Virtual Evidence: A Constructive Semantics for Classical Logics

This article presents a computational semantics for classical logic using constructive type theory. Such semantics seems impossible because classical logic allows the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM), not accepted in constructive logic since it does not have computational meaning. However, the apparently oracular powers expressed in the LEM, that for any proposition P either it or its negation, not P, is true can also be explained in terms of constructive evidence that does not refer to "oracles for truth." Types with virtual evidence and the constructive impossibility of negative evidence provide sufficient semantic grounds for classical truth and have a simple computational meaning. This idea is formalized using refinement types, a concept of constructive type theory used since 1984 and explained here. A new axiom creating virtual evidence fully retains the constructive meaning of the logical operators in classical contexts. Key Words: classical logic, constructive logic, intuitionistic logic, propositions-as-types, constructive type theory, refinement types, double negation translation, computational content, virtual evidenc

Formal logic: Classical problems and proofs

Not focusing on the history of classical logic, this book provides discussions and quotes central passages on its origins and development, namely from a philosophical perspective. Not being a book in mathematical logic, it takes formal logic from an essentially mathematical perspective. Biased towards a computational approach, with SAT and VAL as its backbone, this is an introduction to logic that covers essential aspects of the three branches of logic, to wit, philosophical, mathematical, and computational

The Complexity of Reasoning for Fragments of Autoepistemic Logic

Autoepistemic logic extends propositional logic by the modal operator L. A formula that is preceded by an L is said to be "believed". The logic was introduced by Moore 1985 for modeling an ideally rational agent's behavior and reasoning about his own beliefs. In this paper we analyze all Boolean fragments of autoepistemic logic with respect to the computational complexity of the three most common decision problems expansion existence, brave reasoning and cautious reasoning. As a second contribution we classify the computational complexity of counting the number of stable expansions of a given knowledge base. To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper analyzing the counting problem for autoepistemic logic

From truth to computability II

Computability logic is a formal theory of computational tasks and resources. Formulas in it represent interactive computational problems, and "truth" is understood as algorithmic solvability. Interactive computational problems, in turn, are defined as a certain sort games between a machine and its environment, with logical operators standing for operations on such games. Within the ambitious program of finding axiomatizations for incrementally rich fragments of this semantically introduced logic, the earlier article "From truth to computability I" proved soundness and completeness for system CL3, whose language has the so called parallel connectives (including negation), choice connectives, choice quantifiers, and blind quantifiers. The present paper extends that result to the significantly more expressive system CL4 with the same collection of logical operators. What makes CL4 expressive is the presence of two sorts of atoms in its language: elementary atoms, representing elementary computational problems (i.e. predicates, i.e. problems of zero degree of interactivity), and general atoms, representing arbitrary computational problems. CL4 conservatively extends CL3, with the latter being nothing but the general-atom-free fragment of the former. Removing the blind (classical) group of quantifiers from the language of CL4 is shown to yield a decidable logic despite the fact that the latter is still first-order. A comprehensive online source on computability logic can be found at http://www.cis.upenn.edu/~giorgi/cl.htm

Propositional computability logic I

In the same sense as classical logic is a formal theory of truth, the recently initiated approach called computability logic is a formal theory of computability. It understands (interactive) computational problems as games played by a machine against the environment, their computability as existence of a machine that always wins the game, logical operators as operations on computational problems, and validity of a logical formula as being a scheme of "always computable" problems. The present contribution gives a detailed exposition of a soundness and completeness proof for an axiomatization of one of the most basic fragments of computability logic. The logical vocabulary of this fragment contains operators for the so called parallel and choice operations, and its atoms represent elementary problems, i.e. predicates in the standard sense. This article is self-contained as it explains all relevant concepts. While not technically necessary, however, familiarity with the foundational paper "Introduction to computability logic" [Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 123 (2003), pp.1-99] would greatly help the reader in understanding the philosophy, underlying motivations, potential and utility of computability logic, -- the context that determines the value of the present results. Online introduction to the subject is available at http://www.cis.upenn.edu/~giorgi/cl.html and http://www.csc.villanova.edu/~japaridz/CL/gsoll.html .Comment: To appear in ACM Transactions on Computational Logi