Integration of Blockchain and Auction Models: A Survey, Some Applications, and Challenges

In recent years, blockchain has gained widespread attention as an emerging technology for decentralization, transparency, and immutability in advancing online activities over public networks. As an essential market process, auctions have been well studied and applied in many business fields due to their efficiency and contributions to fair trade. Complementary features between blockchain and auction models trigger a great potential for research and innovation. On the one hand, the decentralized nature of blockchain can provide a trustworthy, secure, and cost-effective mechanism to manage the auction process; on the other hand, auction models can be utilized to design incentive and consensus protocols in blockchain architectures. These opportunities have attracted enormous research and innovation activities in both academia and industry; however, there is a lack of an in-depth review of existing solutions and achievements. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive state-of-the-art survey of these two research topics. We review the existing solutions for integrating blockchain and auction models, with some application-oriented taxonomies generated. Additionally, we highlight some open research challenges and future directions towards integrated blockchain-auction models

Optimal and Secure Electricity Market Framework for Market Operation of Multi-Microgrid Systems

Traditional power systems were typically based on bulk energy services by large utility companies. However, microgrids and distributed generations have changed the structure of modern power systems as well as electricity markets. Therefore, restructured electricity markets are needed to address energy transactions in modern power systems. In this dissertation, we developed a hierarchical and decentralized electricity market framework for multi-microgrid systems, which clears energy transactions through three market levels; Day-Ahead-Market (DAM), Hour-Ahead-Market (HAM) and Real-Time-Market (RTM). In this market, energy trades are possible between all participants within the microgrids as well as inter-microgrids transactions. In this approach, we developed a game-theoretic-based double auction mechanism for energy transactions in the DAM, while HAM and RTM are cleared by an optimization algorithm and reverse action mechanism, respectively. For data exchange among market players, we developed a secure data-centric communication approach using the Data Distribution Service. Results demonstrated that this electricity market could significantly reduce the energy price and dependency of the multi-microgrid area on the external grid. Furthermore, we developed and verified a hierarchical blockchain-based energy transaction framework for a multi-microgrid system. This framework has a unique structure, which makes it possible to check the feasibility of energy transactions from the power system point of view by evaluating transmission system constraints. The blockchain ledger summarization, microgrid equivalent model development, and market players’ security and privacy enhancement are new approaches to this framework. The research in this dissertation also addresses some ancillary services in power markets such as an optimal power routing in unbalanced microgrids, where we developed a multi-objective optimization model and verified its ability to minimize the power imbalance factor, active power losses and voltage deviation in an unbalanced microgrid. Moreover, we developed an adaptive real-time congestion management algorithm to mitigate congestions in transmission systems using dynamic thermal ratings of transmission lines. Results indicated that the developed algorithm is cost-effective, fast, and reliable for real-time congestion management cases. Finally, we completed research about the communication framework and security algorithm for IEC 61850 Routable GOOSE messages and developed an advanced protection scheme as its application in modern power systems

On the tradeoff between privacy and efficiency: A bidding mechanism for scheduling non-commercial services

Services providers, such as public healthcare systems and government agencies, are under tremendous pressure to reduce costs and improve service quality. Scheduling is an important managerial component which has considerable impact on both the costs and quality of services. Service providers need customers’ availability information to improve resource utilization. On the other hand, customers may be of “two minds” about communicating their private information. While communicating certain amount of availability might be necessary in order to obtain preferred schedules, too much communication place a potential cost due to privacy loss. In this paper, we present a bidding-based mechanism which aims at generating high quality schedules and, at the same time, protecting customers’ privacy. We show that, under the proposed bidding procedure, myopic bidding is the dominant strategy for customers. We also evaluate the privacy and efficiency performance of the proposed mechanism through a computational study

Order Flow and the Formation of Dealer Bids: Information Flows and Strategic Behavior in the Government of Canada Securities Auctions

Is order-flow an important component of private information possessed by traders in government securities markets? Utilizing a detailed data set on Government of Canada securities auctions, we argue that the answer is yes. Direct participation in these auctions is limited to government securities dealers. However, non-dealer customers can also submit bids through dealers. We document patterns of strategic behavior by both sides of the market, dealers and customers, that support the hypothesis that customer bids provide valuable order-flow information to dealers. Dealer bids respond to privately observed customer bids, and dealers observing customer bid can predict the auction cutoff price better. Customers also respond strategically to dealers' use of the information contained in their bids.

A Free Exchange e-Marketplace for Digital Services

The digital era is witnessing a remarkable evolution of digital services. While the prospects are countless, the e-marketplaces of digital services are encountering inherent game-theoretic and computational challenges that restrict the rational choices of bidders. Our work examines the limited bidding scope and the inefficiencies of present exchange e-marketplaces. To meet challenges, a free exchange e-marketplace is proposed that follows the free market economy. The free exchange model includes a new bidding language and a double auction mechanism. The rule-based bidding language enables the flexible expression of preferences and strategic conduct. The bidding message holds the attribute-valuations and bidding rules of the selected services. The free exchange deliberates on attributes and logical bidding rules for automatic deduction and formation of elicited services and bids that result in a more rapid self-managed multiple exchange trades. The double auction uses forward and reverse generalized second price auctions for the symmetric matching of multiple digital services of identical attributes and different quality levels. The proposed double auction uses tractable heuristics that secure exchange profitability, improve truthful bidding and deliver stable social efficiency. While the strongest properties of symmetric exchanges are unfeasible game-theoretically, the free exchange converges rapidly to the social efficiency, Nash truthful stability, and weak budget balance by multiple quality-levels cross-matching, constant learning and informs at repetitive thick trades. The empirical findings validate the soundness and viability of the free exchange