A Rational and Efficient Algorithm for View Revision in Databases

The dynamics of belief and knowledge is one of the major components of any autonomous system that should be able to incorporate new pieces of information. In this paper, we argue that to apply rationality result of belief dynamics theory to various practical problems, it should be generalized in two respects: first of all, it should allow a certain part of belief to be declared as immutable; and second, the belief state need not be deductively closed. Such a generalization of belief dynamics, referred to as base dynamics, is presented, along with the concept of a generalized revision algorithm for Horn knowledge bases. We show that Horn knowledge base dynamics has interesting connection with kernel change and abduction. Finally, we also show that both variants are rational in the sense that they satisfy certain rationality postulates stemming from philosophical works on belief dynamics

Credibility limited revision

Five types of constructions are introduced for non-prioritized belief revision, i.e., belief revision in which the input sentence is not always accepted. These constructions include generalizations of entrenchment-based and sphere-based revision. Axiomatic characterizations are provided, and close interconnections are shown to hold between the different constructions.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Object knowledge base revision

crampe1998aInternational audienceA revision framework for object-based knowledge representation languages is presented. It is defined by adapting logical revision to objects and characterised both semantically and syntactically. The syntactic analysis of revision shows that it can be easily interpreted in terms of object structures (e.g. moving classes or enlarging domains). This is the source of the implementation and it enables users to be involved in the revision process

Revision in networks of ontologies

euzenat2015aInternational audienceNetworks of ontologies are made of a collection of logic theories, called ontologies, related by alignments. They arise naturally in distributed contexts in which theories are developed and maintained independently, such as the semantic web. In networks of ontologies, inconsistency can come from two different sources: local inconsistency in a particular ontology or alignment, and global inconsistency between them. Belief revision is well-defined for dealing with ontologies; we investigate how it can apply to networks of ontologies. We formulate revision postulates for alignments and networks of ontologies based on an abstraction of existing semantics of networks of ontologies. We show that revision operators cannot be simply based on local revision operators on both ontologies and alignments. We adapt the partial meet revision framework to networks of ontologies and show that it indeed satisfies the revision postulates. Finally, we consider strategies based on network characteristics for designing concrete revision operators

Credibility-limited base revision: new classes and their characterizations

In this paper we study a kind of operator —known as credibility-limited base revisions— which addresses two of the main issues that have been pointed out to the AGM model of belief change. Indeed, on the one hand, these operators are defined on belief bases (rather than belief sets) and, on the other hand, they are constructed with the underlying idea that not all new information is accepted. We propose twenty different classes of credibility limited base revision operators and obtain axiomatic characterizations for each of them. Additionally we thoroughly investigate the interrelations (in the sense of inclusion) among all those classes. More precisely, we analyse whether each one of those classes is or is not (strictly) contained in each of the remaining ones.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Difference-Making Conditionals and Connexivity

Today there is a wealth of fascinating studies of connexive logical systems. But sometimes it looks as if connexive logic is still in search of a convincing interpretation that explains in intuitive terms why the connexive principles should be valid. In this paper I argue that difference-making conditionals as presented in Rott (Review of Symbolic Logic 15, 2022) offer one principled way of interpreting connexive principles. From a philosophical point of view, the idea of difference-making demands full, unrestricted connexivity, because neither logical truths nor contradictions or other absurdities can ever ‘make a difference’ (i.e., be relevantly connected) to anything. However, difference-making conditionals have so far been only partially connexive. I show how the existing analysis of difference-making conditionals can be reshaped to obtain full connexivity. The classical AGM belief revision model is replaced by a conceivability-limited revision model that serves as the semantic base for the analysis. The key point of the latter is that the agent should never accept any absurdities

Advances on belief base dynamics

The main goal underlying the research area of belief change consists in finding appropriate ways of modelling the belief state of a rational agent and, additionally, the changes which occur in such a state when the agent receives new information. The most important model of belief change is the so-called AGM model, proposed in [AGM85]. In this model, the belief state of an agent is represented by a belief set—a deductively closed set of sentences. A change consists in adding or removing a specific sentence from a belief set to obtain a new belief set. Two of the main shortcomings pointed out to the AGM model of belief change are the use of belief sets to represent belief states and the (unrealistic) acceptance of any new piece of information. In this thesis we address both those issues. We present axiomatic characterizations for ensconcement-based contractions and for brutal contractions, two kinds of belief bases contraction operators introduced in [Wil94b] that are based on the concept of ensconcement, which is a generalization to the case of belief bases of the concept of epistemic entrenchment introduced in [Ga¨r88, GM88]. We compare the axiomatic characterizations of these operators with those of other well-known base contraction operators and study the interrelations among the former and the contraction operators based on epistemic entrenchments. We study non-prioritized base change operators, namely shielded base contractions and credibility-limited base revisions. We propose several different classes of shielded base contractions and obtain axiomatic characterizations for each one of them. Additionally we thoroughly investigate the interrelations (in the sense of inclusion) among all those classes. Afterwards we perform a similar study for credibility-limited base revisions. Finally, we study the interrelation between the different proposed classes of operators of credibility-limited base revision and of shielded contraction by means of the consistency-preserving Levi identity and the Harper identity.O objetivo principal da a´rea de revis˜ao de cren¸cas ´e encontrar modelos que permitam modelar o estado de cren¸cas de um agente racional, bem como as mudan¸cas que ocorrem nesse estado de cren¸cas quando o agente recebe novas informa¸co˜es. O modelo mais influente desta ´area ´e o chamado modelo AGM proposto em [AGM85]. Neste modelo, o estado de cren¸cas de um agente ´e representado por um conjunto de cren¸cas—conjunto de f´ormulas dedutivamente fechado. Uma mudan¸ca consiste em adicionar ou remover uma fo´rmula espec´ıfica de um conjunto de cren¸cas para obter um novo conjunto de crenc¸as. Dois dos principais problemas apontados ao modelo AGM sa˜o o uso de conjuntos de cren¸cas para representar estados de cren¸ca e a aceita¸ca˜o (irrealista) de qualquer nova informa¸ca˜o. Nesta tese abordamos ambas as quest˜oes. Apresentamos caracteriza¸co˜es axiom´aticas para contra¸c˜oes baseadas em ensconcements e para contra¸c˜oes brutais, dois tipos de operadores de contrac¸˜ao em bases de cren¸cas introduzidos em [Wil94b] e que se baseiam no conceito de ensconcement— generaliza¸ca˜o em bases de cren¸cas, do conceito de epistemic entrenchment introduzido em [Ga¨r88, GM88]. Comparamos as caracteriza¸c˜oes axiom´aticas destes operadores com as de outros operadores de contrac¸˜ao em bases bem conhecidos e estudamos as inter-rela¸co˜es entre os primeiros e os operadores de contra¸ca˜o baseados em epistemic entrenchments. Estudamos operadores de mudanc¸as de crenc¸as na˜o-priorizados em bases, nomeadamente contra¸c˜oes protegidas e revis˜oes com limite de credibilidade. Propomos v´arias classes de operadores de contra¸c˜oes protegidas e obtemos teoremas de representa¸ca˜o para cada uma dessas classes. Investigamos, igualmente, as inter-rela¸co˜es (no sentido de inclusa˜o) entre todas essas classes. Posteriormente, realizamos um estudo semelhante para reviso˜es com limite de credibilidade. Finalmente, estudamos a inter-relac¸˜ao entre as diferentes classes propostas de operadores (definidos em bases de cren¸cas) de revis˜ao com limite de credibilidade e de contra¸co˜es protegidas atrav´es da identidade de Levi conservadora-da-consistˆencia e da identidade de Harper