epistemologically, grammatically, or otherwise would be a matter of indifference to Heidegger, since he probably regards the same considerations as paralleled in all of these senses of transcendence). Subsequently in VWG Heidegger attempts a revision of this structure. It is not only in terms of transcendence that Heidegger attempts this foundational revision. The same revision of uni-directional foundational movements appears in a number of other guises. In this section those guises in which it appears in SZ are the subject of study. Generally speaking, the problem is that of the movement between entity and being, between the (supposed) poles of the ontological difference. Being, perhaps, is the foundation of the entity, and the problem of the question of the the meaning of being is the question of the movement from entity to being. While words such as "transcendence" and "ontological difference" are absent from this section, the matter of eliciting the nature of this foundational movement between being and entity is its constant subject.

1) The *sens* and duplicity of being

In the title of this section, both *sens* and duplicity carry a double meaning. The French *sens* means both meaning and direction; duplicity means both doubleness and deceitfulness. *Sens* and duplicity refer to two precedents in the secondary literature for the kind of structure attributed in this section to Heidegger's understanding of the foundational. The first of these is an article by Gérard Guest on reversals of direction in SZ; the second of these comes from a book by Pat Bigelow in which (*inter alia*) he presents what he calls the "amphiboly of being" in SZ.

⁵ VWG, p.33 (GA9, p.137); own translation.

Guest's article "Anabase - Acheminement vers l'amont de la 'présupposition'" is an extremely detailed interpretation of a number of sentences from SZ §44.⁶ The area of Guest's meditating concerns "the topology of the land of being", a topology which he finds does not obey certain norms. Reversals of direction are the key to the topological irregularities. Although Guest's article does not explicitly take issue with any interpretation of Heidegger (and is devoid of almost any mention of secondary literature), it seems to be a polemic directed at a particular conservative interpretation: namely, one according to which the early Heidegger is seen as progressing from *Dasein* to being, and the later Heidegger - after the *Kehre* (reversal) - is seen as progressing in the reverse direction, from being to *Dasein*. Guest studies the connection of the poles *Dasein* and *Wahrheit des Seins* as they occur in SZ, especially on pp.226-228, and finds that both directions of movement are present in, and essential to, SZ. In other words, he finds that a *Kehre* of a kind said to apply to Heidegger's thought diachronically is already present and complete, synchronically, in SZ, and in such a way that the reversed movements are not sequentially related, but simultaneously. Guest describes the double-movement thus:

"...un mouvement d'aller-et-retour... caractéristique du mouvement d'ensemble de l'ontologie fondamentale, et essentiel à sa démarche. Il s'agit de ce mouvement de va-et-vient qui... remonte vers l'`idée de l'être pur et simple', pour venir ensuite, comme sur l'élan même de la remontée mais par contre-coup.... comme un boomerang."⁷

And later, bringing in the *Kehre*, he continues:

"L'effectuation de ce va-et-vient méthodique, qui constitue comme telle l'`anabase' de *Sein und Zeit*, est l'un des chemins au `détour' desquels (à la

⁶ G.Guest, "Anabase - Acheminement vers l'amont de la 'présupposition' - Le chemin de *Sein und Zeit*", *Heidegger Studies* 5 (1989), pp.79-133. The following account of his article is not comprehensive, but selects those points relevant to my own thesis.

⁷ Guest, op.cit., p.98. "...a movement of going-and-returning... characteristic of the entire movement of fundamental ontology and essential to its progress. It is a matter of a movement of coming-and-going which... reascends towards the 'pure and simple idea of being', only then to return, as if with the same momentum of the reascent but by re-percussion.... like a boomerang." The idea of a language group of coming-and-going is by no means new to Heidegger scholarship. See T.Kisiel, "The Language of the Event: the Event of Language", in J.Sallis ed. *Heidegger and the Path of Thinking* (Pittsburgh: Dusquesne University Press, 1970), at pp.101f. Kisiel identifies this language group in the later Heidegger. What Guest does that is new is to identify the same movements in the earlier Heidegger.

`Kehre' desquels), le Dasein s'expose à être conduit, induit ou requis, à faire cette `expérience de la pensée' en quoi consiste la `Kehre'."⁸

A part (although not the main part) of Guest's achievement here is to trace a number of *Kehre* patterns occurring within SZ. (1) He introduces the problem of bi-directionality as the efforts of phenomenology to move in a direction opposite to that of *Verfallen*. "L'anabase méthodique de la phénoménologie de *Sein und Zeit* suit, à contre-courant du sens du `dévalement' (*Verfallen*), le contre-flux phénoménologique...."⁹ (2) He notices that there is a general play on reversal of directions occurring at SZ, p.437: on the one hand Heidegger asks about the possibility of a way from time to being; on the other hand Dasein already always has a pre-understanding of being.¹⁰ (Guest does not seem to spot the play here between *Verstehen* and *Entwurf*, in terms of which I examine the problem further on). (3) He notices the bi-directionality attributed to philosophical questioning ("...entspringt... zurückschlägt.") in the following text:

"Philosophie ist universale phänomenologische Ontologie, ausgehend von der Hermeneutik des Daseins, die als Analytik der *Existenz* das Ende des Leitfadens alles philosophischen Fragens dort festgemacht hat, woraus es *entspringt* und wohin es *zurückschlägt*."¹¹

"Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology, and takes its departure from the hermeneutic of Dasein, which, as an analytic of *existence*, has made fast the guiding-line for all philosophical inquiry at the point from which it *arises* and to which it *returns*."

(4) He notices a bi-directionality attributed to *Lichtung* (carrying the senses of intellectual illumination and the later Heideggerian "clearing"), whereby in some places *Dasein* appears to be the source of *Lichtung*, such that *Dasein* sheds light on the truth; in other places, it is truth which illuminates *Dasein*.¹² (5) But above all, Guest's article turns on a

⁸ Guest, op.cit., p.117. "The performance of this methodical coming-and-going, which constitutes as such the `anabasis' of *Sein und Zeit*, is one of the paths on the twists of which (on the *Kehre* of which) Dasein dares to be led, induced or conscripted, dares to undergo the `experience of thinking' in which the *Kehre* consists."

⁹ Guest, op.cit., p.80. "The methodical anabasis of the phenomenology of *Sein und Zeit* follows the phenomenological counter-flux, against the flow of the direction of `falling' (*Verfallen*)...."

¹⁰ Discussed in Guest, op.cit., pp.89-92.

¹¹ SZ, pp.51 & 436 (Heidegger says it twice; Macquarrie & Robinson's translation with a slight alteration), quoted and discussed in Guest, op.cit., p.96f.

¹² Compare SZ, pp.133, 313, 436. Discussed in Guest, op.cit., pp.99-103.

bi-directionality of *Voraussetzen* (presupposition) in the *Dasein*-truth relation.¹³ Which way round is the presupposition? Is it "we" who presuppose truth, or truth that is the origin of our presuppositions?

The sentences which occupy the centre of Guest's attention are the following:

"Aus der existenzial begriffenen Seinsart der Wahrheit wird nun auch der Sinn der Wahrheitsvoraussetzung verständlich. Warum müssen wir voraussetzen, daß es Wahrheit gibt? Was heißt »voraussetzen«? Was meint das »müssen« und »wir«? Was besagt: »es gibt Wahrheit«? Wahrheit setzen »wir« voraus, weil »wir«, seiend in der Seinsart des Daseins, »in der Wahrheit« sind.... Nicht wir setzen die »Wahrheit« voraus, sondern sie ist es, die ontologisch überhaupt möglich macht, daß wir so sein können, daß wir etwas »voraussetzen«. Wahrheit ermöglicht erst so etwas wie Voraussetzung."¹⁴

"From the existentially conceived kind of being of truth now too the meaning of truth-presupposition becomes intelligible. *Why must we presuppose that there is truth?* What does 'presupposing' denote? What do 'must' and 'we' mean? What is conveyed by saying: 'there is truth'? 'We' presuppose truth, because 'we', being in the kind of being of Dasein, are 'in the truth'.... It is not we who presuppose 'truth', rather, it is 'truth' which makes it ontologically at all possible that we can be such as to 'presuppose' something. Truth first makes possible such a thing as presupposing."

The two sentences at the centre of this are these:

"Wahrheit setzen »wir« voraus, weil »wir«, seiend in der Seinsart des Daseins, »in der Wahrheit« sind.... Nicht wir setzen die »Wahrheit« voraus, sondern sie ist es, die ontologisch überhaupt möglich macht, daß wir so sein können, daß wir etwas »voraussetzen«."

"'We' presuppose truth, because 'we', being in the kind of being of Dasein, are 'in the truth'.... It is not we who presuppose 'truth', rather, it is 'truth' which makes it ontologically at all possible that we can be such as to 'presuppose' something."

The attention here is the change between the two sentences: in the first, "we" presuppose truth; in the second, seemingly paradoxically, this is denied, and rather it is truth that acts as the origin of presupposing. Guest initially provides a parallaxic explanation of the paradox: namely, that it is not the matter itself which is first affirmed and denied, but

¹³ SZ, pp.226-228. Discussed in Guest, op.cit., pp.80-87, 117-124. It should be noted that Guest was using a Niemeyer edition of SZ, where Heidegger's *Randbemerkungen*, first added in the 15th Niemeyer edition and the *Gesamtausgabe* edition, are added at the end, rather than inserted on each page as in the *Gesamtausgabe*. Thus Guest has page references such as 439 and 444, which for a *Gesamtausgabe* user are useless, since this stops at p.437. *Gesamtausgabe* references can be converted to Niemeyer, but not vice versa; thus Guest's reference system should not be followed. (e.g. Guest's SZ, p.444 is more helpfully cited as SZ, p.227n).

¹⁴ SZ, p.227f.; own translation.

rather, the point of view changes from which the two sentences are uttered. Thus Guest writes:

"En un sens ('vom Dasein aus'): ".....". Mais, en un autre sens ('vom Wahrheit des Seyns her')..... Mais ces deux sens, une fois distingués, doivent être pensés comme s'entre-appartenant, et comme, au fond ne faisant qu'un...."¹⁵

But then, as the passage shows, he reaffirms the unity of the points of view. There is more going on here than a simple change of direction, and for this point, Guest builds on the footnote added to the *Gesamtausgabe* edition, which changes or compliments the second sentence thus:

"(Nicht wir setzen die »Wahrheit« voraus,) sondern das Wesen der Wahrheit setzt uns in das Voraus des Zugesagten!"¹⁶ "(It is not we who presuppose 'truth',) rather the essence of truth supposes [lit. places] us in the pre- of the accepted."

In the light of the grammatical peculiarities this poses, Guest comes to the following position:

"S'il s'agit bien de maintenir, dans la formulation de l'apostille, le vocabulaire de la 'présupposition', c'est au prix d'une étonnante réforme de la 'grammaire' de celle-ci; réforme qu'accomplit ici, non pas tant la simple inversion du clivage, que l'apparent démantèlement, et la savante 'de-struction', de l'usage du verbe 'voraussetzen'.... Il ne s'agit pas seulement d'inverser le sens d'effectuation et de provenance de la 'présupposition de vérité'.... Ce que fait 'l'essence de la vérité', selon la 'grammaire' de l'expression (qui accomplit ici... cette 'Befreiung der Grammatik'...)..., c'est bel et bien nous 'poser' dans... l'amont qu'est ce qui vient au-devant de la 'présupposition' pour la rendre possible...."¹⁷

¹⁵ Guest, op.cit., p.121. It should be noted that Guest's words are chosen with great care; thus the literalism of the following translation: "In one direction/sense ('vom Dasein aus' [from out of Dasein]): ".....". But in another direction/sense ('vom Wahrheit des Seyns her' [hither from the truth of being])..... But these two directions/senses, once distinguished, must be thought as belonging-together and as basically constituting one...."

¹⁶ SZ, p.227n. (Own translation). The brackets contain the main text, then the footnote is added directly.

¹⁷ Guest, op.cit., p.125f.; the loose quotation of "Befreiung der Grammatik" (freeing from grammar) is from SZ, p.165f. Tr.: "While it may be a matter of maintaining the vocabulary of 'presupposition' in the formulation of the marginal note, this is at the price of an astonishing reform of the 'grammar' of [this vocabulary]; a reform which accomplishes, not so much the simple inversion of the cleavage, as the apparent demolition and the skilful 'de-struction' of the usage of the verb 'presuppose'.... It is not simply a question of inverting the direction [sense] of performance and the provenance of the 'presupposition of truth'.... What 'the essence of truth'

In other words, he recognizes that there is more here than just reversals of direction, and more still than *Kehre*-figures within the fabric of thought of SZ: there is also a grammatical reform going on, particularly in relation to the concept of "presupposition".

Guest's article makes a contribution, not only on the basis of these conclusions, but also by virtue of the meticulous care of his analysis of the texts in question. Width is sacrificed to depth, however, and a more general pervasiveness of *Kehre* patterns within the thought of SZ remains to be shown, although Guest claims that the double movement is "essential" to fundamental ontology.¹⁸ Guest's attention is likewise on the poles of this double movement (*Dasein*, the truth of being), and the topology of being; the between of these poles takes second place, while the foundational is left out completely. Yet it is only a short step from Guest's deliberations to issues of foundations. As Heidegger remarks during the same passages analysed by Guest:

"Was besagt »voraussetzen«? Etwas verstehen als den Grund des Seins eines anderen Seienden."¹⁹

"What does 'presupposing' mean? To understand something as the ground of the being of another entity."

An immediate consequence of Guest's indication of a reform of the grammar of "presupposition" is that the foundational is likewise being subjected to such a structural reform. (It is unlikely Guest missed this; he simply does not choose to go in this direction).

Another weakness or limitation of Guest's article is that it does not put this double movement firmly into a wider philosophical context: what does Heidegger hope to gain by deploying such a cursive figure? I suggest that it serves a purpose well beyond that of a mere revision of the grammar of foundations.

* * * * *

does, according to the 'grammar' of the expression (which here accomplishes... this 'Befreiung der Grammatik'...),..., is to place us well and truly in... the incline which is what comes in front of the 'presupposition' to render it possible...."

¹⁸ Guest, op.cit., p.98 (quoted above).

¹⁹ SZ, p.228 (own translation).

Bigelow provides a very different perspective and approach to what is essentially the same curiosity as that examined by Guest.²⁰ Bigelow names the double movement in SZ as the "amphiboly of being", and (unlike Guest) links it firmly to the problem of foundations and metaphysics. Virtually the only explicit point of contact between Bigelow's and Guest's analyses are the references to the problem of the hermeneutic circle. The basic mood of Bigelow's book is a fatalistic and playfully eloquent resignation, with a carefully cultivated style which seemingly idles between the thoughtful and the rhetorical; it is quite the opposite of Guest's meticulous extraction of the remotest nuances of meaning from every sentence. Another major difference from Guest is that, while Guest exploits the double movement as a contribution to appreciating the unity of Heidegger's thought, Bigelow sees in it the core of the failure of SZ, prompting a (biographical) turn away from that work towards a playful state of philosophical resignation (like Bigelow's own). Here the thoroughness and care of Guest's assessment must take preference; Bigelow's work has a more speculative and artistic value.

What is the "amphiboly of being"?²¹ It does not have a centered definition; rather it operates like a Gasché-esque infrastructure,²² reappearing, iterating, in a number of supervenient but non-identical patterns. The main examples given by Bigelow are: (i) being's ambiguous categorisability as substantive or as activity - that is, that about being which is reflected in its dual grammatical status as a participle;²³ (ii) the dual instability of the ontological difference, such that any attempt to articulate being devolves into ontic enquiry, while conversely, the articulation of the nature of entities always presupposes a reference to or understanding of being;²⁴ (iii) the double self-effacement of being, such that not only does any attempt to articulate it devolve, but that the devolution is disguised:

²⁰ P. Bigelow, *The Conning, The Cunning of Being - Being a Kierkegaardian Demonstration of the Postmodern Implosion of Metaphysical Sense in Aristotle and the Early Heidegger* (Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1990).

²¹ The word amphiboly is used by Kant in the title of the appendix to the Transcendental Analytic in his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. The term is not discussed by Kant, however, nor does Bigelow refer to this use. Amphiboly normally means a sentence (as distinct from a word) with two meanings.

²² See R. Gasché, *The Tain of the Mirror*.

²³ P. Bigelow, *op.cit.*, p. 111.

²⁴ *ibid.*, e.g. pp. 108, 110, 118f.

"amphiboly is both the trace of the oblivion of being and the effacement of this trace".²⁵ Amphiboly appears in a number of subsidiary plays of duality - such as Heidegger's play on concealment and unconcealment and the duplicity of genitives.²⁶ Amphiboly names the virtual structure (better: paratype) behind the various evasions of being, and thus accounts for the impossibility of ontology. In accounting for the impossibility of ontology, amphiboly of course describes being - it is itself part of an ontology; the very fact of an analysis of amphiboly proclaims the possibility of ontology. This play between the possibility and impossibility of ontology, this incompatibility of strata, is, according to Bigelow, another appearance of the amphiboly of being: in other words, it is a character of being that the strata of a critical ontology (such as his own) will be incompatible. Ontology is eminently and immanently deconstructible.

As regards the role of the amphiboly of being in SZ, Bigelow regards this work as a failed attempt to "disambiguate" the amphiboly of being.

"This failure is due to the dialectical nature of the amphiboly of being, that the attempt to cleave being *from* beings contracts into the cleaving of being *to* beings...."²⁷

While Bigelow's ideas offer interesting food for thought, there is no real argument for his case. In particular, his conclusion that the amphiboly of being results in the impossibility of ontology does not follow from the descriptions given of the amphiboly of being. What follows is that a successful ontology would require a uniquely cunning method. Bigelow does not analyse Heidegger's method in this respect, and thus he does not reach a position from which he can judge the success or failure of SZ.

To show how the amphiboly of being cripples the SZ project, Bigelow turns to the role of the foundational in Heidegger's thought. This he summarizes as follows.

"At the beginning of his career Heidegger's exclusive concern was to lay a foundation for metaphysics. Repeatedly he insists on the urgency, the needfulness, of this concern. But as we know, his way was to be underway toward the thinking of the ground of thinking, until eventually he came to see that along this path the

²⁵ *ibid.*, p.121.

²⁶ *ibid.*, pp.113 & 119.

ground no longer mattered, for it is the path in the clearing that precisely suffices."²⁸

And the amphiboly of being raises the following foundational problem in SZ:

"...it is precisely the meaning of ground in *Being and Time*... that volatilizes the metaphysical venture, for in *Being and Time* the intelligibility of the ground revolves around the hermeneutic circle until it collapses into the auto-apotropaia of the *Ab-grund*, a perpetual turning the gaze away from the ground by turning the *Ab-grund* away from its own groundlessness."²⁹

A criticism of this passage: it may well be that the meaning of ground in SZ does indeed have volatile consequences for metaphysics (but Tyman's point³⁰ should be kept in mind, namely, that the concept of metaphysics here is too narrow, and that there is a suppressed tradition in which Heidegger's revision of ground nevertheless stands); ground does indeed have much to do with the hermeneutic circle - the question is what exactly, and this question will be pursued below; finally, Bigelow overstates and misinterprets the role of the *Abgrund*.³¹

2) Projective understanding, circularity and dialectic

In Guest's article there is a play between the two meanings of "*sens*" in French: meaning and direction.³² In the following paragraphs this play will be extended. Heidegger defines *Sinn (sens)* as follows:

²⁷ *ibid.*, p.128.

²⁸ *ibid.*, p.106.

²⁹ *ibid.*, p.139.

³⁰ See pt.A, ch.1, section 3.

³¹ See pt B, ch.2, section 2.

³² "*Sinn*" (the German for *sens*) can very occasionally have the meaning of direction (as well as the normal meaning of "meaning"): in the phrase "*im Uhrzeigersinn*" (clockwise), "*-sinn*" conveys the idea of directionality.

"Sinn ist das... Woraufhin des Entwurfs, aus dem her etwas als etwas verständlich wird."³³

"Meaning is the whither-upon of projection whence something becomes understandable as something...."³⁴

Particular attention needs to be paid to the reversal of directions in this definition. *Entwerfen* (projecting) is an away-towards... movement (whither), while *Verstehen* (understanding) is the returning movement from whatever it was towards which projecting moved (whence). *Entwerfen* is associated with the directional particles "auf... hin", while *Verstehen* is associated with the directional particles "aus... her" which express the reverse movement.³⁵

To what extent is this double movement of sense a double movement in the foundational? Guest's article already anticipates such a move: he notes the changes of direction associated with *Voraussetzen* and *Lichtung*, both of which belong to the network of foundational notions analysed earlier.³⁶ However much more is needed to establish this double movement as a movement within the foundational. As was seen in the section on semantic interpenetration, lexical variation is used to introduce an internal heterogeneity into the conception of the foundational, and the dimensions of this heterogeneity consisted of different kinds of tension. One of these dimensions of tension concerns the direction of action. To explain: the classic transitive subject-predicate relation posits an agent, which acts upon an object. Grammatically, the object remains passive. The uni-directionality of action in the classic subject-predicate relation is of course purely surface-grammatical, but the danger exists for abstract thought that the surface-grammatical structure may invade the matter to be thought³⁷ (perhaps, indeed, it already has - this invasion may the movement of falling). Lexical variation can remedy this. An example: saying that "X illuminates (*lichtet*) Y" sets up X as the foundation for Y, and has the directional structure X ---> Y. "Y essences out of (*west aus*) X" sets up the same foundational relation, but reverses the directional surface-syntax: Y is the source of action. The philosophical


³³ SZ, p.151.

³⁴ Own translation. "Aus dem her" would normally be translated with Macquarrie & Robinson's "in terms of", but the directional relationship to "auf... hin" is of overriding importance.

³⁵ For a consideration (with a different interest and emphasis) of *Entwurf*, *Verstehen* and circles, see J.Sallis, *Delimitations*, pp.119-125. The points here are not covered by Sallis.

³⁶ See pt.A, ch.1, section 2.

significance is this: that the conception of ground against which Heidegger is reacting is one where founding is a one-way dependence - rather like a pile of bricks in a gravitational field like that experienced on the surface of the earth, each item depends on the one below it. Some passages in Heidegger show a juxtaposition of directionally different foundational notions - e.g. the opposition of "*gründen in*" (based upon) and "*speisen aus*" (feeding from)³⁸; the opposition of "*gründen in*" and "*wesen aus*" (essencing from)³⁹; the opposition of "*in ihm gründend*" (based in it) and "*aus ihm entspringend*" (arising from it).⁴⁰ Generally most of the lexical items in the foundational network can be ascribed a directionality, either by virtue of their normal meaning, or with the help of prepositions and particles Heidegger normally places with them. Translation often loses these nuances. Thus a crude division of foundational notions as follows can be made. (This is sometimes difficult to spot, since semantic directionality cuts across grammatical directionality).⁴¹



³⁷ One might also apply Chomsky's distinction between surface and deep structure here.

³⁸ SZ, p.169. The Macquarrie-Robinson translation loses the sense of the directional tension.

³⁹ SZ, p.252 ("*wesen aus*" occurs in the *Gesamtausgabe* footnote).

⁴⁰ SZ, p.284.

⁴¹ The arrows mark the directionality of the terms in relation to the source. Verbs only have been used here for the sake of clarity. Nouns and other parts of speech from Heidegger can be divided similarly, but this would be confusing and tedious. The prepositions (only some are given here) emphasize the directionality; likewise the untranslatable particles "hin" and "her" - "hin" means an outwards or away-from movement, "her" an inwards movement. The first column translates (from top to bottom): ground in, be founded in, be carried away to, project onto, root in, presuppose, lie in. The second column: spring from, give, essence out of, understand, grow from, make possible, illuminate.

The most notable omission from this list is the verb *zeitigen*.⁴² Heidegger seems to ascribe both directions to this verb. While the other main foundational notions tend to have a unique direction and a bi-directional heterogeneity arises only through their common integration into the foundational semantic field, *zeitigen* seems to have an internal heterogeneity.

* * * * *

The revision of ground in this manner is not merely a reaction against a perception of traditional foundationalism, but has a concrete and central role to play in the functioning of fundamental ontology. This is best shown by following the interplay of *Verstehen* and *Entwurf*. At various points it will become clear that this interplay has a foundational significance, but to demonstrate the foundational relevance from the start, it will be shown how Heidegger associates *Grund* and *Sinn* (*Sinn* was defined in terms of *Entwurf* and *Verstehen* in the passage quoted above).

In this passage Heidegger recites the familiar thesis of the grounding character of *Zeitlichkeit*:-

<p>"Der ursprüngliche ontologische Grund der Existenzialität des Daseins aber ist die <i>Zeitlichkeit</i>." ⁴³</p>	<p>"The primordial ontological basis for Dasein's existentiality is <i>temporality</i>."</p>
---	--

A couple of paragraphs later he refers back to this. The context expects the repetition of the relation between *Zeitlichkeit* and *Dasein* as foundational, given in terms of *Grund*. However the notion of grounding has been replaced by that of *Seinssinn*:-

<p>"Wenn die <i>Zeitlichkeit</i> den ursprünglichen <i>Seinssinn</i> des Daseins ausmacht...." ⁴⁴</p>	<p>"If temporality makes up the primordial meaning of Dasein's Being...."</p>
--	---

This is not a casual slip. Exactly the same is seen in the following reference to exactly the same thesis:-

⁴² lit. "to temporalise" or "to mature"; there is an extended discussion of its meaning in the next chapter.

⁴³ SZ, p.234.

⁴⁴ SZ, p.235.

"Die These, der Sinn des Daseins ist die Zeitlichkeit...." ⁴⁵

"The thesis that the meaning of Dasein is temporality...."

And again, even more clearly, in one of the closing passages of *Sein und Zeit*:

"Die Aufgabe der bisherigen Betrachtungen war, das *ursprüngliche Ganze* des faktischen Daseins hinsichtlich der Möglichkeiten des eigentlichen und uneigentlichen Existierens existenzial-ontologisch *aus seinem Grunde* zu interpretieren. Als dieser Grund und somit als Seinssinn der Sorge offenbarte sich die *Zeitlichkeit*." ⁴⁶

"In our considerations hitherto, our task has been to Interpret the *primordial whole* of factual Dasein with regard to its possibilities of authentic and inauthentic existing, and to do so in an existential-ontological manner *in terms of its very basis*. *Temporality* has manifested itself as this basis and accordingly as the meaning of the Being of care."

The key part of this passage is "als dieser Grund und somit als Seinssinn...". The establishment of the *Seinssinn* comes or occurs "with" (*mit*) the establishment of ground.

Another helpful passage is this:-

"Der Sinn von Sein kann nie in Gegensatz gebracht werden zum Seienden oder zum Sein als tragenden »Grund« des Seienden, weil »Grund« nur als Sinn zugänglich wird, und sei er selbst der Abgrund der Sinnlosigkeit." ⁴⁷

"The meaning of Being can never be contrasted with entities, or with Being as the 'ground' which gives entities support; for a 'ground' becomes accessible only as meaning, even if it is itself the abyss of meaninglessness."

There is no contrast between the meaning of being, and being as ground. »Grund«, in scare-quotes, should probably be taken to refer to the unrevised traditional notion of ground. Thus "becomes accessible only as meaning" refers to the kind of change ground undergoes in the revision. There is no access to any objective, external facts which constitute ground, even if this is what grounding as such attempts to establish. The establishment of ground establishes only the *Seinssinn* of what we try to ground. Grounding is meaning insofar as it uncovers the being of something.

* * * * *

To return to Heidegger's "definition" of *Sinn*, it ran thus:

⁴⁵ SZ, p.331.


⁴⁶ SZ, p.436.

⁴⁷ SZ, p.152.


"Sinn ist das... Woraufhin des Entwurfs, aus dem her etwas als etwas verständlich wird."⁴⁸

"Meaning is the whither-upon of projection whence something becomes understandable as something...."

This could be shown diagrammatically thus:⁴⁹



However this misrepresents the situation in the following respects: (1) although the *Woraufhin* (*Worausher*) has a certain unity, it is a rather holistic and indeterminate notion; the diagram suggests it might be easily delimited; to improve, the diagram would somehow show the *Entwurf* dispersing itself, and *Verstehen* resynthesising. (2) *Verstehen* does not "return" to that which the *Entwurf* left: what it was initially sought to understand changes its character during the course of this process of understanding; thus the diagram would show *Entwurf* and *Verstehen* diverging slightly. So an improvement of the above diagram would look like this:⁵⁰




⁴⁸ SZ, p.151; own translation. "Aus dem her" would normally be translated with Maquarrie & Robinson's "in terms of", but the directional relationship to "auf... hin" is of overriding importance.

⁴⁹ Explanation of diagram: the arrows show a to and fro movement. One of the poles of this movement is named: *Woraufhin* (also termed *Worausher*). The two movements are also named: respectively, *Entwurf* and *Verstehen*.

⁵⁰ Explanation of diagram: a simple development of the previous diagram, such that the two directions (*Entwurf* and *Verstehen*) disperse themselves into an indefinite (non-polar) region on the right of the diagram, and that the two directions diverge slightly on the left of the diagram. This divergence marks the fact that the to-and-fro of the *Entwurf-Verstehen* cycle lead to a definite development of the concept (which lies, unmarked, on the left).

This pattern reappears in numerous guises in Heidegger's writings, often so that it may not be recognised. For example, Heidegger's analysis of questioning at the beginning of SZ⁵¹ breaks up questioning into the concepts < *Gefragte*, *Befragte*, *Erfragte* >.⁵² which could be placed on the diagram in the following way:⁵³



At the end of the section on the formal structure of the question of being (SZ§2), Heidegger addresses the problem of circularity in the question of being, a theme he returns to a number of times. He says this:

"Nicht ein »Zirkel im Beweis« liegt in der Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein, wohl aber eine merkwürdige »Rück- oder Vor-bezogenheit« des Gefragten (Sein) auf das Fragen als Seinsmodus eines Seienden."⁵⁴

"In the question of the meaning of Being there is no 'circular reasoning' but rather a remarkable 'relatedness backward or forward' which what we asking about (Being) bears to the inquiry itself as a mode of Being of an entity."

⁵¹ SZ, p.5. For a more general analysis of SZ§2, see J.Sallis, op.cit., pp.105-111.

⁵² Even Macquarrie & Robinson were largely defeated for translations; the terms are built on the -*frag*- root; *fragen* means to ask or to question. For a better understanding of their meaning, see Heidegger's explanation in SZ§2, or the diagram.

⁵³ Explanation of diagram: essentially the same as the previous one. The *Woraufhin* or *Worausher* has been relabelled as *Befragte*. The directions have not been labelled. That from which the to-and-fro movement starts and at which it ends have been labelled, respectively, *Gefragte* and *Erfragte*. The divergence of the directions to the left of the diagram represents the difference which the movement opens up between *Gefragte* and *Erfragte*.

⁵⁴ SZ, p.8.

The last phrase, "das Fragen als Seinsmodus eines Seienden", refers to the peculiarly inquisitive character of *Dasein*, which is selected as the *Befragte*. Thus in this passage Heidegger already refers to a dialectical mediation, a non-circular hermeneutic to-and-fro. And in the passage just prior to this, Heidegger shows that the non-circularity (or non-viciousness of what circularity there might be) turns on the foundational character of this dialectical mediation, and on the revision of this foundational character.

"Ein »Zirkel im Beweis« kann in der Fragestellung überhaupt nicht liegen, weil es in der Beantwortung der Frage nicht um eine ableitende Begründung, sondern um aufweisende Grund-Freilegung geht."⁵⁵

"A 'circular argument' cannot in any way lie in formulating the question [about the meaning of being]; for in answering this question the issue is not one of a derivative grounding, rather it is one of [a] showing ground-free-laying."

Heidegger says nothing more here on the nature of this revision, though at the very least one can read into the words *ableitend* (deriving) and *Freilegung* (free-laying) the rejection of hierarchical founding in favour of a founding associated with freedom, as presented in MAL and VWG.

* * * * *

As Guest points out, one of the directions in this double-movement is a "falling" direction, and the efforts of SZ are aimed at moving against this natural flow of understanding. This is stated by Heidegger quite clearly in the following passage:

"Die Freilegung des ursprünglichen Seins des Daseins muß ihm vielmehr *im Gegenzug* zur verfallenden ontisch-ontologischen Auslegungstendenz *abgerungen* werden."⁵⁶

"The free-laying of Dasein's primordial being must rather be *wrested* from Dasein by following the *opposite course* from that taken by the falling ontico-ontological tendency of interpretation."

The *Freilegung* (and here *Freilegung* once again in the sense of *Grund-Freilegung*) moves in opposition to the naturally falling tendencies of ontological interpretation, and must do so. Heidegger goes on to say that this inflicts a violence on our everyday processes of

⁵⁵ SZ, p.8; Macquarrie & Robinson's translation has been literalised.

⁵⁶ SZ, p.311 (Heidegger's emphasis); Macquarrie & Robinson's translation slightly adjusted.

understanding. (This should be compared with one aspect of the solution found earlier in this chapter for semantic interpenetration in Heidegger).⁵⁷

"Die existenziale Analyse hat daher für die Ansprüche bzw. die Genügsamkeit und beruhigte Selbstverständlichkeit der alltäglichen Auslegung ständig den Charakter einer *Gewaltsamkeit*. Dieser Charakter zeichnet zwar die Ontologie des Daseins besonders aus, er eignet aber jeder Interpretation, weil das in ihr sich ausbildende Verstehen die Struktur des Entwerfens hat."⁵⁸

"Existential analysis, therefore, constantly has the character of doing violence to the claims or the complacency and placid obviousness of everyday interpretation. This characteristic [of violence] is a remarkable feature of the ontology of Dasein [in general], but linked [particularly] to interpretation because interpretation's internally developing understanding has the structure of projection."

Thus *Entwerfen* names this violent move against the natural direction of understanding. Not only *Entwerfen*, however, but also this naturally falling tendency itself belongs to being:

"Die *Seinsart* des Daseins *fordert* daher von einer ontologischen Interpretation..., *daß sie sich das Sein dieses Seienden gegen seine eigene Verdeckungstendenz erobert*."⁵⁹

"Dasein's *kind of being* thus *demands* of an ontological interpretation.... *that it storm and subjugate the being of the entity contrary to its [being's] own disguising tendency*."

In this last passage, the tendency of being to disguise itself by enticing ontological understanding to run in the wrong direction echoes the amphibolous character of being described by Bigelow. Bigelow, as stated above, holds that the amphibolous character of being precludes the success of Heidegger's project in SZ; his objection is a version of the vicious circle objection: namely, that being's character of always leading understanding away from itself makes ontology inherently impossible. But it is exactly here that Heidegger has a theory that, if not successful, at least goes a step beyond Bigelow - and this is the possibility of a violent contrary movement: the *Entwurf*. The problem which now arises is that of the operation of the *Entwurf*: where does it take us, and with what justification? Heidegger raises these questions too.

⁵⁷ See pt. A, ch. 1, section 3 (second part of the solution).

⁵⁸ SZ, p.311; own translation. The second sentence is particularly obscure, and the given translation is a free interpretation. The important point, though, the causal association of the violence of the ontology with the structure of projection, is not in doubt.

⁵⁹ SZ, p.311; Macquarrie & Robinson's translation altered. Heidegger's emphasis.

"Aber gibt es hierfür [d.h. für das Entwerfen] nicht je eine eigene *Leitung* und *Regelung*? Woher sollen aber die ontologischen Entwürfe die Evidenz der phänomenalen Angemessenheit für ihre »Befunde« nehmen? Die ontologische Interpretation entwirft vorgegebenes Seiendes auf das ihm eigene Sein, um es hinsichtlich seiner Struktur auf den Begriff zu bringen. Wo sind die Wegweiser für die Entwurfsrichtung, damit sie überhaupt auf das Sein treffe? Und wenn gar das Seiende, das für die existenziale Analytik thematisch wird, *in* seiner Weise zu sein das ihm zugehörige Sein verbirgt?"⁶⁰

"But isn't there ever a specific *guidance* and *regulation* for this [i.e. for projection]? From where are ontological projections to get the evidence for the phenomenal appropriacy of their `findings'? Ontological interpretation projects a given entity onto its own being so as to bring it to conceptualisation with regard to its structure. Where are the signposts for the direction of projection, so that it successfully targets being? And what if the entity which becomes the theme of the existential analytic *in* its way of being actually conceals the being which belongs to it?"

The questions about some sort of guide for the *Entwurf* eventually take Heidegger to the *Seinsverständnis* that is always already "in" *Dasein*, but in an indeterminate and obscure way.⁶¹ The *Verstehen-Entwurf* reciprocity now seems to begin to iterate, and thus Heidegger once again raises the question of circularity.⁶² The circle is discussed earlier in §32 of SZ.⁶³ Here the well-known passage is found in which Heidegger says that it is not a matter of escaping or avoiding the circle, but getting into it in the right way.

"Das Entscheidende ist nicht, aus dem Zirkel heraus-, sondern in ihn nach der rechten Weise hineinzukommen."⁶⁴

"What is decisive is not to get out of the circle but to come into it in the right way."

But what could this right way be? If ontology is to be possible, then to come into the circle in the right way must also be a possibility. Bearing in mind that the "circle" is constructed from the to-and-fro movement of *Verstehen* and *Entwurf*, this word *Entwurf* also occurs in the introduction to the second edition of Kant's *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, during Kant's discussion of the nature of scientific revolutions and the problem of hermeneutic circularity.⁶⁵ Kant writes:

⁶⁰ SZ, p.311f.; own translation.

⁶¹ SZ, p.313.

⁶² SZ, p.314.

⁶³ SZ, pp.152f.

⁶⁴ SZ, p.153.

⁶⁵ The reference is owed to P. Bigelow, *op.cit.*, p.148.

"Sie begriffen, daß die Vernunft nur das einsieht, was sie selbst nach ihrem Entwurfe hervorbringt...."⁶⁶

In other words, a projection or plan (*Entwurf*) is prior to understanding. The point is, for example, that something such as the Copernican conception of the solar system could never be deduced from observations, but required an *Entwurf* which could then be tested against observations. The problem which arises is: how can one produce a correct *Entwurf*? is there any sure path towards it? The answer is obviously no. Of course, one's previous knowledge may give one a vague idea of the sort of thing which might work, but some kind of leap is still required.⁶⁷ Copernicus is an example of someone who managed to get into the circle in the right way, but it was only in retrospect that this could be shown. How, then, do we get into Heidegger's circle in the right way? Can one be sure in advance?

"Es gilt, einen Weg zur Aufhellung der ontologischen Fundamentalfrage zu suchen und zu gehen. Ob er der *einzig*e oder überhaupt der *rechte* ist, das kann erst *nach dem Gang* entschieden werden."⁶⁸

"One must seek and *follow* a way of casting light on the fundamental question of ontology. Whether this is the *only* way or even the *right* one can be decided only *after one has gone along it*."

This passage would seem to confirm the suspicion that in advance of finding the path, of getting into the circle in the right way, one can only hope for some luck. However Heidegger has more up his sleeve than simply this. The next move is a typically Heideggerian device which does not seem to be appreciated in the secondary literature: namely, the revaluation of the problematic as the fundamental. (This is not a random device external to the matter of the being itself; rather it reflects the restructuring of ground itself). Classically, the vicious circle objection is a problem which an investigation meets along its path. The problem is external to the matter in hand, and prevents further progress along the path (or rather, dubs further progress as absurd). The Heidegger device is to stop seeing the problem as external to the matter in hand, and rather to see it emerging from the matter in hand. The idea is that as the problem emerges from the matter in hand, so the structure of the problem must, in some way, reflect the structure of

⁶⁶ Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Bxiii. "They learned that reason has insight only into that which it produces after a plan (*Entwurf*) of its own."

⁶⁷ Cf. the concept of the "leap" (*Sprung*) which occurs in Heidegger's writings.

the matter in hand. Thus to progress further, one looks at the way in which the problem emerges from the matter in hand to get a better insight into its essence or structure.⁶⁹ This device can be seen at work in the following passages, which extend the discussion quoted above of finding an adequate *Entwurf*.

"Wird so nicht endlich ganz offenkundig, daß sich das aufgerollte fundamentalontologische Problem in einem »Zirkel« sich bewegt? Zwar zeigten wir schon bei der Analyse der Struktur des Verstehens überhaupt, daß, was mit dem unangemessenen Ausdruck »Zirkel« bemängelt wird, zum Wesen und zu der Auszeichnung des Verstehens selbst gehört."⁷⁰

"Does it not finally become patently clear that the rolled-up fundamental-ontological problem moves in a `circle'? We have indeed already shown in the analysis of the structure of understanding in general that what is undervalued with the inappropriate term `circle' belongs to the essence and distinctive character of understanding itself."

Here Heidegger refers back to the discussion of the hermeneutic circle in §32, and it can be seen that the problematic "circle" (note the scare-quotes) sketches out the structure of the essence of understanding.

"Was die Verständigkeit, vermeinend, der höchsten Strenge wissenschaftlicher Untersuchung zu genügen, mit der Vermeidung des »Zirkels« zu beseitigen wünscht, ist nichts Geringeres als die Grundstruktur der Sorge. Ursprünglich durch sie konstituiert, ist das Dasein je schon sich-selbst-vorweg."⁷¹

"What common sense wishes to eliminate in avoiding the `circle', on the supposition that it is measuring up to the loftiest rigour of scientific investigation, is nothing less than the basic structure of care. Because it is primordially constituted by care, any Dasein is already ahead of itself."

Here Heidegger goes further: the problematic "circle" structure is the *Grundstruktur* (ground-structure) of care. Indeed, not only is the problematic in the circle revalued and appropriated as the ground and essence of *Dasein*, so also the *Zirkeleinwand*, the objection.

⁶⁸ SZ, p.437; Macquarrie & Robinson's translation altered.

⁶⁹ This device or tactic is what is rhetoricized (and misunderstood?) by Bigelow as the synchronous possibility and impossibility of ontology. The only Heidegger text which bears explicitly on the matter is the analysis of conspicuity (*Auffälligkeit*) in SZ§16.

⁷⁰ SZ, p.314. Macquarrie & Robinson's translation considerably altered.

⁷¹ SZ, p.315.

"Der »Zirkeleinwand« kommt aber selbst aus einer Seinsart des Daseins."⁷²

"Yet the `charge of circularity' itself comes from a kind of being which belongs to Dasein."

Almost all along, the references to circularity have been circumscribed and suspended with the use of quotation marks. The inference is that there is not really a circle here anyway, but some other kind of structure, which only appears as a circle in the field of logic. What clues does Heidegger give as the "real" structure of this "circle"? After saying that it is the *Grundstruktur* of *Sorge* (quoted above), Heidegger then recapitulates the structure of *Sorge* as "je schon sich-selbst-vorweg". This structure is metaleptic - another kind of double movement.⁷³ Further clues to the "real" structure of this "circle" are given in the following passage:

"Der gegen die existenziale Interpretation vorgebrachte »Zirkeleinwand« will sagen: die Idee der Existenz und des Seins überhaupt wird »vorausgesetzt« und »darnach« das Dasein interpretiert, um daraus die Idee des Seins zu gewinnen. Allein was bedeutet das »Voraussetzen«? Wird mit der Idee der Existenz ein Satz angesetzt, aus dem wir nach den formalen Regeln der Konsequenz weitere Sätze über das Sein des Dasein deduzieren? Oder hat diese Voraus-setzen den Charakter des verstehenden Entwerfens, so zwar, daß die solches Verstehen ausbildende Interpretation das Auszulegende gerade erst selbst zu Wort kommen läßt, damit es von sich aus entscheide, ob es als dieses Seiende die Seinsverfassung hergibt, auf welche es im Entwurf formalanzeigend erschlossen wurde?"⁷⁴

"The `circularity objection' which is brought against existential interpretation claims: the idea of existence and being in general is `presupposed' and `after that' Dasein is interpreted so as to extract the idea of being. But what does `presupposing' mean? With the idea of existence is a proposition being posited, from which we deduce further propositions about the being of Dasein according to the formal rules of logicity? Or does this presupposing have the character of understanding projecting, such that the interpretation which develops such understanding *is precisely what first allows the matter for interpretation to put itself into words, so that the matter resolves itself as to whether, as this entity, it reveals the constitution of being onto which it was formally disclosed in projection?*"

The "circle" acquires two characterisations here: first, that its movement is non-sequential; second, that its movement is creative. (1) The sequentiality of the steps is suggested as an origin for the vicious circle by the scare-quoted »vorausgesetzt« (lit. placed before) and

⁷² SZ, p.315.

⁷³ For a discussion of metalepsis, see the discussion of Rapaport in the earlier section on semantic interpenetration.

⁷⁴ SZ, p.314f.; own translation. The interpretation and translation of the section italicised by Heidegger is exceptionally difficult. The strength of "von sich aus entscheide" (resolves itself) is (probably) freedom from pre-judice as to whether the interpretation faithfully conveys something of the being of the entity which it was sought to understand.

»darnach« (after). The later phrase *verstehendes Entwerfen* suggests a participatory synchronicity, a synthetic tension. (2) The reference to principles and the phrase "erst selbst zu Wort kommen läßt" (itself actually first articulates) contrasts the ready-made fine definition of principles with the creative process. The mediative bi-directional process of *verstehendes Entwerfen* is prior to the determination of such principles, indeed, is the creation of articulation and conceptual determination. If the *verstehend-entwerfend* mediation is creative, it follows that it could not indefinitely extend backwards in a constant circling; rather, it quickly reaches an origin. The logical vicious circle depends for its infinite regression on a clearly distinct and determinate sequence. Heidegger must be right to think that if the circle gets rapidly indeterminate as it regresses, one may soon be unable to trace a regression any more. The contrast between the propositional nature of the principle (*Satz*) and Heidegger's idea of "erst zu Wort kommen läßt" needs especial emphasis: it is not only that the search for foundations should not be thought to consist in the production of propositions; further, the very nature of such a foundational enquiry is that it deals with the pre-propositional (as well as the pre-cognitive), and thus it works with semantic-syntactic structures other than those of everyday language (i.e. with paratypes). The vicious circle arises if one ignores this. The next section takes up another tactic by which the proposition is disintegrated so as to bring the circle into its correct relation to the understanding.

* * * * *

To draw this section to a close, two things will be done: first, to place the bi-directionality or dialectic of projective understanding in its historical perspective; second, to show how the reversal (*Kehre*) of projective understanding is anticipated in the final paragraph of SZ.

To place this bi-directionality in its historical perspective, it can justifiably be called dialectic. This justification needs to be made, since on the whole the term is not well received by Heidegger.⁷⁵ Dialectic is discussed by Plato in *The Republic* as a part of the

⁷⁵ And even less well by Kant, who calls it a logic of illusion: *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, B349. The purpose of introducing the term "dialectic" here is that of finding a convenient and adequate description of Heidegger's method and language. Dialectic has had many meanings in

education of the philosopher.⁷⁶ Plato maps out the function and status of dialectic more clearly than its procedure. Dialectic is the highest method in philosophy, and the only method available to pure reason in the attainment of the highest forms of knowledge. At 533c-d Plato refers to the problem of gaining firm knowledge of the first principle in the face of prejudices and assumptions - dialectic is unique in its ability to avoid these prejudices and assumptions. Heidegger claims⁷⁷ that phenomenology is the only appropriate method for ontology (i.e. for the recovery of the question of being); this is exactly analogous to Plato's claim about dialectic and the first principle. And in both cases, the primary concern is the development of a method which avoids prejudices.

Heidegger never exhaustively describes what he means by phenomenology, although there are extensive passages on the subject.⁷⁸ From SZ §7 it is clear that phenomenology is a hermeneutical⁷⁹ method for overcoming the self-concealing⁸⁰ tendencies of phenomena (and presumably being), a method which has to supply not only its own lexis, but even its own grammar.⁸¹ While the structure of projective understanding is never explicitly associated with phenomenology, it becomes clear in the course of SZ that the structure and directionality of projective understanding is a grammatically revisional hermeneutical method for overcoming the self-concealing tendencies of being, and that, like phenomenology, it is considered essential to the operation of fundamental ontology.

In discussing Heidegger, I therefore use the term "dialectic" to refer to a key device or figure (paratype) in the phenomenological method, namely, that of the double foundational movement of projective understanding. Phenomenology is commonly thought to belong to the early Heidegger, and to distinguish the early from the late Heidegger. However it is a

philosophy. I have drawn from Plato, not from Kant or Hegel, and my interest is in the semantics, not the logic, of the word.

⁷⁶ Plato, *The Republic*, 531d-534e.

⁷⁷ SZ, p.35.

⁷⁸ e.g. PGZ §§4-13; SZ §7; GP §5.

⁷⁹ SZ, p.37.

⁸⁰ SZ, p.35f.

⁸¹ SZ, p.39.

case of the terminology changing more than the method, and the dialectic paratype in phenomenology clearly outlasts the term "phenomenology". It is in this way that I interpret the comments of Heidegger in his letter to Richardson, in which he carefully warded off any suggestion that he had stopped being a phenomenologist.

What might the paratype "dialectic" have to do with ground? The unreconstructed conception of ground is one of a linear, mono-directional dependence relation, structurally analogous to our local experience of gravity. Working with such an unreconstructed conception makes it relatively easy to move in one direction (deductively), and relatively difficult moving in the other direction (contrary to the falling tendency of interpretation⁸²). In practice the difficulty with moving in the other direction is not so much speculating about possible reasons or grounds; the problem is justifying the move in this direction, that is, finding an *Entwurfsrichtung* (direction of projection) which is adequate to target being accurately.⁸³ The crucial difficulty is how to avoid the presumption of a God's-eye view of the universe, and in so doing quietly making an illicit assumption in one's arguing back. How can one legitimately move back?

One kind of attempt to deal with this problem is transcendental argumentation. Heidegger uses forms of expression (particularly the Kantian phrase "condition of the possibility for") which suggest he too might be using a basically transcendental form of argumentation. Crudely and briefly described, transcendental argumentation has the general form of two premises and a conclusion, where (1) the first premise p is an admission of a very general and uncontroversial empirical character, such as the facticity of empirical knowledge or experience or the facticity of meaningful communication, and (2) the second premise is condition of the form "if q then p ", stating a necessary condition for the possibility of p ; as, according to (1), p holds, so therefore q must hold as the necessary condition for the possibility of p .⁸⁴ In this manner transcendental argumentation lays a claim to justifiable movement back towards first principles. However the God's-eye view objection can be played with respect to the second premise. In fact there are no

⁸² SZ, p.311 (quoted above).

⁸³ SZ, p.311f. (quoted above).

formal, extended transcendental arguments in Heidegger, although transcendental arguments could be constructed from what Heidegger says. His use of the suggestive phrase "condition for the possibility of" is a parasitic allusion to Kant where the key interest in borrowing the phrase is not for its logical form, but for its semantic properties: Heidegger has no interest in the logic of the transcendental argument; his interest is that semantically the phrase "condition for the possibility of" expresses a justifiable move back towards first principles. Evidence for this is that the phrase "condition for the possibility of" is used alongside (and interchangeably with) other terms expressing the same retrogression.⁸⁵ Thus any logical defect in transcendental argumentation would not affect Heidegger. The question remains, how does Heidegger avoid the God's-eye view?

One can restate the problem in terms of Kierkegaard's criticism of Hegel in terms of palaces and builder's huts. The classic systematic philosopher builds a palace while inhabiting a builder's shack nearby: the shack constitutes the perspective and methodology which lie outside the fine homogeneous and totalising structure of the palace. The necessity of such an external perspective and methodology places a question-mark over the possibility of a total system. With respect to Heidegger, phenomenology seems to be a method whereby the builder's shack is itself gradually turned into the palace.⁸⁶ This reflects the structure of the paratype (disassembling device) whereby the problematic is revalued as the essential. In the metaphor his position runs as follows: in fact we always already have been in the palace (of *Seinsverständnis*); it is just that the palace has fallen

⁸⁴ This summary is extremely simplified and does the extensive secondary literature on transcendental arguments little justice. For a start, see T. Wilkerson, *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (Oxford University Press, 1976), ch.10.

⁸⁵ See section on semantic interpenetration.

⁸⁶ But in any case Heidegger's palace is more like Kant's dwelling-house than a tower reaching to the heavens: *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, B735. Whether Heidegger's "palace" is a totalising system is very questionable: Heidegger's continual appeal in SZ to the necessity of a (pre-perspectival? pre-conceptual?) access to Dasein's totality do not constitute a claim to provide a total analysis, nor are these appeals ever satisfied - they serve simply to motivate the next steps. (However to find a term to describe the relation of SZ to Dasein's totality is difficult: terms like "aspect", "part", "perspective", are ruled out; Heidegger's terminological evasions make it difficult to defend him on this point. There is a sense in which it is quite obvious that SZ provides no total analysis, but instead moves quickly to intimating the extra-textual origins and/or limits of that totality). As Kant says of his own project, at the outset it seemed as though a tower was to be built to the heavens, but the execution of the project humbled these ambitions.

(*verfallen*) into terrible decay and we have to reverse this process using the materials lying around us inside the palace/shack. There is then something of a Pompidou Centre move, whereby the scaffolding and other building paraphernalia actually turn out to constitute the palace.

That the problem of moving back ever arose is diagnosed as a forgetting or bracketing-put of *Entwurf* as part of the dialectical process of projective understanding. The theory of projection does not therefore respond to the problem in the terms the problem sets, but undermines it. The retrieve of *Entwurf* inflicts violence on our natural thought processes, since it moves in an opposite direction, and in so doing demands a new lexis and grammar.⁸⁷ It is in this way that Heidegger's dialectic responds to Plato's hope of an unprejudiced ascent to the first principle.

With these comments as to the foundationally dialectical character of meaning as projective understanding, the final paragraph of SZ, on the meaning of being, will be interpreted, and its anticipation of a reversal (*Kehre*) brought out.

In this final paragraph, Heidegger asks:

"*Wie ist erschließendes Verstehen von Sein daseinsmäßig überhaupt möglich?*"⁸⁸ "*How is this disclosive understanding at all possible for Dasein?*"

As has already been shown, the acquisition of *Verstehen* turns on an adequate *Entwurf*, and an *Entwurf* is the reverse of the natural process of understanding. As there is already a *Seinsverständnis* in *Dasein*, the matter thus turns to the reversal of this *Seinsverständnis*. To do this, Heidegger digs deeper into the constitution of *Dasein*, finding it has the basic structure of *Zeitlichkeit*. With regard to *Dasein's* inherent *Seinsverständnis*, *Zeitlichkeit* is *Temporalität*.⁸⁹ It follows that gaining an adequate *Entwurf* for the meaning of being has something to do with a reversal and the structure of *Temporalität*. This is as far as SZ

Kant, interestingly, speaks of the inevitability that each must build his own intellectual home, such is the size of people's mutual misunderstanding, resulting in a scattering of constructions.

⁸⁷ SZ, p.39. Cf. pt.A, ch.1 and ch.2 on the lexis and grammar of founding.

⁸⁸ SZ, p.437 (Heidegger's emphasis).

⁸⁹ This point is only shown in GP.

gets. Not all of this is clear from the closing words, but what is clear from the final paragraph is that after the above question about a *Verstehen von Sein*, Heidegger then turns to the possibility of *Zeitlichkeit* offering an *Entwurf*.

"Kann die Frage ihre Antwort im Rückgang auf die *ursprüngliche Seinsverfassung* des Sein-verstehenden Daseins gewinnen? Die existenzial-ontologische Verfassung der Daseinsganzheit gründet in der *Zeitlichkeit*. Demnach muß eine ursprüngliche Zeitigungsweise der ekstatischen *Zeitlichkeit* selbst den ekstatischen Entwurf von Sein überhaupt ermöglichen."⁹⁰

"Can this question be answered by going back to the *primordial constitution-of-being* of that Dasein by which being is understood? The existential-ontological constitution of Dasein's totality is grounded in temporality. Hence the ecstatical projection of being must be made possible by a primordial way in which ecstatical temporality temporalizes."

This brings the matter to time. But before going on to the next chapter (on time), there is still something outstanding in the structure and methodology of founding which must be examined. In the last passage, Heidegger said that the constitution of *Dasein* was grounded in *Zeitlichkeit*. And in GP, Heidegger speaks of an "Entwurf auf Zeit", a projection onto time, as the projection which will make possible a recovery of the meaning of being.⁹¹ Time and temporality appear here as poles of a grounding-projecting relation. Yet what seems to happen as Heidegger circles towards being is that the poles become subordinate to and indistinguishable from their relatedness. This raises the methodological problem which will be pursued in the next section.

3) A short note on metaxy and the end of circling

"Dasein... ist... das *Sein* des Grundes....
Dasein ist sein Grund existierend.... "⁹²

"Dasein... is... the *being* of ground.... Dasein
is its basis existently.... "

There is a role-shift for ground in SZ, such that the investigation of ground no longer targets something that there is to understand, rather, what it is to understand. The ground of *Dasein* is not a category to be filled, but an existential: this, of course, is nothing new, but were the implications of this ever worked out properly in the secondary literature?

⁹⁰ SZ, p.437; Macquarrie & Robinson's translation with minor alterations.

⁹¹ GP, p.437.

⁹² SZ, p.285; own translation. Macquarrie & Robinson interpret out the crucial point.

Dasein does not have ground, does not have a rationale, does not have a *Seinssinn*; it is such. As Heidegger says so often, the Greeks described human being as the *zoon logon echon*.⁹³ In this definition *logos* is not only the source of speech, but also of rationale, in the sense of (a) reason, ground. Here the proposition "temporality is the ground of *Dasein*", which posits a relation between temporality and *Dasein*, begins to disintegrate as a proposition. *Dasein*, surface-grammatically a pole of the founding relation, coalesces in on the relation, such that as a matter of the deep-syntax it cannot be distinguished from the founding relation.

In the previous section it was seen how Heidegger's defence against the circularity objection, that is, the infinite regression of grounds to which ontology may seem doomed, turned on the mistake of regarding the constituents of the circle as determinate propositions. The statement that temporality is the ground of *Dasein* would be one such constituent of the circle. Thus the disintegration of the propositional nature of this statement is crucial to Heidegger's defence; indeed, the way in which the disintegration occurs is crucial to the project of ontology. MAL demonstrates that the proposition is ultimately foundational (as a matter of its internal structure) not only in this case, but generally so.⁹⁴ Thus the disintegration or reconstruction of propositional-form reflects a revision of ground.

The classic proposition sets up a subject-predicate relation in which the subject, grammatically, acts as the point of security - as the *hypokeimenon*. The interpretations of ground as freedom, transcendence and temporality are examples of Heidegger putting the principle of the following passage into practice:

"Diese Situation ist nicht die rettende Küste sondern der Sprung ins treibende Boot, und es hängt nun daran, das Tau für die Segel in die Hand zu bekommen und nach dem Wind zu sehen."⁹⁵

"This situation is not the rescuing coast, rather the leap into the drifting boat, and now it is a matter of taking the sail-rope in one's hand and looking for the wind."

⁹³ e.g. SZ, pp.25, 48, 165.

⁹⁴ See the material on MAL in pt.A, ch.2.

⁹⁵ PIA, p.37.

Thus weaning thought from false ontic security, Heidegger tries to open a space of free creativeness, where the foundational is not a groping for the nearest point of security, but a response to a radical absence of such ontological security. This thought is analogous, not to the immediately experience of gravity on the earth's surface - an inevitable falling to the floor, but to the planets and stars which fail to fall - which literally create their own ground. In other words, a thought which has effected a Copernican turn with regard to the foundational. At the grammatical level, this means (*inter alia*) a disruption of the proposition. At the lexical level, this means (*inter alia*) a cultivation of terms which act like bridges without supports. In this vein we have the following passage in SZ:

"In welche Richtung gilt es zu sehen für die phänomenale Charakteristik des In-seins als solchen? Wir erhalten Antwort durch die Erinnerung daran, was bei der Anzeige des Phänomens dem phänomenologisch behaltenden Blick anvertraut wurde: das In-sein im Unterschied von der vorhandenen Inwendigkeit eines Vorhandenen »in« einem anderen.... das In-Sein vielmehr als wesenhafte Seinsart dieses Seienden selbst. Was anderes stellt sich aber dann mit diesem Phänomen dar als vorhandene commercium *zwischen* einem vorhandenen Subjekt und einem vorhandenen Objekt? Diese Auslegung käme dem phänomenalen Bestand schon näher, wenn sie sagte: das *Dasein ist das Sein* dieses »Zwischen«. Irreführend bliebe die Orientierung an dem »Zwischen« trotzdem. Sie macht unbesehen den ontologisch unbestimmten Ansatz des Seienden mit, wozwischen dieses Zwischen als solches »ist«. Das Zwischen ist schon als Resultat der *convenientia* zweier Vorhandenen begriffen."⁹⁶

"In what direction must one look for the phenomenal characterisation of being-in as such? We get an answer by recalling what was entrusted to the persistently phenomenological view when this phenomenon was announced: the difference of being-in from the present-at-hand insiderness of one present-at-hand thing `in' another.... rather, being-in as the essential way of being of this entity itself. But what else does this phenomenon then present if not a present-at-hand commercium *between* a present-at-hand subject and a present-at-hand object? This interpretation would come closer to the phenomenal content by saying: *Dasein is the being* of this `between'. Nevertheless orientating oneself with the `between' would remain misleading. It covertly brings in the ontologically vague assumption of the entities between which this between, as such, `is'. The between is already conceived as the result of the *convenientia* of two things present-at-hand."

Here Heidegger can be seen trying to set up the "in" and the "between" as (impossibly) poleless relations. This does not mean that Heidegger simply reduces everything to the relational.⁹⁷ Rather, the structure towards which Heidegger is working is the condition for the possibility of a subject-object-relation,⁹⁸ in the same way that the laws according to which planets and stars do not fall, but create their own ground, are prior conditions for

⁹⁶ SZ, p.132; own translation.

⁹⁷ SZ, p.88.

⁹⁸ *ibid.*

the locally prevailing gravitational conditions on the earth's surface. The paratype (disassembling structure) which Heidegger tries to create here lacks a name, and as it will reappear a number of times yet, it needs one; it will therefore be called metactical (from "metaxy").⁹⁹ Creating a sense of the metactical involves such devices as depriving relations of their poles; prioritising them over their poles; interchanging bi-polar opposites; letting the names of the poles stand for the relation and vice versa.

Metaxy can be seen at work again in the following passage from SZ:

"*Im Sein* des Daseins liegt schon das »Zwischen« mit Bezug auf Geburt und Tod. Keineswegs dagegen »ist« das Dasein in einem Zeitpunkt wirklich und außerdem noch von dem Nichtwirklichen seiner Geburt und seines Todes »umgeben«. Existenzial verstanden ist die Geburt nicht und nie ein Vergangenes im Sinne des Nichtmehrvorhandenen, so wenig wie dem Tod die Seinsart des noch nicht vorhandenen, aber ankommenden Ausstandes eignet. Das faktische Dasein existiert gebürtig, und gebürtig stirbt es auch schon im Sinne des Seins zum Tode.... Als Sorge *ist* das Dasein das »Zwischen«."¹⁰⁰

"The 'between' which relates to birth and death already lies *in the being* of Dasein. This in no way means to say that Dasein 'is' actual in a point of time and, supplementarily, 'surrounded' by the non-actuality of its birth and death. Existentially understood, birth is not and never is something past in the sense of something no longer present-at-hand; and death is just as far from having the kind of being of something outstanding which is not yet present-at-hand but coming along. Factual Dasein exists birth-wise, and it dies birth-wise in the sense of being-towards-death.... As care, Dasein is the 'between'."

Immediately after this passage, Heidegger says that the ground of the unity of (presumably) the dispersion into <birth - between of life - death> is *Zeitlichkeit* (temporality). Repeatedly, the methodologically irregular structures which the investigation of the foundational has uncovered lead to the issue of *Zeitlichkeit*. As regards the problem of the hermeneutic circle, it will be seen that Heidegger says that *Zeitlichkeit* is the end of the retrogression - and this, it must be, by virtue of its metactical character.

⁹⁹ This follows C.Lutz, *Zwischen Sein und Nichts - Der Begriff des 'Zwischen' im Werk von Martin Heidegger* (dissertation, Bonn University, 1984). Lutz appropriates the word "metaxy" into the German language, taking it from Plato (*Symposion* 204). The Greek "metaxy" means between. Lutz's rather short dissertation is more instructive as regards the later Heidegger, and quoting SZ p.132 *in extenso* rather refutes his statements about the earlier Heidegger. Lutz notes a number of connections, but lacks any depth or persistence.

¹⁰⁰ SZ, p.374; Macquarrie & Robinson's translation with alterations.

SUMMARY OF PART A.

This part of the thesis approached the issue of ground in the early Heidegger by taking methodological problems as starting-points. As a matter of presentation, four areas where methodological problems emerged were analysed: (i) semantic interpenetrations, (ii) logico-grammatical irregularities, (iii) macro-structural incongruencies, (iv) problems of mediation between being and entity. Although these starting-points presented problems which affected not only the language and understanding of ground, but many other areas of Heidegger's thought, they led to considerations of the nature of ground. As a matter of the issue itself, these areas had more than mere points of contact. Time and again, the issues came down to ground as origin of and threat to the identity-difference dimension.

The first area, semantic interpenetration, began with the difficulty of identifying "the language of foundations".¹⁰¹ The problem was that both the keywords of Heidegger's writing (including *Grund*, *Ursprung* and *Fundament*) and the language of the structural fabric of his writing interpenetrated, so that not only did fine distinctions often have no more than a local validity, but also the separation of normally distinct philosophical concepts and areas became impossible (e.g. foundations, truth, transcendence, time, freedom, language). Previous secondary literature had two main contributions to make (i) the recognition that such a problem applied to the word *Wesen*; (ii) the recognition of wide morphological variation and semantic interpenetration based on alliterative, etymological and metaphorical associations.¹⁰² These contributions left a gap which would have to be filled as an immediate preliminary to any study of the concept of *Grund* in Heidegger's philosophy. The nature of the problem, in its full extent, was however such that a conventional study of the foundational would finally have failed because of the impossibility of determining the extent of the language in question. Nevertheless, a new direction for studying the foundational arose from considerations of the origin of the problem of semantic interpenetration, and taking clues from (*inter alia*) scattered comments by Heidegger, a solution to the problem emerged. This was presented as having

¹⁰¹ See pt.A, ch.1.

¹⁰² See pt.A, ch.1, section 1.

four aspects.¹⁰³ (1) The first aspect concerns the kind of objectivity that can be ascribed to the ground of meaning (with implications for the objectivity of ground in general) - namely, that such objectivity is a dangerous mirage. The suggestion was made that Heidegger's style was a mimicry, not of everyday discourse, but of trans-cultural and trans-millennial discourse, with the moral that philosophers, in drifting widely around the most abstract reaches of human existence, cannot rescind their own responsibility for (their own grounding of) the reliability and security of truth. (2) The second aspect concerns the homogeneity and unity of ground, building on the idea of trans-millennial discourse, but not in the human-historical sense, rather, in the sense of *Seinsgeschichte*. The idea is that the historically earlier conceptions are closer to some original pre-conceptual, pre-metaphysical access to (grounding in) being, and that history, with its proliferation, semantic dispersion and increasing refinement of metaphysical keywords, represents a falling from being; semantic interpenetration is a device seeking to reverse the natural flow of this process and recreate the linguistic conditions necessary for a recovery of being (as the ground of metaphysics). (3) The third aspect examines this conflict between the homogeneity and heterogeneity of ground in a non-historical (but nevertheless still temporal) way, finding that semantic interpenetration offers some formal structural models for the nature of ground (metalepsis, paralipsis), such that it can operate as the origin of identity and difference and as the explanation of its own unity and fragmentation. (4) The paralipitic presence of ground in semantic interpenetrations led to a fourth part of the solution: that Heidegger stands in a long onto-theo-logical tradition, bordering on the mystical tradition, which asserts a heterogeneity within the origin (ground), an internal heterogeneity which is largely contrary to any conceptuality derivable from our normal environments.

The second area,¹⁰⁴ logical-grammatical irregularities, took its starting-point from the paradoxical and tautological formulations in foundational language: once again, such formulations challenge the possibility of a conventional study of the foundational in Heidegger, but open up a new direction for study. Here the use of paradox and tautology led to questions about the structure and nature of the proposition and Heidegger's assessment of the status of the principles of identity and contradiction in relation to the

¹⁰³ See pt.A, ch.1, section 3.

principle of ground (sufficient reason). The thesis that the principle of ground was prior to the principles of identity and contradiction was a device used to disassemble the hierarchical foundationalism of Leibniz, and a reflection of the precedence of ground over other conventional themes in philosophical logic. Thus it was not so much the case (a) that the precedence of the principle of ground permitted abuses of the principles of identity and contradiction in philosophical discussion of the principle of ground, as (b) that the precedence of ground to the norms of everyday discourse entailed that everyday norms of discourse (i.e. the grammar that is caught within logic) are insufficient for indicating or showing ground in or via language. The exploitation of paradoxical formulations reflects or indicates the tensions of the internal heterogeneity of ground, while tautological formulations indicate the mergence of subject and predicate in avoiding the tendency of surface grammar towards infinite regression of the foundational.¹⁰⁵ A classic means of drawing together unity and multiplicity had of course been arboreal hierarchical ontologies, and Heidegger's rejection of such a system during his discussion of the principles of identity, contradiction and sufficient reason leads into the phenomenon of co-originality or equiprimordiality (*Gleichursprünglichkeit*). *Gleichursprünglichkeit*, although crucially unexplored by Heidegger, is in practice normally posited between phenomena which are, *inter alia*, interdefinable, and with this move the problem more or less merges with that of the preceding chapter on semantic interpenetration. The common problems are the elaboration of the origin of identity and difference, and the breakdown of the conventional methods of semantic and syntactic regulation.

Gleichursprünglichkeit likewise leads into the third area, macro-structural incongruencies.¹⁰⁶ Foundationalism is, *inter alia*, a matter of the macro-structure of thinking, of the overall patterns of cohesion in an ontology. It is not only a matter of the nature or existence of an ultimate ground, but also the manner in which subordinate phenomena relate to it. The classic pattern is the tree-structure. Foundationalist interpretations of SZ probably rest on two superficial observations: firstly, the prevalence of foundationalist language (the significance of which was questioned in the previous two chapters), and secondly, the macro-structure. Consideration of the macro-structure of SZ

¹⁰⁴ See pt.A, ch.2.

¹⁰⁵ A metactical paratype or device, the function of which was described in pt.A, ch.4.

led initially to multiple incongruencies in the apparently prevailing intermapping of triadic structures (closer analysis revealed an ambiguity between triadic and quadratic structures).¹⁰⁷ But behind this a deeper incongruence was then identified: a conflict between two structural systems - (i) an "anti"-systematic structuring labelled wrap-into clustering, where the tree-structure was replaced by something like an onion-structure, with the qualification that succeeding layers invaded the existing structure rather than lying above them, and (ii) a more superficial triadic formalising motivated by the need to recapitulate the everyday analysis of *Dasein* in terms of the triadic analysis of temporality.¹⁰⁸ It was concluded that the interplay between structural power and structural intangibility in SZ provided the seeds of a self-disassembly of its apparently conventional foundationalism.

The fourth area concerned problems of mediation between being and entity (thus: the origin and "bridging" of the ontological difference). The privileged entity in the recovery of the question of being is of course *Dasein*, and it is primarily the cognitive foundational relation between being and *Dasein* (*Seinsverständnis*) which Heidegger exploits. In this chapter the matters for analysis were the dynamics of the cognitive foundational relation and the attempt to secure a method which would render ontology possible in the face of the naturally deceptive character of being. This problem, often discussed as that of the hermeneutic circle, was met by (i) an attempt to recover a two-way (dialectical) conception of grounding,¹⁰⁹ and (ii) a metactical interpretation of ground.¹¹⁰ Dialectic names that same paratypal double movement described as the second part of the solution¹¹¹ to semantic interpenetration: the interplay between the naturally falling movement of the understanding away from being (interpretation), and the violent *Entwurf* back towards being and contrary to the everyday processes of understanding. Metaxy names a paratype which disintegrates the subject-predicate relation (e.g. as mentioned in the chapter on logico-syntactic irregularities), and more generally that grammar of thought which

¹⁰⁶ See pt. A, ch. 3.

¹⁰⁷ See pt. A, ch. 3, section 1.

¹⁰⁸ See pt. A, ch. 3, section 2.

¹⁰⁹ See pt. A, ch. 4, section 2.

¹¹⁰ See pt. A, ch. 4, section 3.

illegitimately demands a constant reference back for ontological security; it is a cultivation of the poleless between, of poles with no between. Together, dialectic and metaxy secure the possibility of finite ontological regression, and mark a stark revision of the concept of ground.

¹¹¹ See pt.A, ch.1, section 3.

PART B. CONNECTIONS: *GRUND - ZEITLICHKEIT - EREIGNIS*

CH.1. TEMPORALITY: COALESCENCE OF TIME AND GROUND

Suddenly, in the 1980's, time was discovered... (as a subject of Heidegger interpretation). Nevertheless from 1989-1991 three authors, one American, one French, and one German, separately complained that despite the obvious centrality of the theme to *Sein und Zeit* hardly anything had been written on Heidegger and time.¹ Their complaints, if anything, witnessed only to the bibliographical difficulties, since the wave of publications on time had already struck the presses.² We now have: expositions and interpretations ranging from the basic to the detailed and exhaustive,³ examinations of the development of Heidegger's thought on time,⁴ comparisons with most other major writers on time

¹ Chronologically: H.Rapaport, *Heidegger and Derrida - Reflections on Time and Language*, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989, at p.1; F.Dastur, *Heidegger et la question du temps*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1990, at p.126; M.Fleischer, *Die Zeitanalysen in Heideggers 'Sein und Zeit'*, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1991, at p.8. There is a 4th and more timely complaint to the same effect in G.Nicholson, "Ekstatic Temporality in *Sein und Zeit*", in J.J.Kockelmans, *A Companion to Martin Heidegger's 'Being and Time'*, Washington DC: University Press of America, 1986, at p.209.

² The 24 or so references given here are only a selection. A few further references are given in M.Fleischer, op.cit., p.8f. and F.Dastur, op.cit., p.126f.

³ M.Heinz, *Zeitlichkeit und Temporalität im Frühwerk Martin Heideggers*, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1982 (originally a doctoral dissertation for Wuppertal University, 1980); P.Ricoeur, "Temporalité, Historialité, Intratemporalité: Heidegger et le concept «vulgaire» de temps", in *Temps et Récit III*, Paris: Seuil, 1985, pp.90-144; M.Heinz, "The Concept of Time in Heidegger's Early Works", in J.J.Kockelmans ed., *A Companion to Martin Heidegger's 'Being and Time'*, pp.181-207; J.J.Kockelmans, *Heidegger's 'Being and Time'*, Ch.11-14; D.C.Wood, *The Deconstruction of Time*, Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1989, pp.137-264; F.Dastur, "La constitution ekstatique-horizontale de la temporalité chez Heidegger" in *Heidegger Studies* 2 (1986), pp.97-109; F.Dastur, "Heidegger et la question du temps" (op.cit.); M.Fleischer, op.cit.; G.Nicholson, op.cit.

⁴ O.Pöggeler, "Zeit und Sein bei Heidegger", in E.Orth ed., *Zeit und Zeitlichkeit bei Husserl und Heidegger*, Freiburg: Alber, 1983, pp.152-191; T.Kisiel, "Der Zeitbegriff beim früheren Heidegger (um 1925)", in *Phänomenologische Forschung* 14 (1983), pp.192ff.; D.Krell, *Intimations of Mortality: Time, Truth and Finitude in Heidegger's Thinking of Being*, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1986, (ch.3).

(Aristotle⁵, Augustine⁶, Kant⁷, Kierkegaard⁸, Bergson⁹, Husserl¹⁰, Derrida¹¹ - Hegel so far gets a miss, despite SZ§82), a few comparisons with other major themes in Heidegger,¹² and two informed and strategically significant attacks on Heidegger's account.¹³ While all of this is only a selection among the many publications now available, nevertheless one can say definitively that Heidegger and time is no longer an understudied area. Probably the reasons for the significant delay on the production of a body of secondary literature in this field were (i) Heidegger's own apparent abandonment of time after SZ, wrongly felt to be an acknowledgement of the theme's pointlessness, (ii) and possibly Derrida's "*Ousia et Grammé*", which with its suggestion that time is irretrievably metaphysical¹⁴ may have given an intellectual content to the feelings of suspicion aroused by (i). Gaps nevertheless remain: generally, there is a need to go beyond exegeses and

⁵ J.Derrida, "Ousia and Gramme: Note on a Note from 'Being and Time'" in *Margins of Philosophy*, tr.A.Bass, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982; also: P.Bigelow, "The Indeterminability of Time in 'Sein und Zeit'" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 46 (1985/86), pp.357-379; T.Clark, "Time after Time: Temporality, Temporalisation", *Oxford Literary Review* 9 (1/2) (1987), pp.119-135.

⁶ P.Bigelow, op.cit.

⁷ C.Sherover, *Heidegger and Kant on Time*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1971.

⁸ C.White, *Time and temporality in the existential thought of Kierkegaard and Heidegger*, dissertation, Berkeley, 1976.

⁹ L.Giroux, *Durée Pure et Temporalité: Bergson et Heidegger*, Tournai: Desdée, 1971.

¹⁰ R.Bernet, "Die Frage nach der Ursprung der Zeit bei Husserl und Heidegger", in *Heidegger Studies* 3/4 (1987/88), pp.89-104; D.C.Wood, op.cit.

¹¹ T.Clark, op.cit., H.Rapaport, op.cit., D.C.Wood, op.cit.

¹² i.a. - logic: V.Vukicevic, *Logik und Zeit in der phänomenologischen Philosophie Martin Heideggers (1925-1928)*, Hildesheim: Olms Verlag, 1988 (doctoral dissertation, Bochum, 1987); selfhood and individuality: F-K.Blust, *Selbstheit und Zeitlichkeit*, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1987 (doctoral dissertation, Freiburg, 1986); U.Thiele, *Individualität und Zeitlichkeit*, dissertation, Freiburg, 1985; history: M.Gillespie, "Temporality and History in the Thought of Martin Heidegger", *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 168 (1989), pp.33-51; language: H.Rapaport, op.cit.

¹³ P.Bigelow, op.cit.; J.Derrida, op.cit. Bigelow uses Augustine to attack Heidegger in a manner that deliberately parallels Derrida's well-known use of Aristotle in "*Ousia et Grammé*".

¹⁴ D.C.Wood (op.cit.) has the overall purpose of rescuing time from this claim - p.2. P.Bigelow (op.cit.) tries a re-burial.

historical comparisons; and in particular, there is no hint anywhere of the connection between temporality and foundations.¹⁵

A connection between temporality and foundations - but what *prima facie* evidence is there that here there might be something significant (and of interest to an age which vainly yearns to be post-metaphysical)? Perhaps there might be an incidental and entertaining comparison to be made - but this would not be relevant. The question here is concerned narrowly with what the foundational is, what ground is (the nature of ground, not the identification of ground), in Heidegger's earlier writings. The answer, as quoted from Heidegger's lectures of winter 1921/22, is this:

"Das eigentliche Fundament der Philosophie ist das radikale existentielle Ergreifen und die Zeitigung der Fraglichkeit."¹⁶

"The authentic foundation of philosophy is the radical existentiell seizing [of] and temporalisation of questionability."

This is repeated two pages later.

"Der feste Boden (Boden etwas, was sich immer erst zeitigt, so wie die Aneignung) liegt im Ergreifen der Fragwürdigkeit, d.h. in der radikalen Zeitigung des Fragens."¹⁷

"The firm ground (ground something which always first temporalises itself, like appropriation) lies in the seizing of question-worthiness, that is, in the radical temporalisation of questioning."

Ground, that is, the ultimate ground sought by metaphysics, is (to be found in, lies in) the radical temporalisation "of" questioning (which genitive?) - a move which (perhaps) aims at the internal destruction (disas-sembly) of metaphysics. This chapter focusses narrowly

¹⁵ With the exception of the undeveloped side-remarks by I.Koza in 1967 (*Das Problem des Grundes in Heideggers Auseinandersetzung mit Kant*, Ratingen bei Düsseldorf: Henn Verlag, 1967), and the more emphatic but likewise undeveloped point in J.Caputo's *The Way back into Ground: An Interpretation of the Path of Heidegger's Thought* (unpublished doctoral dissertation of 1968).

¹⁶ PIA, p.35; own translation.

¹⁷ PIA, p.37; own translation; Heidegger's emphasis. It is quite possible that *Aneignung* (appropriation) is an early echo of *Ereignis*. On the use of PIA, see T.Kisiel, "The Missing Link in the Early Heidegger", in J.J.Kockelmans ed., *Hermeneutic Phenomenology*, Washington DC: University Press of America, 1988, at pp.20f. According to Kisiel, Heidegger continued revising PIA for a few years after delivering it in 1921/22, so thoughts contained in PIA may in fact date from a few years later.

on eliciting the full impact of the meaning of this early and crucial clue, with the aid of the methodological considerations of part A.

1) Time in the Language and Problematic of Foundations

a) Apriori

Heidegger's use of the notion *Apriori*¹⁸ is probably the most obvious coalescence of ground and time which exists in his writings. Epistemologically, a priori principles are those knowable prior to experience; as these principles were taken as enabling the construction of experience (empirical knowledge), they were regarded as foundational. The myth of the initially worldless *res cogitans* which requires an access to the world conditioned by principles creates the traditional association of ground and apriori.

Heidegger initially appropriates, not a Kantian epistemological conception of the apriori, but Husserl's phenomenological conception.¹⁹ The difference is that the phenomenological conception does not describe something initially within the subject, prior to its accessing the world, which aids it to access that world, and which can only be inferred indirectly (e.g. as a necessary condition for the possibility of accessing the world); rather, the phenomenological conception treats the apriori as a "Titel des Seins" (title of being),²⁰ which is "direkt erfaßbar" (directly ascertainable).²¹ The phenomenological apriori is neither epistemological nor ontic, rather, ontological.²² The thus appropriated phenomenological conception of the apriori is then subjected by Heidegger to an

¹⁸ Orthographic note: Heidegger's practice of writing the "a" and the "priori" together as "apriori" for the noun has been followed; separation has been kept for adverbial and adjectival uses. When *Apriori* is used (italicised with a capital letter), this is intended to convey something more specific than apriori: i.e. the concept as a term of art in Heidegger's writing.

¹⁹ PGZ, p.101; but at GP, p.461, he is more receptive to Kant.

²⁰ *ibid.*

²¹ PGZ, p.102; for the possibility and meaning of such a "direct ascertainability", see pt.A, ch.4, section 2 (on *Entwurf*).

²² *ibid.*

etymological literalisation - literally "earlier", it is taken as a fundamentally temporal conception.²³

The initial reliance on Husserl's rather than Kant's conception does not lose the connection with the foundational, however. Although usage in SZ is generally sparse and scare-quoted, one occurrence makes it clear that *Apriori* and *Fundamentalstruktur* (fundamental structure) are the same thing.²⁴ In GP, which recovers and extends the comments made in PGZ, the foundational in the apriori becomes clearer. Thus there is the following associative line: "...daß das Sein ...dem Seienden in gewisser Weise zugrundeliegen, ihm vorangehen, ein *proteron*, ein Früheres sind."²⁵ To be the *Früheres* is to lie-as-a-ground-for (zugrundeliegen), but this same *Früheres*, we are told, is the *Apriori*, and then further on:

"Das Früher ist eine Zeitbestimmung, aber nicht eine solche, die nicht in der Zeitordnung der Zeit liegt, die wir mit dem Uhr messen, sondern ein Früher, das in die »verkehrte Welt« gehört. Daher wird dieses Früher, das das Sein charakterisiert, vom vulgären Verstande als das Später gefaßt."²⁶

"To be earlier is a determination of time, but it does not pertain to the temporal order of the time that we measure by the clock; rather, it is an earlier that belongs to the 'inverted world'. Therefore, this earlier which characterizes being is taken by the popular understanding to be the later."

Thus the apriori marks, not only a coalescence of time and ground, but also a structurally revisionary move (a revision which, e.g., is non-linear and non-hierarchical). Here this revision is hinted at by way of paradox such that the future is not later than the past. Two sources are available for understanding this: (i) the reasons behind Heidegger's general use of paradox²⁷ and (ii) the ecstatic analysis of time. Heidegger takes up the discussion again at the very end of GP, in the section entitled "Temporalität und Apriori des

²³ PGZ, p.100.

²⁴ SZ, p.41.

²⁵ GP, p.27; the association of words here is of the type discussed in pt.A, ch.1. Tr.: "...that being and ...in a certain way underlie beings and precede them and so are a *proteron*, an earlier."

²⁶ GP, p.27.

²⁷ See pt.A, ch.2.

Seins".²⁸ Here he says that the apriori, if it has a temporal origin, requires a revision of the concept of time.

"Die Möglichkeit des Verhaltens zu Seiendem verlangt ein vorgängiges Seinsverständnis; und die Möglichkeit hinwiederum des Seinsverständnisses verlangt einen vorgängigen Entwurf auf die Zeit. Aber wo ist die Instanz dieses Verlangens je vorgängiger Bedingungen? Es ist die Zeitlichkeit selbst als die Grundverfassung des Daseins."²⁹

"The possibility of comportment towards beings demands a precursory understanding of being, and the possibility of the understanding of being demands in its turn a precursory projection upon time. But where is the final stage [Instanz] of this demand for ever further precursory conditions? It is temporality itself as the basic constitution of the Dasein."

What needs to be noted here is the reference to foundational problems (as described in the previous chapter) and the revision of the concept of time which responds to the foundational problem. The initial sentences here are steps back in (a-)priority, and apparently begin to set a circle going (note the occurrences of *Entwurf* and *Verständnis* (from *Verstehen*)³⁰), or at least an unending regress. With the question "wo ist die Instanz dieses Verlangens je vorgängiger Bedingungen?", Heidegger asks for the medium or motivation of the stepping back, of the regression of foundational moves. "Instanz" literally means a court or stage of official proceedings - the place where justification occurs. This place is identified as *Zeitlichkeit*. *Zeitlichkeit* thus appears as the medium or *topos* of grounding. Yet there is a tension in this passage between *Zeit* and *Zeitlichkeit*. For *Zeit* is the pole, the *Woraufhin*, of one of the foundational steps back. Is it that a fine distinction is set up here between *Zeit* and *Zeitlichkeit*, or is it that *Zeit(-lichkeit)* has a dual role? The evidence in fact points towards the latter: Heidegger untidily mixes between the three expressions *Zeit*, *Zeitlichkeit* and *Zeit als Zeitlichkeit*; sometimes it seems he intends a fine distinction, but globally this cannot be maintained.³¹ For example, compare the following passage:

²⁸ GP, §22c.

²⁹ GP, p.462f.

³⁰ For the directional opposition of *Entwurf* and *Verstehen*, see pt.A, ch.4, section 2.

³¹ See pt.A, ch.1.

"Die früher erwähnte Folge der einander gleichsam vorgeschalteten Entwürfe: Verstehen von Seiendem, Entwurf auf Sein, Verstehen von Sein, Entwurf auf die Zeit, hat ihr Ende am Horizont der ekstatischen Einheit der Zeitlichkeit. Ursprünglicher können wir dies hier nicht begründen, wir müßten dabei auf das Problem der Endlichkeit der Zeit eingehen. An diesem Horizont hat jede Ekstase der Zeit, d.h. die Zeitlichkeit selbst ihr Ende." ³²

"The series, mentioned earlier, of projections as it were inserted one before the other - understanding of beings, projection upon being, understanding of being, projection upon time - has its end at the horizon of the ecstatic unity of temporality. We cannot establish this here in a more primordial way; to do that we would have to go into the problem of the finiteness of time. At this horizon each ecstasis of time, hence temporality itself, has its end."

This passage refers back to the regressive chain in the previous passage quoted (although now the circling between *Entwurf* and *Verstehen* is clearer). At the end of the first sentence, Heidegger says that the end of the series (circle) is *Zeitlichkeit*. Then he says this having an end has to do with the finitude, not of *Zeitlichkeit*, but of *Zeit*. Thus it appears that *Zeitlichkeit* is the end of *Zeit*. Yet the earlier passage suggested that if there was a distinction, it was the other way round: *Zeit* is the end of *Zeitlichkeit*. Then in the final sentence we have "Zeit, d.h. Zeitlichkeit", which lays the cards on the table: Heidegger allows his own distinction to decay.

The upshot of this is that it appears that *Zeit(-lichkeit)* is both the medium of grounding, and the end of grounding, or the end of itself as the medium of grounding. The following passage confirms this result.

"Weil das ursprünglich Ermöglichende, der Ursprung von Möglichkeit selbst, die Zeit ist, zeitigt sich die Zeit selbst als das Früheste schlechthin.... Weil die Zeit als Quelle aller Ermöglichungen (Möglichkeiten) das Früheste ist, sind alle Möglichkeiten als solche in ihrer Ermöglichungsfunktion vom Charakter des Früher, d.h. apriori." ³³

"Because the original determinant of possibility, the origin of possibility itself, is time, time temporalises itself as the absolutely earliest.... And because time as the source of all enablings (possibilities) is the earliest, all possibilities as such in their possibility-making function have the character of the earlier, i.e. apriori."

Time (temporality) is ³⁴ the "ursprünglich Ermöglichende", the "Ursprung von Möglichkeit", the "Quelle aller Ermöglichungen"; one might as well say *Urgrund*. As

³² GP, p.437.

³³ GP, p.463; Hofstadter's translation slightly adjusted.

³⁴ This is not an identification of a specific member of a category (e.g. such that time is a specific member of the category of grounds); it is an elaboration of the nature of time and of ground -

such, time is the "earliest" - which repeats the dual role: earliness is measured by time; time measures itself as its own source. In this passage one also finds the tautology "die Zeit zeitigt". Here this tautology acquires a concrete function: as substantive, the temporal denotes itself as source; as verb, the temporal denotes its role as activity proceeding from this source. Thus the etymological tautology³⁵ reflects the "dual" role of the *Urgrund*, of the *Quelle aller Ermöglichung*, of the *Grund des Grundes*. But is this "duality", "reflexiveness", or is it the metactical decay of the pole into the relation, of the relation into the pole,³⁶ the disintegration of the proposition into a primordial unity which Heidegger implied was necessary for the non-application of the circularity objection?³⁷ Along with these considerations, in the earlier passage, Heidegger referred us to the finitude of time as explaining these processes. For "finitude of temporality", read "finitude of grounding" - i.e. its not being subject to infinite regression or vicious circling. By taking up the apriori as a link between ground and time, it is therefore possible to see one way in which time and ground coincide in their mutual revision and response to the same (foundational) problems.³⁸

b) Transzendenz

An almost equally obvious link between ground and time is *Transzendenz*. The recognition of *Grund* as *Transzendenz* has long been recognised on the basis of VWG.³⁹ MAL strongly confirms this early Heidegger position.⁴⁰

this is the point of the apriori - the exclusion of a general/specific or category/member relation between time (temporality) and ground.

³⁵ See pt.A, ch.2, section 1.

³⁶ See pt.A, ch.4, section 3.

³⁷ See pt.A, ch.4, section 2 & SZ, p.314f.; to pun, there is nothing very original about the heterological unity of source and activity here; Christian theological doctrine tried the same kind of ontological move to explain the tri-unity of god some 1500 years ago, and may have been drawing on yet earlier versions of Platonist ontologies of the demiurge.

³⁸ On the apriori and the relation of time and being, see further MAL, pp.184-189.

³⁹ e.g. I.Koza, op.cit.

"Die Freiheit als Transzendenz ist... der Ursprung von Grund überhaupt."⁴¹ "Freedom as transcendence is... the origin of ground in general."

It is strange that this has not led to significant analysis of the association of ground and temporality, since the discussions of *Transzendenz* in Heidegger are always closely integrated with the temporal problematic. In SZ, §69c is entitled "das zeitliche Problem der *Transzendenz* der Welt", clearly labelling, right from the start, transcendence as an essentially temporal problem. In fact §69c contains little of interest, other than a foreshadowing of the much more thorough engagement with the problem of transcendence in GP, MAL and VWG.⁴² In these writings the temporality of transcendence is stated quite unambiguously:

"...weil die Transzendenz im Wesen der Zeit, d.h. aber in ihrer ekstatisch-horizontalen Verfassung wurzelt."⁴³

"...because transcendence is rooted in the essence of time, but that is, in its ecstatic-horizontal constitution."

"Die innere Möglichkeit der Transzendenz, so behaupte ich, ist die Zeit als ursprüngliche Zeitlichkeit!"⁴⁴

"I maintain that the intrinsic possibility of transcendence is time, as primordial temporality!"

"Origo der Transzendenz aber ist die Zeitlichkeit selbst."⁴⁵

"Yet the origin of transcendence is temporality itself."

Although clearly stated there, the temporal interpretation of transcendence is not further developed in VWG.⁴⁶ Only in MAL (and GP) is this interpretation fully carried through.⁴⁷

⁴⁰ R. Crease, *Heidegger, Leibniz and the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, dissertation, Columbia University, 1987.

⁴¹ VWG, p.60 (GA9, p.165); own translation.

⁴² Although *Transzendenz* is relatively absent from SZ, at MAL, p.214f. the whole of SZ is recapitulated in terms of *Transzendenz*.

⁴³ VWG, p.62 (GA9, p.166); own translation.

⁴⁴ MAL, p.252.

⁴⁵ MAL, p.272.

⁴⁶ See Heidegger's footnote to the above-quoted passage from VWG.

⁴⁷ MAL, §12, entitled "Transzendenz und Zeitlichkeit".

Thus one can say that *Transzendenz* marks one of the coincidences of foundational and temporal in Heidegger. But what is the point of it as such? Transcendence arises as a problem for Heidegger rather in the same way as the hermeneutic circle. Both are problems which traditional notions of ground create. The latter is the problem of infinite regressions which the principle of ground (*nihil est sine ratione*) leads into. The former is the problem of relating the *Urgrund* to whatever exists that was not initially internal to it. The supposed simplicity or homogeneity of the *Urgrund* prevented a holistic conception. Thus, for example, if one had posited the "I" as the *Urphänomen*, or the principle of its existence as the ultimate principle, then the problem arose of its accessing other minds, objects (the world) and other times - problems of transcendence.⁴⁸ (The epistemological problem stated here has, for Heidegger, its origin in the ontological problem). Alternatively, but with the same structure, transcendence is the problem of moving from everything that is immediately accessible to what is beyond that (being, noumena, god).⁴⁹ In all these traditional cases, *Grund* is posited as a pole of *Transzendenz*, the pole from which one starts. Heidegger's "solution" of the problem of transcendence is a reshuffling or restructuring of the original assumptions, whereby ground is no longer a pole of the transcending relation, but becomes the transcending relation itself. Thus, for example:

"Das Dasein selbst ist der Überschritt. Darin liegt: Die Transzendenz ist nicht irgendein mögliches Verhalten (unter anderen möglichen Verhaltungen) des Daseins zu anderem Seienden, sondern die Grundverfassung seines Seins, auf deren Grunde es sich allererst zu Seiendem verhalten kann."⁵⁰

"Dasein is itself the passage across. And this implies that transcendence is not just one possible comportment (among others) of Dasein toward other beings, but it is the basic constitution of its being, on the basis of which Dasein can at all relate to beings in the first place."

Rather than the subject ("I") being placed, in its foundational capacity, as the starting-pole, it is identified with the movement of transcendence itself. This reflects, or is derived from, the deeper interpretation of *Grund* as *Transzendenz*. The kind of "solution" which Heidegger offers here conforms to exactly the same kind of strategy used in the case of the hermeneutic circle.⁵¹ That is, ground is identified with the problem; the problematic is revalued as the fundamental. As was said before, this paratype stops one seeing the

⁴⁸ MAL, p.205f.

⁴⁹ MAL, p.207.

⁵⁰ MAL, p.211.

problem (transcendence, circular regression) as external to the matter in hand, coming along to meet it as if from somewhere else; rather, the problem emerges from the matter in hand. This is not unreasonable when one considers that these problems (transcendence, circular regression) are in fact peculiar to the foundational, rather than general problems which could arise anywhere at any time. There is a special relation between them and the foundational problematic. And as Heidegger says, it is precisely when some process breaks down, strikes an impasse, that its normally taken-for-granted inner structure becomes visible to the phenomenological perspective.⁵² The impasse of transcendence (so Heidegger) reveals the essence of ground as that same "impasse" - and thus one may pass.

More strongly emphasised in GP than in MAL is the point that transcendence relies for its transcending character on the ecstatic nature of temporality.⁵³ The meaning of the ecstatic is fairly well covered by Heidegger.⁵⁴ An *ekstatikon* is, according to the meaning of the Greek word, an *Aus-sich-heraustreten* (a stepping-outside-itself).⁵⁵ More commonly Heidegger uses the term *Außer-sich* (outside-itself). Thus in SZ Heidegger says:

"Zeitlichkeit ist das ursprüngliche »Außer-sich« an und für sich selbst."⁵⁶ "Temporality is the primordial 'outside-of-itself' in and for itself."

Clearly the structure of the *Außer-sich*, the ecstatic nature of time, is metaleptic, that is, something which steps beyond itself while remaining where it is. This metaleptic paratype was noted earlier, when discussing the language of foundations and the interpenetration of

⁵¹ See pt.A, ch.4, section 2.

⁵² The possible precedent for the revaluation of the problematic as the fundamental is the SZ discussion of *Auffälligkeit* in §16, to the effect that a smoothly operating system does not give away its inner secrets, and that these inner secrets are best seen at the ruptures, fissures and breakdowns of the system or project. In GP, Heidegger recovers the *Auffälligkeit* discussion for a temporal interpretation - the kind of disruption in question, required for making the item conspicuous in its being, is a temporal disruption, whereby the item is not the same in the different moments of time - GP, pp.439ff.

⁵³ GP, p.428f.

⁵⁴ e.g. SZ, p.329, GP, p.377f.

⁵⁵ GP, p.377.

⁵⁶ SZ, p.329; Heidegger's emphasis.

keywords.⁵⁷ The metaleptic, or ecstatic, is the original pattern or form which enables transcendence. Thus one can say that as transcendence, ground is not so much inverted⁵⁸ as extra-verted - turned outside itself.

Transcendence, in Heidegger, also betrays something of the bi-directional revision of ground noted in the last chapter. Classically, transcendence is mono-directional - from (the given ground) to.... In MAL, not only is ground moved from the position of pole to that of the transcending relation, but where transcendence transcends is likewise named - the *Woraufhin* (whither-upon) of *Transzendenz* is *Welt* (the world).⁵⁹ Heidegger tends to put the emphasis primarily on this classical direction - thus, with regard to the ecstatic basis of transcendence, Heidegger uses the phrase "*Entrückung nach..., auf etwas hin.*"⁶⁰ In contrast to this classical direction of movement is the following passage from GP:

"Transzendenz besagt: *sich aus einer Welt verstehen.*"⁶¹ "Transcendence means *to understand oneself from a world.*"

In the last chapter, the bi-directionality of *Grund* was analysed, *inter alia*, in terms of *Entwurf* (which had direction "auf etwas hin"), and *Verstehen*, which had direction "aus (von) etwas her". Thus in this passage we find the reverse direction in *Transzendenz* emphasised. Once again, a temporal revision of ground maps into the same network of problems and revisions covered in the last chapter - this time the issue of dialectical access to the highest "principle" (being).⁶²

⁵⁷ See ch.2, section 1c.

⁵⁸ Cf. J.Habermas' application to Heidegger of the term "umgekehrte Fundamentalismus" (inverted foundationalism); *Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1985, at p.181.

⁵⁹ MAL, p.212.

⁶⁰ GP, p.378; Heidegger's emphasis.

⁶¹ GP, p.425; Heidegger's emphasis.

⁶² But obviously in Heidegger this is no longer a principle; rather, the disas-sembly or folding-in of such a propositional form.

c) *Zeitigung*

"Was ist die Zeit? ...Ist die Zeit eine Funktion des Raumes? Oder umgekehrt? Oder sind beide identisch? ...Die Zeit ist tätig, sie hat verbale Beschaffenheit, sie »zeitigt«. Was zeitigt sie denn?"⁶³

"What is time? ...Is time a function of space? Or the other way round? Or are they identical? ...Time is active, it has verbal composition, it 'temporalises' [»zeitigt«]. So what does it temporalise?"

The date of the passage is 1924, but the author is not Martin Heidegger, the many times denounced scourge and fascist corrupter of the German language, but Thomas Mann. The verb *zeitigen* had archaic, dialectal and obscure uses in German before either of these authors, but even as regards appropriating it to replace the verb "to be" when predicated of time, no special originality can be claimed for Heidegger. The root of the verb *zeitigen* (-*zeitig*-) goes to form well over a dozen morphological variations and compounds in Heidegger (including the noun *Zeitigung*), and it is used in key positions in the most advanced sections of the SZ project. Although it has usually been translated as "to temporalise", this translation should be treated with some suspicion. Although scattered through most of the writings of the 1920's (and later), the main uses are in SZ and PIA.⁶⁴ In the latter the use is significantly different from SZ, and in particular, there is no association of *Zeitigung*⁶⁵ with temporal notions such as *Zeitlichkeit*.⁶⁶ It may be the SZ use marks a break with PIA (in which case "temporalisation" is more justifiable as a translation in SZ), but if SZ marks only a development of the PIA notion, then *Zeitigung* is certainly best left untranslated. In PIA, *Zeitigung* appears to be used in a very precise sense which is left undeclared; clear only is that it is sometimes associated with the development of questioning⁶⁷, and makes up a dimension of meaning⁶⁸ in association with

⁶³ T.Mann, *Der Zauberberg*, Oldenburg: Fischer Verlag, 1960, at p.479. Originally published in 1924. Reference owed to O.Pugliese, *Vermittlung und Kehre*, Freiburg: Alber Verlag, 1965, at p.10.

⁶⁴ PIA: c.91 uses; SZ: 103 uses (including morphological variations and compounds). Source for SZ statistics: R.A.Bast & H.P.Delfosse, *Handbuch zum Textstudium von Martin Heideggers »Sein und Zeit«*, vol.1.

⁶⁵ From here on *Zeitigung* is understood to refer to morphological variations and compounds as well.

⁶⁶ But AE is transitional in this respect.

⁶⁷ PIA, pp.35, 37, 195.

⁶⁸ i.e. the use of *Zeitigungssinn* in PIA.

the word *Vollzug*.⁶⁹ Otherwise a reasonable speculation would place it as transitional between "showing", "bringing about" and "temporalising". Kisiel remarks that in the unpublished lectures of summer 1922, Heidegger uses *Zeitigung* to translate Aristotle's *energeia*.⁷⁰ It is the SZ use in which *Zeitigung* appears as the activity peculiar to *Zeitlichkeit*.⁷¹

To what extent is *Zeitigung* associated with the foundational? The following passages are analysed for semantic interpenetration.

"Das Verstehen gründet primär in der Zukunft, die *Befindlichkeit* dagegen zeitigt sich primär in der Gewesenheit.... Die These »Befindlichkeit gründet primär in der Gewesenheit« besagt...."
72

"Understanding is grounded primarily in the future; one's *state-of-mind*, however, temporalizes itself *primarily* in having been.... the thesis that 'one's state-of-mind is grounded primarily in having been' means that...."

The first sentence presents a contrast between *Verstehen* and *Befindlichkeit* as concerns their relation to modes of time. The context demands that the same verb (or a verb with the same signification) be used on both sides of the contrast. Yet Heidegger changes the verb. He then quotes what he just said, but misquotes, changing the verb back again. The shift is thus: *gründet* ---> *sich zeitigt* ---> *gründet*. The proximity of the terms, and the order of the shifts, makes a model of "substitution" or "interpretation" improbable. This is semantic interpenetration in the sense described earlier - briefly: a trans-lexical tension of heterogeneity. At the end of SZ §68d there is a summary of the entirety of §68 in which there is a striking degree and range of vocabulary shift. The emphasis (my own) shows the shifts of interest:

⁶⁹ e.g. PIA, pp.31, 79, 108, 158. See T.Kisiel, "The Missing Link in the Early Heidegger", p.21f. (to which article, compare, in general, AE). One can add that in PIA, primarily the noun *Zeitigung* is used, while the verb is non-reflexive; in SZ the reflexive verb is the commoner form.

⁷⁰ T.Kisiel, op.cit., p.21f.

⁷¹ See esp. SZ, p.328.

⁷² SZ, p.340.

"Das Verstehen *gründet* primär *in* der Zukunft (Vorlaufen bzw. Gewärtigen). Die Befindlichkeit *zeitigt* sich primär *in* der Gewesenheit (Wiederholung bzw. Vergessenheit). Das Verfallen *ist zeitlich* primär *in* der Gegenwart (Gegenwärtigen bzw. Augenblick) *verwurzelt*. Gleichwohl ist das Verstehen je »gewesende« Gegenwart. Gleichwohl *zeitigt* sich die Befindlichkeit als »gegenwärtigende« Zukunft. Gleichwohl »entspringt« die Gegenwart *aus*, bzw. *ist gehalten von* einer gewesenden Zukunft. Daran wird sichtbar: Die Zeitlichkeit *zeitigt* sich *in* jeder Ekstase ganz...." ⁷³

"Understanding *is grounded* primarily *in* the future (whether in anticipation or in awaiting). States of mind *temporalize* themselves primarily *in* having been (whether in repetition or in having forgotten). Falling *is temporally rooted* primarily *in* the Present (whether in making-present or in the moment of vision). All the same, understanding is in every case a Present which 'is in the process of having been'. All the same, one's state-of-mind *ripens* itself as a future which is 'making present'. And all the same, the Present 'leaps away' from a future that is in the process of having been, or else it is held on to by such a future. Thus we can see that in every ecstasis, temporality *temporalizes* itself as a whole...."

In this passage the temporal patterns within the triad <*Befindlichkeit, Verstehen, Verfallen*> are listed, then re-listed, with a final comment on the whole listing. The context offers a tight framework of repetition of parallels; yet within this there is a loose shifting of lexis. The shifts are: *gründen in* ---> *sich zeitigen in* ---> *zeitlich verwurzeln in* ---> *sich zeitigen* ---> *entspringen aus* ---> *halten* ---> *sich zeitigen*. The reflexive verb *sich zeitigen* is paralleled to the ideas of: grounding in, being rooted in, leaping or springing out from, and being held by. Once again, *sich zeitigen* is firmly and clearly networked into the language of foundations without the privileging of any (set of) terms over others. Here the point of the non-privileging of the temporal over the foundational is clearer than in the cases of the terms *apriori* and *transcendence*. The nature of the ground-time link is a holding together of ideas in a heterogeneously temporal origin.

* * * * *

One of the fundamental theses of SZ (as a matter of its presentation and overall structure) is the basic thesis that temporality is the ground (or basic constitution) of *Dasein*. Earlier ⁷⁴ the idea was floated, with respect to *Dasein* and ground, that this principle was subject to a metactical disintegration in SZ. In this section, with the coalescing of time and ground, the other pole of this relation folds in, removing the propositional nature of sentences expressing the basic thesis of SZ. "Parataxis" would also express the deterioration or

⁷³ SZ, p.350; Macquarrie & Robinson's translation slightly altered.

⁷⁴ See pt. A, ch.4, section 3.

revision (the sentence then reading *Zeitlichkeit: Grund: Dasein*) but "metaxis" better expresses the idea of a poleless between.

The purpose behind the development of the non-proposition that *Zeitlichkeit* is the *Grund* of *Dasein* is that this non-proposition prepares for the relation of being and time. Although Heidegger does not progress beyond the preparatory stages, a number of clues hint at the role which the non-proposition *Zeitlichkeit: Grund: Dasein* plays. *Dasein* always already has a *Verständnis von Sein* (understanding of being), and the temporality which corresponds to this understanding is *Temporalität*. If the non-proposition *Zeitlichkeit: Grund: Dasein* is to be a preparation, the only function it seems possible for it to have is that of an originating parallel. Thus *Zeitlichkeit: Grund: Dasein* is parallel to *Temporalität: Verständnis: Sein* - and this is perhaps the parallel to ~~them~~ the "origin" of them all - *Zeit: Horizont: Sein*. In other words, it would seem that the revision of ground in SZ, which includes a "destruction" (in the phenomenological sense) of the proposition, is a preparation for a relation that is adequate for the relation of being and time.

2) The Limits (Horizon) of the Foundational Project in *Sein und Zeit*

a) Time as the Horizon for the Understanding of Being

The importance and interest in the notion of the horizon lies in this: that, in the context of the incompleteness of the SZ project, "horizon" is the most specific Heidegger becomes in establishing a structure with which to relate being and time.⁷⁵ From the very first page of SZ, time is announced as the horizon for the understanding of being:

"Die konkrete Ausarbeitung der Frage nach dem Sinn von »Sein« ist die Absicht der folgenden Abhandlung. Die Interpretation der Zeit als des möglichen Horizontes eines jeden Seinsverständnisses überhaupt ist ihr vorläufiges Ziel."⁷⁶

"Our aim in the following treatise is to work out the question of the meaning of *Being* and to do so concretely. Our provisional aim is the Interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of *Being*."

⁷⁵ Cf. F.Dastur, op.cit., pp.101-108.

⁷⁶ SZ, p.1; cf. GP, p.22.

However, the horizontal relation established here cannot be taken in anything like its everyday sense. If we are to understand what Heidegger means when he says that time (as temporality) provides the enabling horizon for the understanding of being, it is the notion of the horizon that most requires examination. Yet Heidegger's project is unfinished - so unfinished that even the preliminaries are unfinished. The thesis that "time provides the enabling horizon for the understanding of being" was to be preparatory for the recovery of the question of being - the question itself presumably being preparatory for any answer. In SZ even this preliminary thesis is unfinished, and in GP (ostensibly a continuation of sorts of SZ)⁷⁷ it is taken only a little further. In SZ, Heidegger intended a threefold "schematism" of the horizon;⁷⁸ the notion of "presence" (much discussed in secondary literature) is only one of these schemata.

"Wir bezeichnen dieses *Wohin der Ekstase* als den Horizont oder genauer das *horizontale Schema der Ekstase*. Jede Ekstase hat in sich ein ganz bestimmtes Schema, das sich mit der Art, wie sich die Zeitlichkeit zeitigt, d.h. wie sich die Ekstasen modifizieren, selbst modifiziert. So wie Ekstasen in sich die Einheit von Zeitlichkeit ausmachen, so entspricht der ekstatischen Einheit der Zeitlichkeit je eine solche ihrer horizontalen Schemata."⁷⁹

"We call this *whither of the ecstasis* the horizon, or, more precisely, the *horizontal schema of the ecstasis*. Each ecstasis has within itself a completely determinate schema which modifies itself in coordination with the manner in which temporality temporalizes itself, the manner in which the ecstases modify themselves. Just as the ecstases intrinsically constitute the unity of temporality, so in each case there corresponds to the ecstatic unity of temporality such a unity of its horizontal schemata."

The schematism of the horizon is a good candidate for the most inelegant part of Heidegger's "system". Overall, the schematism attempts to rework the material⁸⁰ on "world" in the terminology of *Zeitlichkeit*, *Ekstasis* and *Horizont* - that is, in terms of the ecstatico-horizontal unity of temporality. In SZ there is a brief summary of the schematism about two thirds the way through the page and a half devoted to the schematism.⁸¹ In GP

⁷⁷ GP, p. 1n.

⁷⁸ Cf. O.Pöggeler, "Temporale Interpretation und Hermeneutische Philosophie" in *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 168 (1989), pp.5-32, at p.15f. (his analysis differs; the basic matter is the same).

⁷⁹ GP, p.429

⁸⁰ i.e. PGZ, §§21-23; SZ, §§14-18.

⁸¹ SZ, pp.364-5

about 27 pages are devoted to the schematism⁸², but (a) without a summary. (b) with most of the material devoted solely to the schematism of only one of the three horizontal schemata (*Praesenz*), and finally, (c) the word *Praesenz* being absent from SZ, at first glance it can look as if the GP version is entirely new - an impression that can only be removed by reference to PGZ.⁸³

The summary provided in SZ reads:

"Das Schema, in dem das Dasein *zukünftig*, ob eigentlich oder uneigentlich, auf sich zukommt, ist das *Umwillen seiner*. Das Schema, in dem das Dasein ihm selbst als geworfenes in der Befindlichkeit erschlossen ist, fassen wir als das *Wovor* der Geworfenheit bzw. als *Woran* der Überlassenheit. Es kennzeichnet die horizontale Struktur der *Gewesenheit*. Umwillen seiner existierend in der Überlassenheit an es selbst als geworfenes, ist das Dasein als Sein-bei... zugleich gegenwärtigend. Das horizontale Schema der *Gegenwart* wird bestimmt durch das *Um-zu*." ⁸⁴

"The schema in which Dasein comes towards itself *futurally*, whether authentically or inauthentically, is the *'for-the-sake-of-itself'*. The schema in which Dasein is disclosed to itself in a state-of-mind as thrown, is to be taken as that *in the face of which* it has been thrown and that *to which* it has been abandoned. This characterizes the horizontal schema of *what has been*. In existing for the sake of itself in abandonment to itself as something that has been thrown, Dasein, as Being-alongside, is at the same time making present. The horizontal schema for the *Present* is defined by the *'in-order-to'*."

Picking out of these convolutions the emphasised words, the horizontal schema of the future is *Umwillen*, the horizontal schema of the present is *Um-zu (Praesenz)*, and the horizontal schema of the past is *Wovor*. Heidegger's use of the word "schema" here evokes Kant's "Schematism of the Concepts of the Pure Understanding".⁸⁵ Heidegger has an especial interest for Kant's schematism during the 1920's.⁸⁶ Kant's schemata provided an interface between the conceptual and the temporal. Read "being" for "concept", and the parallel between Kant's schematism of the pure concepts and Heidegger's horizontal schematism (interfacing being and time) becomes clear. The SZ project does not stop with the horizon as *Seinsfrage*, but with an unfinished horizontal schematism.

⁸² GP, pp.418-444

⁸³ e.g.: PGZ, pp.252, 254, 264, 268-272, 285

⁸⁴ SZ, p.365

⁸⁵ I.Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, B176-187.

⁸⁶ e.g. 43 pages devoted to it in GA vol.21 (lectures of winter 1925/26).

In the explicit analyses of ground in VWG and MAL, the essence of ground is, *inter alia*, revealed as the *Umwillen*. This is the same concept which functions as the future-orientated horizontal schema. Noting that Heidegger, at this stage, holds to the primacy of the future among the temporal ecstases, it then appears that Heidegger is trying to replace a *Praesenz*-privileging metaphysics with an ontology which prioritises *Umwillen*.⁸⁷ This *Umwillen* is both the revised conception of ground, and the primary horizontal schema. This leads to the question, to what extent and in what way is horizon a foundational notion?

The following analyses draw on the discussion of semantic interpenetration among key foundational notions, and weaves "horizon" into the word-group of ground in a similar manner, but with the proviso that "horizon" is not a general alternative for the other ground-words, being used only in one very specific context and with a narrow range of associated vocabulary and grammar. Once again, the moral is that "substitutive" and "interpretative" models must be dropped for that of a network of non-assimilables in tension with each other.

"...läßt sich dann die Frage stellen: Was ist es, was diese Verstehen von Sein überhaupt möglich macht? Von wo aus, das heißt: aus welchem vorgegebenen Horizont her verstehen wir dergleichen wie Sein?"⁸⁸

"...the question can then be posed, What is it that makes this understanding of being possible at all? Whence - that is, from which antecedently given horizon - do we understand the like of being?"

Here one question is introduced by Heidegger, but two are posed. The questions must therefore be taken as restatements of each other. The first asks for what makes *Seinsverständnis* possible, the second asks for the horizon of *Seinsverständnis*. So we should take it that the horizon, and that which makes something possible (condition of possibility) are the same. The easiest passages for quotation and interpretation tend to link "horizon" just with "condition for the possibility", but this is by no means the only interweaving to be found. In this passage, Heidegger uses the notion of "horizon" in the context of the Platonic understanding of being, interweaving it with *Ursprung*:

⁸⁷ There is a difference intended here between "privilege" and "prioritise". The metaphysics of *Praesenz* supposedly brackets out (completely) other temporal dimensions. The ontology of *Umwillen*, by virtue of the ecstatic nature of temporality, prioritises by bracketting in.

⁸⁸ GP, p.21; passages at GP, pp.388 & 414 could be used for the same point.

"Auf die Schwierigkeiten der Platonischen Interpretation gehen wir hier nicht ein, auch nicht auf den Nachweis des Zusammenhanges der Idee des Guten mit dem, was wir früher über das antike Seinsverständnis, seinen Ursprung aus dem Herstellen, erörterten. Es sieht so aus, als würde unsere These, die antike Philosophie interpretiere das Sein im Horizont des Herstellens im weitesten Sinne, in gar keinem Zusammenhang mit dem stehen, was Plato als die Bedingung der Möglichkeit des Seinsverständnisses fixiert."⁸⁹

"We shall not enter here into the difficulties of Platonic interpretation nor into the demonstration of the connection of the idea of the good with what we discussed earlier regarding the ancient understanding of being, its derivation from production. It appears as though our thesis that ancient philosophy interprets being in the horizon of production in the broadest sense would have no connection at all with what Plato notes as condition of possibility of the understanding of being."

Two ideas, which in the context must be the same, are of importance: the origin of the ancient understanding of being in *Herstellen* (production), and ancient philosophy's interpretation of being in the horizon of *Herstellen*. *Herstellen* is both *Ursprung* and *Horizont* for the ancient understanding of being. In the final sentence, in distinguishing Plato's understanding of being from that of his contemporaries, Heidegger shifts again, using *Bedingung der Möglichkeit* once more.⁹⁰


Nevertheless, horizon is not just any old neo-foundational word; it is used with a relatively small range of associated vocabulary. The following constructions are archetypal: "Zeit als Zeitlichkeit ist der Horizont des Seinsverständnisses" (time as temporality is the horizon for the understanding of being), "Wir verstehen Sein aus dem Horizont der Zeitlichkeit her" ("we understand being in-terms-of/from-out-of the horizon of temporality"). The typically associated vocabulary is *Zeit*, *Zeitlichkeit*, *Sein*, *Seinsverständnis*, and *verstehen*. When "understanding" is expressed in verbal form (as "verstehen" rather than "-verständnis"), the typical grammatical construction is "aus dem Horizont her", which is untranslatable due to its deliberate ambiguity. With "verstehen". the "aus... her" construction means both "in terms of" (the normal German usage) and "from out of... towards us".⁹¹

⁸⁹ GP, p.405

⁹⁰ Further evidence: SZ. §55 is entitled "Die existenzial-ontologischen Fundamente des Gewissens" (The existential-ontological foundations of conscience). The word *Fundamente* (foundations) is footnoted, in the *Gesamtausgabe*, "Horizont".

⁹¹ See, e.g., SZ, p.17: "...bedarf es einer ursprünglichen Explikation der Zeit als Horizont des Seinsverständnisses aus der Zeitlichkeit als Sein des seinsverstehenden Daseins."; GP, p.22: "Der Horizont, aus dem her dergleichen wie Sein überhaupt verständlich wird, ist die Zeit.";

"Verstehen aus etwas her" is one of the directions of the dialectical structure analysed earlier.⁹² During this analysis of the *Verstehen-Entwurf* relation, the question structure of *< Gefragte, Erfragte, Befragte >* was diagrammatically analysed. In SZ§2 the question structure receives this interpretation: the *Gefragte* is being, the *Erfragte* is the meaning of being, and the *Befragte* is eventually designated as *Dasein* (in its inquisitive capacity). Thus the diagram now appears as follows:⁹³



Taking the subsequent identification of the ground or basic structure of *Dasein* as *Zeitlichkeit*, one can substitute *Dasein* in the above diagram for *Zeitlichkeit*. The resulting diagram would represent the following passage:

"*Sein verstehen wir demnach aus dem ursprünglichen horizontalen Schema der Ekstasen der Zeitlichkeit.*"⁹⁴


"*Accordingly, we understand being from the original horizontal schema of the ecstases of temporality.*"

Now replacing *Zeitlichkeit* with horizon, one can compare the diagram with a diagram of Heidegger's own (allowing for a little interpretation in copying the diagram). The diagram is offered by Heidegger as showing the structure of the future ecstasis.⁹⁵

GP, p.385: "Das vulgäre Erfahren von Seiendem verfügt über keinen anderen Horizont des Seinsverständnisses als den der Vorhandenheit."

⁹² See pt.A, ch.4, section 2.

⁹³ Explanation of diagram: this is a development of the sequence of diagrams used in pt.A, ch.4, section 2 (above). Basically the pattern consists of two reciprocal directions, dispersing into a common horizon on the right hand side, diverging slightly on the left. The upper direction corresponds to the *Entwurf*. The lower to *Verstehen*. The last diagram in pt.A, ch.4, section 2 involved the terms *Gefragte, Erfragte, Befragte*. Heidegger interprets these terms in SZ§2. The new diagram simply replaces the old terms with their new interpretations.



The diagram is not well explained by the context. For example, the verbal expansions of the future ecstasis have only one clearly directional element, whereas the diagram has two distinct and reciprocal directional elements, which can only be explained by reference to the *Verstehen-Entwurf* dialectic. The ecstatic movement is marked by the "Entwurf auf etwas hin" direction, now interpreted as "Entrückung nach etwas hin".⁹⁶ The returning movement is the understanding which occurs "from" the horizon.

Having thus set the horizon in the context of the dialectical pattern of phenomenology, the foundational issue of infinite regression (vicious circles) can once again be raised.

⁹⁴ GP, p.436.

⁹⁵ MAL, p.266

⁹⁶ GP, p.378: "Sofern dieser ekstatische Charakter die Zeitlichkeit kennzeichnet, liegt im Wesen jeder Ekstase... eine *Entrückung nach..., auf etwas hin....* Das, wohinein... bezeichnen wir als *Horizont der Ekstase.*" Tr: "In so far as this ecstatic character is distinctive of temporality, each ecstasis... contains within its own essence a *carrying-away toward something....* That toward which each ecstasis is intrinsically open in a specific way we call the *horizon of the ecstasis.*"

"Die früher erwähnte Folge der einander gleichsam vorgeschalteten Entwürfe: Verstehen von Seiendem, Entwurf auf Sein, Verstehen von Sein, Entwurf auf die Zeit, hat ihr Ende am Horizont der ekstatischen Einheit der Zeitlichkeit. Ursprünglicher können wir dies hier nicht begründen, wir müßten dabei auf das Problem der Endlichkeit der Zeit eingehen. An diesem Horizont hat jede Ekstase der Zeit, d.h. die Zeitlichkeit selbst ihr Ende." ⁹⁷

"The series, mentioned earlier, of projections as it were inserted one before the other - understanding of beings, projection upon being, understanding of being, projection upon time - has its end at the horizon of the ecstatic unity of temporality. We cannot establish this here in a more primordial way; to do that we would have to go into the problem of the finiteness of time. At this horizon each ecstasis of time, hence temporality itself, has its end."

Here the possibility of infinite regress is denied by reference to an end "at the horizon of the ecstatic unity of temporality". The horizon marks this end of finite time. Thus it is the conception of the horizon which carries the burden of stopping foundational regression. In passing, it should be noted that there is a structural disarticulation (disassembly) here: on the one hand, time is the horizon for an understanding of being; on the other, the horizon is the end of time as temporality. Put these together, and one deduces that time is its own end - which is the same proposition-disintegrating metactical move observed in the analysis of the apriori.⁹⁸ Leaving this apparent paradox behind, we find another: how is it, that if the horizon puts a stop to regression, that the following applies?

"Der Horizont ist die *offene Weite*, wohinein die Entrückung als solcher außer sich ist." ⁹⁹

"The horizon is the *open expanse* toward which carrying-away as such is outside itself."

b) Finitude: Openness and Closure

The lack of foundation is characterised by Vattimo as having the structure of an infinite regression of grounds:

"As happens also in Heidegger's great etymological reconstructions of the great words of the past, the relationship with tradition does not supply us with a fixed point of support, but rather pushes us on in a sort of return *in infinitum* to the past, a return through which the historical horizons that we inhabit become more

⁹⁷ GP, p.437

⁹⁸ pt.B, ch.1, section 1a.

⁹⁹ GP, p.378; Hofstadter's translation slightly adjusted.

fluid.... The meaning of Being is precisely what is recalled through this re-ascent
in infinitum through the past....¹⁰⁰

The previous section raised the apparently paradoxical idea of the horizon as both open and closed. The closure of the horizon is important as the end (finitude) of grounding and temporality (together). The openness of the horizon prevents this closure being a simply naive self-grounding or pure stop.¹⁰¹

"Was ist mit dem *Horizontcharakter* der Ekstasen gemeint? Horizont - darunter verstehen wir den Umkreis des Blickfeldes. Aber Horizont, von *horizein* [Gk.], ist gar nicht primär auf Blicken und Anschauen bezogen, sondern besagt einfach an sich das Eingrenzende, Umschließende, den *Umschluß*. Und die Ekstasen sind ja kein Wissen um, kein Bewußtsein, und noch weniger ein Schauen."
 102

"What do we mean by the *horizontal character* of the ecstases? We understand horizon to be the circumference of the field of vision. But horizon, from *horizein*, is not at all primarily related to looking and intuiting, but by itself means simply that which delimits, encloses, the *enclosure*. And the ecstases are, of course, not an awareness of, not a consciousness, and even less a looking."

The strength of the "aber" at the beginning of the third sentence is that the idea of the second sentence, that horizon is the limit of the field of vision, is rejected, while the original Greek meaning receives a positive appraisal. Looking at the fourth sentence, not only are visual interpretations of horizon rejected, but so too cognitive interpretations - so presumably therefore also the normal figurative meaning of horizon as the limit of mental experience. What Heidegger picks up is the idea of horizon as *Umschluß* (enclosure), and this he contemplates and turns over in the following lines.

"Jede Ekstase umschließt sich selbst, und zwar gerade als *ekstasis* [Gk.]. Man könnte meinen, das Umgekehrte wäre der Fall - Entrückung ist doch gerade der Sprung über jede Schranke."
 103

"...each ecstasis encloses itself and does so precisely as *ekstasis*. One could believe the converse to be the case, that being-carried-away is the very leap over the barrier."

The first element in the development of horizon as *Umschluß* is to point out a problem. True the ecstasis is, in its horizon, self-enclosing, in so far as it depends upon (or grounds in) nothing further than its own horizon. Yet to express this truth in terms of enclosure

¹⁰⁰ G.Vattimo, *The End of Modernity*, pp.120-121.

¹⁰¹ On time and finitude in general, cf. D.Krell, op.cit., ch.3; J.Sallis, *Delimitations*, ch.10.

¹⁰² MAL, p.269

¹⁰³ MAL, p.269

seems to contradict another characteristic of the ecstasis - that it breaks every boundary. Heidegger's strategy in the following lines is not to reject one or the other side of the contradiction, but to resolve it in retention of elements of truth from both sides. This resolution leads forward to a narrower determination of the character of horizontality.

"Wohl zu beachten bleibt: die Ekstase überspringt jedes Seiende, der Horizont ist nicht etwa in der Sphäre des Subjektes angesiedelt. Dieser Horizont ist daher auch, weil er nichts bestimmtes Seiendes darstellt, nirgends, er ist weder räumlich noch zeitlich in gewöhnlichem Sinne lokalisiert. Er »ist« überhaupt nicht, sondern er zeitigt sich." ¹⁰⁴

"We must keep in mind, however, that the ecstasis surpasses every being and the horizon is not located, say, in the sphere of the subject. Hence this horizon is also nowhere, since it presents no determinate being: it is neither spatially nor temporally located, in the usual sense. It `is' not as such, but it temporalizes itself."

To interpret rather freely: the possibility of a boundary, which first initiates the difference between openness and closure, is conditional upon a temporo-spatial dimension, or subjectivity (setting a boundary between subject and world/object). The ecstatico-horizonal does not subsist in such media, however.

"Jede Entrückung ist in sich selbst *offen*. Zur Ekstase gehört eine eigentümliche *Offenheit*, die mit dem Außer-sich gegeben ist. Das, wohinein jede Ekstase in einer bestimmten Weise in sich selbst offen ist, bezeichnen wir als *Horizont der Ekstase*. Der Horizont ist die *offene Weite*, wohinein die Entrückung als solche außer sich ist. *Die Entrückung öffnet und hält diesen Horizont offen.*" ¹⁰⁵

"Every such carrying-away is intrinsically *open*. A peculiar *openness*, which is given with the outside-itself, belongs to ecstasis. That into-and-toward which each ecstasis is intrinsically open in a specific way we call the *horizon of the ecstasis*. The horizon is the *open expanse* toward which carrying-away as such is outside itself. *The carrying-away opens up this horizon and keeps it open.*"

In the second sentence, Heidegger says that the ecstasis is open into-and-toward the horizon. This into-and-toward (*Wohinein*) is the same movement of the *Entrückung* (carrying-away), of the *Entwurf*, which was noted earlier. Heidegger does not say "opens out onto" but "is open into-and-toward" - which is structurally problematic. The "into" is carefully contrasted to the "outside-itself" of the ecstasis. These structural peculiarities are metactical: that is, they revise (disintegrate) the structure whereby the horizon acts as a pole of the relation of *Entrückung*. The horizon is the openness of the metaleptically self-enclosing outside-itself of the ecstasis. The metaxy which appears here aims at removing

¹⁰⁴ MAL, p.269

¹⁰⁵ GP, p.378; Hofstadter's translation adjusted.

the propositional structure on which infinite regression depends.¹⁰⁶ The metactical point is stated more succinctly in the following (along with the PIA passage¹⁰⁷ quoted earlier, these are most direct statements of metaxy in the early Heidegger).

"Das Ganze der Entrückungen zentriert nicht etwa in etwas, was für sich entrückungsfrei, unekstatisch vorhanden und das gemeinsame Zentrum für den Ansatz und Ausgang der Ekstasen wäre.... Sie bedürften keines Trägers und keiner Pfeiler wie der Bogen einer Brücke, sondern, wenn wir überhaupt von »Sein« der Ekstasen sprechen dürften, müßte gesagt werden: ihr Sein liegt gerade im freien ekstatischen Schwung."¹⁰⁸

"The whole of these three ways of being-carried-away does not center in a kind of thing which would itself lack any being-carried-away, something present on hand unekstatically and which would be the common center for initiating and unfolding the ecstases.... They need no support and pillars, as does the arch of a bridge. But if we may speak at all about the 'being' of the ecstases, we must say that their being lies directly in the free ecstatic momentum."

The last sentences, introducing the idea of an arch without pillars, held by its own momentum, is an expression of metaxy. Further, openness is not simply an absolute opening outwards into an infinite yawning void or abyss:

"Als Entrückung zu... ist die Gegenwart ein Offensein für *Begegnendes*."¹⁰⁹

"As carrying-away to... the present is a being-open for *that which is encountered*."

In "openness", attention is drawn towards the respects in which limits lack, so that the respects in which limits exist are unnoticed. If a pub is "open", this expresses a narrow relation in which the interior is rendered accessible to the public while physical and conventional boundaries remain plentiful. *Offensein* (being-open) expresses a relation towards that which is encountered by *Dasein*. The directional contrast in the passage is important: "Entrückung zu..." has direction away from the local towards the horizon; "Offensein für..." has a reciprocal direction away from the horizon towards the local. The openness of the horizon does not denote an openness into a beyond, something yet further away; rather, it denotes the accessibility of what is within the horizon. At the horizon, openness (regressiveness) turns in.

¹⁰⁶ For the dependence of the vicious or infinite circle on this, see pt. A, ch. 4, section 2.

¹⁰⁷ PIA, p. 37.

¹⁰⁸ MAL, p. 268; Heim's translation slightly altered.

¹⁰⁹ GP, p. 436; own translation.


In the passage quoted at the beginning of this section, Vattimo contrasted having a support, and falling into an infinite, abyssal regression, as if these were the only possibilities. Vattimo fails to appreciate the metactical "turn" of idiom in Heidegger, which seeks to create, which experiments with, the possibility of a finite arch (arché) without pillars.

The horizon is no innocent rotation of ground through 90 degrees, replacing a vertical hierarchy of concepts with a horizontal line of co-original concepts. There is no replacement, but a seamless extension of the foundational network into a semantic heterogeneity. Within this tension of non-assimilables, while no lexical item is prioritised, nevertheless some are made to bear particular revisional functions (e.g. *Zeitigung*, *Horizont*). It is easier to imagine local concepts indefinitely extended, than to imagine their explanation on the basis of non-local concepts of a wholly different structural character to anything previously encountered. To ask of the ecstases what their support or ground might be is to make a mistake of the same order as that of asking what stops the earth and the stars falling. To ask what holds the earth up is to rely on concepts derived from experience only of local conditions on the earth's surface, and a radical change of idiom (both of language and of thought) is required to see one's way through the question. Likewise with ontological foundations. But the explanation of the former question by reference to universal laws of gravitation is an abandonment of "gravity" as little as the ecstatico-horizonal analysis is an abandonment of ground. Grounding is a universal fact of life, a part of normal human conceptual existence. The philosophical question is not whether such grounds are "real" (foundationalism v. anti-foundationalism), but what the ultimate nature of such grounding is - and this requires a change of idiom.

c) Question-worthiness

Questioning is more of a general philosophical issue, crossing into different traditions, than some of the Heidegger secondary literature acknowledges.¹¹⁰ Characteristic of Heidegger's treatment of questioning is the importance and ultimacy it receives.

In MAL, Heidegger draws the following diagram of the ecstatic concept of the future.¹¹¹



He says that the question-mark denotes "den offenbleibenden Horizont" (the open-staying horizon). Thus the question is not only the horizon, but the horizon in its openness, and the horizon as the into-and-towards-which of ecstatic temporality. In a similar vein, in PIA, Heidegger states clearly that the ground or foundation is the "Zeitigung der Fraglichkeit".¹¹² The same idea of ground as question occurs in SZ:

"Das ontologische Vordringen zum »Ursprung« kommt nicht zu ontischen Selbstverständlichkeiten für den »gemeinen Verstand«, sondern ihm öffnet sich gerade die Fragwürdigkeit alles Selbstverständlichen."¹¹³

"The ontological thrust to the 'origin' arrives at nothing ontically self-evident to the 'common understanding'; rather to this ontological thrust opens precisely the question-worthiness of everything self-evident."

¹¹⁰ When the *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* (no.174, 1990) recently devoted a bumper issue to questioning, Heidegger hardly received a mention among the mass of contributions. Likewise, Crease points out that Nozick (a philosopher from a distinctly non-Heidegger tradition) did not see it unreasonable that the "ultimate principle" should be in the interrogative mood: R.Nozick, *Philosophical Explanations*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981, p.671 footnote no.15, quoted in R.Crease, *Heidegger, Leibniz, and the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, dissertation, Columbia University, 1987.

¹¹¹ MAL, p.266.

¹¹² PIA, pp.35 & 37 (quoted at the beginning of this chapter).

¹¹³ SZ, p.334; own translation.

The crucial point here is that what reveals the question-worthy is the thrust towards an origin (ground).¹¹⁴ Once again, the image of "opening" occurs. In the earlier section on openness, it was concluded that this meant, not an openness into the beyond, but an opening of what lies within the horizon. "The ontological thrust opens the question-worthiness of the self-evident" can be rephrased as "ecstatic projection [*Entwurf*] opens the horizon for its within". Bearing in mind the violent reversal performed by *Entwurf* on normal processes of understanding, one can then interpret this passage from John Sallis: "what Heidegger undertakes is to invert these prejudices in such a way that, rather than covering over the questionableness and directing us away from it, they may come to point into that very questioning."¹¹⁵ Derrida, too, turns over and over the idea of the question as the ultimate (and unreconstructedly so) ground in Heidegger.¹¹⁶ Derrida does not frontally, unquestioningly, declare Heidegger's questioning as unquestioned. Taking up Heidegger's phrasing in "Die Frage nach der Technik", that "questioning is the piety of thinking",¹¹⁷ Derrida hesitantly says:

"Mais il n'a *presque* jamais cessé, me semble-t-il, d'identifier le plus haut et le meilleur de la pensée avec la question, avec la décision, l'appel ou la garde de la question, cette «piété» de la pensée. Cette décision, cet appel ou cette garde, est-ce déjà la question? Est-ce encore la question? Quoi de cette «piété»? Et pourquoi *presque* jamais?"¹¹⁸

¹¹⁴ The scare-quotes around "origin" perhaps mean that Heidegger has the idea of the unreconstructed notion of ground in mind here; the point is that by mimicing (reducing-constructing) the metaphysical discourse, one can wreak its internal destruction - turning it around in itself [*Verstehen* - *Entwurf*] to reveal the question at its origin.

¹¹⁵ J.Sallis, *Delimitations*, p.104.

¹¹⁶ J.Derrida, "De l'esprit", in J.Derrida, *Heidegger et la question*, Paris: Flammarion, 1990. See also: F-W.von Herrmann, *Hermeneutische Phänomenologie des Daseins*, Vol.1, p.18: "Das Sein als solches und das zu ihm als Horizont gehörende ursprüngliche Wesen der Zeit sowie das Verstehen des Seins im Horizont der ursprünglichen Zeit bilden in ihrer Zusammengehörigkeit ein ursprüngliches Sachfeld, das wir als den Fundamentalbereich des philosophischen Fragens bezeichnen können." Tr: "Being as such, and the primordial essence of time which as horizon belongs to being, together with the understanding of being in the horizon of primordial time, form from their association a primordial field which we can describe as the fundamental region of philosophical questioning."

¹¹⁷ VA, p.40: "Denn das Fragen ist die Frömmigkeit des Denkens."

¹¹⁸ J.Derrida, op.cit., p.20f. Tr: "But he *almost* never ceased, so it seems to me, to identify the highest and the best of thinking with the question, with the decision, with the call or the maintenance of the question, this 'piety' of thinking. This decision, this call or this maintenance. is it already the question? What of this 'piety'? And why *almost* never?". For critical essays on

Derrida seems to want to place the Heidegger question in a category: that of the unreconstructed, unrevised notion of ground - something enclosed and privileged in the (bad) metaphysical sense. Theodore Kisiel points out the same necessity which faces Heidegger - the necessity of avoiding turning the question into a metaphysical *Urgrund*:

"Accordingly, even without the historical neglect and confusion into which the question had fallen, to ask this question would still call for turning the interrogative mood back upon itself and inquiring into the conditions of emergence and the dynamics of its own questioning as well as of all other questions."¹¹⁹

It seems that Heidegger does indeed meet the demands. A long footnote by Derrida almost completely refutes his own suggestion: in some places in *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (US), Heidegger takes a distinctly critical tilt at the question, including his own earlier phrasing of questioning as the "piety" of thought.¹²⁰ US is not the only departure from an unreconstructed questioning. Returning to PIA, Heidegger said that *das Fundament, der Boden ist die radikale Zeitigung der Fraglichkeit, des Fragens* - ground is the radical *Zeitigung* of the question. The ground is the question - the question is the ground - a piety surely? But what of *radikale Zeitigung*? What is *Zeitigung*? What sort of genitive is the genitive in *Zeitigung des Fragens*? Is the question the agent or the patient? What if the question was the patient? What kind of operation is *Zeitigung*? A de(con)structive or disassembling operation? In the same book (PIA), the *Zeitigung des Fragens* is interpreted as a de-structive process.¹²¹ Or what if neither agent nor patient, but both, paratactically subsumed into the same originative movement?

Derrida's "De l'Esprit" (including his point about the question), see: J.Sallis, "Heidegger und die Dekonstruktion" in D.Papenfuss & O.Pöggeler eds. *Zur Philosophischen Aktualität Heideggers*, vol.2, Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1990 (pp.257-272) and Ö.Sözer, "Kommt der Geist fragend zurück?", in D.Papenfuss & O.Pöggeler eds., op.cit., pp.273-283.

¹¹⁹ T.Kisiel, "Towards the Topology of Dasein", in "Listening - A Journal of Religion and Culture", River Forest, Illinois, USA, vol.12/3 (1977), p.43.

¹²⁰ For the footnote, J.Derrida, op.cit., pp.114-121, in which he discusses especially US, pp.174ff. (in the lectures "Das Wesen der Sprache"). For Heidegger's self-criticism, see US, p.175. A passage missed by Derrida in the lecture "Der Weg zur Sprache" (US, p.257): "Die Frage fragt zuviel und übereilt" (the question asks too much too fast). Are such passages criticisms of the early Heidegger position? Early Heidegger is interested primarily in *Fragwürdigkeit*, not *Fragen*.

¹²¹ PIA, p.195: "Das Fragbare - die Fragbarkeit... radikal gezeitigt... Dies ist nur destruktiv zu zeitigen!" "The questionable - questionability... radically temporalised... This can only be temporalised destructively." (Own translation)

In the sense that Kisiel demands a crude reflexivity of the question, Heidegger does not meet his demand. Returning to the passage quoted above from SZ, the contrast there was between *Selbstverständlichkeit* (of-course-ness) and *Fragwürdigkeit* (question-worthiness). Although Heidegger, as ever, slides between similar words such as *Frage*, *Fraglichkeit*, *fragbar*, *Fragwürdigkeit* - all of which have different nuances - it seems that *Fragwürdigkeit* should be the centre of our attention. It is not a well-defined and articulated question which stands at the horizon, but a primordial sense of interrogation, of question-worthiness. One might say that *Fragwürdigkeit* is what first makes such a thing as questioning and answering possible. Certainly, as Sallis points out, the Heidegger question is not a question that is crudely contrasted to answering:

"The asking is not simply distinct from that which is asked about, the questioning not simply over against what is questioned. Rather, the two sides of the question are intrinsically connected, so thoroughly interconnected that the very deployment of the question cannot but be engaged already in answering it, disrupting the simple opposition between asking and answering."¹²²

Sallis continues by turning to the circularity which can arise between asking and answering, and defends Heidegger on the basis of SZ§2, where Heidegger says that the question of the meaning of being is not circular, but has a backwards-forwards movement - a dialectical pattern like that of *Verstehen-Entwurf*.¹²³ There is another dialectical interplay which can be identified here. Derrida's question is essentially about the relation between question and ground in Heidegger. One must ask, not only whether the question is a ground, but also whether ground coalesces into question-worthiness, and in what way they relate. Twice, so far, in this thesis, Heidegger's tactic of revaluing the problematic (question-worthy) as the fundamental was pointed out.¹²⁴ Rather than perceiving the problematic or question-worthy as an impasse meeting the fundamental inquiry from outside, it was to be perceived as emerging from the fundamental inquiry itself, and thus reflecting the inner structure, the ground, of the matter in hand. *Fragwürdigkeit*, the possibility of the question-answer relation, is not only the horizon towards which the

¹²² J.Sallis, *Delimitations*, p.110. D.Panis, in "Heidegger et le question du fondement" (p.8). finds that the persistence of the *Seinsfrage*, as opposed to the tendency of other questions to devolve into answers, turns on the abyssal nature of the foundation.

¹²³ J.Sallis, *ibid.*; SZ, p.8.

¹²⁴ See pt.B, ch.1, section 1b (on transcendence), and pt.A, ch.4, section 2.

fundamental inquiry moves, but in so doing it is itself taken into the grounding which occurs. The *Zeitigung des Fragens* (translating *Zeitigung* not as temporalisation, but as maturing) is the slow and careful cultivation and maturing of a new idiom (destructive of the tradition), a new idiom in which no simple unreconstructed question, but a sense of *Fragwürdigkeit* lies at the basis.

3) Transition: Links between Temporality and *Ereignis*

In the introduction Gianni Vattimo's use of the following quotation was discussed.¹²⁵

"Das Sein, es selbst eigens denken, verlangt, vom Sein abzusehen, sofern es wie in aller Metaphysik nur aus dem Seienden her und für dieses als dessen Grund ergründet und ausgelegt wird. Das Sein eigens denken, verlangt, das Sein als den Grund des Seienden fahren zu lassen zugunsten des im Entbergen verborgen spielenden Gebens, d.h. des Es gibt." ¹²⁶

"To think being itself explicitly requires disregarding being to the extent that it is only grounded and interpreted in terms of beings and for beings as their ground, as in all metaphysics. To think being explicitly requires us to let being go as the ground of beings in favor of the giving which prevails concealed in unconcealment, in favour of the It gives."

This was interpreted by him as the recommendation of the abandonment of grounds and foundations for a kind of abyssal nihilism. The important question here is one which Heidegger points out repeatedly, and which Vattimo fails to remain with, namely: what is the "it" that "gives"? The "it" has many names in Heidegger's writing. In the lecture "Zeit und Sein" (from which the above passage is taken) the name was *Ereignis*. In MAL, written 34 years earlier, a different name is given. But does this mean the named is so different?

"Nun muß auch deutlicher geworden sein, inwiefern wir von der Welt sagen können, sie sei ein *Nichts*. Was für ein *nihil* ist sie?"¹²⁷

"It must also have become clearer to what extent we can say about the world that it is a *nothing*. What sort of *nihil* is it?"

¹²⁵ Introduction, section 2bii.

¹²⁶ ZSD, p.5f.; Stambaugh's translation slightly altered.

¹²⁷ MAL, p.271.

The matter here is not simply the kind of *Nichts* that the world is; rather, it concerns the nature of the *Nichts* in Heidegger's philosophy, as the ensuing passage shows:

"Wenn sie [die Welt] also ein *nihil* ist, dann kein *nihil negativum*, d.h. nicht die einfache, schlechthinnige leere Negation von etwas. Die Welt ist nichts in dem Sinne, daß sie nichts Seiendes ist. Nichts Seiendes und gleichwohl etwas, was es gibt." ¹²⁸

"If it is a *nihil*, then it must not be a *nihil negativum*, i.e. not the simple pure empty negation of something. The world is nothing in the sense that it is nothing that is. It is nothing that is yet something that 'is there'."

So far Heidegger has been merely negative in his comments, but in this last sentence he turns to a positive thesis, and as in "Zeit und Sein", this positive move turns to the phrase "es gibt". The world is not an entity, but "there is a world". Heidegger then interprets the "es":

"Das »es«, das da dieses Nicht-Seiende gibt, ist selbst nicht seiend, sondern ist die sich zeitigende Zeitlichkeit. Und was diese als ekstatische Einheit zeitigt, ist die Einheit ihres Horizontes: die Welt." ¹²⁹

"The 'there is' which is this not-a-being [more accurately: the 'it' which gives this non-being] is itself not being, but is the self-temporalizing temporality. And what the latter, as ecstatic unity, temporalizes is the unity of its horizon, the world."

The "es" is named here as "die sich zeitigende Zeitlichkeit". The previous formulation that "es gibt eine Welt" has been developed: "die Zeitlichkeit zeitigt eine Welt". The "es" is *Zeitlichkeit*, the verb "geben" has been named as "zeitigen". Recapitulating this conclusion, Heidegger continues:

"Die Welt ist das Nichts, das sich ursprünglich zeitigt, das in und mit der Zeitigung Entspringende schlechthin - wir nennen sie daher das *nihil originarium*." ¹³⁰

"World is the nothing which temporalizes itself primordially, that which simply arises in and with temporalization. We therefore call it the *nihil originarium*."

Does this *nihil originarium* mark a commitment to some form of nihilism? Not every *nihil* founds a nihilism, as a brief comparison with Kant can show. Kant described time (and space, as the pure forms of intuition) as a *Nichts*, and produced a four-fold analysis of

¹²⁸ MAL, pp.271-2.

¹²⁹ MAL, p.272.

¹³⁰ MAL, p.272.

Nichts.¹³¹ Time was specified as one of these four kinds, namely, *Nichts* as *ens imaginarium*. There is no *nihil originarium* in the Kantian analysis; what Kant and Heidegger share is the need they feel to develop conceptions of *Nichts* that are not a mere *nihil negativum* (which would found a nihilism). On the basis of what Heidegger says here about *Nichts*, there is no immediate reason to attribute to him any greater nihilism or abandonment of foundations in favour of a void, than there is to attribute such a view to Kant. The problem here is one of the nature and character of the *Nichts*. What might Heidegger mean by a *nihil originarium*? The "*originarium*" must be emphasised: origin, ground. Rather than being excluded in favour of a void (the Vattimo interpretation), ground has coalesced with a nothing. This same paradox is found in the conception of the abyssal ground, the "*abgründige Grund*", which appears in the writings of the thirties,¹³² and which characterises the renaming of *Zeitlichkeit* as *Zeit-Spiel-Raum*. The *nihil originarium* is not analysed further as such in Heidegger's extant writings, but the passages on the *abgründige Grund* can be taken as providing a development of this theme.¹³³

So far connections have been traced between: (a) *es gibt* and temporal language; (b) *es gibt* and *Ereignis*. Is there any more direct relation of time and *Ereignis* in Heidegger? In MAL the following passage is to be found:

"Weil das Ereignis des Welteingangs des Seienden das Urereignis und in seinem Wesen Zeitigung ist,...."¹³⁴

"Because the event of the entity's access to the world is the original event and is in its essence temporalisation,...."

In MAL, *Ereignis* has not yet emerged as a central keyword, but it is in the formative stages of doing so. These passages mark a transition between a relatively normal understanding of *Ereignis* as an occurrence or event, and *Ereignis* (here *Ur-ereignis*) as something of fundamental import. In this transitional phase, words such as *Urereignis*,

¹³¹ I.Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, B348.

¹³² See esp. BP, pp.371-388.

¹³³ On the *abgründiger Grund*, see next chapter. For more detailed discussion of the *Nichts* in Heidegger's philosophy, see R.Regvald, *Heidegger et le problème du néant*, Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1987.

¹³⁴ MAL, p.274

Urgeschehen, and *Urbewegung* all occur as possible forerunners of the later concept of *Ereignis*. Heidegger's prefixing of all of these dynamic-eventful notions with "Ur-" is significant: the "Ur-" denotes absolute foundation. Further, from the passage it appears that there is an association between being this *Urereignis*, and having the essence of *Zeitigung*.

The final passage for citation in this chapter draws a fascinating parallel between the work of the SZ project, and the later writings involving the terminology of the *Ereignis*. The passage builds up to an identification of "the moment of the *Ereignis*" and "the time of being".

"Warum muß diese Entscheidung gewagt werden? Weil damit die Notwendigkeit des Seyns in die höchste Fragwürdigkeit hinaufgehoben und die Freiheit des Menschen, daß er seines Wesens Erfüllung ins Tiefste legen kann, in die Ab-gründigkeit hinabstoßen, weil so das Sein in die Wahrheit der einfachsten Innigkeit seiner Er-eignung gebracht wird. Und was »ist« dann? Dann erst ist diese Frage unmöglich, dann ist, für einen Augenblick, das Er-eignis Ereignis. Dieser Augenblick ist *die Zeit des Seins*." ¹³⁵

"Why must this decision be ventured? Because by doing so the necessity of Being is raised up into the highest questionworthiness and the freedom of man to be able to situate the fulfilment of his essence at the most profound level is pitched down into the un-fathomable; because by this Being is brought into the truth of the simplest intimacy of its ap-proprietation. And then what "is"? Only *then* is this question impossible; then, for a moment, ap-proprietation is appropriation. This moment is *the time of being*."

The moment described is a moment of two simultaneous extremes: the raising of being into the highest questioning, and the pitching of human freedom down into the most unfathomable (*Abgründigkeit*). The quasi-paradoxical simultaneity of these extremes, the correlativity posited between *Fragwürdigkeit* and *Abgründigkeit*, is a problem which needs to be maintained as such. An unfathomable question would (supposing only that the free translation is acceptable) be a question which does not go away. Heidegger then asks what "is" at this moment, replying on two levels: (i) the question of "is" no longer applies at this moment; (ii) seemingly tautologically, abusing subject-predicate structure, "Er-eignis ist Ereignis". This moment of being brought into the truth, where things are seen as they are, is then identified as the "time of being". At the time of being, in the time of being, "Er-eignis ist Ereignis".

¹³⁵ BP. p.508

Connections: ground into time; time into *Ereignis*. But to what extent does the *Ereignis* engage in the foundational problematic, to what extent is it involved in the disas-sembly of ground? Robert Crease identifies a middle period of Heidegger's thought in which ground "is" *Ereignis*.¹³⁶ The "is" is increasingly problematic during the development of Heidegger's thought, and thus, while the next chapter essentially deals with *Grund* as *Ereignis*, it deals less with the *Ereignis* as such, as with the thinking which takes place within the site of the *Ereignis*. Texts can certainly be adduced from BP which state the foundational role of *Ereignis*,¹³⁷ but the issue is rather, what does this connection have to say about the revision or disas-sembly of ground? It is this latter issue which the thesis now turns to.

¹³⁶ R.Crease, op.cit., p.243.

¹³⁷ For example, (i) there are many occurrences of the phrases "Das Ereignis gründet..." or "...gründet im Ereignis"; (ii) one of the six *Fügungen* of the *Ereignis* is named "die Gründung"; (iii) At BP, p.307, *Grund* (as disas-sembled) is placed in apposition to *Ereignis*; (iv) Consider this passage from BP, p.346: "Wahrheit... ist der Grund als zurücknehmender und durchragender, der das Verborgene überragt, ohne es aufzuheben, die als dieser Grund stimmende Stimmung. Denn dieser Grund ist das Ereignis selbst als Wesung des Seyns. Das Ereignis trägt die Wahrheit = die Wahrheit durchragt das Ereignis." Tr: "Truth is ground as taking-back and rising-through, which rises over the hidden without superceding [aufheben] it; truth is as this ground the sounding mood. Because this ground is the event [Ereignis] itself as the essencing of being. The event bears the truth = the truth rises up through the event." Comment: the passage describes *Grund* as disas-sembled (rising over the hidden); as such *Grund* conforms to the dialectical patterns described in pt.A, ch.4, section 2: *zurücknehmend-durchragend* and *tragen-durchragen* both have a directional reciprocity - a reciprocity which at BP, p.261 & 265 Heidegger describes as "kehrig" (turn-like, versive) and as a "kehrige Gründung" (versive grounding). This dialectical pattern, though, is no neutralisation or superceding (*Aufhebung*). This ground (i.e. as dialectical or *kehrig*), and no other interpretation of ground, is the *Ereignis*.

CH.2. THE TURN: A LEAP INTO THE ABYSS?

The question, to repeat, is narrow: what "is" ground in the earlier writings of Heidegger?¹ What should have become clear is that no stable response to this question is possible: the very being ("is") of ground is undergoing interrogation - is maturing with interrogation (*der Boden ist die Zeitigung des Fragens*). It therefore becomes integral to ask, not only about the present of the term "ground" in the early Heidegger, but also of its future - where is this experimental development going? This chapter is primarily concerned with the meaning of the term *Abgrund* (normally translated as "abyss") and thus the fate of the concept of ground in the earlier work of Heidegger. The most important text for the exploration of the themes is *Beiträge zur Philosophie* (BP).²

The themes of a "turn" (*Kehre*), a "leap" (*Sprung*) and an "abyss" (*Abgrund*) are highly characteristic of Heidegger in this period of his thinking; they are also open to serious misinterpretation - as if Heidegger's thought suddenly and fundamentally changed, and this change involved a leap into the abyss in the sense of a turn away from ground. The concept of the *Kehre* is indeed the key to understanding the fate of ground towards the end of the earlier work of Heidegger - but not at all in the way in which this might initially be expected. The *Kehre* is, at the same time, a key to recovering the unity of Heidegger's thought.

¹ Throughout this dissertation, this question has never been intended in an innocent or frontal sense. Heidegger's strategy with "what is...?" questions should not be taken as justifying their abandonment; they are strategically useful. In writing this dissertation I could find no more useful and instructive a guideline for initiating the discussions than this question - but its integration into the dissertation is strategically non-simple.

² *Contributions to Philosophy*, written 1936-38, unpublished until 1989, when it appeared as volume 65 of the *Gesamtausgabe*. Although the contents of BP were not entirely unknown before its publication (scholars who knew Heidegger personally sometimes had access to the manuscript - see O.Pöggeler, *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers* (3rd ed.), p.442 and D.Krell, *Intimations of Mortality*, pp.106ff.), nevertheless a much smaller familiarity with BP is assumed on the part of the reader than in the case of SZ or the lectures of the 20's. It should be emphasised that this dissertation does not attempt to deal comprehensively with Heidegger's writings after about 1928, though obviously there are many works of paramount importance for the general topic throughout Heidegger's career. The position of BP in this dissertation responds to the need for at least some indication of where Heidegger is going; in this respect BP is the most important transitional writing yet published. The presence of BP here does not indicate an intention to deal more widely with the thought of the 1930's, nor does it indicate an undervaluing of the intricacies of development in Heidegger's thought between 1928 and 1936.

1) Structural-foundational eccentricities in *Beiträge zur Philosophie*

The subject of this section, structural-foundational eccentricities in BP, will be compared wherever possible to the SZ project. This section deals especially with the notions of *Kehre* and fugue, but only insofar as these are necessary for a limited assessment of the idea that Heidegger's turn consists in a "leap" into an "abyss" and away from foundationalism.³

While a crude parallel between the SZ-BP relation and the relation of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* to his *Philosophical Investigations* is not wholly invalid, the comparison only further propagates the innocent misconception of a sudden change or turn in Heidegger's thought.⁴ The same propagation is achieved by Von Herrmann's distinction such that SZ is the transcendental-horizonal or fundamental-ontological approach, in contrast to the *seinsgeschichtliche* (pertaining to the history of being) approach of BP.⁵ To try to put SZ and BP into separate categories from the very beginning seriously prejudices their interpretation. It suggests that Heidegger, having spent a decade toiling with the SZ project and refining various versions of it into lecture series and draft books, started again with a fresh piece of paper, and wrote a completely new, self-standing approach to the question of being. This only draws further attention to the already invitingly obvious, superficial differences between BP and SZ. One of the first tasks for an interpreter of BP must be to draw the reader in the opposite direction, to the far more difficult task of perceiving the unity and interrelation of the two books.⁶ BP is no clean start. Neither is it an unquestioning continuation of SZ in the form proposed within the SZ project. The relation, even at a superficial level, is complex: BP contains many explicit references to SZ, some of which are critical or revisionary; it also contains many more implicit references, such that a familiarity with SZ is essential for a reading of BP:

³ Cf. G.Vattimo, *La Fine della Modernità*, p.37: "Heidegger... parla della necessità di «lasciar perdere l'essere come fondamento», per «saltare» nel suo «abisso»." Tr.: "Heidegger... speaks of the necessity of 'relinquishing being as foundation' in order to 'leap' into its 'abyss'." See introduction, section 2bii, of this thesis.

⁴ Cf. R.Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, p.5; Krell's description of BP as a "gigantic manuscript of extended aphorisms" perhaps has the same parallel in mind (op.cit., p.106): "aphorism" rather devalues the strategy and method of BP.

⁵ E.g. Von Herrmann's editorial afterword to BP, at p.511.

these implicit references often involve the acceptance of much of what the earlier work achieved. BP does not obviously contain any major ideas or theses which conflict with SZ - at least, none which conflict with SZ more than they conflict with other ideas or principles within BP itself. Certainly SZ is a ladder for reaching BP; but it not even possible to distinguish the two by saying that the ladder is thrown away after use.

BP is a book which, like SZ, concentrates on the question of being. It does so, not by expounding any thesis or system (although at times it may seem to do so); rather, by developing a single, complex but unified conception, previously foreign to (or rather, hidden within) thought: *Ereignis*. Thus the subtitle of BP: *Vom Ereignis*. The name of this conception is indeed new when compared strictly to SZ, but is the conception itself new? It is not uninformative to view Heidegger as constantly translating his own work into new idioms in order to exploit the properties of the new idiom - and perhaps this is indeed the main difference between SZ and BP: translation.⁷ But if this is the case, it is a translation which raises many of the most difficult problems of translating: there is little that maps directly between the two idioms. Yet it is the difficulty of providing a mapping which shows up the very advantage of the translation - that the new idiom contains possibilities, connections and structures which were unavailable in the old. Heidegger once famously remarked that language was the nemesis of SZ, but it is possible that these famous lines have been badly misinterpreted.⁸

"Der fragliche Abschnitt [von SZ] wurde zurückgehalten, weil das Denken im zureichenden Sagen dieser Kehre versagte und so mit Hilfe der Sprache der Metaphysik nicht durchkam."⁹

"The questionable section [of SZ] was withheld because thinking came to a breakdown in the adequate saying of this turn and thus could not continue through with the help of the language of metaphysics."

⁶ Cf. the explicit comments by Heidegger in BP on the SZ-BP relation; e.g. pp.84-87.

⁷ This was written partly with the following in mind: D.C.Wood, *The Deconstruction of Time*, p.148. As regards the development of Heidegger's thinking and writing, Wood speaks of "superimposition", "transformation" and especially the "mapping of one discourse onto another", rejecting the notion of "translation".

⁸ For a lengthier reinterpretation, see R.Hosokawa, "Heidegger und das Problem der Kehre". pp.10-12.

⁹ BH, p.159 (GA9, p.328); own translation.

This does not say that SZ failed because of metaphysical language; nor does it say that the metaphysical language of SZ led to a *Kehre*. Rather, the *Kehre* was already an intended part of SZ (whether at a point in the narrative or as a philosopheme - this is unclear), but the idiom did not suffice for the satisfactory formulation of the relevant part of SZ. Clearly SZ itself has a far from homogeneous idiom, subsisting in a development of language or a continual process of translation. The breakdown is the breakdown of this developmental self-translation. This does not mean to say that the ideas of SZ are in any way invalidated by the BH passage, and indeed one finds within the new idiom of BP that many ideas, patterns and strategies are carried over, extended or amended from SZ. *Ereignis*, then, belongs to an idiom which translates (with extensions and amendments) the language of SZ into a mode in which the saying of the *Kehre* is possible - but a translation in which one-to-one lexical mappings are often unavailable.

Robert Crease has identified a middle Heidegger characterised by the interpretation of ground as *Ereignis*.¹⁰ This raises various questions. Given the link between ground and *Ereignis*, to what extent is this different from ground in the 1920's writings? Further, if the link exists, does it mean that *Ereignis* is simply another metaphysical *Urelement*, or does *Ereignis*, by its foundational function, disassemble (deconstruct, lay free) a certain metaphysical foundationalism? One may start by remarking that *Ereignis* has a curious relation to BP, for while conditioning both form and content of that book (subtitled *Vom Ereignis*), it is nevertheless relatively absent from the book. Nor is this a mere paraleptic absence. A closer reader may develop the feeling that somehow the *Ereignis* has a relation to the text like that of the eye to its field of vision. It is Heidegger's tactical goal to create this effect:

"Die gemäße Überschrift lautet daher *Vom Ereignis*. Und das sagt nicht, daß davon und darüber berichtet werde, sondern will heißen: Vom Ereignis er-eignet ein denkerisches Zugehören zum Seyn und in das Wort »des« Seyns." ¹¹

"The appropriate sub-title therefore reads *Vom Ereignis*. And that does not mean reporting 'of' or 'about' the event, rather, it means: from the event comes to pass a thinking-saying belonging to being and in the word 'of' being."

¹⁰ R. Crease, *Heidegger, Leibniz and the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, p.243.

¹¹ BP, p.3; this and all subsequent translations from BP are own translations.

The key move in the text is an untranslatable reversal (*Kehre*) of the meaning of "vom". "Vom Ereignis" would normally suggest first the sense of "Of the Event", in the sense of a comprehensive analysis of the event. Heidegger switches to another possibility held within the German word: "from". The book is written "from" the *Ereignis*, and as such presents a "thinking-saying belonging to being". The idea that BP is written from the event might initially be taken as a suggestion that Heidegger believes himself to have achieved "the other thinking" in the sense of *Denken*; it becomes clear later in the book that the *Ereignis* is not the achievement of *Denken* or even a concept belonging to *Denken*; *Ereignis* is rather the site of the transition between metaphysical thinking and the "other" thinking. Heidegger does not write in a style in which form and content can be separated out. In BP, "form" has to be taken more widely than the pages of the book, for quite explicitly what is most important to the book (*Ereignis*) is scarcely to be found within those pages. It is in this sense that BP is written "from the event". The position of the *Ereignis* with respect to the text is thus the first feature which de-conventionalizes a possible foundationalism.

To continue the exploration of a possible foundationalism, if one was to try to impose a tree-structure on BP with *Ereignis* at the base, the first fork might be between the two structurally dominant figures of BP, namely: *Kehre* and *Fuge*. The rest of this section examines these two structurally dominant figures.

a) Fugue

The core structure of BP is a sixfold fugue, where the fugue elements (*Fügungen*) are (1) *der Anklang* (ringing-in),¹² (2) *das Zuspiel* (play-off),¹³ (3) *der Sprung* (leap), (4) *die*

¹² Translation difficult. The sense of the word conveys the first calling or summons to the recovery of the question of being, or the heralding of the initiation of the quest for being; normally *Anklang* describes the reception or approbation of the public to some achievement (presupposing a separation of observer and observed); but in Heidegger's text the *Anklang* seems to be, indistinguishably, the summons of the subject-matter and the response of the thinker; further, Heidegger exploits the compound construction of the word (*An-klang*: at-ring), so to translate the word we also need to respect the auditive element. "Ringing-in" (as in "to ring in a new era") is taken as combining the auditive and the initiating elements; however it loses the idea of a

Gründung (grounding), (5) *die Zukünftigen* (those-to-come), (6) *der letzte Gott* (the last god). What is the significance of this idiosyncratic structure?

Briefly, fugue can be seen both (a) as paratactic association or semantic interpenetration, which lets go normal propositional structure, further refined and transferred from the level of the sentence to the level of the text as a whole, and (b) as a development of the textual superstructure of the SZ project - namely regressive recapitulation.

More slowly, one can take the meaning of the German word *Fuge* (lit.: fugue) as an initial clue, the core meanings are fivefold: (1) a stringing-together in a construction that may be physical, grammatical or socio-economic; (2) the gaps or joints in such a structure, as distinct from the constituent parts; (3) a musical fugue ("a polyphonic composition in which short melodic theme is introduced by one part and successively taken up by others and developed by interweaving the parts"¹⁴); (4) a decree of fate or of a god; (5) in addition to the normal German meanings, Heidegger adds an association with the word *Verfügung* ("disposal", as in "at one's disposal"), such that a *Fügung* is that which is "posed" at our dis-posal for the venturing of the quest for being.¹⁵ Heidegger would seem, with his use of the word *Fuge* (and its morphological derivatives) to want to hold together all of these meanings.

Initially the choice of the six *Fügungen* (fugue-parts) can seem to be rather inexplicable. Heidegger claims the origin of this structure (both the overall fugue and its constituent *Fügungen*) lies in the matter of the enquiry itself:

summons (or ap-peal) issued by the human situation. D.Krell translates "intimation" (op.cit., p.106).

¹³ "Play-off", not in the sense of a tie-breaker, but in the sense of "playing off one thing against another". D.Krell: "interplay" (ibid.).

¹⁴ As defined in the Concise Oxford Dictionary (6th ed.); this should be taken seriously: the parts of Heidegger's fugue speak polyphonically, successively taking up the theme of the *Ereignis* with its melodic figure of the *Kehre*, developing by interweaving the parts.

¹⁵ BP, p.81

"Dieser Aufriß gibt keine Anreihung verschiedener Betrachtungen über verschiedene Gegenstände.... Der Aufriß dieser »Beiträge« zur Vorbereitung des Übergangs ist dem noch unbewältigten Grundriß der Geschichtlichkeit des Übergangs selbst entnommen...." ¹⁶

"This outline does not give a sequence of various observations about various objects.... The outline of these 'contributions' to the preparation of the transition is taken from the still unmastered ground-plan of the historicity of the transition itself...."

In this passage it should be emphasised: that the six *Fügungen* are supposedly given by the matter itself, rather than imposed by the writer¹⁷; likewise, that the matter itself (the transition of thinking), as it gives the six *Fügungen*, is respected as unmastered, untamed; finally, that the matter itself, as it gives the six *Fügungen*, is regarded in its *Geschichtlichkeit* (its narrative historicity). In what sense should we take this *Geschichtlichkeit*? Discernible in the naming of the six *Fügungen* is a movement from beginning to end, from first to last (from the ringing-in to the last god). Can one therefore suppose a linear, directional structure? Such an impression is one Heidegger attempts to avoid:

"Dieser Aufriß... ist auch kein einleitender Aufstieg von einem Unten nach einem Droben."
¹⁸

"Neither is this outline an introductory ascent from something lower to something higher."

The following passage gives one of the most positive overall interpretations:

¹⁶ BP, p.6.

¹⁷ Cf. the comments on phenomenological method in §7 of SZ.

¹⁸ BP, p.6.

"Die Fuge ist wesentlich anderes als ein ›System‹.... Die sechs Fügungen der Fuge stehen je für sich, aber nur, um die wesentliche Einheit eindringlicher zu machen. In jeder der sechs Fügungen wird über das Selbe je das Selbe zu sagen versucht, aber jeweils aus einem anderen Wesensbereich dessen, was das Ereignis nennt. Äußerlich und stückhaft gesehen findet man dann leicht überall ›Wiederholungen‹. Doch das Verharren beim Selben, dies Zeugnis der echten Inständigkeit des anfänglichen Denkens, fugenmäßig rein zu vollziehen, ist das Schwerste.... Jede Fügung steht jeweils in sich, und dennoch besteht ein verborgenes Ineinanderschwingen und eröffnendes Gründen der Entscheidungsstätte für die wesentlichen Übergang in die noch mögliche Wandlung der abendländischen Geschichte."¹⁹

"The fugue is essentially other than a 'system'.... The six fugue-parts of the fugue each stand for themselves, but only in order to make their essential unity the more penetrating. In each of the six fugue-parts, it is sought always to say the same about the same, but in each case from another essential sphere of that which the event names. Externally and fragmentarily seen, one can then easily find 'repetitions' everywhere. However to cleanly accomplish the persistence with the same (this testimony of the genuine proficiency of initiatory thinking) is the most difficult task.... Each fugue-part stands respectively in itself and yet a hidden swinging-into-each-other prevails, an opening grounding of the decision-site for the essential transition into the still possible transformation of Western history."

Despite the superficial novelty of the fugue in Heidegger's writing, all the elements in this passage are reminiscent of well-established themes. For example: consider the discussion of tautology and contradiction earlier in this thesis. Each *Fügung* is said to the same about the same, to persist with the same - which is what a tautology achieves. In other words, what Heidegger has earlier achieved by means of tautology, at the level of the sentence, he here raises to the level of the text by means of fugue. Yet fugue-structure is also a quasi-contradiction: self-standing parts which nevertheless find their sole purpose in their unity; supposedly saying the same they apparently say quite different things. The character of this contradiction is described as a swinging-into-each-other - the notion of swinging was used in earlier works to describe the relation of the ecstases of temporality. The relation of the fugue and its *Fügungen* repeats the problem of the origin of identity and difference, and in this vein the interrelation of the *Fügungen* is reminiscent of *Gleichursprünglichkeit*. Heidegger continues by describing this curiously contradictory unity of the *Fügungen* as an opening grounding (*Gründen*) of the decision-site. It is not only that one of the *Fügungen* is named *Gründung*, but each has a foundational role. Yet this foundation is described as "open" and appositionally related to the horizontally interpenetrative notion of "swinging into each other" (*Ineinanderschwingen*). The fugue-structure is called foundational (among other things), but clearly it can only be so in a radically unconventional sense.

¹⁹ BP, pp.81-2.

If all of this leaves the impression that however unconventional the foundationalism of the fugue-structure may be, it is nevertheless a formalism, this too is balanced out in BP. In a number of passages in BP, Heidegger summarizes the movement and interrelation of the *Fügungen* in a non-formal, narrative movement.

"Der *Anklang* des Seyns als der Verweigerung. Das *Zuspiel* des Fragens nach dem Seyn. Das *Zuspiel* ist zuerst *Zuspiel* des ersten Anfangs, damit dieser den anderen Anfang ins Spiel bringe und aus diesem Wechselzuspiel die Vorbereitung des Sprunges erwachse. Der *Sprung* in das Seyn. Der Sprung erspringt den Abgrund der Zerklüftung und so erst die Notwendigkeit der Gründung des aus dem Seyn zugewiesenen Da-seins. Die *Gründung* der Wahrheit als der Wahrheit des Seyns (das Da-sein)." ²⁰

"The *ringing-in* of being as shutting-out. The *play-off* of the questioning after being. The play-off is initially the play-off of the first beginning, so that this may bring the other beginning into play and that out of their interplay may evolve the preparation of the leap. The *leap* into being. The leap leaps from the abyss of the clefting and thus first [arises] the necessity of the grounding of the Da-sein assigned from being. The *grounding* of truth as the truth of being (the Da-sein)."

In this last passage, summarising the first four *Fügungen*, one of the important points to notice is how each *Fügung* is linked to *Seyn*.

"Der *Anklang* hat seine Tragweite in das Gewesende und das Künftige und somit seine Einschlagskraft in das Gegenwärtige durch das *Zuspiel*. Das *Zuspiel* nimmt seine Notwendigkeit erst aus dem *Anklang* der Not der Seinsverlassenheit. *Anklang* und *Zuspiel* sind Boden und Feld für den ersten Absprung des anfänglichen Denkens zum *Sprung* in die Wesung des Seyns. Der Sprung eröffnet zuvor die unabgeschrittenen Weiten und Verbergungen dessen, wohin die *Gründung* des Da-seins, zugehörig dem Zuruf des Ereignisses, vordringen muß. Alle diese *Fügungen* müssen in solcher Einheit bestanden werden aus der Inständigkeit im Da-sein, die das Sein der *Zukünftigen* auszeichnet. Sie übernehmen und verwahren die durch den Zuruf erweckte Zugehörigkeit in das Ereignis und seine Kehre und kommen so vor die Winke *des letzten Gottes* zu stehen." ²¹

"By means of the play-off, the *ringing-in* has a range carrying into the having-been and the yet-to-come, and thus [has] its strike-power in the present. The *play-off* first takes its necessity from the ringing-in of the need of the desolation of being. Ringing-in and play-off are earth and field for the first leap-down of initiatory thinking to the *leap* into the essencing of being. The leap opens up the uncharted reaches and concealments of that into which must push forward the *grounding* of the Da-sein belonging to the acclamation of the event. All these fugue-parts must be fashioned into a unity of this kind from the proficiency in the Da-sein which distinguishes *those-to-come*. They adopt and maintain the belonging to the event and its turn, a belonging awakened by the hail; and thus they come to stand before the gestures of *the last god*."

Note that "die Not der Seinsverlassenheit" (the need of being's desolation), "anfängliches Denken" (initiatory thinking), "die durch den Zuruf erweckte Zugehörigkeit" (the

²⁰ BP, p.9.

²¹ BP, p.82.

belonging awakened by the hail), and "der Wink" (the gesture) are all terms and phrases of special significance in BP.

"Was gesagt wird, ist gefragt und gedacht im »Zuspiel« des ersten und des anderen Anfangs zueinander aus dem »Anklang« des Seyns in der Not der Seinsverlassenheit für den »Sprung« in das Seyn zur »Gründung« seiner Wahrheit als Vorbereitung der »Zukünftigen« »des letzten Gottes«. " ²²

"What is said is asked and thought in the 'play-off' against each other of the first and the other beginning, out of the 'ringing-in' of being in the need of the desolation of being, for the 'leap' into being to the 'grounding' of its truth as preparation for 'those-to-come' 'of the last god'."

In this last sentence, Heidegger accomplishes a complete saying of the *Fügungen* in one sentence, a sentence which reads like a narrative. However there is not only a non-formal narrative element here in the interrelation of the *Fügungen*; the passage has more to say: the play-off of the first beginning of thought (metaphysics) with the other beginning is already the leap; the leap is already grounding, before anything is "reached"; and so on. The journey is not a journey from the ringing-in to the last god; rather, it is a journey to the realisation that in each *Fügung* only the same has been said, and indeed to the realisation that even within each *Fügung*, only the same has been said in different ways; and with this realisation the consciousness of what is meant by *Ereignis*, as the site of the fugue, is developed. What is said in (a) the "concept" *Ereignis* (word level), (b) the "principles" and "sub-theses" of BP (sentence level), (c) the *Fügungen* (fugue-parts), (d) the whole book, comes to the "same". Does this mean that BP is one great tautology, in the pejorative sense, sterile and meaningless? The response to this is to say that the reader should look less for the result (the "same") and more for the achievement of this result: it is the coming to the same that is the contribution to philosophy of BP. Phenomenology strives to see things as they are for themselves - that is, as nothing other than the same - and is thus a disas-sembling of the semblances of metaphysics. In BP this disas-sembly is the coming to the same effected by a macro-structural convergence of narrative parallels.

To the extent that fugue provides a foundational structure, it can be compared instructively to the rhizomatic foundationalism of Deleuze and Guattari.²³ In his 1989 dissertation on Heidegger's early ontology, Purcell suggested the account of Deleuze and Guattari as an

²² BP, p.7.

²³ e.g. G.Deleuze & F.Guattari, *Rhizome* (Paris: Minuit, 1976).

advance and improvement on Heidegger.²⁴ Rhizomatic foundationalism basically substitutes the traditional single arboreal structure of metaphysics for a plurality of horizontally iterating, interconnecting, mutually originating but autonomous mini-tree structures. Criticism of the rhizome account, as an ontology, would focus on its failure to change the idiom of the tradition; this failure reduces it to a minor qualification of arboreal philosophy, a reordering or reshuffling of the same categorial stock. Rhizomes may be exciting as regards their superficial logical properties, but they involve no deep-syntactic change. They operate entirely within a logical space governed by Kant's amphibolies;²⁵ Heidegger questions this government. The Heideggerian fugue seems to comprise all the virtues of the rhizome, while liberating itself rather more successfully from the vices of arboreal philosophy (i.e. its deep-structural origins).

b) Kehre

Fugue-structure, then, is a saying of the "same"; but the nature of this "same" is a problem, not least because it is a highly contradictory same; it is a same that thrives on tension, on the unresolved problematic of conflicts, a problematic from which BP takes its life as a contribution to philosophy. The pre-figure of all these conflicts is the *Kehre*.²⁶ Thus *Kehre* is anything but separate from fugue.

The so-called *Kehre* is an enormous topic in secondary literature, and despite this it remains deeply misunderstood. For decades even Heidegger's ridiculing of the critics' misinterpretations failed to stir this most entrenched of errors.²⁷ Much which needs to be said to correct the misinterpretation has been set down in two excellent and condensed

²⁴ J.Purcell, *Heidegger's Early Ontology: Rethinking the Ground* (dissertation, Purdue University, 1989).

²⁵ *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, B316-324 (matter-form, inner-outer, identity-difference, agreement-opposition).

²⁶ Lit.: a sharp bend; left untranslated except in quotations. In quotations I have avoided the traditional "turn" and "reversal", and used "version" (in an etymologically primitive sense of turning), as this allows the links between the morphological variations of the *-kehr-* root to be translated as well; and leaves "turn" for the word *Wende* (which it more accurately translates).

²⁷ Letter to Richardson, p.XIX.

articles by Ryiochi Hosokawa (1989) and Jean Grondin (1990).²⁸ A summary could not do justice to these articles or substitute reading them. The basic idea is that the *Kehre* is NOT a turn or reversal which applies to Heidegger's philosophical biography, marking a change in his thinking; rather, it is a philosopheme, a keyword of his thought. As such (Grondin says), "loin de la scinder, la *Kehre* pourrait ainsi nous habiliter à reconquérir l'unité de la pensée heideggérienne".²⁹ As a philosopheme, the *Kehre* is a virtual or non-abstractable pattern which iterates through a number of guises on different scales in Heidegger's thinking (i.e. what I call a paratype). It has an intellectual elusiveness which defies an adequate or satisfactory account. Like *Ereignis*, it names the locus within which Heidegger's always strives to move, but within which it moves rather more confidently and self-consciously in BP than in SZ.

The *Kehre* is perhaps the nearest Heidegger comes at this stage of his philosophy to an elaboration of being itself:

"In der Kehre des Ereignisses ist die Wesung der Wahrheit zumal die Wahrheit der Wesung. Und diese Widerwendigkeit selbst gehört zum Seyn als solchem." ³⁰

"In the version of the event the essencing of truth is at the same time the truth of essencing. And this contra-turning itself belongs to being as such."

The chiasmatic structure of the first sentence is only one of the many non-assimilable versions in which the *Kehre* appears.³¹ The following text emphasizes the relation of the *Kehre* to being even more strongly.

²⁸ R.Hosokawa, "Heidegger und das problem der Kehre", in *Studies in Philosophy*, no.5 (1989). (This periodical is a bulletin of the Faculty of Literature, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan). J.Grondin, "Prolégomènes à l'intelligence du tournant chez Heidegger", in *Les Etudes philosophiques* 3 (1990), pp.333-352. *Inter alia*, these articles discuss and account for the famous Heidegger passages on the *Kehre*.

²⁹ J.Grondin, op.cit., p.343. Tr.: "Far from dividing it, the *Kehre* can thus enable us to reconquer the unity of Heidegger's thought."

³⁰ BP, p.258.

³¹ The chiasmus or *Kehre* is not a "dialectical game", as Heidegger comments in a similar passage on p.95.

"Die Er-eignung in ihrer Kehre ist weder im Zuruf, noch in der Zugehörigkeit allein beschlossen, in keinem von beiden und doch beides er-schwingend, und das Erzittern dieser Er-schwingung in der Kehre des Ereignisses ist das verborgenste Wesen des Seyns." ³²

"The e-venting in its version is summed up, neither in the acclamation alone, nor in the belonging alone, [swinging/attainable³³] in neither of these and yet in both; and the trembling of the [swing/attainment] in the version of the event is the most hidden essence of being."

In this passage another version of the *Kehre* is seen in the bipolar opposition of *Zuruf* and *Zugehörigkeit*: the *Kehre* is (n)either in one, (n)or in the other, and certainly no tertium quid. A relation of *Er-schwingen* names the presence of the *Kehre* in the opposition - a relation which is similar to that of the *Ineinanderschwingen* of the *Fügungen* (and of the ecstases of temporality in the 1920's).

The *Kehre* is a primitive figure present in the *Ereignis*,³⁴ prefigurative for the structure of a number of conceivably quite different philosophical problems: the interrelation of bipolar oppositions, pre-propositional structure, the nature of truth, the problem of foundations, the difficulty of escaping one's philosophical heritage in pursuit of a new beginning, the hermeneutic circle.... In this description of the *Kehre*, it is important to emphasize its prefigurativeness for (philosophical) problems - for the unresolved, for the situation of still not having come to terms with conflicts and tensions. Moreover, as such a prefigure, Heidegger described the *Kehre* as a ground:

³² BP, p.342

³³ "Er-schwingen" is an untranslatable play between (a) "erschwinglich", meaning attainable or affordable, and (b) "schwingen" (to swing), which has already commonly been used to express the interrelation of certain concepts.

³⁴ The phrases "die Kehre im Ereignis" or "die Kehre des Ereignisses" are highly characteristic of the thought of BP; see e.g. pp.31f, 34, 82, 185, 231, 258, 267, 311, 320, 342, 351, 372, 407ff.

"Das Ereignis hat sein innerstes Geschehen und seinen weitesten Ausgriff in der Kehre. Die im Ereignis wesende Kehre ist der verborgene Grund aller anderen, nachgeordneten, in ihrer Herkunft dunkel, ungefragt bleibenden, gern an sich als »Letztes« genommenen Kehren, Zirkel und Kreise (vgl. z.B. die Kehre im Leitfragengefüge; den Zirkel im Ver-stehen)."
35

"The event has its innermost happening and its furthestmost purview in the version. The version essencing in the event is the hidden ground of all those other subordinate versions, circles and rings whose origins are dark and which remain unquestioned and gaily accepted in themselves as 'ultimate' (cf. e.g. the version in the fugue of the leading question; the circle in the understanding)."

Heidegger never says that the *Kehre* is universal as pre-figurative for thinking; on the other hand, it does in fact pre-figure every pattern to be found in his thinking at this stage. Some examples follow.

While discussing the question "who are we?" (the same question addressed in SZ §§25-27), Heidegger comments:

"Sogleich wird deutlich: die Art wie in der Frage das Befragte angesetzt wird: »wir«, enthält schon eine Entscheidung über das Wer. Das will sagen: wir können nicht, unberührt durch die Wer-frage, das »wir« und »uns« ansetzen gleichsam als ein Vorhandenes, dem nur noch die Bestimmung des Wer abgeht. Auch in dieser Frage liegt ein Widerschein der Kehre. Sie ist nicht geradezu weder zu stellen noch zu beantworten."³⁶

"This at once comes clear: the way in which the questionee is situated in the question ('we') already contains a decision about the Who. That means to say: we cannot, unaffected by the who-question, situate 'we' and 'us' just as if they were things present-at-hand lacking no more than the determination of who they are. In this question too there is a reappearance of the version. The question cannot be formulated directly, neither can it be answered directly."

Thus at the heart of the general philosophical problem of personal identity, Heidegger argues that there is a *Kehre*-figure. From SZ, it might be thought that Heidegger takes an approach similar to Ryle's category-mistake tactic.³⁷ However Heidegger is beyond saying simply that the question grammatically connects concepts which "should" not be connected in this way: the first person ('I', 'we') can be situated in the who-question; but not as if it was a thing present-at-hand. Situating the first person in the who-question (a legitimate

³⁵ BP, p.407; further example of the *Kehre* as pre-figure of the structure of understanding - p.259: "Im Verstehen als geworfenen Entwurf liegt notwendig gemäß dem Ursprung des Daseins die Kehre." "In the understanding as thrown projection necessarily lies, according to the origin of Dasein, the version."

³⁶ BP, pp.48-49

³⁷ There is more than a mere possibility that Ryle got his idea from Heidegger - see M.Murray. "Heidegger and Ryle: Two Versions of Phenomenology", in M.Murray ed. *Heidegger and Modern Philosophy* (Yale University Press, 1978), pp.271-290.

move, not a mistake) will only get questioners towards their goal if they first respect the grammatical peculiarity of such a question. Respecting the grammatical peculiarity of the question means: to recognise that the question has a different deep-structure to that which it normally has, i.e. to recognise the *Kehre* as the heart of the problem. To note the circularity, and, believing this circularity to be the ultimate problem and defeat of the question "who am I?", to give up, is to fail to go deep enough. To put this another way, *Kehre* is a metagrammatical form of thinking (paratype), which, if it could be grasped, bypasses the category-mistake objection and permits the question (but not in the "direct" categorial sense, not according to the surface-structure).

To turn to the next example, one of the standard characteristics of Heidegger's style is the juxtaposition of opposites (particularly prepositional pairs such as in/out and near/far) in a way falling short of outright contradiction. In the following passage we see such juxtaposition used to describe the phenomenon of death.

"Der Tod ist als das Äußerste des Da zugleich das Innerste seiner möglichen völligen Verwandlung. Und darin liegt zugleich ein Hinweis in das tiefste Wesen des Nichts.... Was hier als eigenste Verborgenheit in das Da hereinsteht, der Wechselbezug des Da zu dem ihm zugekehrten Weg, ist der Widerschein der Kehre im Wesen des Seins selbst." ³⁸

"Death is, as the outermost of the there, at the same time the innermost of its possible complete transformation. And in this there lies at the same time a pointer to the deepest essence of the nothing.... Here what, as ownmost hiddenness, stands into the there, the interrelation of the there to the away³⁹ which has returned to it, is the reappearance of the version in the essence of being itself."

The play on death as both innermost and outermost has already been one of the key tactics in the SZ exposition of death. Here Heidegger adds something to the interpretation of this juxtaposition: namely, that the clash provides a pointer to the essence of the nothing. That to which the clash points is the *Kehre*. In saying this, Heidegger offers a further description of the juxtaposition of inner and outer: namely the pattern of a return from being away. This return from being away should probably be interpreted as

³⁸ BP, p.325.

³⁹ "Away" is a deliberately unusual translation; "der Weg" normally means "the way", but the particle "weg" means "away"; on pp.323-5 of BP, where the quoted passage occurs, the noun "Weg" is used in a special sense - which Heidegger tells us is a more original formulation of the SZ concept "Uneigentlichkeit" (inauthenticity); the context of these passages suggests that the translation "the away" best captures the special sense meant.

inauthenticity's immanent (but hidden) potential for a "way back" to authenticity.⁴⁰ The play between the innermost and outermost of death's significance is a play between (what in SZ was known as) authentic and inauthentic self-understanding. In both SZ and BP, mortality is a phenomenon which can be used to effect a *transition between...* (kinds of understanding). It is this "transition between..." that is the *Kehre*. The avoidance of acknowledging the horror of mortality is an origin for misinterpretations of human existence, that is, for metaphysical semblances which Heidegger strives to disassemble. There is another play in this passage which should be noted in passing: the *Kehre* is announced first as something pertaining to the essence of the nothing; then later in the passage as pertaining to the essence of being. This "contradiction" is another quite deliberate version of the *Kehre*.

In SZ, in the discussion of the hermeneutic circle, Heidegger said that the "circular" structure of understanding reflected the structure of *Dasein*; likewise he was distinctly circumspect about "circularity" as a good model, maintaining it within "...". In BP the *Kehre* names this "circular" structure of *Dasein*:

"Das Dasein hat den Ursprung im Ereignis und dessen Kehre."⁴¹

"The Dasein has its origin in the event and its version."

Or again:

"Da-sein ist das Geschehnis der Erklüftung der Wendungsmitte der Kehre des Ereignisses.... Das Da-sein ist der Wendungspunkt in der Kehre des Ereignisses, die sich öffnende Mitte des Widerspiels von Zuruf und Zugehörigkeit...."⁴²

"Da-sein is the happening of the cleaving⁴³ of the turning-middle of the version of the event.... The Da-sein is the turning-point in the version of the event, the self-opening middle of the counter-play of acclamation and belonging...."

In this there was an accumulation of the ideas of: turning, middle, self-opening, happening, cleaving, counter-play, and *Zuruf* versus *Zugehörigkeit*. The *Kehre* is not only

⁴⁰ See previous footnote.

⁴¹ BP, pp.31f.

⁴² BP, p.311.

⁴³ "Er-klüftung" is a neologism which adds the nuance that the cleaving involves an achievement rather than a loss; the association with the "Er-" prefix of "Er-ignis" should also be noted.

a turning and a middle, but an opening and a cleaving: the *Kehre* is not like a bend in a road, where one moves from one end to the other; rather its directions of coming and going split open the line into a move between identity and difference. In the following, not dissimilar text, are added ideas of truth (grounded truth), illumination and concealing.

"Die Wahrheit des Seyns ist nichts geringeres als das Wesen der Wahrheit, begriffen und gegründet als lichtende Verbergung, das Geschehnis des Daseins, des Wendungspunktes in der Kehre als sich öffnende Mitte." ⁴⁴

"The truth of being is no less than the essence of truth, conceived and grounded as illuminating concealment, the happening of the Dasein, of the turning-point in the version as self-opening middle."

The *Kehre*, as opening middle, is both illumination and concealment, and as such contains the essence of truth. In the following passage the illuminating concealment is developed into a similarly counter-playing association of swinging and counter-swinging.

"Die Lichtung für die Verbergung ist schon die Schwingung des Gegenschwunges der Kehre des Ereignisses." ⁴⁵

"The illumination for the concealment is already the swinging of the counter-swing of the version of the event."

This swinging idea was met earlier as describing the manner in which oppositional pairs were held together in the two parts of the *Kehre*. The way in which the *Kehre* is foundational for dichotomies is probably its most important feature in BP, and it is to this feature the analysis now turns. ⁴⁶

In BP the *Ereignis* is depicted by means of a number of two-part expressions, the two parts of which are in tension with one another. Each of these bi-polar tensions names the *Kehre* in the *Ereignis*. The most important dichotomous tensions in BP include: (1) a first beginning of thought - an other beginning of thinking;⁴⁷ (2) *Zeit* - *Raum*;⁴⁸ (3) *Welt* -

⁴⁴ BP, p.189.

⁴⁵ BP, p.351.

⁴⁶ Cf. Derrida's engagement with metaphysical dichotomy in "La Pharmacie de Platon" (in *La Dissémination*, Paris: Seuil, 1972). Would Derrida sell a product like *Kehre* in his own pharmacy (along with *différance*, *pharmakon*, et al.)?

⁴⁷ BP, passim, esp.pp.169-224.

⁴⁸ time - space; BP, passim, esp.pp.371-388.

Erde;⁴⁹ (4) *Götter - Menschen*;⁵⁰ (5) *Grund - Abgrund*;⁵¹ (6) *Lichtung - Verbergung*;⁵² (7) *Entrückung - Berückung*;⁵³ (8) *Ankunft - Flucht*;⁵⁴ (9) *Anfall - Ausbleib*;⁵⁵ (10) *Nähe - Ferne*;⁵⁶ (11) *Ermittlung - Vermittlung*;⁵⁷ (12) *Sein - Seiendes*;⁵⁸ (13) *Sein - Nichtsein*;⁵⁹ (14) *Entweder - Oder*;⁶⁰ (15) *Zuruf - Zugehörigkeit*;⁶¹ (16) *schaffend - opfernd*;⁶² (17) *Entzug - Schenkung*.⁶³ In many cases, there are words describing the site or middle of these pairs: *Übergang, Streit, Spiel, Zuspiel, Mitte, Dasein, Wahrheit, Seyn, Entscheidung...* (transition, struggle, play, play-off, middle, *Dasein*, truth, being, decision...).

A number of comments need to be made with respect to this. Tension may be internal to the pairs - i.e. they contain contradictions⁶⁴ (for example: illuminating-concealing, creating-sacrificing) or the tension may be imposed by Heidegger (e.g. the pairs world-earth and gods-men are not obviously in any kind of tension, but Heidegger continually refers to these pairs in respect of the struggle (*Streit*) between them). Further, some of the pairs have a relation of the kind earlier described as "dialectic" (e.g. arrival-flight, onset-

⁴⁹ world - earth; BP, passim, e.g. pp.96, 322, 408; esp. p.310.

⁵⁰ gods - human beings; e.g. BP, pp.87, 413; esp. p.310.

⁵¹ ground - abyss; BP, passim, esp. pp.371-388.

⁵² illuminating - concealing; BP, passim, e.g. pp.70, 236, 322, 389.

⁵³ carrying-away-in-thought - applying-thought-in-a-considered-manner; e.g. BP, pp.70, 236.

⁵⁴ arrival - flight; e.g. BP, pp.31f., 406, 408.

⁵⁵ onset - abeyance; e.g. BP, pp.235, 408.

⁵⁶ proximity - distance; e.g. BP, p.91.

⁵⁷ facilitation - mediation; e.g. BP, p.73.

⁵⁸ being - entity (i.e. the ontological difference); e.g. BP, pp.13f., 343.

⁵⁹ being - non-being; e.g. BP, p.102.

⁶⁰ either - or; e.g. BP, p.102.

⁶¹ calling-to - belonging; e.g. BP, pp.311, 407.

⁶² creating - sacrificing; e.g. BP, p.236.

⁶³ BP, p.293.

⁶⁴ Thus the *Kehre* names a "solution" to the considerations of pt.A, ch.2.

abeyance),⁶⁵ or as metaleptic (e.g. near-far). Moving to a different point, the pairs should not be thought of categorically - reified and separable; nor as aspects, nor as dialectical in the Hegelian sense of creating some third thing, nor as neutralisations. They are quasi-simultaneous; their conjunction is intended to be harsh and problematic. Moreover, it would be a mistake to suppose that the opposition of, for example, *Welt* and *Erde* makes them different from the *Streit* which reigns between them. One of the means by which Heidegger avoids this is that a number of terms may be used both as the pole of a dimension, and as the site held open by these dimensions (*Lichtung* and *Seyn* are good examples). The "poles" of the dimensions of the *Kehre* cannot be thought of on the analogy of two fixed banks spanned by a bridge. In the analogy the banks are primary and the bridge secondary, dependent; in Heidegger's thinking it is if anything the opposite.⁶⁶ Finally, in SZ, to a large extent the key figures (which were triadic and quadratic) were mappable, due to relations of mutual derivation.⁶⁷ In BP every bi-polar figure is a manifestation of the *Kehre*, otherwise there is little mapping or interrelation of the figures, although one may say that in most cases the dichotomies open the same site (*Ereignis*). The *Kehre* is multi-dimensionally dichotomous.

Perhaps the most dominant dichotomy of BP is the first mentioned - that between the first beginning and other beginning of thought - a transition within which BP attempts to remain, without resolving the play-off between the two sides. One possible interpretation of this dichotomy is the possibility of escaping metaphysics for a thought that is other than metaphysics. Obviously it is problematic whether such a thing is indeed possible. What is found in BP is not an attempt to enact such a transition, or to show its possibility; rather, there is another example here (the earlier examples were those of the hermeneutic circle and transcendence)⁶⁸ of the revaluation of the problematic as the fundamental. The possibility of the escape from metaphysics is problematic, and its problem-character or questionworthiness is virtually hypostatized as a new foundation, or if not a foundation, at least as a philosopheme. One may hazard a guess that something similar occurs with the dichotomy of *Grund-Abgrund*: whether or not philosophy can find a foundation is

⁶⁵ See pt. A, ch. 4.

⁶⁶ See pt. A, ch. 4.

⁶⁷ See pt. A, ch. 3.

problematic, and this problematic becomes a philosopheme in the *kehrige* (versive) relation of *Grund* and *Abgrund*.

One may generalise these particular cases to an account of the *Kehre* in general as an ultimate structure of philosophical thought. One of the main problems of philosophy concerns the "limits" of thinking or knowledge. While it is clear that thinking and knowing have their "limits", it seems that we can only apply the word "limit" to this phenomenon in a qualified or metaphorical sense; because to apply the word "limit" in its full meaning might suggest, contradictorily, that we had somehow "thought" or "known" something about the "other" side. Further, it is doubtful whether any new word or concept would be adequate to discussing such "limits". Generally, the problem of thinking about the region, or within the region, of the limits of thinking, poses the circular problem of how to avoid presuming anything about the unthinkable (i.e. what cannot be thought). In this problem can be seen the figures of circularity, presuming, and the interplay of positive and negative. The tactic of reevaluating the problematic as the fundamental, when faced with a circle, dilemma or other impasse to thinking, consists in not standing off, in refusing to separate out (i) the impasse and (ii) the path of questioning, as if the thinker had somehow been wandering down a path and met an obstacle which came from outside. Rather, it consists in seeing the impasse as belonging essentially to the question which met it. Seeing the impasse in this way means: the nature or structure of the impasse will therefore give an indication of the nature or structure of what it was one was trying to understand in the first place. Instead of trying to get past the impasse and continue as if down a path, the thinker turns the impasse into the new path. To recapitulate: the problem of thinking about the region, or within the region, of the limits of thinking, poses the circular problem of how to avoid presuming anything about the unthinkable; thus the nature of that which one was trying to understand (the "limits" of thinking) is reflected in the nature of the impasse that this gives to thinking: namely, a kind of circularity - the *Kehre*. As a kind of circularity, the *Kehre* at the limits of thinking may be determined further. In trying to reach the "limits" of thinking, thinkers finds themselves metaleptically thrown instead into the "centre". This invertive or reversing phenomenon can be reexpressed with other opposites (e.g. first and last, near and far). On the whole, one

⁶⁸ See pt.A, ch.4, section 2 and pt.B, ch.1, section 1b.

should not be surprised to find that the space of thinking does not obey the same structural rules as natural space.

2) Does the term *Abgrund* signify a nihilistic anti-foundationalism?

The purpose of the previous section was to set the context for the use of the term *Abgrund* (abyss⁶⁹) in Heidegger's thought. BP contains very much more material on ground and foundations; the approach taken here is strictly selective. The choice of *Abgrund* is made, since this term is most open to misunderstanding. Although the word *Abgrund* does not really come into its own until after the 1920's, it is already significantly impending within the SZ project:

<p>"Der Grund ist ein existenzialer, d.h. ein erschlossener Grund - und zwar ein Abgrund."⁷⁰</p>	<p>"The ground is an existential one, i.e. a disclosed ground - and for that matter an abyss."</p>
---	--

Writing of the openness of being in BP, David Krell says that "although it receives the name *Gründung*... the way in which being 'founds' Da-sein in any given epoch really has to do with the abyss or the radical absence of grounds."⁷¹ Perhaps the crucial word here is "really": Krell privileges *Abgrund* (abyss) over *Grund*. Vattimo similarly finds that ground is abandoned for a leap into the *Abgrund*.⁷² Such interpretations are not faithful to what Heidegger writes. As Daniel Panis remarks, "l'originalité de cette interprétation... ne conduit pas simplement à l'identification de l'être et du sans-fond [*Abgrund*], mais plus subtilement à l'identification de l'être et du fondement sans fond. L'être n'est pas

⁶⁹ Lit: down-ground. It is not a pure negative of *Grund* - for this Heidegger uses the words *grundlos* and *Ungrund*. Pure absence of ground is something from which Heidegger maintains a distance, regarding it as the hidden truth behind an unreconstructed conception of ground. *Abgrund* has a greater emotive impact, as the loss of ground, its falling away - evocative of a fear of falling oneself, and of the desire to clutch to something firm to save oneself.

⁷⁰ GA20, p.402; own translation; reference owed to R.Regvald, *Heidegger et le problème du néant*. Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1987; see also SZ, p.152.

⁷¹ D.Krell, op.cit., p.107.

⁷² e.g. G.Vattimo, *La Fine della Modernità*, p.37.

simplement abîme, il est fond abyssal."⁷³ Panis correctly notes that occurrences of *Abgrund* are always associated with occurrences of *Grund*, such that no privileging occurs, and that the two are held together in a heterogeneous unity. The French translation of *Abgrund* as "sans fond" leads to his interpretation of this heterogeneous unity: namely, that the ultimate ground has no further ground - not even itself; thus it is not even self-grounding.⁷⁴ This falls rather short of the full impact of *Abgrund* in Heidegger's thought. Perhaps the best available assessment of *Abgrund* is that of Richard Regvald.⁷⁵ Working without access to BP, he remarks: "le sans-fond ne s'oppose pas au fondement à la façon d'une entité négative, mais ouvre les voies de la différence."⁷⁶

Why should the view of Panis and Regvald be generally preferred to that of (e.g.) Vattimo? Might it be the case that the increased use of 'nihilistic' concepts after the SZ project, particularly of the word *Abgrund*, show that Heidegger is 'abandoning' fundamental ontology, recognising that its reliance upon ground-concepts tied it inextricably to metaphysics? Such would be a shallow misinterpretation. Yet a better interpretation is hard even to approach. In BP Heidegger writes the following about *Abgrund* in the development of his thought. Here he is discussing the "changes" between SZ and BP, "changes" which he himself puts in inverted commas, warning the reader to beware of applying such a concept to the SZ-BP relation.

"Die »Änderungen« entspringen der wachsenden Abgründigkeit der Seynsfrage selbst...."⁷⁷

"The 'changes' spring from the growing abyssalness of the question of being itself...."

How might this be interpreted? In the passage, Heidegger shifts the responsibility for the changes away from himself and onto the *Seynsfrage*. This shift of responsibility echoes

⁷³ D.Panis, "Heidegger et la question du fondement", p.11. Tr.: "The originality of this interpretation... does not simply lead to an identification of being and abyss, but more subtly to the identification of being and the abyssal ground. Being is not simply abyss, it is abyssal ground." (Panis' emphasis).

⁷⁴ D.Panis, op.cit., p.6.

⁷⁵ R.Regvald, op.cit., pp.93, 116-119, 122.

⁷⁶ ibid., p.122. Tr.: "The abyss does not oppose ground in the manner of a negative entity, rather it opens the paths of difference."

⁷⁷ BP, p.85

Heidegger's remark that BP was written not "about" but "from" the *Ereignis*. How should we interpret the time-structure of the present participle "wachsend" (growing)? Was the *Seinsfrage* growing in its abyssalness year by year, so that in 1936 it was more abyssal than in 1926? Perhaps there is a reference here to the developments in Heidegger's immediate environment - i.e. to the rise of Nazism in these 10 years. Or, more likely, Heidegger perceived Nazism as symptomatic of the entire abyssalness of the Western mood. Alternatively, instead of a human-historical interpretation of the time-structure, one could take a textual interpretation: the *Seinsfrage* is in its essence not static, but dynamic - the questioning of being ("questioning" now a present participle too) is a growing. To put this another way, as the question of being follows its natural progress, the conception of the *Abgrund* must come to the fore. The passage just quoted witnesses the importance of the conception of the *Abgrund* in BP; it could be well misused to promote the view that BP is indeed a turn away from metaphysics into Vattimo-esque post-modernist nihilism.

The problem here is this: can it be said that *Abgrund* is introduced into Heidegger's thinking to replace *Grund*, marking a turn away from the metaphysically tainted SZ project towards something else (e.g. post-modernist nihilism)? Such an interpretation rests on the standard misunderstanding of the *Kehre*, and a misreading of how Heidegger actually uses the term *Abgrund*.

The interpretation can be countered fairly easily: while the use of *Abgrund* in BP may be striking and invite overemphasis, it could never seriously be taken as a replacement for *Grund* and other (positive) ground-words. Both a qualitative and statistical comparison must conclude that *Abgrund* is more a footnote or qualification to *Grund* than vice versa. Statistically, BP not only positively reappropriates the large range of grounding expressions found in the SZ project and employs them with a similar frequency, but in fact BP shows a significant expansion of the variety of expressions (neologisms, morphological variations, compounds) associated with grounding. BP is, foundationally speaking, outrageously creative. Further, in most cases of the incidence of *Abgrund* (or a morphological variation⁷⁸) there is a paradoxical or quasi-paradoxical conjunction with

⁷⁸ The morphological variations found in BP are: *abgründig*, *Abgründigkeit*, *Abgründung*, *abgründlich*, *abgründigerweise*, *abgründigst*; all of which frequently occur with the "ab-" prefix separated by a hyphen.

Grund (or a morphological variation). From this it can be taken that the central problem is not the possible existence of *Abgrund* as a replacement of *Grund*; rather the central problem is the clash and tension deliberately maintained between *Grund* and *Abgrund*. The following passages provide some examples of these conjunctions of *Grund* and *Abgrund*.

"Die Fragenden haben alle Neugier abgelegt; ihr Suchen liebt den Abgrund, in dem sie den ältesten Grund wissen."⁷⁹

"The questioners have abandoned all curiosity; their searching cherishes the abyss, in which they know the most ancient ground."

"Der Grund gründet als *Ab-grund*."⁸⁰

"Ground grounds as *abyss*."

"Der gegründete Grund ist zugleich Abgrund für die Zerklüftung des Seyns und Ungrund für die Seinsverlassenheit des Seienden."⁸¹

"Grounded ground is at the same time abyss for the sundering of being and un-ground for the entity's desolation of being."

"Abgründig gegründet ist in das Ereignis das Da-sein und somit der Mensch, wenn ihm der Einsprung in schaffender Gründung gelingt."⁸²

"The Da-sein is abyssally grounded in the event, and with this likewise man, when he manages the leap-in into creative grounding."

The passages in which *Abgrund* and *Grund* are conjoined do not allow any priority to be given to one or the other; the concepts are treated as correlative, as co-equal. How can the "paradox" of the "abyssal ground" be resolved? Is it indeed a proper paradox? Heidegger's concern to show the non-negativity of *Abgrund* suggests that "paradox" is the wrong way to think about what is going on here. Heidegger's primary aim is to set in motion an interplay, to revive a tension; not to tinker with logic.

"Allein, der Ab-grund ist als Wesung des Grundes kein bloßes Sichversagen als einfacher Rückzug und Weggang. Der *Ab-grund* ist *Ab-grund*."⁸³

"Alone the abyss [lit. down-ground] is, as essencing of ground, no mere self-denial as simple retreat and departure. The *down-ground* is *down-ground*."

⁷⁹ BP, p.13; *Neugier* (curiosity) refers back to the SZ project (e.g. SZ§36) in which it exemplified a way of falling. Curiosity was an inadequate attitude for the venturing of the question of being.

⁸⁰ BP, p.29.

⁸¹ BP, p.33.

⁸² BP, p.280. Further evidence: pp.286, 352, 375 (occurrences of the frequent phrase "abgründiger Grund"); also pp.256, 304, 317, 346, 350, 381, 383, 384, 386, 411, 430, 490, 500.

⁸³ BP, p.379; cf. also for the non-negativity of *Abgrund* pp.380 & 382.

Heidegger's hyphenisation and emphasis in the last sentence, whether or not faithful to a German speaker's linguistic intuitions, are probably intended to show that a "positive" element is internal to the concept of *Abgrund*; the reader is invited to think of *Abgrund* as a kind of modification of ground, rather than as its sheer denial. The following passage not only militates against a negative appreciation of *Abgrund*, but presents some of the more positive characteristics as well.

"Das Offene des Ab-grundes ist nicht grundlos. Abgrund ist nicht das Nein zu jedem Grund wie Grundlosigkeit, sondern das Ja zum Grund in seiner verborgenen Weite und Ferne. Der Abgrund ist so die in sich zeitigend-räumend-gegenschwingende Augenblicksstätte des »Zwischen«, als welches das Da-sein gegründet sein muß. Der Ab-grund ist so wenig »negativ« wie die zögernde *Versagung*; beides zwar, unmittelbar (»logisch«) gemeint, enthält ein »nein«, und gleichwohl ist die zögernde *Versagung* das erste und höchste Aufleuchten des Winkes. Ursprünglicher begriffen west in ihr freilich ein »Nicht«. Aber es ist das ursprüngliche Nicht, das zum Seyn selbst und somit zum Ereignis gehört." ⁸⁴

"The open of abyss is not groundless. Abyss is not the No to every ground as groundlessness, rather the Yes to ground in its hidden width and distance. Abyss is the momentary site of the `between', temporo-spatially counter-swinging into itself, as which the Da-sein must be grounded. Abyss is as little `negative' as hesitating *refusal*; ⁸⁵ both indeed, taken immediately (`logically'), contain a `no', and yet hesitating refusal is the first and highest illumination of the gesture. ⁸⁶ Primordially conceived, of course there essences a `not' in hesitating refusal. But it is the primordial not, which belongs to being itself and thus to the event."

Another significant non-negative characterisation of *Abgrund* is the description of *Abgrund* as freedom. ⁸⁷ This evokes, among other passages, the work on ground and freedom in §§11-14 of MAL, where the origin of ground was found to reside in freedom. ⁸⁸ How can the link between *der abgründige Grund* and freedom be explained? So-called "negative freedom" consists in an absence of constraints, whereas "positive freedom" is the capacity for self-creation. Positive and negative freedom do not ^{generally} find a place in Heidegger's writings as such, ^{88a} but the issues of absence of constraint (whether in thinking or acting) and the capacity for self-creation do find a place. Heidegger deals with issues such as the constraint of the inescapable historical determination of our thinking, the absence of constraint in the loss of traditional "grounds" (e.g. the "death of god"), the necessity of refounding man's self-understanding in the face of these absences and constraints. Such

⁸⁴ BP, p.387f.

⁸⁵ "Zögernde *Versagung*" (hesitating refusal) is a term of art in BP.

⁸⁶ "Wink" (gesture, signal) is likewise a term of art.

⁸⁷ BP, p.438.

^{88a} They do in fact find a place in GA31, Vom Wesen der menschlichen

issues have the same form as the issue of the nature of freedom - Heidegger would probably say the same origin. Thus the complex, conflicting issues present in the problem of freedom provide a model for the kind of tension found in the notion of the abyssal ground.

This non-negative maintenance of the *Abgrund* in strict conflictual proximity to *Grund* can ultimately only be explained by reference to the *Kehre*. As was seen, the *Kehre* is a virtual pre-figure subsisting in a multi-dimensionality of dichotomies. As such the *Kehre* created no tertium quid and no neutralisation; rather it reflected the irresolvably conflictual and heterogeneous character of the origin, of being. There is no metalanguage of the *Kehre*: the language in which the *Kehre* is described (e.g. as foundational, as ground, for the problems of the hermeneutic circle and transcendence) is subject to the *Kehre*, and for this reason the foundational is subjected to a certain versiveness, is maintained in conflict with the *Abgrund*. The abyssal ground names a dimension of the *Kehre* as a philosopheme. The subsequent analyses of this section turn to the relation between the abyssal ground and two other dimensions of the *Kehre*, namely: (a) illuminating concealment (i.e. the essencing of truth), and (b) time-space.

* * * * *

What can be learnt from the association of illuminating concealment and abyssal ground about the nature of *Abgrund*?

"Der Ab-grund ist die erstwesentliche lichtende Verbergung, die Wesung der Wahrheit."⁸⁹

"The abyss is the first-essential illuminating concealment, the essencing of truth."

Selective quotation might suggest that truth is primarily abyssal in BP; however the association of *Abgrund* with *Wahrheit* does not provide an instance in which *Grund* and *Abgrund* can be disentangled. The following passages balance the previous ones:

⁸⁸ e.g. MAL, p.282

⁸⁹ BP, p.380.

"Ein ursprünglicher Wesensbezug zwischen Grund und Wahrheit besteht, aber Wahrheit begriffen als *lichtende Verbergung*." ⁹⁰

"There is a primordial essential relation between ground and truth, but truth conceived as illuminating concealment."

"Der Grund ist das Wesen der Wahrheit." ⁹¹

"Ground is the essence of truth."

These apparently conflicting assessments of the nature of truth actually sometimes occur juxtaposed, in the same sentences:

"Das Seyn: das Ereignis, im Gegenschwung nichthaft und so strittig. Der Ursprung des Streitiges - Seyn oder Nichtsein. Die Wahrheit: Grund als Abgrund." ⁹²

"Being: the event, nothing-like in the counterswing and thus conflictual. The origin of the conflict - to be or not to be. Truth: ground as abyss."

In this text, the sentence "Die Wahrheit: Grund als Abgrund" should probably be understood on the basis of the previous sentences, as structurally isomorphic to the counterswinging conflict between being and non-being. In one of the earlier passages, truth was described as *lichtende Verbergung* (illuminating concealment), a conflict-dimension pre-figured by the *Kehre*. Truth analysed in terms of *Grund* and *Abgrund* carries the same irresolvable tension. *Abgründiger Grund; lichtende Verbergung*: what might these two non-assimilable but structurally isomorphic manifestations of the *Kehre* character of truth be? The *lichtende Verbergung* theme plays on the disclosive character of truth, drawing on Heidegger's well-known analyses of the Greek word *aletheia* (truth not only draws attention to something, but in so doing draws attention away from something else; all language, as interpretation, hides at the same time as it shows). The *abgründige Grund* theme plays on a superficially different but ultimately similar character of truth; this is expressed most clearly in the following passage:

⁹⁰ BP, p.308.

⁹¹ BP, p.379.

⁹² BP, p.346; further examples on pp.375 & 386.

"Wahrheit ist uns nicht das Festgemachte.... aber auch nicht das bloße Gegenteil.... Sie ist die abgründige Mitte, die erzittert im Vorbeigang des Gottes und so der ausgestandene Grund ist für die Gründung des schaffenden Da-seins." ⁹³

"For us truth is not the firmly secured.... but neither is it the sheer opposite.... Truth is the abyssal middle, which trembles in the passage of the god and is thus the outstood⁹⁴ ground for the grounding of creative Da-sein."

The structure of this passage is a "neither... nor..." followed by a "both... and...". The rejected couple are *das Festgemachte* (the firmly secure) and its opposite. The accepted couple, accepted together, are *die abgründige Mitte* (the abyssal middle) and *der ausgestandene Grund* (the outstood ground). Thus the passage makes it clear that *Grund* and *Abgrund* are not the same as *das Festgemachte* and its opposite. The *abgründige Grund* dimension of truth is not the repetition of an old dichotomy, but a conflict whose poles have been revised from the traditional conception. The qualification of *Grund* with *ausgestandene* (cognate with *ecstasis* - standing out) emphasizes this revision.

Turning to another point in this last passage, what does it mean to say that truth, as abyssal middle, "trembles in the passage of the god"? Might it be a religiously cynical idea, that religious thinking has always violated truth, and thus truth trembles (in fear of its violation) before theology? A subtler idea might be that the ideals which have normally been associated with religious thinking nurture false epistemological ideals, epistemological ideals which place the problem of truth in a tortured, irresolvable set of dilemmas. An example of such a false ideal might be: that responsibility for the guaranteeing of truth can be left to the absolute or divine, and that therefore the question of truth becomes "what is truth?", rather than a matter of how can we understand our own responsibility for the truth, of how we can reappropriate and understand our neglected guardianship of the truth.⁹⁵ Truth as "our own terrifying responsibility" is one way in which truth as "abyssal ground" may be taken: there is no further court for the judgement of truth, and this realisation brings the terror of a loss (*Abgrund*); at the same time the development of our responsibility for the truth is a founding of truth (*Grund*).

⁹³ BP, p.331.

⁹⁴ Translation of "ausgestandene" difficult. It evokes the SZ ideas of "Ausstehen", which is etymologically cognitive with "Ekstasis". However the past participle used here may add quite a different slant.

⁹⁵ *Dasein* as guardian (*Wahrer und Wächter*) of truth is a theme of BP; see, e.g., BP, p.16f.

To put these thoughts and more together, what might Heidegger be trying to convey in these passages about truth and abyss? To my mind, his thinking lies in the following region. Many attempts have been made in the history of philosophy to provide some concrete standard or starting-point, from which true knowledge may be derived, by which it may be measured, on which it may be built up. The location and identification of such a standard or starting-point has always been problematic and controversial; yet the search has pressed forward with the fervour of a crusade, spurred on by the unpleasant ("nihilistic") implications (e.g. ethical, political, religious) of an admission that its holy grail did not exist. It is not the case that the only alternative to "the chase for truth v. submission to nihilism" is some kind of "relativism" (e.g. by which truth is measured merely according to its fit with the totality of an indeterminate set of already held common-sense notions). Heidegger's way belongs to another set of alternatives (where Kant might also be placed), which regard "truth" in an absolute sense as non-susceptible to understanding (i.e. inexpressible). In Kant, however, this ineffable truth had a bare objective existence, which was never placed in doubt. Heidegger's thought represents strong reactions against the rigid distinctions of the Kantian system: (i) "objectivity" is weakened to something presupposing subjectivity-objectivity; (ii) "ineffability" is weakened to susceptibility to an allusive, pre-linguistic understanding; (iii) the dubitability of the existence of absolute truth is transferred from an external phenomenon facing and challenging formulators of a theory of truth, to an integral part of the theory of truth (i.e. revaluation of the problematic as the fundamental). Truth becomes something which may be understood allusively in a site presupposed by the distinction of "subjective-objective", and to the essence of which belongs the possibility of its doubt and denial, of its self-effacement. If truth, then, may be allusively understood, in what does this allusive understanding consist? Although what Heidegger produces may often seem like high-flown speculation, the standard tactic is in fact to return to the history of philosophy and the human situation (albeit very abstractly), taking the obstacles and dilemmas faced in history or in the human situation, and using them as clues for making further progress with the problem. The phenomena which the history of philosophy and the human situation have in common, as regards truth, are (a) the desire for certainty, or perhaps the feeling of our temporary factual existence as certain and (b) the dread of the absence of this anchor (whether this manifests itself for example as the intellectual inability to conceive of truth, or as the loss of factual existence in death). The dimension opened up by (a) and (b) -

naming truth - is a dimension between *Grund* and *Abgrund*. These phenomena are the irreconcilable poles between which all searching for truth has occurred. Heidegger takes up the theme of their irreconcilable interplay as a clue, an indication, for what the essence of truth might indeed be. Thus: a new beginning on the path to achieving at least an allusive understanding of truth must take the given situation as regards truth at its most comprehensive and fundamental: as an agonised tension between....⁹⁶

* * * * *

The bipolar pair time-space likewise form a dimension of the *Kehre*. In what way does this relate to the abyssal ground, and what can be learnt from this about the *Abgrund*? But before this, what exactly is *Zeit-Raum* (time-space)? As said, a dimension in the *Kehre*; as such *Zeit-Raum* functions as one of the namings of the *Ereignis*, that is, of the site of the transition between the first beginning of thinking (metaphysics) and the other beginning.

"Der Zeit-Raum ist als Fügung der Wahrheit ursprünglich die Augenblicks-Stätte des Ereignisses."⁹⁷

"Primordially time-space is as fugue of truth the momentary site of the event."

"Der Zeit-Raum ist die ereignete Erklüftung der Kehrbahnen des Ereignisses, der Kehre zwischen Zugehörigkeit und Zuruf, zwischen Seinsverlassenheit und Erwinkung (das Erzittern der Schwingung des Seyns selbst!)."⁹⁸

"Time-space is the evented polarisation of the versive-paths of the event, the version between belongingness and hail, between desolation of being and gesturing (the trembling of the swinging of being itself!)."

What relation is there between the 1920's concepts of *Zeitlichkeit* and *Temporalität*, and *Zeit-Raum*? In the SZ project, Heidegger had thought that he could account for space on the basis of time; therefore in his more fundamental exploration of the relation of being and time, he thought that space could be left out.⁹⁹ This is a position from which Heidegger has withdrawn by the mid 1930's, and he has taken a more traditional view placing time and space on an equal level. While this change is a major refurbishment of a key concept, *Zeit-Raum* should not be taken as "different". The SZ work on *Zeitlichkeit* and the BP work on *Zeit-Raum* complement each other. That *Zeit-Raum* is a modification

⁹⁶ For a comment on the extent to which the *Wahrheit-Grund* relation was seen in SZ, and in what sense BP differs: BP, pp.351f.

⁹⁷ BP, p.30.

⁹⁸ BP, p.372.

(or translation) of *Zeitlichkeit/Temporalität*, rather than an abandonment, is suggested by clues such as the apposition¹⁰⁰ of *Zeit-Raum* and *Temporalität* and the elaboration of *Zeitlichkeit* as "den Zeit-Spiel-Raum des Da".¹⁰¹ In more detail, *Zeit-Raum* in BP is not a simple conjunction of four dimensions as a natural scientist might understand the phrase "space-time". *Zeit-Raum* is a concept preceding both time and space as we know them; it is a concept which obeys Heidegger's curious metalogical forms of thought (paratypes) - for example, in that it operates with a tension between its unity (such that time and space are indistinguishable) and its duality; and in that in so far as it is internally complex, its moments determine one another. This interdeterminability, associated in SZ with the phenomenon of *Gleichursprünglichkeit*, and in BP with the *Kehre*, means that the temporal in *Zeit-Raum* determines the spatial, and vice versa: the spatial determines the temporal. In fact, the SZ position survives intact within BP: space is still "derived from" time; the development is an addition - the reverse is also the case.¹⁰²

In the previous chapter it was argued that the relation between ground and *Zeitlichkeit* or *Zeitigung* is essential to an appreciation of the SZ project. In BP Heidegger provides the following comment, which not only vaguely confirms this, but rephrases the relation, retrospectively, in terms of space as well.

"Dabei sind aber Zeit und Raum ursprünglich aus der Wahrheit begriffen und auf die Gründung wesentlich bezogen. In »Sein und Zeit« ist dieser Bezug gesehen, aber hintergründlich und nicht bewältigt."¹⁰³

"Yet therewith time and space are primordially conceived in terms of truth and essentially related to grounding. In 'Being and Time' this relation was seen, but in the background, and not properly dealt with."

In what way, then, is this relation between time-space and grounding developed in BP? Section (d) of the fourth *Fügung (die Gründung)*, entitled "der Zeit-Raum als der Ab-

⁹⁹ SZ, §§22-24 & §70.

¹⁰⁰ BP, p.18.

¹⁰¹ BP, p.22.

¹⁰² See BP, §98.

¹⁰³ BP, p.308

grund",¹⁰⁴ circles around and around the relation, establishing, for the most part, its intangibility and elusiveness. It begins:

"Der Ab-grund ist die ursprüngliche Wesung des Grundes. Der Grund ist das Wesen der Wahrheit. Wird daher der Zeit-Raum als Ab-grund begriffen und kehrig vom Zeit-Raum her der Ab-grund bestimmter gefaßt, so eröffnet sich damit der kehric Bezug und die Zugehörigkeit des Zeit-Raums zum Wesen der Wahrheit."¹⁰⁵

"The abyss is the primordial essencing of ground. Ground is the essence of truth. If time-space is therefore conceived as abyss and conversely [*kehrig*] the abyss understood more determinately in terms of time-space, then with this the versive [*kehrige*] relation and belonging of the time-space to the essence of truth opens up."

Here it can be seen that *Abgrund*, *Zeit-Raum*, and *Wesen der Wahrheit* all interrelate according to a *Kehre* figure, which means that each can be understood in terms of the other, but none are prior to the others. This is the relation which in the SZ project was known as equiprimordiality. It has already been shown how each of the dimensions *abgründiger Grund*, *Zeit-Raum*, and truth as *lichtende Verbergung* form dimensions of the *Kehre*; here one sees that the *Kehre* figure not only operates within these dichotomous phenomena, but also between them.

As was the case with the relation between *Abgrund* and *Wahrheit*, it is possible, by selective quotation, to create the impression that *Abgrund* plays the primary role in relation to *Zeit-Raum*; more careful use of texts creates a different picture. For example, compare the two following passages:

"Der Abgrund ist die *ursprüngliche Einheit* von Raum und Zeit."¹⁰⁶

"The abyss is the *primordial unity* of space and time."

¹⁰⁴ "Time-space as the abyss", BP, pp.371-388.

¹⁰⁵ BP, p.379.

¹⁰⁶ BP, p.379

"Sie [Raum & Zeit] haben aber auch kein Gemeinsames als Einheit, sondern ihr Einigendes, was sie entspringen läßt in jene unzertrennliche Gewiesenheit, der Zeit-Raum, das Ab-gründen des Grundes: die Wesung der Wahrheit."¹⁰⁷

"However neither do space and time have anything common as unity, rather what unifies them, what lets them leap out *into* that indivisible array, time-space, the down-grounding of ground: the essencing of truth."

In the second passage the unifying of time and space is stated rather more carefully as "das Ab-gründen des Grundes". With respect to the first passage, it is probable that Heidegger sometimes uses *Ab-grund* for both *Grund* and *Abgrund*; there is, in any case, a cultivated lexical inexactitude in Heidegger's writings.

Given, then, that there is this link between *Zeit-Raum* and *abgründiger Grund*, what can be made of it? In BP, Heidegger exploits the concept of "emptiness" as a link between the abyss and the site opened in the dimensions of time and space; but, as he is at pains to point out, this is no "emptiness" in the ordinary or negative sense.¹⁰⁸ In the same way that *Zeitlichkeit* was quite unlike the vulgar concept of time, and *Grund* was quite unlike any firm *Boden* or *Festgemachtes*, so this emptiness is more an emotive prelude to filling. Another way one might try to explain the link between *Zeit-Raum* and *abgründiger Grund* is that the latter concept articulates the non-entitateness or nothing-character of time and space, together with their status (in Kantian terms) as conditions for the possibility of experience. In MAL¹⁰⁹ Heidegger used the concept of the *nihil originarium* (originative nothing) - this term, which evokes the idea of the *abgründige Grund*, could be applied to time and space as such non-entitative pre-conditions.

The link between *Zeit-Raum* and *abgründiger Grund* is very much more explicit in BP than the link between *Zeitlichkeit* and *Grund* in the SZ project. Probably the BP position should be conceived as a translation of the SZ position: thus, for example, in the 1920's *Grund* was identified with *Transzendenz*; in BP there is a fugal relation between *Sprung* (probably a modifying translation of *Transzendenz*) and *Gründung* (slightly different from *Grund*). The translation of *Zeitlichkeit* <---> *Grund* to *Zeit-Raum* <---> *abgründiger*

¹⁰⁷ BP, p.386; for further passages connecting *Zeit-Raum* to the idea of the *abgründiger Grund* (abyssal ground), see pp.17, 29, 223, 308, 323, 346, 379, 384-388.

¹⁰⁸ BP, §242.

¹⁰⁹ MAL, p.272.

Grund represents a maintenance of all that the earlier position contained, along with two additions: the mutual interdefinability of time and space (despite their fundamental difference of kind), and the integration of the *Nichtigkeit* of temporality (and spatiality) into their foundational status.

* * * * *

One final comment will be added by way of conclusion to this section on the *Abgrund*. In his article "Heidegger and the Deconstruction of Foundations", Stephen Tyman concludes by saying that Heidegger's revision of ground (together with the tradition in which that revision stands) responds to a need.¹¹⁰ I would agree with and extend this conclusion. In BP, which was not available to Tyman, Heidegger speaks of this need.

"Anklang der Wesung des Seyns aus der Seinsverlassenheit durch die nötigende Not der Seynsvergessenheit. Diese Vergessenheit durch eine Erinnerung *als* Vergessenheit zum Vorschein ihrer verborgenen Macht bringen und darin den Anklang des Seyns. Die *Anerkenntnis* der Not.... Die höchste Not: *die Not der Notlosigkeit*."¹¹¹

"Ring-in of the essencing of being from the desolation of being by means of the necessitating need of forgottenness of being. To bring this forgottenness into the light of its hidden power by means of a remembering *as* forgottenness and therein the ringing-in of being. The *recognition* of need.... The highest need: *the need of needlessness*."

It is with these words that Heidegger opens the first *Fügung* and declares the need to which he responds, to which the enquiry responds. The *Fügungen* are a saying of the same, and the same which is said in the phrase *Not der Notlosigkeit* (in the context of the *Fügung* of *der Anklang*) is surely the same that is said in the phrase *abgründiger Grund* (in the context of the *Fügung* of *die Gründung*). Heidegger proclaims no nihilism; it is the challenge of nihilism, the *Not der Notlosigkeit*, to which Heidegger responds. No need is greater or more penetrating than the human need to escape the nihilistic threat, and this need is the foundation (an abyssal foundation) of philosophy. The foundation is abyssal because it arises from this highest of needs. The *abgründiger Grund* is no nihilistic concept; it is a dimension of *Ereignis*, a foundational decision-site, a conflictual *Kehre*, which contains within itself the archetype of the fundamental need.

¹¹⁰ S.Tyman, "Heidegger and the Deconstruction of Foundations", *International Philosophical Quarterly* 24 (1984), at p.372.

¹¹¹ BP, p.107.

SUMMARY OF PART B

This part of the thesis was devoted to the connections between *Grund*, *Zeitlichkeit* and *Ereignis*. Despite the demands of many other themes (e.g. metaphysics, history), to my mind the most urgent considerations in answering the question about what ground "is" in Heidegger's early ontology, are (after method) time and *Ereignis*. There is no attempt in this thesis to be comprehensive, only to examine the most essential.

What do these connections contribute to an understanding of what ground "is" in Heidegger's early ontology?

In the time chapter it was shown how ground was inextricably interwoven with time, not only lexically or textually, but also as a matter of issues. The normal conceptions of both time and ground are revised (disassembled) such that they coalesce, becoming a heterogeneous "same" which responds to certain standard philosophical problems. This coalescence of time and ground of course applies only to the metalinguistic, that is, it carries only as a matter of the deep-structure of a paratypal discourse.

This interweaving of lexis and problematic was shown first with respect to the notions of apriori, transcendence and *Zeitigung*. Apriori occupies a semantically undecidable position between the temporal and the foundational: traditionally a foundational conception. Heidegger literalises it as the "earlier", a temporal relation. The apriori was used to introduce the way in which Heidegger recasts the threat to foundationalism of circularity or infinite regress as a temporal problematic. Understood temporally, the problem was then subjected to certain disassembling techniques (not unlike some of those studied in part A). In particular, the end of the regression folded in on the medium of the regression.

a metactic move isomorphic to the tautology.¹¹² Transcendence is both foundational and temporal, not by virtue of semantic manipulation, but by virtue of interpretation (but not such that any substitution occurs). Transcendence itself names the pattern of another problem raised by the traditional conception of ground against which Heidegger reacts. To take ground, not as subject to the problem of transcendence, but as characterised by the structure of transcendence, is the disassembling move (paratype) of revaluing the problematic as the fundamental or essential. The link between transcendence and the revised notion of temporality lay essentially in the ecstatic nature of time, such that it always already stands outside itself. The structure of ecstasis is isomorphic to the structure of ground as transcendence.¹¹³ Subsequently the concept *Zeitigung* was examined.¹¹⁴ Ostensibly a purely temporal term, *Zeitigung* in fact semantically interpenetrates with foundational language in a manner described in part A, chapter 1, that is, such that one cannot speak of a change of lexis, or of substitution or interpretation; rather, of a near interchangeability, a *Zusammengehörigkeit*. *Zeitigung* itself is a term which is less an innocent verbalisation of time (*Zeitlichkeit*) than it has seemed - in PIA there are provocative associations of this term with questioning as the ultimate foundation of philosophy, and with the historically destructive (disassembling) method of phenomenology.

The second section of the first chapter turned to the term "horizon" as marking both the textual and philosophical limits of the SZ project. Among the foundational associations of horizon, it was found in particular that the revision of ground in VWG and MAL (namely, ground as *Umwillen*) was the same as the future-orientated schema in the triadic horizontal schematism of time onto being - that is, that ground formed the primary or originative part of the horizon.¹¹⁵ It was then sought to determine more exactly the structural properties of the horizon,¹¹⁶ for example, in relation to the dialectic movement in phenomenological method examined in chapter 4 of part A. Horizon was found to contain certain structural disarticulations (impossible at least from the perspective of a horizon in natural space). By

¹¹² See pt.B, ch.1, section 1a.

¹¹³ See pt.B, ch.1, section 1b.

¹¹⁴ See pt.B, ch.1, section 1c.

¹¹⁵ See pt.B, ch.1, section 2a.

virtue of these disarticulations, an end was put to foundational (temporal) regression, not as a crude stop or reflexivity, but as a metactical disas-sembly (e.g. of propositional structure, of the traditional idiom of founding). The horizon was then¹¹⁷ used to lead into a brief account of the role of the question as a foundation: as a foundation, Heidegger's question is not an unreconstructed object of veneration, rather, there is *prima facie* evidence, even quite early in Heidegger, for suspecting that even the question has undergone a disas-sembling revision.

The disas-sembling foundational innovation particularly associated with the connection of *Grund* and *Ereignis* is the idea of *Grund* as *Abgrund*.¹¹⁸ While there are indications that the *Abgrund* move was already intended in the mid-1920's, the *abgründige Grund* is a manifestation of the *Kehre*. The *Kehre* was a part of the SZ project where Heidegger had initially insuperable difficulties in developing an adequate idiom, and consequently the full elaboration of the *abgründige Grund* did not appear until the 1930's. The term *Abgrund* is particularly prone to misinterpretation, and thus it was sought to place this firmly in the context of the structural-foundational eccentricities of BP. Above all, it had to be understood in terms of the *Kehre*, *Kehre* not as a biographical feature of Heidegger's thought, but *Kehre* as a philosopheme, as an omnipresent pre-figure of the structural tendencies of thought at its extremes. As such, the *Kehre* in BP was, *inter alia*, dichotomously multi-dimensional, holding together a range of non-assimilable dichotomies in a manner which sought to go behind or cleave open traditional possibilities of conceptual interrelation.¹¹⁹ Thus it was not only possible to reject outright the view that somehow the notion of a foundation came to be abandoned in favour of a negative or nihilistic abyss; it was also possible to develop the beginnings of an account of the synchronous tension and intimacy of *Grund* and *Abgrund*.¹²⁰ To this end the associations of the *abgründige Grund* with freedom, time-space, and the illuminating concealment of truth were all exploited. Ultimately, however, the abyssal ground, the *abgründige Grund*, was explained as a trans-lation of another phrase from BP: the need of needlessness (*die*

¹¹⁶ See pt.B, ch.1, section 2b.

¹¹⁷ See pt.B, ch.1, section 2c.

¹¹⁸ See pt.B, ch.2.

¹¹⁹ See pt.B. ch.2, section 1b.

Not der Notlosigkeit). Ultimately Heidegger's position is an attempt to lay thinking free of the metaphysical semblances which hide its hiding of the true origin or foundation - and that origin is a need, the highest need, a need which responds to the lack of all needs.¹²¹

¹²⁰ See pt.B, ch.2, section 2.

¹²¹ *Notlosigkeit* could be interpreted as a phenomenon characterising the technologically all-satiating post-society of the twentieth century, and as such representative of a threat of nihilism.

CONCLUSION

What has been shown in this dissertation, and what has not? As this dissertation is an exploratory exegesis of an attempted ontological revolution, there is a danger of trying to extract weightier conclusions than the evidence warrants. Nevertheless, on the one hand it is plausible that what is valuable as a matter of Heidegger interpretation also lies beyond the bounds of what can be "proved" or established beyond reasonable doubt, and thus for which one must go beyond the evidence. On the other hand there are also fairly concrete corrections to be made of entrenched misinterpretations of Heidegger. This conclusion deals with the following (interlinking) areas: (i) the interpretation of *Kehre*; (ii) the interpretation of *Abgrund*; (iii) the general nature of the development of Heidegger's thought; (iv) whether the revised notion of the foundational should actually be called "foundational"; (v) the assessment of Heidegger's language; (vi) the issue of Heidegger's overcoming of metaphysics; (vii) the role of the word "deconstruction" in the title of this dissertation; (viii) a final answer to the guiding question of this dissertation.

There can be little doubt that the decades of interpretation of the *Kehre* as biographical were wrong. This much has been shown by Hosokawa and Grondin. What their corrections leave open is a deeper examination of the nature of the *Kehre* as a philosopheme or paratype encompassing or iterating through or crowning the "content" of Heidegger's thought. A straight exposition of BP can meet this requirement, but this has been added to in this dissertation by identifying further paratypes in the 1920's thought which anticipate the *Kehre*.¹ Although the biographical development of Heidegger's thought can be traced into the *Kehre*, it is only as a derivative (and a less important one at that) of the *Kehre* as a philosopheme or paratype. It follows that the term *Kehre* cannot be

¹ Not all the paratypes necessarily anticipate the *Kehre*, though most seem to. Turning to paratypes in general, the most important I have identified include: semantic interpenetration, revaluation of the problematic as the fundamental, dialectic-metactic subversion of the propositional. One could also name amphiboly, metalepsis, paralipsis. I hesitate to definitively enumerate paratypes present in Heidegger's writing, since, to the extent that they are "present" there, there is a problem as to their ability to be distinguished and enumerated. Heidegger's language is undoubtedly paratypal, having a tendency to reproduce paratypes, and permitting at least a partial imposition of a schema of paratypes. But I do not wish to suggest (e.g. by listing "the" paratypes) that Heidegger was operating with a fully conceptualised list of devices identical to

employed as a model for an "abandonment" of ground, and that those many authors who were cited in the introduction as holding such a view (e.g. ^{Deleuze} Marx) can be refuted.

With regard to the use of the term *Abgrund* in Heidegger, there is a similar level of certainty. The term *Abgrund* marks no retreat or abandonment of ground; it does not replace ground; it cannot be used to justify anything approaching anti-foundationalism. *Abgrund*, already anticipated before SZ, has a versive intimacy with *Grund*, an intimacy which pre-figures the "foundationalism versus anti-foundationalism" division by its embodying the *Not der Notlosigkeit* (the need of needlessness) as an original existential situation fuelling the *Seinsfrage*. The interpretation of *Abgrund* by authors such as Vattimo can be refuted.

It is not only with respect to the secondary literature hijacking of the terms *Kehre* and *Abgrund* that an abandonment of foundations can be ruled out. The dissertation also establishes the general point that an abandonment or distancing (in the conventional sense) from the lexis, idea or problematic of foundations does not occur in the period under investigation; rather, there is a revision of ground. Thus textual analysis shows very plainly that, contrary to the claims of, e.g., ^{Deleuze} Marx, the lexis of foundations never gets "substituted" by a lexis of temporality, opening, *Ereignis*, clearing and so on. Rather the various, supposedly separable lexes are used inextricably and interchangeably, without prioritisation. Likewise one may state firmly that the problematic of ground (e.g. the hermeneutic circle, infinite regression, transcendence) does not disappear, but is appropriated or internalised in the course of the revision.

Something which cannot be established with quite such assurance is the nature of the revision which ground undergoes. The revision is a change of the idiom, not only of language, but also of thinking. Thus the fate of ground is that same movement Heidegger constantly prepares and contemplates - the movement into an other thinking. That there is less certainty and more intangibility here arises from the nature of the matter itself: the new idiom is one which depends upon its rejection of a system of categories which would

those I have identified, nor do I wish to suggest that I think I have exhaustively analysed Heidegger in this respect.

admit of a neat and tidy description.² The question arises with respect to this claim of a revision, does the revised notion of ground actually deserve the name "ground", or is the difference between the "abandonment and substitution" model and the "revision" model simply one of terminology? Here Heidegger can be defended firmly: what is revised he continues to associate with (*inter alia*) a foundational lexis; further, the revised notion not only explains the inadequate notion, it likewise responds (rather more self-consciously) to the same need from which the conventional notion arose. It is as senseless to cease talking of ground just as it would have been senseless to cease talking of gravity after the scientific revolutions associated with Copernicus and Newton: in both cases the relation between old and new conceptions remains of paramount importance for the new theory; to deprive the new theory of the old name removes its legitimate importance and misinterprets it.

Another issue which arises is the extent to which this dissertation bears on the problem of Heidegger's language. It was not the intention to produce a revolutionary theory of language or to engage with, *en bloc*, those many Heidegger commentators in this area. The intention was to demonstrate how Heidegger's language works in so far as this was necessary for investigating the fate or deconstruction of foundations in his earlier work. It is not adequate to have deep and penetrating thoughts about Heidegger's language, only to wrap these in a parody of his style as an offering to literary art. Naturally there is the issue of misinterpreting Heidegger by violently subjecting him to a conventional metalanguage, and the question of the impossibility of addressing the issues of his thought in a conventional idiom; nor do I suggest that literary art has no place in philosophy. On the other hand there are the dual needs of those students and scholars who have to approach Heidegger initially from the outside, and of a response to the strong and vilifying criticism of his language (and the linking of this with accusations of Nazism). To meet these latter needs, a prosaic and analytical account of how his language operates, and why it does so, is required. The "why" of his language is that it is integral to the anti-metaphysical thrust of phenomenology that the natural processes of the understanding which lead one away from being should be reversed. This reversal is an anticipation of the *Kehre*. It is almost as though *Entwurf* were an attempt to harness and tame the processes

² See further below for a more extended attempt to characterise the new idiom and the revised

of inspiration and genius. The "how" of his language is then worth investigating further as a multi-level series of tactics for achieving such a reversal and return.³ Only a few beginnings of this task were made in this dissertation. At the same time it must be borne in mind that Heidegger probably regards many of the traditional ills of philosophy as derived from an established omnipresence in language of the illegitimate globalisation of local cognitive and linguistic conditions (i.e. local not only geographically, culturally and socially, but also as a matter of the range of experiences which are encountered in everyday life). This provides a secondary motivation for the unconventional language tactics of his philosophy. But these are remarks which arise out of the dissertation; they do not represent its substance or purpose.

To extend on this theoretical linguistic framework: an ideally paratypal language (i.e. a means of deconstruction or disassembling, of reversing the natural processes of understanding), if such a thing could exist, would not consist merely in the provision of a range of syntactical categories alternative to those of the main European language group. Paratypes would not be alternative categories; rather, they would be such that they would prevent categorisation - that is, the tendency of thought and language to create their own ruts. One can think of language on the analogy of a river, and consider the meandering of the river in its full maturity across a flood plain. The river cuts its course deep and clearly, but over the centuries the course slowly changes: new curves and meanders are carved out; old courses become blind channels or are separated completely from the river. Language too can change some of its categories over time, it can create its own alternatives. A paratype could never be a natural linguistic category, since it seeks to reverse the natural processes of language - in particular, to reverse the process by which the surface-categories of language invade thought (and for this reason a paratypal language is of interest as a philosophical tool). Since the visible or audible parts of such a discourse would nevertheless have to follow fairly closely the surface-forms of a natural language, a paratypal communication would have to contain a radical misfit between its surface-grammar and its deep-grammar, between its surface-semantics, and its deep-

notion of ground.

³ Such a language is what I have called a "paratypal" language; such tactics are paratypes. NB: "tactic" is a methodological notion; "philosopheme" a notion governing content. Paratypes, such as the *Kehre*, are both.

semantics. Such a misfit reveals itself, for example, in the uses of semantic interpenetration and paradox in Heidegger.

In these comments on the assessment of Heidegger's language, the anti-metaphysical thrust of phenomenology was mentioned, which raises the implications of this dissertation for the metaphysical status of Heidegger's earlier ontology. This dissertation has intentionally avoided studying the metaphysical aspect of the problem of ground,⁴ and there is no claim to an adequate study of the primary and secondary materials bearing on this matter. The thoughts here are side remarks. To what extent does Heidegger overcome metaphysics, and to what extent do the matters dealt with in this dissertation contribute to this question? Derrida perhaps raises the most crucial question for Heidegger:

"La requête de l'archie en général, quelles que soient les précautions dont on entoure ce concept, n'est-elle pas l'opération essentielle de la métaphysique?"⁵

This turns partly on what one means by "metaphysics", nor is it a matter of mere caprice how this is defined. Some definitions are more useful than others; some definitions are presupposed or encompassed by others. Further, given the disdain with which this term is now commonly met, any worthwhile definition of metaphysics would have to explain why it is an undesirable thing. To define metaphysics on the basis of a lexis, a style, or an epoch would be too superficial (though it might transpire that on the basis of a more worthwhile definition, metaphysics was in fact associated with some such thing). On the whole, it seems the accounts of metaphysics in the secondary literature are open to objection, or they amount to versions or derivations of the definition given in the introduction.⁶ Of course, there may be other worthwhile accounts, but if one takes the definition given in the introduction, then it follows from the account of this dissertation that even in his early ontology, Heidegger was developing a method of some subtlety which directs itself not only at (in Purcell's terms) "certain determinations within metaphysics", but at the metaphysical pattern of thinking in its entirety. One of the critical

⁴ See the comments on aims and limitations of the dissertation in section 3 of the introduction, where metaphysics is also discussed.

⁵ J.Derrida, "Ousia et Gramme"; ET at p.63: "Is not the quest for an archie in general, no matter with what precautions one surrounds the concept, still the "essential" operation of metaphysics?"

⁶ See introduction, section 3.

ruts one needs to avoid in judging Heidegger is the terminology of success and failure. Heidegger's developmental claims (e.g. "ways, not works", from the motto to the *Gesamtausgabe*, or the insistence in BP that he remains within the transition between the first and the other thinking) need taking seriously. His writing is experimental, such that even a "failure" contains a "success". In any case, was it not Heidegger who said that it is in their breakdowns that the inner structure of processes become most conspicuous? In what way is Heidegger's writing experimental, and what is the nature of the breakdown in Heidegger, if there is one? There is the possibility of regarding SZ as a kind of (metaphysical) agar dish for growing (anti-metaphysical) cultures. (The cultures would be the paratypes, the tools of disas-sembly). The turn in the unpublished third section of the first half of SZ was perhaps where Heidegger stopped growing the cultures, and extracted them for closer study. Thus, are the breakdowns and incoherencies in SZ (both those mentioned in this dissertation and by other critics) perhaps breakdowns cultivated by Heidegger? If one takes Heidegger's theory of conspicuity seriously, then an immanent destruction of metaphysics would undoubtedly consist in pushing it to its limits from within until it revealed through its own inadequacies and fissures a "beyond". Such a perspective on the metaphysics of SZ is one which, I think, cannot be proved or disproved; nevertheless it remains a viable and valuable possibility and perspective.

To return to the Derrida's question, it ran:

"La requête de l'archie en général, quelles que soient les précautions dont on entoure ce concept, n'est-elle pas l'opération essentielle de la métaphysique?"

In this question there is a play between inner and outer. The precautions "surround" the concept, that is, they do not penetrate it. But metaphysics and the *archie* have an essential relationship, they penetrate. The issue is the penetration and the non-penetration of ground. With regard to the tactic of semantic interpenetration in Heidegger, it would seem that Heidegger has already anticipated Derrida and penetrated ground to an extreme where one can no longer say what lies inside or outside it. Perhaps, after this, one could play a little with Derrida. *La conquête de la métaphysique, quelles que soient les précautions dont on entoure ce concept, n'est-elle pas l'opération essentielle de la requête de l'archie?* That is, however one might try to twist metaphysics free by redefinitions, the project of fundamental ontology is the overcoming of metaphysics. If one nurtures the concept of

metaphysics in order to let its all-encompassing jaws loose on others, who is the greater metaphysicist? At which end does metaphysics bite? This is no frivolous objection, but a point about where the interpretation of a text occurs, about where it is judged as metaphysical. A text "is" not necessarily metaphysical. There are also writers of texts and readers of texts, and reading and writing the same text could have an independent degree of metaphysicality. If it is the case that metaphysics arises from the invasion of linguistic deep-structure (thought?) by linguistic surface-structure, then a text which attempts to break with metaphysics must set up a radical break between its surface structure and its deep structure, and employ devices to maintain this break.⁷ For such a text, there will always be the possibility of reading it only according to its surface structure, in other words, of producing a metaphysical reading. A metaphysicist can surely be so, not only by virtue of writing, but also by virtue of reading. The inversion of Derrida's question likewise has a serious intent. If metaphysics and foundations have such an intimate connection as he claims, then might not the successful revision of the foundational have implications for the fate of metaphysics. The foundational could be an exit as well as an entrance to the domain of metaphysics. In any case, one should not rule out *a priori* the possibility of a useful and valuable conception of the foundational.

The next issue which arises for consideration is the extent to which, as the title suggests, this is an exercise in deconstructivism. It is not. The term *Destruktion* used by Heidegger is inadequate for two reasons: (i) it does not represent the entirety of the phenomenological method of *Reduktion-Konstruktion-Destruktion*; (ii) the English equivalent "destruction" is suggestive of a rather immature vandalism (cf. Derrida's comments on his original choice of the word *déconstruction* discussed in the introduction). Heidegger's method certainly has the character of methodically taking apart a conventional or received structure of thinking and speaking, of philosophizing, and in this sense the literal sense of "deconstruction" undoubtedly applies. However this word also has its

⁷ The idea here becomes clearer if one uses the terminology of deep structure, surface structure, and a break between the two. The increased clarity also brings an increased susceptibility to objection. The depth-surface model is used hypothetically here, and only approximates to what I want to attribute to Heidegger. The danger of this model is that it oversimplifies the relation of thought and language in Heidegger - certainly one cannot speak of a "break" between them. On the other hand, one should speak of devices inserted in the writing (paratypes) which are intended to enable a thinking to speak in the language without being infected or "bewitched"

shortcomings: it is not only the use of the word over the past couple of decades, but also the inherent suggestion of the word, that it denotes something purely negative and parasitic. The experience of deconstructivism as a movement has also added (perhaps unjustified) overtones of textual idealism. Thus bringing *déconstruction* into proximity with Heidegger's *Freilegung* and the English "disas-sembling" (with a hyphen) is intended to point out that (in Heidegger) the process of deconstruction reveals something (extra-textual) which the conventional structures of thinking and speaking have concealed.⁸ Thus the "deconstruction of foundations" is both a dismantling of the conventional notion of a foundation (removing the mantle constituted by the conventional foundations) and a revealing of the foundation which dissimulates and effaces itself in the assembling of metaphysics. Is there such a deconstruction in Heidegger?

The partial demonstration of such an incomplete deconstruction consisted in tracing certain paratypes (deep-structures⁹, infrastructures, metalogical forms of thinking) which occur for the most part inexplicitly in Heidegger's use of foundational notions and structures. The terms *Tiefenstruktur* (from Rombach), infrastructure (Gasché) and metalogical form of thought (Schöfer) all seem, independently, to get at the same thing, and to be applicable to Heidegger, even if not in the sense that the original users of these terms would have preferred. The *Tiefenstruktur* (if one calls it this for the moment) is a post-systematic

(Wittgenstein) by the organisational properties peculiar to writing and speaking. The point about metaphysical readers remains the same.

⁸ See also the more extensive comments at the beginning of the introduction and in section 3 of the introduction.

⁹ The term (German: *Tiefenstruktur*) is taken from the discussion of H.Rombach in L.Dümpelmann & R.Hüntelmann, *Sein und Struktur* (Pfaffenweiler: Centaurus-Verlagsgesellschaft, 1991). The work by Rombach of relevance is H.Rombach, *Die Gegenwart der Philosophie* (Freiburg: Alber Verlag, 1962, 1988). In its use here it has a much narrower meaning than its more well-known use by Chomsky (see, e.g., N.Chomsky, *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965), though it remains loaded with structuralist dogma. Chomsky's distinction between deep structure and surface structure can certainly be used to specify the relation of paratypes to Heidegger's text: the paratype gives rise to but is not immediately visible in the text. Chomsky himself pointed out that he did not mean anything substantially different from Wittgenstein's distinction between deep grammar and surface grammar (Chomsky, op.cit., p.199; Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, p.168). However, for reservations about the application of such a crude dichotomy to Heidegger, see the earlier footnote on the depth-surface model (in this conclusion). Rombach's idea of the deep structure as an iterating and non-systematic pattern narrows Chomsky's use. The paratype differs in that it reverses or disassembles the conventional structures of language. In forming the word I have taken the prefix "para-" in its senses of changing or guarding against.

pattern: relatively simple, but iterating itself at different levels and in the most varied contexts; any field of human activity (including the writing of philosophical texts) supposedly tends towards reproducing such forms, but they are not subject to any global pattern. The rhizome of Deleuze and Guattari is a simple transfer of foundationalism as a system to the foundational as a *Tiefenstruktur*. The *Kehre* is perhaps the paratype *par excellence* in Heidegger's thought, but there are other paratypes, which may not necessarily always have been intended to be drawn into the *Kehre*, some of which are developed and continued in Heidegger's thought, others of which are dropped. Thus semantic interpenetration, logico-syntactic disruption, the dialectic-metactic disintegration of the proposition, tripolar-tetrapolar uncertainty, wrap-into clustering, metalepsis, paralipsis may all be metalogical forms which emerge from the breakdown of the conventional notion of ground, and which contribute to the refounding of foundations.¹⁰ It is quite possible that some, perhaps much of this, was not intended by Heidegger, or at least, not conceived as such. Perhaps his distinctive method evolved more by avoidance of standard pitfalls, and only in retrospect did he appreciate the patterns into which his style had developed. Or perhaps even in retrospect he did not appreciate the patterns as such, but they might nevertheless be necessitated in the attempt to reappropriate and comprehend his thinking in a critical framework which does it justice, as a framework to hold one relatively free of domination and submersion into his style. The issue is, to the extent that it reads too much into Heidegger, is it nevertheless valuable?

The final point I wish to make in this thesis concerns what the reader expects of it as an answer. At one point this dissertation came near to reenacting (perhaps presumptuously) with respect to Heidegger what Gasché does to Derrida in *The Tain of the Mirror*. That is, a systematisation of a number of devices or foundational infrastructures which disassemble a text or way of thought. A close study of methods of the early Heidegger does indeed reveal such disassembling yet foundational infrastructures. Nevertheless, with his positive evaluation of foundations and system, Gasché risks pitching deconstructivism back into a system. In response to this, Gasché has a small stock of anti-systematisers: e.g. minimality as opposed to totality, incompleteness as opposed to completion, heterogeneity as opposed to homogeneity. There is perhaps one metaphysical trait to

¹⁰ But note the earlier footnote in this conclusion on the questionability of listing paratypes.

which Gasché remains vulnerable: while the number of infrastructures may remain open and incomplete, the account has an aura of satisfying, perfecting completion; everything fits too well - which raises a *prima facie* doubt as to its truth-value. The Heidegger-Derrida tradition is one of experimentation and restless readjustment - for which reason a Gasché-esque approach, if it is textually faithful, must result in something which is ultimately unsatisfactory, where the relevant mis-fits. To return to the issue, what can the reader expect as a conclusion? There is, in Heidegger's early ontology, a multiplicity of incompletely assimilable and sometimes conflicting experimental tactics and patterns, some of which develop and merge (not necessarily improving in the process), other of which disappear, more or less non-systematically. This dissertation is foremost an exegesis of Heidegger, which both in its preparation and presentation sought to work from the "ground" up, from the text; it has avoided the procedure of setting up a hypothetical framework or proposition (thesis) in advance, which then dominates the presentation and the evidence adduced (however elegant such a procedure might be). The unity of the dissertation is thematic, not logical. The primary development of the thesis is not that of an argument, it is the putting together of a picture, the growth of an appreciation. So, finally, what is ground in the earlier writings of Heidegger? Without laying claim to an exhaustive analysis, and without supposing that a list of concluding propositions could "contain" an answer (they can only point back at some of the turns along the path of answering) one can say that ground is the *Zeitigung* of questioning, in the sense of a historically destructive appropriation of the aporetic structures of its own sembling (*inter alia*, transcendence, the hermeneutic circle, the issue of its own existence and origin); that ground is coalescent with a pre-temporal dimension, a dimension which is pre-propositionally metactic; that ground is open, not only as ecstatic temporality, as the future-orientated horizontal schema (*Umwillen*) of the schematism of time and being, but also on, e.g., the semantic level (cf. semantic interpenetration); that ground is *kehrig* in the sense of dialectical, as the reversing of its own sembling; that ground, as abyssal, responds to a need, the highest need, the need of needlessness.

Appendix - Guide to German terms used in the text

This guide includes only those terms used repeatedly in the text (i.e. it excludes (i) terms used only on one occasion, (ii) terms used in the quotations. Quotations are always translated. Likewise, all German terms used in the text are translated at their first occurrence in each chapter. The list does not contain all the standard translations, since it is a guide to Heidegger's German, not to his English translations.

Note: the reasons for the considerable use of German words in the text of the thesis are as follows: (1) many of Heidegger's terms have received a number of standard translations into English (even the simplest - let alone the untranslatable); this situation has reached the point where misunderstanding can arise through the use of English terminology; particularly when comparing different works, where different sets of translations are used, the points of lexical contact between the texts can only be maintained by using the German; (2) unlike many previous German philosophers, Heidegger cannot be subjected to an intensive textual study in any language other than his own (one may cite word-plays, neologisms, philosophically pregnant alliterative and etymological associations).

Abgrund	abyss (lit. down-ground)
Anklang.....	intimation, ringing-in
Angst	dread
Auslegung	interpretation
aussprechen	to express (lit. speak out)
Bedingung	condition
Befindlichkeit.....	disposition, state-of-mind
bestimmen	to determine, define
Boden	floor, basis
Dasein.....	(normally untranslated)
Daseinsanalytik.....	analysis of Dasein
Entdecktheit.....	discoveredness
entspringen.....	to rise (as the source of a river)
Entwurf	projection
Ereignis	event (of appropriation)
ermöglichen	to make possible
Ermöglichung.....	making possible
Erschlossenheit	disclosedness
erwachsen	to grow up
Existenz.....	existence
Festgemachtes	something solidly secured

Frage	question
fragen	to ask, inquire
Fraglichkeit	questionability
Fragwürdigkeit	question-worthiness
Freiheit.....	freedom
freilegend	free-laying
Freilegung	laying-free
Fuge	fugue (see pt.B, ch.2, section 1a)
Fundament	foundation
fundamental	fundamental
fundieren	to found
Fügung.....	(see pt.B, ch.2, section 1a)
Furcht	fear
Gerede	gossip, idle chatter
Geschehen	happening, occurrence
Geworfenheit	thrown-ness
gleichursprünglich	equiprimordial, co-original
Gleichursprünglichkeit.....	equiprimordiality, co-originality
Grund	ground, reason
gründen	to ground
gründlich	thoroughly (lit. ground-ly)
Gründlichkeit	thoroughness (lit. ground-liness)
Gründung.....	grounding
Horizont	horizon
In-der-Welt-sein.....	being-in-the-world
In-sein.....	being-in
Kehre.....	turn, reversal
kehrig	versive, turning
Kehrigkeit	versiveness, turn-like-ness
Lichtung	clearing (lit. light-ing)
liegen.....	to lie
Mitteilung	communication
Möglichkeit	possibility
Öffnung.....	opening
Neugier	curiosity
Phänomen	phenomenon
Praesenz	presence
Rede	speech, discourse
Seiendes	entity
Sein, Seyn.....	being
Seinsfrage	question of being
Seinsgeschichte.....	history of being

seinsgeschichtlich	according to history of being
Seinsverständnis.....	understanding of being
selbstverständlich	of course
Selbstverständlichkeit	of-course-ness
Sicht	sight
Sinn.....	sense, meaning
Sorge	care
Sprache	language
Sprung	leap
Temporalität	temporality
Tod	death
Transzendenz	transcendence
Umwillen	for-the-sake-of
Urgrund.....	most basic or original ground
Urphänomen	most basic or original phenomenon
Ursprung	origin (lit. most original leap)
ursprünglich.....	original, primordial
Verbergung	concealing, concealment
Verfallen.....	falling
Verstehen.....	understanding
Verwurzelung.....	rootedness
voraussetzen	to presuppose
Wahrheit.....	truth
Wesen	essence
Woraufhin	whither-upon, towards-which
Worausher.....	from-out-of-which, whence
Zeit	time
Zeit-Raum	time-space
zeitigen.....	(see pt.B, ch.1, section 1c)
Zeitigung	(see pt.B, ch.1, section 1c)
Zeitlichkeit	temporality
Zusammengehörigkeit.....	belonging-together-ness
Zweideutigkeit.....	ambiguity

List of Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used for the works of Heidegger. For bibliographical details, see section 2 of the bibliography.

- AE the so-called *Aristoteles-Einleitung*, entitled *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles*
- BH *Brief über den Humanismus*
- BP..... *Beiträge zur Philosophie*
- GA (+ no.) *Gesamtausgabe* (complete edition), followed by volume number
- GP *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*
- KM *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*
- MAL *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik*
- PGZ *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*
- PIA *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles*
(i.e. the lectures of this name)
- SG *Der Satz vom Grund*
- SZ..... *Sein und Zeit*
- US *Unterwegs zur Sprache*
- VA..... *Vorträge und Aufsätze*
- VWG *Vom Wesen des Grundes*
- WD *Was heißt Denken?*
- WIM..... *Was ist Metaphysik?*
- ZSD *Zur Sache des Denkens*

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Bibliographical Sources

For general bibliographical information up to 1981:

Saß, H-M. *Martin Heidegger: Bibliography and Glossary*. Bowling Green, Ohio: Philosophy Documentation Center, 1982.

For a bibliographical guide to English-language publications from 1982-1990:

Nordquist, J. *Martin Heidegger: a bibliography*. Santa Cruz, California: Reference & Research Services, 1990.

For more comprehensive and up to date information there is *The Philosopher's Index*; but perhaps even more valuable is the following, which while not a bibliographical work *stricto sensu*, nevertheless lists some 800 secondary sources (excluding articles), of which c.450 are for the period 1982-1991.

Raffelt, A. "Katalog der in der Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg vorhandenen Sekundärliteratur zum Werk von Martin Heidegger." *Informationen, Bibliothekssystem der Albert-Ludwigs-Universität*, Freiburg: Universitätsbibliothek. No's 50-52 (1990 & 1991), pp.659-668, 705-716, 759-763. ISSN 0938-2089.

Clearly the bibliographical situation is unsatisfactory, with Saß out of date, Nordquist restricted to English-language publications, and Raffelt selective and exclusive of articles. It is important for the researcher to have some idea of the size of the secondary literature, and of the reliability of Saß. Statistical projections based on the categories of information in the above three sources lead to estimates for the increase in size of the secondary literature in the period 1982-1991 from a conservative 50% up to 125% (from the five and a half thousand or so publications recorded by Saß in 1982). The on-going publication of the *Gesamtausgabe* (complete works) of Heidegger, including much previously unpublished material, since 1975 means that the 1980's literature is all the more important.

2. Writings of Heidegger cited in this thesis.

The main source is the *Gesamtausgabe* (complete edition, Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1975-), which is not yet approaching complete publication. Wherever a *Gesamtausgabe* edition was available, this has been used for the German texts. *Gesamtausgabe* volumes are cited "GA" together with the volume number, though in many cases an alternative abbreviation is used (given below after the names of the publications). This list below is in order of composition. English translations, where available, are cited immediately after the German edition.

Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie. Freiburg lectures of 1919. *Gesamtausgabe* vol.56/57. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1987.

Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles; Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung (PIA). Freiburg lectures of winter 1921/22. *Gesamtausgabe* vol.61. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1985.

"Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles" (AE, 1922). i.e. the so-called *Aristoteles-Einleitung*. In *Dilthey Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften* 6 (1989): 228-274.

Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizität). Freiburg lectures of summer 1923. *Gesamtausgabe* vol.63. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1988.

Der Begriff der Zeit (lecture of 1924). Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1989.

Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (PGZ). Marburg lectures of summer 1925. *Gesamtausgabe* vol.20, Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1979. ET: *History of the Concept of Time*, trans. T.Kisiel. Bloomington: Indiana University press, 1985.

Logik - Die Frage nach der Wahrheit, Marburg lectures of winter 1925/26. *Gesamtausgabe* vol.21. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976.

Sein und Zeit (SZ, 1926). *Gesamtausgabe* vol.2. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1977. ET: *Being and Time*, trans. J.Macquarrie & E.Robinson. Oxford: Blackwell, 1962.

- Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (GP). Marburg lectures of summer 1927. *Gesamtausgabe* vol.24. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1975. ET: *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. A.Hofstadter. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982 (the revised ed. of 1988 has been used for translations).
- Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz* (MAL). Marburg lectures of summer 1928. *Gesamtausgabe* vol.26. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1978. ET: *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, trans. M.Heim. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984.
- "Was ist Metaphysik?" (WIM, 1928). In *Gesamtausgabe* vol.9. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976. ET: "What is metaphysics?", tr. D.Krell in *Basic Writings*, New York: Harper & Row, 1977.
- "Vom Wesen des Grundes" (VWG, 1928). In *Gesamtausgabe* vol.9. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976. ET: *The Essence of Reasons* (bilingual ed.), trans. T.Malick. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969.
- Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (KM, 1929). *Gesamtausgabe* vol.3. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1990. ET: *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, trans. R.Taft. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 4th ed. (enlarged) 1990.
- "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" (1930). Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1961. ET: "On the Essence of Truth", trans. J.Sallis, in D.Krell ed., *Basic Writings*. New York: Harper & Row, 1977.
- Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (BP, 1936-1938). *Gesamtausgabe* vol.65. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1989.
- "Brief über den Humanismus" (BH, 1949). In *Gesamtausgabe* vol.9. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976. ET: "Letter on Humanism", tr.F.Capuzzo & J.Glenn Gray in D.Krell, *Basic Writings*. New York: Harper & Row, 1977.
- "Einleitung zu »Was ist Metaphysik?«" (1949). In *Gesamtausgabe* vol.9. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976.
- Vorträge und Aufsätze* (VA). Pfullingen: Neske, 1985. Includes the lectures "Die Frage nach der Technik", "Das Ding" (1950), and "Bauen, Wohnen, Denken" (1951).

Was heißt Denken? (WD). Freiburg lectures of winter 1951/52 and summer 1952. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1954. ET: *What is called Thinking?*, tr.J.Glenn Gray. New York: Harper & Row, 1968.

Der Satz vom Grund (SG). Freiburg lectures of winter 1955/56. Pfullingen: Neske, 1957.

Unterwegs zur Sprache (US). Pfullingen: Neske, 1982 (7th ed.), including the lectures "Das Wesen der Sprache" (1957/58) and "Der Weg zur Sprache" (1959).

Letter to Father Richardson (1962), published in English and German as the preface to: W.Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963.

Zur Sache des Denkens (ZSD). Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1969. Contains "Zeit und Sein" (1962) and "Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens" (1966). ET: *On Time and Being*. Trans. J.Stambaugh. New York: Harper & Row, 1972.

Correspondence with Karl Jaspers: W.Biemel & H.Saner ed. *Martin Heidegger/Karl Jaspers: Briefwechsel 1920-1963*. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1990.

3. Other works cited in this thesis.

Adorno, Theodor. *Jargon der Eigentlichkeit*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1964.

Ansen, Reiner. *Bewegtheit: Zur Genesis einer kinetischen Ontologie bei Heidegger*. Cuxhaven: Junghans Verlag, 1990.

Bast, Rainer. "Ist Heideggers »Sein und Zeit« ein patchwork?" *Information Philosophie* 4 (1986): 18-30.

Bast, Rainer & H.P.Delfosse. *Handbuch zum Textstudium von Martin Heideggers 'Sein und Zeit'*, vol.1. Stuttgart: Frommann Verlag, 1979.

Bernet, Rudolf. "Die Frage nach der Ursprung der Zeit bei Husserl und Heidegger." *Heidegger Studies* 3/4 (1987/88): 89-104.

Bigelow, Patrick. *The Conning, The Cunning of Being - Being a Kierkegaardian Demonstration of the Postmodern Implosion of Metaphysical Sense in*

- Aristotle and the Early Heidegger*. Tallahassee: Florida State University, 1990.
- Bigelow, Patrick. "The Indeterminability of Time in SZ." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 46, (1985/86): 357-379.
- Blust, Franz-Karl. *Selbstheit und Zeitlichkeit*. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1987.
- Buchanan, James. "Heidegger and the Problem of Ground." *Philosophy Today* 17 (1973): 232-245.
- Caputo, John. "Being, Ground and Play in Heidegger." *Man & World* 3 (1970): 26-48.
- Caputo, John. *The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought*. New York: Fordham University Press, 1986.
- Caputo, John. "The rose is without why." *Philosophy Today* 15 (1971): 3-16.
- Caputo, John. *The Way back into Ground. An interpretation of the path of Heidegger's Thought*. Dissertation, Brynn Mawr College, (1968).
- Carnap, Rudolf. "The Overcoming of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language." In M.Murray ed. *Heidegger and Modern Philosophy*, pp.23-34.
- Chomsky, Noam. *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965.
- Clark, Timothy. "Time after Time: Temporality, Temporalisation." *Oxford Literary Review* 9 (1987): 119-135.
- Crease, Robert. *Heidegger, Leibniz and the Principle of Sufficient Reason*. Dissertation. Columbia University, 1987.
- Cristin, Renato. *Heidegger e Leibniz: il pensiero e la ragione*. Milan: Bompiani, 1990.
- Dastur, Françoise. *Heidegger et la question du temps*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1990.
- Dastur, Françoise, "La constitution ekstatische-horizontale de la temporalité chez Heidegger." *Heidegger Studies* 2 (1986): 97-109.

- Dastur, Françoise. "Logic and Ontology: Heidegger's 'Destruction' of Logic." *Research in Phenomenology* 17 (1987): 55-74.
- Deleuze, Gilles. & Guattari, Félix. *A Thousand Plateaus*. Tr.: B.Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1987.
- Deleuze, Gilles. & Guattari, Félix. *Rhizome*. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1976.
- Derrida, Jacques. "De l'Esprit." In J.Derrida, *Heidegger et la question*. Paris: Flammarion, 1990.
- Derrida, Jacques. *La Dissémination*, Paris: Seuil, 1972.
- Derrida, Jacques. "Letter to a Japanese Friend." Tr.: D.Wood & A.Benjamin in D.Wood & R.Bernasconi eds. *Derrida and Différance*, pp.1-5. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Derrida, Jacques. "Ousia and Gramme: Note on a Note from 'Being and Time'." In *Margins of Philosophy*, pp.29-67, tr.A.Bass. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982.
- Derrida, Jacques. *Positions*. Tr.: A.Bass. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1971.
- Dümpelmann, L. & R.Hüntelmann. *Sein und Struktur*. Pfaffenweiler: Centaurus-Verlagsgesellschaft, 1991.
- Ebeling, Hans. *Martin Heidegger: Philosophie und Ideologie*. Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1991.
- Emad, Parvis. "The significance of the new edition of 'Subjekt und Dasein' and the fundamental ontology of language." *Heidegger Studies* 2 (1986): 141-151.
- Fleischer, Marion. *Die Zeitanalysen in Heideggers 'Sein und Zeit'*. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1991.
- Gasché, Rodolphe. *The Tain of the Mirror*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986.
- Ghanotakis, George. "Unscrambling Heidegger's notion of 'essence'." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 15/1 (1984): 22-33.
- Gillespie, Michael. "Temporality and History in the Thought of Martin Heidegger." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 168 (1989): 33-51.

- Giroux, Laurent. *Durée Pure et Temporalité: Bergson et Heidegger*. Tournai: Desdée, 1971.
- Grieder, Alfons. "What did Heidegger mean by 'essence'?" *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 19/1 (1988): 64-89.
- Grondin, Jean. "Prolégomènes à l'intelligence du tournant chez Heidegger." *Les Etudes Philosophiques* 1990: 333-352.
- Guest, Gérard. "Anabase - Acheminement vers l'amont de la présupposition." *Heidegger Studies* 5 (1989): 79-133.
- Guzzoni, Ute ed. *Nachdenken über Heidegger*. Hildesheim: Gerstenberg Verlag, 1980.
- Habermas, Jürgen. *Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1985.
- Haefner, Gerd. *Heideggers Begriff der Metaphysik*. Munich, Berchmans Verlag, 1981.
- Heinz, Marion. "The Concept of Time in Heidegger's Early Works." In J.J.Kockelmans ed. *A Companion to Martin Heidegger's 'Being and Time'*, pp.181-207. Washington DC: University Press of America, 1986.
- Heinz, Marion. *Zeitlichkeit und Temporalität im Frühwerk Martin Heideggers*. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1982.
- Herrmann, Friedrich-Wilhelm von. *Hermeneutische Phänomenologie des Daseins*, vol.1. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1987.
- Herrmann, Friedrich-Wilhelm von. *Subjekt und Dasein*. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1974. Substantially extended 2nd ed. 1985.
- Hosokawa, Ryoichi. "Heidegger und das Problem der Kehre." *Studies in Philosophy* 5 (1989): 1-23. (This periodical is a bulletin of the Faculty of Literature, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan).
- Hühnerfeld, Paul. *In Sachen Heidegger. Versuch über ein deutsches Genie*. München: Paul List Verlag, 1961.
- Kant, Immanuel. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. R.Schmidt ed. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1976. ET: tr.N.Kemp Smith, London: Macmillan, 1929.

- Kisiel, Theodore. "Der Zeitbegriff beim früheren Heidegger." In E.Orth ed. *Zeit und Zeitlichkeit bei Husserl und Heidegger*. Freiburg: Alber, 1983.
- Kisiel, Theodore. "The Language of the Event: The Event of Language." In J.Sallis ed. *Heidegger and the Path of Thinking*, pp.85-104. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1970.
- Kisiel, Theodore. "The Missing Link in the Early Heidegger." In J.Kockelmans ed. *Hermeneutic Phenomenology*. Washington DC: Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology, 1988.
- Kisiel, Theodore. "Towards the topology of Dasein." *Listening* 12/3 (1977): 38-49.
- Kockelmans, Joseph ed. *A Companion to Martin Heidegger's 'Being and Time'*. Washington DC: University Press of America, 1986.
- Kockelmans, Joseph ed. *Hermeneutic Phenomenology*. Washington DC: University Press of America, 1988.
- Kockelmans, Joseph ed. *On Heidegger and Language*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972.
- Kockelmans, Joseph. *Heidegger's 'Being and Time'*. Washington DC: University Press of America, 1989.
- Koza, Ingeborg. *Das Problem des Grundes in Heideggers Auseinandersetzung mit Kant*. Ratingen bei Düsseldorf: Henn Verlag, 1967.
- Krell, David. *Intimations of Mortality: Time, Truth and Finitude in Heidegger's Thinking of Being*. Pennsylvania State University Press, 1986.
- Lohmann, Johannes. "M.Heideggers »Ontologische Differenz« und die Sprache." *Lexis* I (1948): 49-106. ET in J.J.Kockelmans ed. *On Heidegger and Language*. Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1972.
- Lutz, C.L. *Zwischen Sein und Nichts*. Dissertation, Bonn University, 1984.
- Mann, Thomas. *Der Zauberberg*. Oldenburg: Fischer Verlag, 1960.
- Marx, Werner. "Thought and Issue in Heidegger." ET in: J.Sallis ed. *Radical Phenomenology*. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1978.

- Meschonnic, Henri. *Le Langage Heidegger*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1990.
- Murray, Michael, ed. *Heidegger and Modern Philosophy*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978.
- Murray, Michael. "Heidegger and Ryle: Two Versions of Phenomenology." In M. Murray ed. *Heidegger and Modern Philosophy*, pp.271-290.
- Nicholson, Graeme. "Ekstatic Temporality in *Sein und Zeit*." In J.J.Kockelmans, *A Companion to Martin Heidegger's 'Being and Time'*. Washington DC: University Press of America, 1986.
- Nozick, Robert. *Philosophical Explanations*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981.
- Orth, Ernst ed. *Zeit und Zeitlichkeit bei Husserl und Heidegger*. Freiburg: Alber, 1983.
- Panis, Daniel. "Vers une pensée plus originelle du pourquoi." *Heidegger Studies* 7 (1991): 111-124. Circulated earlier as "Heidegger et la question du fondement" in *La Philosophie d'Aujourd'hui* 1986 (Bulletin of the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Liège). Page references are to the latter.
- Panis, Daniel. "La question de l'être comme fond abyssal d'après Heidegger." *Les Etudes Philosophiques* 1986: 59-78.
- Panis, Daniel. "Heidegger et le soupçon du fondement." *Cahiers Internationaux de Symbolisme* 51/52 (1985): 103-114.
- Papenfuss, Dietrich & Otto Pöggeler eds. *Zur Philosophischen Aktualität Heideggers* (2 volumes). Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1990.
- Plato. *The Republic*. Tr.D.Lee, London: Penguin, 1974.
- Pöggeler, Otto. *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers*. Pfullingen: Neske, 3rd ed., 1990 (with additions).
- Pöggeler, Otto. "Temporale Interpretation und Hermeneutische Philosophie." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 168 (1989): 5-32.
- Pöggeler, Otto. "Zeit und Sein bei Heidegger." In E.Orth ed. *Zeit und Zeitlichkeit bei Husserl und Heidegger*, pp.152-191. Freiburg: Alber, 1983.

- Pugliese, Orlando. *Vermittlung und Kehre*. Freiburg: Alber Verlag, 1965.
- Purcell, Jack. *Heidegger's Early Ontology: Rethinking the Ground*. Dissertation, Purdue University, USA, 1989.
- Rapaport, Herman. *Heidegger and Derrida: Reflections on Time and Language*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989.
- Regvald, Richard. *Heidegger et le problème du néant*. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987.
- Richardson, William. *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963.
- Ricoeur, Paul. "Temporalité, Historialité, Intratemporalité: Heidegger et le concept «vulgaire» de temps." In *Temps et Récit III*, pp.90-144. Paris: Seuil, 1985.
- Rombach, H. *Die Gegenwart der Philosophie*. Freiburg: Alber Verlag, 1962, 1988.
- Rorty, Richard. *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1980.
- Sallis, John ed. *Heidegger and the Path of Thinking*. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1970.
- Sallis, John ed. *Radical Phenomenology*. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1978.
- Sallis, John. *Delimitations: Phenomenology and the End of Metaphysics*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986.
- Sallis, John. "Heidegger und die Dekonstruktion." In D.Papenfuss & O.Pöggeler eds. *Zur Philosophischen Aktualität Heideggers*, vol.2, pp.257-272. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1990.
- Sallis, John. "Meaning Adrift." *Heidegger Studies* 1 (1985): 91-100.
- Schmidt, Dennis. "In Heidegger's Wake: Belonging to the Discourse of the 'Turn'." *Heidegger Studies* 5 (1989): 201-211.
- Schöfer, Erasmus. *Die Sprache Heideggers*. Pfullingen: Neske, 1962. ET of a part is in J.Kockelmans ed. *On Heidegger and Language*, pp.281-301. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972.

- Sheehan, Thomas. "Heidegger's 'Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion', 1920/21." In J.Kockelmans ed. *A Companion to Martin Heidegger's 'Being and Time'*.
- Sherover, Charles. *Heidegger and Kant on Time*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1971.
- Sözer, Önay. "Kommt der Geist fragend zurück?" In D.Papenfuss & O.Pöggeler eds. *Zur Philosophischen Aktualität Heideggers*, vol.2, pp.273-283. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1990.
- Thiel, Manfred. *Der Nihilismus: Heidegger und die Sophistik*. Elpis Verlag, Heidelberg, 1986.
- Thiel, Manfred. *Heidegger: Sein Werk - Aufbau und Durchblick*. Heidelberg: Elpis, 1977.
- Thiele, U. *Individualität und Zeitlichkeit*. Dissertation, Freiburg, 1985.
- Tyman, Stephen. "Heidegger and the Deconstruction of Foundations." *International Philosophical Quarterly* 24 (1984): 347-372.
- Vattimo, Gianni. "An-Denken, Denken und Grund." In U.Guzzoni ed. *Nachdenken über Heidegger*, pp.287-302.
- Vattimo, Gianni. "Dialectics, Difference, and Weak Thought." *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal* 10/1 (1984): 151-164.
- Vattimo, Gianni. *La Fine della Modernità*. Milan, Garzanti, 1985. ET: *The End of Modernity*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1988.
- Versényi, Lazlo. *Heidegger, Being and Truth*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965.
- Vezin, François. "Translation as Phenomenological Labour" (trilingually published in French, English & German), *Heidegger Studies* 3/4 (1987/88): 109-154.
- Vukicevic, Vladimir. *Logik und Zeit in der phänomenologischen Philosophie Martin Heideggers (1925-1928)*. Hildesheim: Olms Verlag, 1988.
- Wenzel, Uwe. *Die Problematik des Grundes beim späten Heidegger*. Rheinfelden: Schäuble Verlag, 1986.

- White, Carol. *Time and temporality in the existential thought of Kierkegaard and Heidegger*. Dissertation, Berkeley, 1976.
- White, David. *Logic and Ontology in Heidegger*. Ohio State University Press, 1985.
- Wilkerson, Terence. *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Tr.: D.Pears & B.McGuinness. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*. Tr.: G.Anscombe. New York: Macmillan, 1958.
- Wohlfahrt, Günter. *Der Augenblick*. Freiburg: Alber, 1982.
- Wood, David. *The Deconstruction of Time*. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1989.
- Zarader, Marlène. *Heidegger et les paroles de l'origine*. Paris: Vrin, 1986.