A Better-response Strategy for Self-interested Planning Agents

[EN] When self-interested agents plan individually, interactions that prevent them from executing their actions as planned may arise. In these coordination problems, game-theoretic planning can be used to enhance the agents¿ strategic behavior considering the interactions as part of the agents¿ utility. In this work, we define a general-sum game in which interactions such as conflicts and congestions are reflected in the agents¿ utility. We propose a better-response planning strategy that guarantees convergence to an equilibrium joint plan by imposing a tax to agents involved in conflicts. We apply our approach to a real-world problem in which agents are Electric Autonomous Vehicles (EAVs). The EAVs intend to find a joint plan that ensures their individual goals are achievable in a transportation scenario where congestion and conflicting situations may arise. Although the task is computationally hard, as we theoretically prove, the experimental results show that our approach outperforms similar approaches in both performance and solution quality.This work is supported by the GLASS project TIN2014-55637-C2-2-R of the Spanish MINECO and the Prometeo project II/2013/019 funded by the Valencian Government.Jordán, J.; Torreño Lerma, A.; De Weerdt, M.; Onaindia De La Rivaherrera, E. (2018). A Better-response Strategy for Self-interested Planning Agents. Applied Intelligence. 48(4):1020-1040. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10489-017-1046-5S10201040484Aghighi M, Bäckström C (2016) A multi-parameter complexity analysis of cost-optimal and net-benefit planning. In: Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Conference on International Conference on Automated Planning and Scheduling. AAAI Press, London, pp 2–10Bercher P, Mattmüller R (2008) A planning graph heuristic for forward-chaining adversarial planning. 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An Abstract Framework for Non-Cooperative Multi-Agent Planning

[EN] In non-cooperative multi-agent planning environments, it is essential to have a system that enables the agents¿ strategic behavior. It is also important to consider all planning phases, i.e., goal allocation, strategic planning, and plan execution, in order to solve a complete problem. Currently, we have no evidence of the existence of any framework that brings together all these phases for non-cooperative multi-agent planning environments. In this work, an exhaustive study is made to identify existing approaches for the different phases as well as frameworks and different applicable techniques in each phase. Thus, an abstract framework that covers all the necessary phases to solve these types of problems is proposed. In addition, we provide a concrete instantiation of the abstract framework using different techniques to promote all the advantages that the framework can offer. A case study is also carried out to show an illustrative example of how to solve a non-cooperative multi-agent planning problem with the presented framework. This work aims to establish a base on which to implement all the necessary phases using the appropriate technologies in each of them and to solve complex problems in different domains of application for non-cooperative multi-agent planning settings.This work was partially funded by MINECO/FEDER RTI2018-095390-B-C31 project of the Spanish government. Jaume Jordan and Vicent Botti are funded by Universitat Politecnica de Valencia (UPV) PAID-06-18 project. Jaume Jordan is also funded by grant APOSTD/2018/010 of Generalitat Valenciana Fondo Social Europeo.Jordán, J.; Bajo, J.; Botti, V.; Julian Inglada, VJ. (2019). An Abstract Framework for Non-Cooperative Multi-Agent Planning. Applied Sciences. 9(23):1-18. https://doi.org/10.3390/app9235180S118923De Weerdt, M., & Clement, B. (2009). Introduction to planning in multiagent systems. 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Schelling, von Neumann, and the Event that Didn’t Occur

Thomas Schelling was recognized by the Nobel Prize committee as a pioneer in the application of game theory and rational choice analysis to problems of politics and international relations. However, although he makes frequent references in his writings to this approach, his main explorations and insights depend upon and require acknowledgment of its limitations. One of his principal concerns was how a country could engage in successful deterrence. If the behavioral assumptions that commonly underpin game theory are taken seriously and applied consistently, however, nuclear adversaries are almost certain to engage in devastating conflict, as John von Neumann forcefully asserted. The history of the last half century falsified von Neumann’s prediction, and the “event that didn’t occur” formed the subject of Schelling’s Nobel lecture. The answer to the question “why?” is the central concern of this paper

Computational Mechanism Design: A Call to Arms

Game theory has developed powerful tools for analyzing decision making in systems with multiple autonomous actors. These tools, when tailored to computational settings, provide a foundation for building multiagent software systems. This tailoring gives rise to the field of computational mechanism design, which applies economic principles to computer systems design

Making The Policy-Makers: Askesis, Or To Continuously Work On Oneself

This paper uses a Foucauldian discursive approach to shed light into how organisational actors are ‘made’ to act as strategists, incorporating into their work practices the demands and expectations of what it means to be a strategist in a specific context at a specific time. It draws on a Foucauldian understanding of governing and self formation to explore the ways in which actors work on themselves in order to act meaningfully as strategists. I argue that, rather than organisational identities being static or finished, organisational actors actively say and do things in their continual attempts to attain a more complete, acceptable and congruent identity. In contexts with high degrees of uncertainty and heavily power- and conflict-laden relationships, both discourses of how strategy is made and the practices involved in it can be seen as exercises (askesis) which strategists actively perform to better embrace their responsibility of rendering the future governable for others. The paper brings together the literatures on identity and on strategic practices to show the dialectic relationship between them

The 2007 Nobel Prize in Economics: Mechanism Design Theory

The 2007 Nobel Prize in Economics has been awarded to Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin, and Roger Myerson, for their contributions to mechanism design theory. The article discusses the importance of mechanism design theory for modern economics, focusing on some of its implications for economic policy making.Nobel Prize, mechanism design, economic policy

Comparing Mutuality and Solidarity in Its Application to Disaster Ethics

Often it has been observed that in disaster situations, people (including victims) become altruistic and are very willing to listen, obey and act in a manner that would help bring an end to the situation. In this chapter, linking disaster ethics and human rights, it is argued that this indeed is how it should be, disaster or otherwise, and that we have moral duties to oneself and to others. An individual exhibiting solidarity, comradery and altruism during a disaster is indeed behaving as a reasonable Self, and exercising ethical individualism as per Gewirthian philosophy. It is the duty of the State and society to act as a supportive State and a caring society. In order to do this, we need to be conditioned for ethical rationality before any whiff of disaster arises, i.e. in our day-to-day conduct and decision-making, at a personal, institutional and transnational level. Our ethical resilience during disasters can only be as robust as our rational moral compass during ‘peace-time’. This chapter argues that Gewirthian solidarity ethics (GSE) should play a role in European policy and action in order to provide a system that conditions ethical rationality and in order to fulfil human rights. This involves addressing our current understanding of human rights as distinct categories of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights and to effect a shift towards a more holistic understanding of human rights, whereby the hierarchy of fulfilment does not always prioritise civil and political rights.Peer reviewe