The Turing Machine on the Dissecting Table

Since the beginning of the twenty-first century there has been an increasing awareness that software rep- resents a blind spot in new media theory. The growing interest in software also influences the argument in this paper, which sets out from the assumption that Alan M. Turing's concept of the universal machine, the first theoretical description of a computer program, is a kind of bachelor machine. Previous writings based on a similar hypothesis have focused either on a comparison of the universal machine and the bachelor machine in terms of the similarities of their structural features, or they have taken the bachelor machine as a metaphor for a man or a computer. Unlike them, this paper stresses the importance of the con- text as a key to interpreting the universal Turing machine as a bachelor machine and, potentially, as a self-portrait

ABSTRACTS

AbstractThe purpose of this department is to give sufficient information about the subject matter of each publication to enable users to decide whether to read it. It is our intention to cover all books, articles, and other materials in the field.Books for abstracting and eventual review should be sent to this department. Materials should be sent to Prof. David E. Zitarelli, Department of Mathematics, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA 19122, U.S.A. (e-mail: [email protected])Readers are invited to send reprints, autoabstracts, corrections, additions, and notices of publications that have been overlooked. Be sure to include complete bibliographic information, as well as transliteration and translation for non-European languages. We need volunteers willing to cover one or more journals for this department.In order to facilitate reference and indexing, entries are given abstract numbers which appear at the end following the symbol #. A triple numbering system is used: the first number indicates the volume, the second the issue number, and the third the sequential number within that issue. For example, the abstracts for Volume 20, Number 1, are numbered: 20.1.1, 20.1.2, 20.1.3, etc.For reviews and abstracts published in Volumes 1 through 13 there are anauthor indexin Volume 13, Number 4, and asubject indexin Volume 14, Number 1.The initials in parentheses at the end of an entry indicate the abstractor. In this issue there are abstracts by Vı́ctor Albis (Bogotá), Irving Anellis (Ames, IA), Thomas L. Bartlow (Villanova, PA), David Bressoud (St. Paul, MN), Catherine Goldstein (Paris), Herbert Kasube (Peoria, IL), Albert C. Lewis (Hamilton), Laura Nurzia (Reading, GB), James V. Rauff (Decatur, IL), Paul Wolfson (West Chester), and David E. Zitarelli

Lessons from the history and philosophy of science regarding the Research Assessment Exercise

The Research Assessment Exercise (henceforth abbreviated to RAE) was introduced in 1986 by Thatcher, and was continued by Blair. So it has now been running for 21 years. During this time, the rules governing the RAE have changed considerably, and the interval between successive RAEs has also varied. These changes are not of great importance as far as the argument of this paper is concerned. We will concentrate on the main features of the RAE which can be summarised as follows

How to be naïve about the mind

This dissertation defends common-sense views of the mind by com- bating two widespread tendencies among philosophers. One such tendency is to eliminate: to resolve puzzles about the mind by denying the existence of or- dinary mental features. For instance, many think that while we can experience the shape, color, and texture of a baseball, we cannot experience the time it takes for a baseball to fall to the ground or the number of times it bounces — indeed, we cannot experience any temporal features. The other tendency is to inflate: to resolve puzzles about the mind by positing new and unusual mental features. For instance, it is almost universally accepted among philosophers that to allow for the rationality of agents, especially those like Lois Lane and Oedipus, we must posit guises (or senses, or modes of presentation) under which agents think. Against these tendencies, I argue that we can resolve puzzles about the mind without invoking new features or denying ordinary ones. In chapter one I confront ‘Frege puzzles’ concerning Lois Lane and show that there several distinct yet often-conflated issues at play. Moreover, the plausibility of such puzzles depends on an equivocation between them. Once disentangled, it is clear there are simple explanations of Lois’ rationality that do not employ guises. In chapter two I confront the Knowledge Argument, which aims to establish that Mary the color scientist learns a non-physical fact upon seeing red for the first time, and by extension that the mind is not physical. The most popular responses to this argument invoke special mental features, including so-called phenomenal concepts, knowledge by acquaintance, and certain mental abilities. I argue for a simple response to the argument which does not invoke any special mental features. On the simple response, Mary is simply misled into thinking she’s learned something when she has not. In chapter three I confront a puzzle about temporal experience that many take to suggest we do not experience temporal features. I argue that experiencing is a process rather than a state (more like running than like being tall) and that this distinction resolves the puzzle: we experience temporal features over periods of time but not in virtue of experiencing them at instants during that time (just as one runs over periods of time but not in virtue of running at instants during that time).Philosoph

Interpretations of Bicoherence in Space & Lab Plasma Dynamics

The application of bicoherence analysis to plasma research, particularly in non-linear, coupled-wave regimes, has thus far been significantly belied by poor resolution in time, and/or outright destruction of frequency information. Though the typical power spectrum cloaks the phase-coherency between frequencies, Fourier transforms of higher-order convolutions provide an n-dimensional spectrum which is adept at elucidating n-wave phase coherence. As such, this investigation focuses on the utility of the normalized bispectrum for detection of wave-wave coupling in general, with emphasis on distinct implications within the scope of non-linear plasma physics. Interpretations of bicoherent features are given for time series from shots at the DIII-D tokamak facility; the solar wind, as measured by the Cluster-II satellite installation; a van der Pol oscillator; and various audio signals, both recorded and contrived. Evaluations of the bicoherence exhibited by simple harmonic relationships are contrasted with those displaying truly non-linear signatures, and the temporal dynamics of their respective bispectra are assessed. Also considered are the curatives and caveats of cogently condensing these 4-dimensional data

Boundary -work in United States psychology: A study of three interdisciplinary programs

Between 1970 and 2000 scientists from three interdisciplinary programs---evolutionary psychology, cognitive science, and chaos theory---contributed to changing U.S. psychology\u27s disciplinary boundaries. These interdisciplinary scientists brought about this change through their conceptual, material, and social practices. Psychologists used boundary-work as a means to control the influx of these various practices. Boundary-work connotes activities that promote scientists\u27 epistemic authority in society. Boundary-work also serves to demarcate a science\u27s particular collection of knowledge from other collections. Through their boundary-work activities, various psychologists resisted some of the practices of these interdisciplinary scientists while making accommodations for other types of practices. These resistances and accommodations illustrate the ways in which psychologists conveyed their epistemic authority and demarcated their discipline\u27s boundaries between these three decades. The purpose of my dissertation is to describe psychologists\u27 boundary-work in reaction to the introduction of these interdisciplinary programs\u27 practices between 1970 and 2000. First, I present an overview of psychology\u27s complex disciplinary boundaries. I then use the history of psychology and sociology of scientific knowledge literature to describe the nature of boundary-work activities. Next, I present the foundational components and a brief history of each interdisciplinary program. Fourth, I outline each program\u27s conceptual, material, and social practices. Lastly, I discuss psychologists\u27 resistances and accommodations to each interdisciplinary program\u27s practices with reference to how they affected psychology\u27s disciplinary boundaries. My results indicate that certain psychologists most often resisted evolutionary psychologists\u27, cognitive scientists\u27, and chaos theorists\u27 conceptual practices. Psychologists\u27 resistances seemed ineffective in preventing these conceptual practices from entering the discipline and did not stop other psychologists from using them. Accommodations occurred for all types of practices for all three programs, indicating that psychology\u27s disciplinary boundaries are relatively permeable. I argue that psychologists made accommodations for these practices to increase their epistemic authority within the scientific community and throughout society. Finally, I discuss the advantages of writing psychology\u27s history through an examination of psychologists\u27 boundary-work

If I Can\u27t Predict My Future, Why Can AI? Exploring Human Interaction with Predictive Analytics

This research study seeks to understand how AI-based chatbots can potentially be leveraged as a tool in a PSYOP. This study is methodologically driven as it employs validated scales concerning suggestibility and human-computer interaction to assess how participants interact with a specific AI chatbot, Replika. Recent studies demonstrate the capability of GPT-based analytics to influence user’s moral judgements, and this paper is interested in exploring why. Results will help draw conclusions regarding human interaction with predictive analytics (in this case a free GPT-based chatbot, Replika) to understand if suggestibility (how easily influenced someone generally is) impacts the overall usability of AI chatbots. This project will help assess how much of a concern predictive AI chatbots should be considered as virtual AI influencers and other bot-based propaganda modalities emerge in the contemporary media environment. This study uses the CASA paradigm, medium theory, and Boyd’s theory of conflict to explore how factors that often drive human computer interaction— like anthropomorphic autonomy and suspension of disbelief— potentially relate to suggestibility or chatbot usability. Overall, this study is interested in specifically exploring if suggestion can predict usability in AI chatbots

John Templeton Foundation: Capabilities Report

This annual report, celebrating the 25th anniversary of the foundation, includes letters from its leaders, a history of the foundation, details of current grantmaking and other activities, financial statements, and lists of trustees