Irreversible Capital Investment in a Two-Stage Bimatrix Fishery Game Model

Abstract

A two-stage, two-player noncooperative game model is developed(under an irreversible capital investment assumption) with the main aim of predicting the number of vessels that each player in such a game will find in his best interest to employ in the exploitation of the Arcto-Norwegian cod stock, given a noncooperative environment and the fact that all players are jointly constrained by the population dynamics of the resource. The predictions so obtained are then compared with (i) the sole owner's optimal capacity investments for the two players; (ii) the results in Sumaila (1994), where perfect malleability of capacity is assumed implicitly: and (iii) available data on the Acrto-Norwegian cod fishery.noncooperative, game, fisheries, irreversible, capital, trawl, coastal, Environmental Economics and Policy,