222 research outputs found
Perfect equilibrium in a model of competitive arms accumulation
Equilibrium Theory
âLivingâ wage, class conflict and ethnic strife
We examine how group-specific differences in reservation wage, arising due to asymmetries in social entitlements, impact on distribution via the joint determination of class conflict between workers and employers, and âethnicâ conflict among workers. We model a two-dimensional contest, where two unions, representing different sections of workers, jointly but non-cooperatively invest resources against employers in enforcing an exogenously given rent, while also contesting one another. The rent arises from a âlivingâ wage, set above reservation wage rates via labour regulations. We show that high reservation wage workers gain, and employers lose, from better social entitlements for low reservation wage workers. The latter however benefit, with employers and against the former, from weak labour regulations. When minority/immigrant workers are marginalized both in the labour market and in non-wage entitlements, improving job access and expanding âsocial supportâ has contradictory effects on class and ethnic conflicts. âTrade unionismâ, i.e. political articulation of shared economic interests alone, appears insufficient to temper ethnic conflicts among workers.Class conflict, Ethnic conflict, Living wage, Labour regulation, Social entitlement, Affirmative action, Distribution.
âLivingâ Wage, Class Conflict and Ethnic Strife
We examine how group-specific differences in reservation wage, arising due to asymmetries in social entitlements, impact on distribution via the joint determination of class conflict between workers and employers, and âethnicâ conflict among workers. We model a two-dimensional contest, where two unions, representing different sections of workers, jointly but non-cooperatively invest resources against employers in enforcing an exogenously given rent, while also contesting one another. The rent arises from a âlivingâ wage, set above reservation wage rates via labour regulations. We show that high reservation wage workers gain, and employers lose, from better social entitlements for low reservation wage workers. The latter however benefit, with employers and against the former, from weak labour regulations. When minority/immigrant workers are marginalized both in the labour market and in non-wage entitlements, improving job access and expanding âsocial supportâ has contradictory effects on class and ethnic conflicts. âTrade unionismâ, i.e. political articulation of shared economic interests alone, appears insufficient to temper ethnic conflicts among workers.class conflict, ethnic conflict, living wage, labour regulation, social entitlement, affirmative action, Distribution
Institutional design and spatial (in)equality - the Janus face of economic integration
This paper analyzes within a spatial endogenous growth setting the impact of public policy coordination on agglomeration. Governments in each of the two symmetric regions provide a local public input that becomes globally effective due to integration. Micro-foundation of governmental behavior is based on three different coordination schemes: autarky, full or partial coordination. Scale effects act as agglomeration force and in addition to private capital agglomeration increase the concentration of the public input. Integration promotes dispersion forces with respect to the distribution of physical capital which are based on decreasing private returns. However, within the governmentsâ decision on the concentration of the public input, increasing integration reinforces agglomeration because it promotes the interregional productive use of the public input. Taking feedback effects between the private and the public sector into account leads to mutual reinforcement, hence agglomeration forces almost always dominate and the spreading equilibrium becomes unstable. If convergence is a separate (additional) political objective, it needs sustained additional political effort
'Living' wage, class conflict and ethnic strife
We examine how group-specific differences in reservation wage, arising due to asymmetries in social entitlements, impact distribution via the joint determination of class conflict between workers and employers, and 'ethnic' conflict among workers. We model a two-dimensional contest, where two unions, representing different sections of workers, jointly but non-cooperatively invest resources against employers in enforcing an exogenously given rent, while also contesting one another. The rent arises from a 'living' wage, set above reservation wage rates via labour regulations. We show that high reservation wage workers gain, and employers lose, from better social entitlements for low reservation wage workers. The latter however benefit, with employers and against the former, from weak labour regulations. When minority/ immigrant workers are marginalized both in the labour market and in non-wage entitlements, improving job access and expanding 'social support' has contradictory effects on class and ethnic conflicts. 'Trade unionism', i.e. political articulation of shared economic interests alone, appears insufficient to temper ethnic conflicts among workers
Information, expectations and macroeconomic policy.
PhDThe thesis is motivated by some important recent developments
in macroeconomic theory and the theory of macroeconomic policy. A
common theme emphasized throughout is the integration of rational
expectations into macroeconomic policy evaluation and the sophism
of conducting evaluations predicated on alternative expectations
hypotheses.
The application of rational expectations to optimal control
theory inspires a game-theoretic paragigm for the derivation of
optimal economic policies. This transform fundamentally the way
in which economists should address the control problem. The recent
proliferation of research in the area is subject to the first
systematic investigation. The necessity for assimilating model
uncertainty into the problem of policy evaluation is emphasized.
This is made operational with respect to a particulaxly topical
issue concerning the optimal choice of monetary instrument.
A substantial part of the thesis is devoted to a rigorous
exploration of the information structure conditioning expectations.
Particular emphasis is on partial ignorance. An intelligent system
can exploit statistical filtering techniques to extract the information
content of certain economic variables. The thesis illustrates
vividly the potentially critical dependence of the laws of motion of
the system on the information structure. it calls for a detailed
explication of that structure a3 a pre-requisite for any analysis and
highlights properties of certain earlier treatments which are
symptomatic of their neglect of this.
Analytical work is combined with computer simulations of a
larger econometric model. Higher order dynamics are the realised
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consequences of asset accumulati6n and the government budget
constraint. The issue of bond-financed deficit instability is
subject to extensive testing and the implications of divergent
e: cpectations mechanisms elicited
Tinbergen and Theil Meet Nash: Controllability in Policy Games
This paper generalizes the classical theory of economic policy to a static LQ-strategic context between n players. We show how this generalized version of controllability can profitably be used to deal with policy ineffectiveness issues and Nash equilibrium existence.Policy games, policy ineffectiveness, static controllability, Nash equilibrium existence
Is public co-ordination of investment in information security desirable?
This paper provides for the presentation, in an integrated manner, of a sequence of results addressing the consequences of the presence of an information steward in an ecosystem under attack and establishes the appropriate defensive investment responses, thus allowing for a cohesive understanding of the nature of the information steward in a variety of attack contexts. We determine the level of investment in information security and attacking intensity when agents react in a non-coordinated manner and compare them to the case of the systemâs coordinated response undertaken under the guidance of a steward. We show that only in the most well-designed institutional set-up the presence of the well-informed steward provides for an increase of the systemâs resilience to attacks. In the case in which both the information available to the steward and its policy instruments are curtailed, coordinated policy responses yield no additional benefits to individual agents and in some case they actually compared unfavourably to atomistic responses. The systemâs sustainability does improve in the presence of a steward, which deters attackers and reduces the numbers and intensity of attacks. In most cases, the resulting investment expenditure undertaken by the agents in the ecosystem exceeds its Pareto efficient magnitude
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