Is automatic imitation a specialized form of stimulus–response compatibility? Dissociating imitative and spatial compatibilities

In recent years research on automatic imitation has received considerable attention because it represents an experimental platform for investigating a number of inter-related theories suggesting that the perception of action automatically activates corresponding motor programs. A key debate within this research centers on whether automatic imitation is any different than other long-term S-R associations, such as spatial stimulus-response compatibility. One approach to resolving this issue is to examine whether automatic imitation shows similar response characteristics as other classes of stimulus-response compatibility. This hypothesis was tested by comparing imitative and spatial compatibility effects with a two alternative forced-choice stimulus-response compatibility paradigm and two tasks: one that involved selecting a response to the stimulus (S-R) and one that involved selecting a response to the opposite stimulus (OS-R), i.e., the one not presented. The stimulus for both tasks was a left or right hand with either the index or middle finger tapping down. Speeded responses were performed with the index or middle finger of the right hand in response to the finger identity or the left-right spatial position of the fingers. Based on previous research and a connectionist model, we predicted standard compatibility effects for both spatial and imitative compatibility in the S-R task, and a reverse compatibility effect for spatial compatibility but not for imitative compatibility in the OS-R task. The results from the mean response times, mean percentage of errors, and response time distributions all converged to support these predictions. A second noteworthy result was that the recoding of the finger identity in the OS-R task required significantly more time than the recoding of the left-right spatial position, but the encoding time for the two stimuli in the S-R task was equivalent. In sum, this evidence suggests that the processing of spatial and imitative compatibility is dissociable with regard to two different processes in dual processing models of stimulus-response compatibility

Cognitive Computation sans Representation

The Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) holds that cognitive processes are essentially computational, and hence computation provides the scientific key to explaining mentality. The Representational Theory of Mind (RTM) holds that representational content is the key feature in distinguishing mental from non-mental systems. I argue that there is a deep incompatibility between these two theoretical frameworks, and that the acceptance of CTM provides strong grounds for rejecting RTM. The focal point of the incompatibility is the fact that representational content is extrinsic to formal procedures as such, and the intended interpretation of syntax makes no difference to the execution of an algorithm. So the unique 'content' postulated by RTM is superfluous to the formal procedures of CTM. And once these procedures are implemented in a physical mechanism, it is exclusively the causal properties of the physical mechanism that are responsible for all aspects of the system's behaviour. So once again, postulated content is rendered superfluous. To the extent that semantic content may appear to play a role in behaviour, it must be syntactically encoded within the system, and just as in a standard computational artefact, so too with the human mind/brain - it's pure syntax all the way down to the level of physical implementation. Hence 'content' is at most a convenient meta-level gloss, projected from the outside by human theorists, which itself can play no role in cognitive processing

Artificial consciousness and the consciousness-attention dissociation

Artificial Intelligence is at a turning point, with a substantial increase in projects aiming to implement sophisticated forms of human intelligence in machines. This research attempts to model specific forms of intelligence through brute-force search heuristics and also reproduce features of human perception and cognition, including emotions. Such goals have implications for artificial consciousness, with some arguing that it will be achievable once we overcome short-term engineering challenges. We believe, however, that phenomenal consciousness cannot be implemented in machines. This becomes clear when considering emotions and examining the dissociation between consciousness and attention in humans. While we may be able to program ethical behavior based on rules and machine learning, we will never be able to reproduce emotions or empathy by programming such control systems—these will be merely simulations. Arguments in favor of this claim include considerations about evolution, the neuropsychological aspects of emotions, and the dissociation between attention and consciousness found in humans. Ultimately, we are far from achieving artificial consciousness

High resolution fire hazard index based on satellite images

In December 2015, after 3 year of activity, the FP7 project PREFER (Space-based Information Support for Prevention and REcovery of Forest Fires Emergency in the MediteRranean Area) came to an end. The project was designed to respond to the need to improve the use of satellite images in applications related to the emergency services, in particular, to forest fires. The project aimed at developing, validating and demonstrating information products based on optical and SAR (Synthetic Aperture Radar) imagery for supporting the prevention of forest fires and the recovery/damage assessment of burnt area. The present paper presents an improved version of one of the products developed under the PREFER project, which is the Daily Fire Hazard Index (DFHI)