Stability and Success of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations

According to international law, straddling fish stocks should preferably be managed cooperatively through regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs). This paper analyzes the stability and success of these organizations through a game in partition function form based on the classical Gordon-Schaefer bioeconomic model. A comprehensive analysis of the economic and biological fundamentals that influence the success of coalition formation is provided. The results show that the larger the number of fishing states that compete for the fish stock the higher would be the relative gains from full cooperation, but the lower is the likelihood of large RFMOs being stable. It is also shown that the success of coalition formation is positively correlated with the degree of production cost asymmetry among fishing states and negatively with the overall level of efficiency.Straddling Fish Stock, Regional Fisheries Management Organizations, Unregulated Fishing, Bioeconomic Model, Coalition Formation Model, Free-Riding

Irreversible Capital Investment in a Two-Stage Bimatrix Fishery Game Model

A two-stage, two-player noncooperative game model is developed(under an irreversible capital investment assumption) with the main aim of predicting the number of vessels that each player in such a game will find in his best interest to employ in the exploitation of the Arcto-Norwegian cod stock, given a noncooperative environment and the fact that all players are jointly constrained by the population dynamics of the resource. The predictions so obtained are then compared with (i) the sole owner's optimal capacity investments for the two players; (ii) the results in Sumaila (1994), where perfect malleability of capacity is assumed implicitly: and (iii) available data on the Acrto-Norwegian cod fishery.noncooperative, game, fisheries, irreversible, capital, trawl, coastal, Environmental Economics and Policy,

Stability and Success of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations

According to international law, straddling fish stocks should be managed cooperatively through Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs). This paper analyzes the stability and success of these organizations through a game in partition function form based on the classical Gordon-Schaefer bioeconomic model. It is shown that the larger the number of fishing states that compete for the fish stock the higher are the relative gains from full cooperation, but the lower is the likelihood of large RFMOs being stable. Moreover, the success of coalition formation is positively correlated with the degree of production cost asymmetry among fishing states and negatively with the overall level of efficiency

Benefits of Spatial Regulation in a Multispecies System

Spatial heterogeneity in multispecies systems affects both ecological interactions and the composition of harvest. A bioeconomic model is used to analyze the nonselective harvest of two stocks with generalized ecological interaction and different persistent distributions across two spatial strata. Harvester response to aggregate effort controls is shown to partially dissipate rents relative to the case where the spatial distribution of effort can be specified. Numerical solutions for time paths of spatial (first-best) and aggregate (secondbest) input constraints indicate factors affecting their relative efficiency. In the scenarios studied, benefits of spatial specificity range from 0 to 15% of total net present value (NPV), depending upon the spatial correlation of stocks, their relative growth rates and prices, and the cost gradient across space. The benefits of spatial regulation are also heightened by the presence of ecological interaction, especially predator-prey dynamics.Bycatch, multispecies system, second-best regulation, spatial, Q20, Q22, Q28, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

SPATIAL COMPETITION IN OVERLAPPING SEASONAL FISHERIES: A BIOECONOMIC MODEL OF FISHERMEN AND REGULATORS

This paper develops a single-season dynamic game between fishermen and regulators. Fishermen maximize the NPV of profits by their location choice in a system with congestion, adjustment costs, and adaptive, quota-driven, site closures. Simulation results reveal feedbacks between site-choice and closure decisions and suggest the usefulness of spatial policy instruments in reducing congestion externalities and costly congestion-averting expenditures.Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

Valuing Ecosystem Services with Fishery Rents: A Lumped-Parameter Approach to Hypoxia in the Neuse River Estuary

Valuing ecosystem services with microeconomic underpinnings presents challenges because these services typically constitute nonmarket values and contribute to human welfare indirectly through a series of ecological pathways that are dynamic, nonlinear, and difficult to quantify and link to appropriate economic spatial and temporal scales. This paper develops and demonstrates a method to value a portion of ecosystem services when a commercial fishery is dependent on the quality of estuarine habitat. Using a lumped-parameter, dynamic open access bioeconomic model that is spatially explicit and includes predator-prey interactions, this paper quantifies part of the value of improved ecosystem function in the Neuse River Estuary when nutrient pollution is reduced. Specifically, it traces the effects of nitrogen loading on the North Carolina commercial blue crab fishery by modeling the response of primary production and the subsequent impact on hypoxia (low dissolved oxygen). Hypoxia, in turn, affects blue crabs and their preferred prey. The discounted present value fishery rent increase from a 30% reduction in nitrogen loadings in the Neuse is $2.56 million, though this welfare estimate is fairly sensitive to some parameter values. Surprisingly, this number is not sensitive to initial conditions.Open access, Predator-prey, Hypoxia, Habitat-dependent fisheries

Towards an appropriate economic management regime of tuna fisheries in Ghana

The Ghanaian tuna fishery is a baitboat and purse seine fishery. Three main species of tuna are caught namely, Skipjack, Bigeye and Yellowfin. A detailed and comprehensive set of catch and effort data for the tuna fisheries has been obtained for the period 1980-2001. Harvest functions have been designed and estimated. By maximising the loglikelihood function by numerical methods, parameter estimates and performance indicators of the different models were obtained. The best result was obtained for a harvest model allowing inclusion of a time trend parameter. For this model the stockoutput elasticity is assumed to be 1, the effort-output elasticity is estimated at 0.849, and the technological change at about 3.6% annual increase in productivity. Technical – Economic interactions among the species have been analysed. Different periods where chosen for each period, cross – elasticity of supply calculated between the species. The result indicated a mixed significance, which gives room for the existence of technical – economic interactions among the species over the years, considered. This suggests that single species management may be inappropriate for the tuna fishery

A New Zealand ITQ Fishery with an In-Season Stock Externality

Abstract This paper explores the economic performance of a fishery that operates under an individual transferable quota (ITQs) management system and that is subject to an in-season stock externality. While Boyce (1992) and others have established theoretically that ITQ management is not fully efficient under all conditions, this is the first study that empirically estimates the efficiency losses due to an in-season stock externality in an actual fishery. We study the New Zealand southern scallop fishery, which has been under ITQ management since 1992. Our analysis provides evidence of a race-to-fish in the fishery, and estimates that individual firm profits were approximately $2,300 and$2,000 (20% and 10%) less in 1996 and 1997, respectively, than they would have been under optimal management. We recommend modifications in the ITQ policy to improve the economic performance of the fishery.Fisheries management, individual quotas, stock depletion, New Zealand, scallops., Livestock Production/Industries, Q220, Q280, Q570, Q580,