Reapportionments of State Legislatures—Legal Requirements

The continuously rising attention to and practice of eco-city development in Sweden and China, as well as the countries’ active cooperation has motivated this study and the exploration of eco-city development in these two countries. In eco-city development, diverse environmental issues may well be beyond the planning sector’s capacity and need to be resolved elsewhere by other authorities and agencies in such areas as energy, water and traffic. This may in practice require the reframing of certain institutions to ensure that relevant sector authorities, scientific institutions and actors have responsibilities for integrative tasks and can cooperate effectively. The study aims to investigate how institutional conditions affect environmental integration in urban planning. The approach used is the exploration of how different institutional conditions promote and/or hinder environmental integration by the examination of four examples of eco-city development in Sweden and China. Based on theories of institutions, Environmental Policy Integration (EPI) and sustainable urban planning, an analytical framework is used to describe institutional conditions related to formal rulemaking, informal rules and administrative management and organizations. Formal rules provide framework and legitimacy for guiding and enforcing actors in the practice of realizing environmental integration in urban planning. Meanwhile, informal rules; i.e. wills, interests, understanding and knowledge, could considerably affect the design of formal rules and how they are to be implemented. Administrative management and organization serve to realize environmental integration following the formal rules, but the informal institutional conditions of e.g. officials’ interests, understanding, knowledge and experience, as well as political support, affect the organizations’ performance and abilities for implementation, which in turn also largely depends on the specific organizational settings. All three need to be combined to achieve environmental integration in sustainable urban planning, since each one has its own strengths and weaknesses and they gradually affect each other in practices.QC 20140908</p

Measuring the Compactness of Political Districting Plans

The United States Supreme Court has long recognized compactness as an important principle in assessing the constitutionality of political districting plans. We propose a measure of compactness based on the distance between voters within the same district relative to the minimum distance achievable -- which we coin the relative proximity index. We prove that any compactness measure which satisfies three desirable properties (anonymity of voters, efficient clustering, and invariance to scale, population density, and number of districts) ranks districting plans identically to our index. We then calculate the relative proximity index for the 106th Congress, requiring us to solve for each state's maximal compactness; an NP-hard problem. Using two properties of maximally compact districts, we prove they are power diagrams and develop an algorithm based on these insights. The correlation between our index and the commonly-used measures of dispersion and perimeter is -.22 and -.06, respectively. We conclude by estimating seat-vote curves under maximally compact districts for several large states. The fraction of additional seats a party obtains when their average vote increases is significantly greater under maximally compact districting plans, relative to the existing plans.

A Vote Cast; A Vote Counted: Quantifying Voting Rights through Proportional Representation in Congressional Elections

The current winner-take-all or first-past-the-post system of voting promotes an inefficient market where votes are often wasted. In this system, representatives are selected from a single district in which the candidate with the plurality of votes gains victory. Candidates who appear non-generic can rarely, if ever, expect to receive the most votes in this system. This phenomenon is especially apparent when African-Americans and other minority groups seek elected office. In part because white voters constitute at least a plurality of voters in every state except Hawaii, minorities in the forty-nine other states have had historically little success in gaining election to the United States Senate. As a consequence, the only real opportunity for minorities to gain access to federal elected office remains limited to the United States House of Representatives. The flaws of the winner-take-all-system and single member district are readily apparent. First, significant blocs of voters are consistently denied the right to elect a truly preferred candidate, because such candidates can almost never expect to receive the most votes. Consequently, many potential candidates are deterred from running because the prospect for victory is so slim. As a result, large numbers of voters are often forced to select the candidate they believe has the greatest chance of winning, rather than their preferred candidate. In addition, many voters in a winner-take-all system are represented by persons they did not support. For instance, in 1994, while Democratic candidates for Iowa\u27s five seats in the United States House of Representatives received 42% of the total votes cast in Iowa, none of Iowa\u27s five congressional seats was won by a Democrat. Similarly, in 1992, Republican congressional candidates garnered 48% of the two-party statewide vote in North Carolina, but won only four of twelve seats. Thus, many losing votes may be considered wasted. Wasted votes may also include those cast for the victorious candidate: any vote cast in addition to the number needed for victory might as well have never been cast. Thus, in landslide races, where the prospect of wasting one\u27s vote is high, the incentive to vote seems almost non-existent. Since over 75 percent of congressional races in any given election tend to be landslide races, many eligible voters do not vote. This Article considers an alternative system of voting: proportional representation, of which there are two basic forms, List System and Choice Voting/Single Transferable Vote. In the list system, a voter simply selects one party and its slate of candidates. Thereafter, the seats are allocated on the basis of the share of votes each party earned. For instance, in the Iowa congressional example discussed above, instead of receiving zero congressional seats with 42% of the statewide vote, the state Democratic Party would have earned two seats out of the available five. Often, with the list system, a minimum share of votes (such as 5%) is required for a party to earn representation. Alternatively, in a choice voting system, a voter simply ranks candidates in order of preference (first choice, second choice, etc.). Once a voter\u27s first choice is elected or eliminated, the voter\u27s excess votes are transferred to subsequent preferred candidates until all the seats are filled. In either arrangement, proportional representation would diminish wasted votes, provide greater opportunities for minority groups to gain access to legislative positions, and offer greater incentive for eligible voters to vote. Though proportional representation risks the election of fringe groups (such as hate groups), a minimum bar of 5% to 7% would likely neutralize that possibility. All told, proportional representation appears to be an intriguing alternative to our present winner-take-all voting system