On an Intuitionistic Logic for Pragmatics

We reconsider the pragmatic interpretation of intuitionistic logic [21] regarded as a logic of assertions and their justications and its relations with classical logic. We recall an extension of this approach to a logic dealing with assertions and obligations, related by a notion of causal implication [14, 45]. We focus on the extension to co-intuitionistic logic, seen as a logic of hypotheses [8, 9, 13] and on polarized bi-intuitionistic logic as a logic of assertions and conjectures: looking at the S4 modal translation, we give a denition of a system AHL of bi-intuitionistic logic that correctly represents the duality between intuitionistic and co-intuitionistic logic, correcting a mistake in previous work [7, 10]. A computational interpretation of cointuitionism as a distributed calculus of coroutines is then used to give an operational interpretation of subtraction.Work on linear co-intuitionism is then recalled, a linear calculus of co-intuitionistic coroutines is dened and a probabilistic interpretation of linear co-intuitionism is given as in [9]. Also we remark that by extending the language of intuitionistic logic we can express the notion of expectation, an assertion that in all situations the truth of p is possible and that in a logic of expectations the law of double negation holds. Similarly, extending co-intuitionistic logic, we can express the notion of conjecture that p, dened as a hypothesis that in some situation the truth of p is epistemically necessary

Content and Meaning Constitutive Inferences

A priori theories of justification of logic based on meaning often lead to trouble, in particular to issues concerning circularity. First, I present Boghossian’s a prioriview. Boghossian maintains the rule-circular justifications from a conceptual role semantics. However, rule-circular justifications are problematic. Recently, Boghossian (Boghossian, 2015) has claimed that rules should be thought of as contents and contents as abstract objects. In this paper, I discuss Boghossian’s view. My argumentation consists of three main parts. First, I analyse several arguments to show that in fact, Boghossian’s inferentialist solution is not fully satisfying. Second, I discuss the matter further, if one accepts that basic logical rules are constitutive of meaning, that is, they constitute the logical concepts and the content of a rule is an abstract object, then abstract objects — like, for example, rules — could be constitutive of meaning. The question is whether conceptual priority is in the judgment or in the object and what theory of content is pursued. Grasping content as a matter of knowing how a word or concept behaves in inferences is not completely explicative. Finally, I contend that rules come to exist as a result of certain kinds of mental action. These actions function as constitutive norms. Logical rules are not abstract objects but ideal. What one construes as norms or rules of content may involve idealization, but this is because we share a language

Scientific Argumentation as a Foundation for the Design of Inquiry-Based Science Instruction

Despite the attention that inquiry has received in science education research and policy, a coherent means for implementing inquiry in the classroom has been missing [1]. In recent research, scientific argumentation has received increasing attention for its role in science and in science education [2]. In this article, we propose that organizing a unit of instruction around building a scientific argument can bring inquiry practices together in the classroom in a coherent way. We outline a framework for argumentation, focusing on arguments that are central to science—arguments for the best explanation. We then use this framework as the basis for a set of design principles for developing a sequence of inquiry-based learning activities that support students in the construction of a scientific argument. We show that careful analysis of the argument that students are expected to build provides designers with a foundation for selecting resources and designing supports for scientific inquiry. Furthermore, we show that creating multiple opportunities for students to critique and refine their explanations through evidence-based argumentation fosters opportunities for critical thinking, while building science knowledge and knowledge of the nature of science

On Thin Air Reads: Towards an Event Structures Model of Relaxed Memory

To model relaxed memory, we propose confusion-free event structures over an alphabet with a justification relation. Executions are modeled by justified configurations, where every read event has a justifying write event. Justification alone is too weak a criterion, since it allows cycles of the kind that result in so-called thin-air reads. Acyclic justification forbids such cycles, but also invalidates event reorderings that result from compiler optimizations and dynamic instruction scheduling. We propose the notion of well-justification, based on a game-like model, which strikes a middle ground. We show that well-justified configurations satisfy the DRF theorem: in any data-race free program, all well-justified configurations are sequentially consistent. We also show that rely-guarantee reasoning is sound for well-justified configurations, but not for justified configurations. For example, well-justified configurations are type-safe. Well-justification allows many, but not all reorderings performed by relaxed memory. In particular, it fails to validate the commutation of independent reads. We discuss variations that may address these shortcomings

Are Reasons Causally Relevant for Action? Dharmakīrti and the Embodied Cognition Paradigm

How do mental states come to be about something other than their own operations, and thus to serve as ground for effective action? This papers argues that causation in the mental domain should be understood to function on principles of intelligibility (that is, on principles which make it perfectly intelligible for intentions to have a causal role in initiating behavior) rather than on principles of mechanism (that is, on principles which explain how causation works in the physical domain). The paper considers Dharmakīrti’s kāryānumāna argument (that is, the argument that an inference is sound only when one infers from the effect to the cause and not vice versa), and proposes a naturalized account of reasons. On this account, careful scrutiny of the effect can provide a basis for ascertaining the unique causal totality that is its source, but only for reasoning that is context‐specific

Knowledge dependencies in fuzzy information systems evaluation

Experience and research within the field of Information Systems Evaluation (ISE), has traditionally centered on providing tools and techniques for investment justification and appraisal, based upon explicit knowledge which encodes financial and other direct situational factors (such as accounting, costing and risk metrics). However, such approaches tend not to include additional causal interdependencies that are based upon tacit knowledge and are inherent within such a decision-making task. The authors show the results of applying a cognitive mapping approach, in the guise of a Fuzzy Cognitive Mapping (FCM) simulation, i.e. Fuzzy Information Systems Evaluation (F-ISE), in order to highlight the usefulness of applying such a technique. The authors highlight those contingent and necessary knowledge dependencies, in an exploratory sense, which relate to the investment appraisal decision-making task, in terms of the interplay between tacit and explicit knowledge, in this regard

Epistemological Realism and Onto-Relations

The traditional concept of knowledge is a justified true belief. The bulk of contemporary epistemology has focused primarily on that task of justification. Truth seems to be a quite obvious criterion—does the belief in question correspond to reality? My contention is that the aspect of ontology is far too separated from epistemology. This onto-relationship of between reality and beliefs require the epistemic method of epistemological realism. This is not to diminish the task of justification. I will then discuss the role of inference from the onto-relationships of free invention and discovery and whether it is best suited for a foundationalist or coherentist model within a theistic context