An Empirical Model of Inventory Investment by Durable Commodity Intermediaries

This paper introduces a new detailed data set of high-frequency observations on inventory investment by a U.S. steel wholesaler. Our analysis of these data leads to six main conclusions: orders and sales are made infrequently; orders are more volatile than sales; order sizes vary considerably; there is substantial high-frequency variation in the firm's sales prices; inventory/sales ratios are unstable; and there are occasional stockouts. We model the firm generically as a durable commodity intermediary that engages in commodity price speculation. We demonstrate that the firm's inventory investment behavior at the product level is well approximated by an optimal trading strategy from the solution to a nonlinear dynamic programming problem with two continuous state variables and one continuous control variable that is subject to frequently binding inequality constraints. We show that the optimal trading strategy is a generalized (S,s) rule. That is, whenever the firm's inventory level q falls below the order threshold s(p) the firm places an order of size S(p) - q in order to attain a target inventory level S(p) satisfying S(p) >= s(p), where p is the current spot price at which the firm can purchase unlimited amounts of the commodity after incurring a fixed order cost K. We show that the (S,s) bands are decreasing functions of p, capturing the basic intuition of commodity price speculation, namely, that it is optimal for the firm to hold higher inventories when the spot price is low than when it is high in order to profit from "buying low and selling high." We simulate a calibrated version of this model and show that the simulated data exhibit the key features of inventory investment we observe in the data.Commodities, inventories, dynamic programming

Pharmaceutical innovation and parallel trade

This paper proposes a North–South model to study the interaction between price regulation policies and parallel trade, with a particular focus on the pharmaceutical sector. We show that, under parallel trade, R&D investment can rise only when the South government takes into full account its impact both on investment and on the firm's decision to supply the regulated country. This arises because of a complete withdrawal from price regulation. When policy choices are endogenized, indeed the South wants to achieve this level of full commitment when it is large in size. When instead it is smaller in size, the South chooses an intermediate form of commitment whereby it anticipates its effect only on local distribution and delivery, but not on global R&D investment. As a response to these credible levels of price control commitments, the North reacts by allowing parallel imports from the South

Dynamic efficiency of enviromental policy: the case of intertemporal emissions trading

In this paper we analyze the effects of dynamic environmental policies on firms' optimal investment behavior within finite time horizons. We show that when finns are allowed to intertemporally trade their emissions, they invest in abatement in earlier periods, advancing compliance with future environmental standards. Therefore, policies such us emissions banking" enhances the dynamic efficiency of the marketable permits and derives substantial cost-savings by itself. We show the dynamics of banking policy and emissions trading when the firm faces a two step emission standard with strict requirements at the end of the programo The firm's optimaI trajectory under apure banking program is compared to command-and-control (CAC), Pigouvian taxes and emissions borrowing, aH for a finite time horizon. Banking introduces time flexibility, inducing the firm to over-comply with environmental standards in earlier periods, thus buying a delay in adjustment to future tighter policies. Finally, we analyze the dynamics of a pure emission trading program, where permits are available in a perfect competitive market, but do not last forever. Our results justify the current low trading in the U.S. Acid Rain Program (ARP) alld link firm's cost savings to the success of the banking policy

Competitive Effects of Partial Ownership: Financial Interest and Corporate Control

In this article, we set up an economic framework for analyzing the competitive effects of partial ownership interests. We have three main goals. First, we conceptually derive and explain the competitive effects of partial ownership, explaining its key elements and drawing analogies to the key ideas behind the analysis of horizontal mergers. Second, we present a general framework for evaluating the competitive effects of partial ownership that is analogous to, but at the same time recognizes key differences in the standard analysis for evaluating horizontal mergers. Third, we examine several methods of quantifying these competitive effects

‘Short Interest Pressure’ and Competitive Behaviour

This study introduces and examines a new-to-strategy form of Wall Street pressure – ‘short interest pressure’ – the tension felt by management caused by short sales of the firm\u27s stock. Drawing from a sample of over 5000 competitive actions carried out by competing firms over a 6-year time period, we test whether the level of short interest pressure experienced by the firm in one time period is predictive of properties of the firm\u27s competitive action repertoire in the ensuing time period. Our findings suggest that when faced with short interest pressure firms tend to carry out a higher number of competitive actions in the following time period, as well as a set of actions that deviate from the industry norm. In addition, post hoc analysis reveals that this effect is amplified for poorly performing firms. Thus, our study contributes to a deeper understanding of the relationship between capital market signals and competitive strategy

Incentives for cost reducing innovations under quantitative import restraints

The effect of quotas on fmns' incentive to invest in cost-reducing R&D is studied in a two-stage price-setting duopoly. A domestic and a foreign firm choose initially R&D efforts and then set the prices of their differentiated products in the domestic market. With a quota imposed at, or close to, the free-trade level of imports, the domestic fmn faces less competition than under free-trade and chooses to invest less in R&D. Contrarily, the constrained foreign fmn invests more in R&D as the negative strategic effect of a reduction in its cost is now absent. These results differ from the Coumot duopoly case in which R&D expenditures are lower for both fmns. We also show that as the quota becomes more restrictive, the domestic fmn increases and the foreign fmn decreases its expenditures in R&D. Finally, we show that domestic welfare is a1ways higher under free-trade than under any quota regardless of the degree of product substitutability

Investment and Q in Spanish manufacturing firms

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Do Publicly Traded Corporations Act in the Public Interest?

Models of corporate behavior normally assume that a firm acts in the interest of shareholders, and that shareholders care only about the returns they receive on the shares they own in that firm. But shareholders should also care about the effects of a manager's decisions on the value of shares they own in other firms, on the price they pay as consumers of the firm's output, on the value of the firm's bonds they own, on government tax revenue which finances public expenditures benefiting shareholders, etc. These effects are normally presumed to be of second order. This paper reexamines this presumption, argues that many of these effects are likely to be important, and examines how a variety of conventional conclusions about corporate behavior change as a result.