38 research outputs found
Fast Iterative Combinatorial Auctions via Bayesian Learning
Iterative combinatorial auctions (CAs) are often used in multi-billion dollar
domains like spectrum auctions, and speed of convergence is one of the crucial
factors behind the choice of a specific design for practical applications. To
achieve fast convergence, current CAs require careful tuning of the price
update rule to balance convergence speed and allocative efficiency. Brero and
Lahaie (2018) recently introduced a Bayesian iterative auction design for
settings with single-minded bidders. The Bayesian approach allowed them to
incorporate prior knowledge into the price update algorithm, reducing the
number of rounds to convergence with minimal parameter tuning. In this paper,
we generalize their work to settings with no restrictions on bidder valuations.
We introduce a new Bayesian CA design for this general setting which uses Monte
Carlo Expectation Maximization to update prices at each round of the auction.
We evaluate our approach via simulations on CATS instances. Our results show
that our Bayesian CA outperforms even a highly optimized benchmark in terms of
clearing percentage and convergence speed.Comment: 9 pages, 2 figures, AAAI-1
A Bayesian Clearing Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions
We cast the problem of combinatorial auction design in a Bayesian framework
in order to incorporate prior information into the auction process and minimize
the number of rounds to convergence. We first develop a generative model of
agent valuations and market prices such that clearing prices become maximum a
posteriori estimates given observed agent valuations. This generative model
then forms the basis of an auction process which alternates between refining
estimates of agent valuations and computing candidate clearing prices. We
provide an implementation of the auction using assumed density filtering to
estimate valuations and expectation maximization to compute prices. An
empirical evaluation over a range of valuation domains demonstrates that our
Bayesian auction mechanism is highly competitive against the combinatorial
clock auction in terms of rounds to convergence, even under the most favorable
choices of price increment for this baseline.Comment: 9 pages, 4 figures, AAAI-1
Design and Effects of Information Feedback in Continuous Combinatorial Auctions
Advancements in information technologies offer opportunities for designing and deploying innovative market mechanisms. For example, combinatorial auctions, in which bidders can bid on combinations of goods, can increase the economic efficiency of a trade when goods have complementarities. However, lack of real-time bidder support tools has been a major obstacle preventing this mechanism from reaching its full potential. This study uses novel feedback mechanisms to aid bidders in formulating bids in real-time to facilitate participation in continuous combinatorial auctions. Laboratory experiments examine the effectiveness of our feedback mechanisms; the study is the first to examine how bidders behave in such information-rich environments. Our results indicate that feedback results in higher efficiency and higher sellerâs revenue compared to the baseline case where bidders are not provided feedback. Furthermore, contrary to conventional wisdom, even in complex economic environments, individuals effectively integrate rich information in their decision making
Designing smart markets
Electronic markets have been a core topic of information systems (IS) research for last three decades. We focus on a more recent phenomenon: smart markets. This phenomenon is starting to draw considerable interdisciplinary attention from the researchers in computer science, operations research, and economics communities. The objective of this commentary is to identify and outline fruitful research areas where IS researchers can provide valuable contributions. The idea of smart markets revolves around using theoretically supported computational tools to both understand the characteristics of complex trading environments and multiechelon markets and help human decision makers make real-time decisions in these complex environments. We outline the research opportunities for complex trading environments primarily from the perspective o
Combinatorial Clock Auctions: Price Direction and Performance
This paper addresses three concerns with ascending price Combinatorial Clock Auc- tions (APCA); price guidance toward e ciency relevant packages, computational bur- den, and susceptibility to collusive bidding. We propose a descending price Combi- natorial Clock Auction (DPCA) with a newly devised pricing strategy to alleviate all of these concerns. Mimicking bidding behavior of human subjects found in previous laboratory experiments, agent-based simulations of a DPCA show improvements in ef- ciency resulting from better price guidance and a reduction in computational burden when compared to an APCA
Design and Evaluation of Feedback Schemes for Multiattribute Procurement Auctions
Multiattribute auctions, which allow bids on multiple dimensions of the product, are IT-enabled sourcing mechanisms that increase the efficiency of procurement for configurable goods and services compared to price-only auctions. Given the strategic nature of procurement auctions, the amount of information concerning the buyerâs preferences that is disclosed to the suppliers has implications on the profits of the buyer and suppliers and, consequently, on the long-term relationship between them. This study develops novel feedback schemes for multiattribute auctions that protect buyerâs preference information from the supplier and suppliersâ cost schedule from the buyer. We conduct a laboratory experiment to study bidder behavior and profit implications under three different feedback regimes. Our results indicate that bidders are able to extract more profit with more information regarding the state of the auction in terms of provisional allocation and prices. Furthermore, bidding behavior is substantially influenced by the nature and type of feedback
Engineering Trust - Reciprocity in the Production of Reputation Information
Reciprocity in feedback giving distorts the production and content of reputation information in a market, hampering trust and trade efficiency. Guided by feedback patterns observed on eBay and other platforms we run laboratory experiments to investigate how reciprocity can be managed by changes in the way feedback information flows through the system, leading to more accurate reputation information, more trust and more efficient trade. We discuss the implications for theory building and for managing the redesign of market trust systems.market design, reputation, trust, reciprocity, eBay
International energy markets
Diese Dissertationsschrift trĂ€gt den Titel âInternationale EnergiemĂ€rkte â Empirische
Erhebungenâ und beinhaltet drei von Experten begutachtete Publikationen in internationalen
Zeitschriften (plus zusÀtzlich drei Konferenz Proceedings / PrÀsentationen
und ein Buchkapitelbeitrag). Den gemeinsame Rahmen dieser drei separaten Werke
bilden jeweils EnergiemÀrkte und empirische Methoden, welche in jedem der BeitrÀge
behandelt werden bzw. zur Anwendung kommen.
Der erste Beitrag analysiert die Auswirkungen der EinfĂŒhrung einer tĂ€glichen Ăkostromzuweisung
durch die Ăkostromabwicklungsstelle OEMAG und dem Anfang des
tÀglichen Handels an der deutschen Strombörse EEX auf den österreichischen
Strommarkt. Diese beiden Ănderungen im Bereich des Energiehandels werden als
natĂŒrliche Experimente unter Zuhilfenahme von statistischen und ökonometrischen
Methoden und anhand eines speziellen Datenbestands auf folgende Auswirkungen
untersucht: (i) eine Reduktion der Ăkostromprognoseungenauigkeit; (ii) einen im Allgemeinen
effizienteren Strommarkt mit niedrigeren Ausgleichsenergiekosten. Weiters
untersuchen wir, ob (iii) 7-Tage-Handel den Freitag-Montag-Effekt, welcher oft an
AktienmÀrkten oder anderen Börsen beobachtet wurde, verringert. Schlussendlich
wird analysiert, ob (iv) das neue Marktdesign die Ăkostromabwicklungsstelle OEMAG
dazu verleitet, Ăkostromaufkommensprognosen systematisch zu positiv anzusetzen.
Ergebnisse zeigen, dass diese neuen Marktdesigns die Ăkostromprognoseungenauigkeit
verringern und dabei auch zu niedrigeren Ausgleichsenergiekosten
fĂŒhren. Freitag-Montag-Effekte werden etwas reduziert und vermindern dadurch die
VolatilitĂ€t an Strombörsen. AbschlieĂend setzt die Ăkostromabwicklungsstelle OEMAG
Ăkostromaufkommensprognosen im Vergleich zu tatsĂ€chlichen Ăkostromproduktionsaufkommen
systematisch zu niedrig an.
Die zweite Publikation analysiert das Nabucco Gas Pipeline Projekt â von manchen
als kosteneffizienteste Verbindung zu neuem Gas bezeichnet â um festzustellen, ob
es fĂŒr die EuropĂ€ische Union zur kosteneffizienten Diversifizierung Ihrer Gaslieferungen fĂŒhrt und dadurch deren Energieversorgungssicherheit in Zukunft verbessert.
Weiters wird der Nabucco Open Season KapazitÀtsallokationsprozess vorgestellt.
Durch die Anwendung von empirischen Methoden und Benchmarking werden drei
Hypothesen evaluiert: WĂ€hrend sich Hypothese (1) auf die Nachfrage fĂŒr Nabucco
Pipeline-KapazitÀten konzentriert, untersuchen Hypothese (2) faire Nutzungsrechte
und Hypothese (3) Kosteneffizienz des Projekts. Empirische Ergebnisse veranschaulichen,
dass der steigende Bedarf an Gas und die sinkende Eigenproduktion eine
neue Gasleitung fĂŒr Europa notwendig machen. Die empirische Studie zeigt, dass
die KapazitÀten der Nabucco Gasleitung von Gasunternehmen stark nachgefragt
werden, und dass Nabucco faire Nutzungsrechte von 50% der KapazitĂ€ten fĂŒr Drittfirmen
anbietet. SchlieĂlich untermauert die Benchmarkinganalyse, dass Nabucco
tatsĂ€chlich eine kosteneffiziente Gasleitung und Verbindung zu neuem Gas fĂŒr Europa
darstellt. Basierend auf diesen Ergebnissen bleibt zu hoffen, dass Nabucco nicht
nur eine berĂŒhmte Oper bleibt, sondern zu einem der erfolgreichsten Energieprojekte
fĂŒr Europa wird.
Schlussendlich analysiert der dritte Artikel das optimale Design einer Auktion fĂŒr
Gas-Pipeline-TransportkapazitÀten. Als Folge russischer Gaslieferdominanz, steigender
Gasnachfrage und sinkender Eigenproduktion Europas sind derzeit eine Vielzahl
an Gaspipelineprojekten in Planung. Zur Finanzierung dieser Projekte werden
oftmals spezielle Auktionsformen verwendet. Auktionen haben sich in jĂŒngster Zeit
zu den erfolgreichsten mikroökonomischen Allokationsmechanismen entwickelt.
Durch eine Kombination von mathematischer Formulierung, experimenteller ĂberprĂŒfung
und empirischer Auktionsstudie wird das optimale Auktionsdesign fĂŒr Gas Pipeline
TransportkapazitÀten anhand alternativer VorschlÀge untersucht. Ergebnisse
zeigen Trade-Offs zwischen Umsatzoptimierung und fairer bzw. transparenter Allokation:
So ist âAllocation per Optimizationâ das bevorzugte Auktionsdesign wenn Umsatzmaximierung
am Wichtigsten ist. Andererseits scheint âPro Rata Allocationâ das
optimale Auktionsdesign in Bezug auf Fairness und Transparenzmaximierung zu
sein.
ZusÀtzlich zu den begutachteten Publikationen in internationalen Zeitschriften wurden
diese drei BeitrÀge zur weiteren Wissensdissemination auch auf internationale
Forschungskonferenzen prÀsentiert. Ein extra Buchkapitelbeitrag (in diesem Annex
enthalten) untermauert zudem die ForschungsaktivitĂ€ten des Autors.This dissertation titled âInternational Energy Markets â Empirical Investigationsâ covers
three peer-reviewed publications in international journals (plus additionally three
conference proceedings / presentations and one book chapter) which are guided by
the common frame of energy markets and empirical methods. The individual papers
can be related to the top-three energy policy objectives of the European Union.
The first paper deals with the impacts of daily green electricity production forecasting
and 7-day-trading on the Austrian electricity market. The applied methods include an
empirical survey, a natural experiment evaluation and an econometric analysis. This
paper connects to the European Unionâs goal of fighting against global warming and
fostering green electricity production.
The second paper investigates the energy supply security of the European Union in
the wake of Russian dominance of the gas supplies of the European Union. The demand
for the Nabucco Gas Pipeline project is surveyed and the favorability of the
Nabucco Gas Pipeline project versus other pipeline projects is evaluated. An empirical
survey is carried out and econometric analysis is applied. This paper follows the
European Unionâs search for energy supply security and diversification of imported
energy sources.
The third paper analyses the optimal auction design for gas pipeline transportation
capacity. A combination of three research methods is applied: mathematical formulation,
experimental testing, and empirical auction surveying. This paper â building on
the enormous attention that auction theory has attracted in recent years leading to
the award of Nobel Prices in Economics â accompanies the European Unionâs
search for competitive energy markets and market mechanisms.
In addition, for the further dissemination of knowledge, these papers were also presented
at international research conferences. An extra book chapter contribution (see
Annex) further demonstrates the authorâs research ambitions