The role of non-state actors in regime formation: Case study on Internet governance.

Many scholars argue that the Internet is a symbol of globalization and avoidance of state control. The Internet governance negotiations, which aims to establish an international regime for the Internet, is conducted through a multi-stakeholder setting associated with extensive involvement of non-state actors. This has been viewed as an indicator for a \u27diminishing state role\u27 in international relations; particularly, formation of international regimes. This study indicates that the role of states does not diminish in regime formation. States, especially great powers, are the main actors that set international principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures. They create regimes in order to regulate international behavior as to global sectors, including the Internet. States deliberately enable certain non-state actors to participate in regime formation and governance of some global sectors, based on conscious perception of the utility and usefulness of such participation

ICANN : guilty as charged

Discusses the role of ICANN (the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers), a private not-for-profit California corporation created to manage the Internet domain name system and take the regulatory action that the US Department of Commerce (DoC) was unable or unwilling to handle directly. Considers ICANN's legal status and policy-making activities. Explores the criticisms that have been levelled at ICANN, relating to: (1) the DoC's relationship with ICANN; (2) the violation of competition laws; and (3) the effect of ICANN's actions in Europe

Legal Mechanisms for Governing the Transition of Key Domain Name Functions to the Global Multi-Stakeholder Community

This Chapter proposes an alternative approach to the IANA transition that migrates the existing core contractual requirements imposed by the US government to the existing IANA functions customers. It also advances modest internal accountability revisions that could be undertaken within ICANN’s existing structure. Specifically, it advocates that the Independent Review Tribunal charged with reviewing certain ICANN board of directors-related decisions be selected by a multi-stakeholder committee rather than being subject to approval by ICANN and expanding the grounds for review to cover all of the rubrics recommended by ICANN’s “Improving Institutional Confidence” process in 2008-2009, including fairness, fidelity to the power, cogency of decision making and addressing the public interest. This new tribunal could be drawn from a standing panel of internationally recognized relevant technical experts, as well as internationally recognized jurists. Members of ICANN’s various stakeholder groups and the public should be able to make comments on the proposed bench before final appointment

Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitution

The Internet relies on an underlying centralized hierarchy built into the domain name system (DNS) to control the routing for the vast majority of Internet traffic. At its heart is a single data file, known as the root. Control of the root provides singular power in cyberspace. This Article first describes how the United States government found itself in control of the root. It then describes how, in an attempt to meet concerns that the United States could so dominate an Internet chokepoint, the U. S. Department of Commerce (DoC) summoned into being the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), a formally private nonprofit California corporation. DoC then signed contracts with ICANN in order to clothe it with most of the U. S. government\u27s power over the DNS, and convinced other parties to recognize ICANN\u27s authority. ICANN then took regulatory actions that the U. S. Department of Commerce was unable or unwilling to make itself, including the imposition on all registrants of Internet addresses of an idiosyncratic set of arbitration rules and procedures that benefit third-party trademark holders. Professor Froomkin then argues that the use of ICANN to regulate in the stead of an executive agency violates fundamental values and policies designed to ensure democratic control over the use of government power, and sets a precedent that risks being expanded into other regulatory activities. He argues that DoC\u27s use of ICANN to make rules either violates the APA\u27s requirement for notice and comment in rulemaking and judicial review, or it violates the Constitution\u27s nondelegation doctrine. Professor Froomkin reviews possible alternatives to ICANN, and ultimately proposes a decentralized structure in which the namespace of the DNS is spread out over a transnational group of policy partners with DoC

Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitution

The Internet relies on an underlying centralized hierarchy built into the domain name system (DNS) to control the routing for the vast majority of Internet traffic. At its heart is a single data file, known as the root. Control of the root provides singular power in cyberspace. This Article first describes how the United States government found itself in control of the root. It then describes how, in an attempt to meet concerns that the United States could so dominate an Internet chokepoint, the U. S. Department of Commerce (DoC) summoned into being the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), a formally private nonprofit California corporation. DoC then signed contracts with ICANN in order to clothe it with most of the U. S. government\u27s power over the DNS, and convinced other parties to recognize ICANN\u27s authority. ICANN then took regulatory actions that the U. S. Department of Commerce was unable or unwilling to make itself, including the imposition on all registrants of Internet addresses of an idiosyncratic set of arbitration rules and procedures that benefit third-party trademark holders. Professor Froomkin then argues that the use of ICANN to regulate in the stead of an executive agency violates fundamental values and policies designed to ensure democratic control over the use of government power, and sets a precedent that risks being expanded into other regulatory activities. He argues that DoC\u27s use of ICANN to make rules either violates the APA\u27s requirement for notice and comment in rulemaking and judicial review, or it violates the Constitution\u27s nondelegation doctrine. Professor Froomkin reviews possible alternatives to ICANN, and ultimately proposes a decentralized structure in which the namespace of the DNS is spread out over a transnational group of policy partners with DoC