163 research outputs found

    Rating mechanisms for sustainability of crowdsourcing platforms

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    Crowdsourcing leverages the diverse skill sets of large collections of individual contributors to solve problems and execute projects, where contributors may vary significantly in experience, expertise, and interest in completing tasks. Hence, to ensure the satisfaction of its task requesters, most existing crowdsourcing platforms focus primarily on supervising contributors\u27 behavior. This lopsided approach to supervision negatively impacts contributor engagement and platform sustainability

    Smartphone User Privacy Preserving through Crowdsourcing

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    In current Android architecture, users have to decide whether an app is safe to use or not. Expert users can make savvy decisions to avoid unnecessary private data breach. However, the majority of regular users are not technically capable or do not care to consider privacy implications to make safe decisions. To assist the technically incapable crowd, we propose a permission control framework based on crowdsourcing. At its core, our framework runs new apps under probation mode without granting their permission requests up-front. It provides recommendations on whether to accept or not the permission requests based on decisions from peer expert users. To seek expert users, we propose an expertise rating algorithm using a transitional Bayesian inference model. The recommendation is based on aggregated expert responses and their confidence level. As a complete framework design of the system, this thesis also includes a solution for Android app risks estimation based on behaviour analysis. To eliminate the negative impact from dishonest app owners, we also proposed a bot user detection to make it harder to utilize false recommendations through bot users to impact the overall recommendations. This work also covers a multi-view permission notification design to customize the app safety notification interface based on users\u27 need and an app recommendation method to suggest safe and usable alternative apps to users

    Quality of Information in Mobile Crowdsensing: Survey and Research Challenges

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    Smartphones have become the most pervasive devices in people's lives, and are clearly transforming the way we live and perceive technology. Today's smartphones benefit from almost ubiquitous Internet connectivity and come equipped with a plethora of inexpensive yet powerful embedded sensors, such as accelerometer, gyroscope, microphone, and camera. This unique combination has enabled revolutionary applications based on the mobile crowdsensing paradigm, such as real-time road traffic monitoring, air and noise pollution, crime control, and wildlife monitoring, just to name a few. Differently from prior sensing paradigms, humans are now the primary actors of the sensing process, since they become fundamental in retrieving reliable and up-to-date information about the event being monitored. As humans may behave unreliably or maliciously, assessing and guaranteeing Quality of Information (QoI) becomes more important than ever. In this paper, we provide a new framework for defining and enforcing the QoI in mobile crowdsensing, and analyze in depth the current state-of-the-art on the topic. We also outline novel research challenges, along with possible directions of future work.Comment: To appear in ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks (TOSN

    A Formal Framework for Modeling Trust and Reputation in Collective Adaptive Systems

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    Trust and reputation models for distributed, collaborative systems have been studied and applied in several domains, in order to stimulate cooperation while preventing selfish and malicious behaviors. Nonetheless, such models have received less attention in the process of specifying and analyzing formally the functionalities of the systems mentioned above. The objective of this paper is to define a process algebraic framework for the modeling of systems that use (i) trust and reputation to govern the interactions among nodes, and (ii) communication models characterized by a high level of adaptiveness and flexibility. Hence, we propose a formalism for verifying, through model checking techniques, the robustness of these systems with respect to the typical attacks conducted against webs of trust.Comment: In Proceedings FORECAST 2016, arXiv:1607.0200

    ECHO Information sharing models

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    As part of the ECHO project, the Early Warning System (EWS) is one of four technologies under development. The E-EWS will provide the capability to share information to provide up to date information to all constituents involved in the E-EWS. The development of the E-EWS will be rooted in a comprehensive review of information sharing and trust models from within the cyber domain as well as models from other domains

    On the Provision of Public Goods on Networks: Incentives, Exit Equilibrium, and Applications to Cyber .

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    Attempts to improve the state of cyber-security have been on the rise over the past years. The importance of incentivizing better security decisions by users in the current landscape is two-fold: it not only helps users protect themselves against attacks, but also provides positive externalities to others interacting with them, as a protected user is less likely to become compromised and be used to propagate attacks against other entities. Therefore, security can be viewed as a public good. This thesis takes a game-theoretic approach to understanding the theoretical underpinnings of users' incentives in the provision of public goods, and in particular, cyber-security. We analyze the strategic interactions of users in the provision of security as a non-excludable public good. We propose the notion of exit equilibrium to describe users' outside options from mechanisms for incentivizing the adoption of better security decisions, and use it to highlight the crucial effect of outside options on the design of incentive mechanisms for improving the state of cyber-security. We further focus on the general problem of public good provision games on networks. We identify necessary and sufficient conditions on the structure of the network for the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in these games. We show that previous results in the literature can be recovered as special cases of our result. We provide a graph-theoretical interpretation of users' efforts at the Nash equilibria, Pareto efficient outcomes, and semi-cooperative equilibria of these games, by linking users' effort decisions to their centralities in the interaction network. Using this characterization, we separate the effects of users' dependencies and influences (outgoing and incoming edges, respectively) on their effort levels, and uncover an alternating effect over walks of different length in the network. We also propose the design of inter-temporal incentives in a particular type of security games, namely, security information sharing agreement. We show that either public or private assessments can be used in designing incentives for participants to disclose their information in these agreements. Finally, we present a method for crowdsourcing reputation that can be useful in attaining assessments of users' efforts in security games.PhDElectrical Engineering: SystemsUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/133328/1/naghizad_1.pd
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