14 research outputs found

    Creation and detection of hardware trojans using non-invasive off-the-shelf technologies

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    As a result of the globalisation of the semiconductor design and fabrication processes, integrated circuits are becoming increasingly vulnerable to malicious attacks. The most concerning threats are hardware trojans. A hardware trojan is a malicious inclusion or alteration to the existing design of an integrated circuit, with the possible effects ranging from leakage of sensitive information to the complete destruction of the integrated circuit itself. While the majority of existing detection schemes focus on test-time, they all require expensive methodologies to detect hardware trojans. Off-the-shelf approaches have often been overlooked due to limited hardware resources and detection accuracy. With the advances in technologies and the democratisation of open-source hardware, however, these tools enable the detection of hardware trojans at reduced costs during or after production. In this manuscript, a hardware trojan is created and emulated on a consumer FPGA board. The experiments to detect the trojan in a dormant and active state are made using off-the-shelf technologies taking advantage of different techniques such as Power Analysis Reports, Side Channel Analysis and Thermal Measurements. Furthermore, multiple attempts to detect the trojan are demonstrated and benchmarked. Our simulations result in a state-of-the-art methodology to accurately detect the trojan in both dormant and active states using off-the-shelf hardware

    Creation and detection of hardware trojans using non-invasive off-the-shelf technologies

    Get PDF
    As a result of the globalisation of the semiconductor design and fabrication processes, integrated circuits are becoming increasingly vulnerable to malicious attacks. The most concerning threats are hardware trojans. A hardware trojan is a malicious inclusion or alteration to the existing design of an integrated circuit, with the possible effects ranging from leakage of sensitive information to the complete destruction of the integrated circuit itself. While the majority of existing detection schemes focus on test-time, they all require expensive methodologies to detect hardware trojans. Off-the-shelf approaches have often been overlooked due to limited hardware resources and detection accuracy. With the advances in technologies and the democratisation of open-source hardware, however, these tools enable the detection of hardware trojans at reduced costs during or after production. In this manuscript, a hardware trojan is created and emulated on a consumer FPGA board. The experiments to detect the trojan in a dormant and active state are made using off-the-shelf technologies taking advantage of different techniques such as Power Analysis Reports, Side Channel Analysis and Thermal Measurements. Furthermore, multiple attempts to detect the trojan are demonstrated and benchmarked. Our simulations result in a state-of-the-art methodology to accurately detect the trojan in both dormant and active states using off-the-shelf hardwar

    Silencing hardware backdoors.

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    Abstract-Hardware components can contain hidden backdoors, which can be enabled with catastrophic effects or for ill-gotten profit. These backdoors can be inserted by a malicious insider on the design team or a third-party IP provider. In this paper, we propose techniques that allow us to build trustworthy hardware systems from components designed by untrusted designers or procured from untrusted third-party IP providers. We present the first solution for disabling digital, designlevel hardware backdoors. The principle is that rather than try to discover the malicious logic in the design -an extremely hard problem -we make the backdoor design problem itself intractable to the attacker. The key idea is to scramble inputs that are supplied to the hardware units at runtime, making it infeasible for malicious components to acquire the information they need to perform malicious actions. We show that the proposed techniques cover the attack space of deterministic, digital HDL backdoors, provide probabilistic security guarantees, and can be applied to a wide variety of hardware components. Our evaluation with the SPEC 2006 benchmarks shows negligible performance loss (less than 1% on average) and that our techniques can be integrated into contemporary microprocessor designs

    Securing Soft IPs against Hardware Trojan Insertion

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    Due to the increasing complexity of hardware designs, third-party hardware Intellectual Property (IP) blocks are often incorporated in order to alleviate the burden on hardware designers. However, the prevalence use of third-party IPs has raised security concerns such as Trojans inserted by attackers. Hardware Trojans in these soft IPs are extremely difficult to detect through functional testing and no single detection methodology has been able to completely address this issue. Based on a Register-Transfer Level (RTL) and gate-level soft IP analysis method named Structural Checking, this dissertation presents a hardware Trojan detection methodology and tool by detailing the implementation of a Golden Reference Library for matching an unknown IP to a functionally similar Golden Reference. The matching result is quantified in percentages so that two different IPs with similar functions have a high percentage match. A match of the unknown IP to a whitelisted IP advances it to be identified with a known functionality while a match to a blacklisted IP causes it to be detected with Trojan. Examples are given on how this methodology can successfully identify hardware Trojans inserted in unknown third-party IPs. In addition to soft IPs analysis, Structural Checking provides data flow tracking capability to help users discover vulnerable nodes of the soft IPs. Structural Checking is implemented with a graphical user interface, so it does not take users much time to use the tool

    Persistent monitoring of digital ICs to verify hardware trust

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    The specialization of the semiconductor industry has resulted in a global Integrated Circuit (IC) supply chain that is susceptible to hardware Trojans - malicious circuitry that is embedded into the chip during the design cycle. This nefarious attack could compromise the missioncritical systems which implement these devices. While a trusted domestic IC supply chain exists with resources such as the Trusted Foundry Program, it\u27s highly desirable to utilize the high yield, fast turn-around time, low cost, and leading-edge technology of the global IC supply chain. Research into the verification of hardware trust has made significant progress in recent years but is still far from a single, comprehensive solution. Most proposed solutions are one-time implementable methods that attempt to detect hardware Trojans during the verification stage of the IC development process. While this is a desirable solution, it\u27s not realistic given the current limitations of hardware Trojan detection techniques. We propose a more comprehensive solution that involves the persistent verification of hardware trust in the field, in addition to several one-time methods implemented during IC verification. We define a persistent verification framework that involves the use of a few ICs from a secure process flow to persistently monitor and verify the operation of several untrusted ICs from the global supply chain. This allows the system integrator to realize the benefits of the global IC supply chain while maintaining the integrity of the system. We develop a system monitor which filters the IO of untrusted digital ICs for a set of patterns, which we refer to as digital signal signatures, to verify the operation of the devices

    An On-chip PVT Resilient Short Time Measurement Technique

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    As the CMOS technology nodes continue to shrink, the challenges of developing manufacturing tests for integrated circuits become more difficult to address. To detect parametric faults of new generation of integrated circuits such as 3D ICs, on-chip short-time intervals have to be accurately measured. The accuracy of an on-chip time measurement module is heavily affected by Process, supply Voltage, and Temperature (PVT) variations. This work presents a new on-chip time measurement scheme where the undesired effects of PVT variations are attenuated significantly. To overcome the effects of PVT variations on short-time measurement, phase locking methodology is utilized to implement a robust Vernier delay line. A prototype Time-to-Digital Converter (TDC) has been fabricated using TSMC 0.180 µm CMOS technology and experimental measurements have been carried out to verify the performance parameters of the TDC. The measurement results indicate that the proposed solution reduces the effects of PVT variations by more than tenfold compared to a conventional on-chip TDC. A coarse-fine time interval measurement scheme which is resilient to the PVT variations is also proposed. In this approach, two Delay Locked Loops (DLLs) are utilized to minimize the effects of PVT on the measured time intervals. The proposed scheme has been implemented using CMOS 65nm technology. Simulation results using Advanced Design System (ADS) indicate that the measurement resolution varies by less than 0.1ps with ±15% variations of the supply voltage. The proposed method also presents a robust performance against process and temperature variations. The measurement accuracy changes by a maximum of 0.05ps from slow to fast corners. The implemented TDC presents a robust performance against temperature variations too and its measurement accuracy varies a few femto-seconds from -40 ºC to +100 ºC. The principle of robust short-time measurement was used in practice to design and implement a state-of-the-art Coordinate Measuring Machine (CMM) for an industry partner to measure geometrical features of transmission parts with micrometer resolution. The solution developed for the industry partner has resulted in a patent and a product in the market. The on-chip short-time measurement technology has also been utilized to develop a solution to detect Hardware Trojans

    Modeling and model-aware signal processing methods for enhancement of optical systems

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    Theoretical and numerical modeling of optical systems are increasingly being utilized in a wide range of areas in physics and engineering for characterizing and improving existing systems or developing new methods. This dissertation focuses on determining and improving the performance of imaging and non-imaging optical systems through modeling and developing model-aware enhancement methods. We evaluate the performance, demonstrate enhancements in terms of resolution and light collection efficiency, and improve the capabilities of the systems through changes to the system design and through post-processing techniques. We consider application areas in integrated circuit (IC) imaging for fault analysis and malicious circuitry detection, and free-form lens design for creating prescribed illumination patterns. The first part of this dissertation focuses on sub-surface imaging of ICs for fault analysis using a solid immersion lens (SIL) microscope. We first derive the Green's function of the microscope and use it to determine its resolution limits for bulk silicon and silicon-on-insulator (SOI) chips. We then propose an optimization framework for designing super-resolving apodization masks that utilizes the developed model and demonstrate the trade-offs in designing such masks. Finally, we derive the full electromagnetic model of the SIL microscope that models the image of an arbitrary sub-surface structure. With the rapidly shrinking dimensions of ICs, we are increasingly limited in resolving the features and identifying potential modifications despite the resolution improvements provided by the state-of-the-art microscopy techniques and enhancement methods described here. In the second part of this dissertation, we shift our focus away from improving the resolution and consider an optical framework that does not require high resolution imaging for detecting malicious circuitry. We develop a classification-based high-throughput gate identification method that utilizes the physical model of the optical system. We then propose a lower-throughput system to increase the detection accuracy, based on higher resolution imaging to supplement the former method. Finally, we consider the problem of free-form lens design for forming prescribed illumination patterns as a non-imaging application. Common methods that design free-form lenses for forming patterns consider the input light source to be a point source, however using extended light sources with such lenses lead to significant blurring in the resulting pattern. We propose a deconvolution-based framework that utilizes the lens geometry to model the blurring effects and eliminates this degradation, resulting in sharper patterns
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