A Model of Emotion as Patterned Metacontrol

Adaptive systems use feedback as a key strategy to cope with uncertainty and change in their environments. The information fed back from the sensorimotor loop into the control architecture can be used to change different elements of the controller at four different levels: parameters of the control model, the control model itself, the functional organization of the agent and the functional components of the agent. The complexity of such a space of potential configurations is daunting. The only viable alternative for the agent ?in practical, economical, evolutionary terms? is the reduction of the dimensionality of the configuration space. This reduction is achieved both by functionalisation —or, to be more precise, by interface minimization— and by patterning, i.e. the selection among a predefined set of organisational configurations. This last analysis let us state the central problem of how autonomy emerges from the integration of the cognitive, emotional and autonomic systems in strict functional terms: autonomy is achieved by the closure of functional dependency. In this paper we will show a general model of how the emotional biological systems operate following this theoretical analysis and how this model is also of applicability to a wide spectrum of artificial systems

A Model of Emotion as Patterned Metacontrol

Adaptive agents use feedback as a key strategy to cope with un- certainty and change in their environments. The information fed back from the sensorimotor loop into the control subsystem can be used to change four different elements of the controller: parameters associated to the control model, the control model itself, the functional organization of the agent and the functional realization of the agent. There are many change alternatives and hence the complexity of the agent’s space of potential configurations is daunting. The only viable alternative for space- and time-constrained agents —in practical, economical, evolutionary terms— is to achieve a reduction of the dimensionality of this configuration space. Emotions play a critical role in this reduction. The reduction is achieved by func- tionalization, interface minimization and by patterning, i.e. by selection among a predefined set of organizational configurations. This analysis lets us state how autonomy emerges from the integration of cognitive, emotional and autonomic systems in strict functional terms: autonomy is achieved by the closure of functional dependency. Emotion-based morphofunctional systems are able to exhibit complex adaptation patterns at a reduced cognitive cost. In this article we show a general model of how emotion supports functional adaptation and how the emotional biological systems operate following this theoretical model. We will also show how this model is also of applicability to the construction of a wide spectrum of artificial systems1

Task demands modulate decision and eye movement responses in the chimeric face test: examining the right hemisphere processing account

A large and growing body of work, conducted in both brain-intact and brain-damaged populations, has used the free viewing chimeric face test as a measure of hemispheric dominance for the extraction of emotional information from faces. These studies generally show that normal right-handed individuals tend to perceive chimeric faces as more emotional if the emotional expression is presented on the half of the face to the viewer's left (“left hemiface”). However, the mechanisms underlying this lateralized bias remain unclear. Here, we examine the extent to which this bias is driven by right hemisphere processing advantages vs. default scanning biases in a unique way—by changing task demands. In particular, we compare the original task with one in which right-hemisphere-biased processing cannot provide a decision advantage. Our behavioral and eye movement data are inconsistent with the predictions of a default scanning bias account and support the idea that the left hemiface bias found in the chimeric face test is largely due to strategic use of right hemisphere processing mechanisms

The morphofunctional approach to emotion modelling in robotics

In this conceptual paper, we discuss two areas of research in robotics, robotic models of emotion and morphofunctional machines, and we explore the scope for potential cross-fertilization between them. We shift the focus in robot models of emotion from information-theoretic aspects of appraisal to the interactive significance of bodily dispositions. Typical emotional phenomena such as arousal and action readiness can be interpreted as morphofunctional processes, and their functionality may be replicated in robotic systems with morphologies that can be modulated for real-time adaptation. We investigate the control requirements for such systems, and present a possible bio-inspired architecture, based on the division of control between neural and endocrine systems in humans and animals. We suggest that emotional epi- sodes can be understood as emergent from the coordination of action control and action-readiness, respectively. This stress on morphology complements existing research on the information-theoretic aspects of emotion

Consciousness, Meaning and the Future Phenomenology

Phenomenological states are generally considered sources of intrinsic motivation for autonomous biological agents. In this paper we will address the issue of exploiting these states for robust goal-directed systems. We will provide an analysis of consciousness in terms of a precise definition of how an agent “understands” the informational flows entering the agent. This model of consciousness and understanding is based in the analysis and evaluation of phenomenological states along potential trajectories in the phase space of the agents. This implies that a possible strategy to follow in order to build autonomous but useful systems is to embed them with the particular, ad-hoc phenomenology that captures the requirements that define the system usefulness from a requirements-strict engineering viewpoint

Towards architectural foundations for cognitive self-aware systems

In this talk we address a proposal concerning a methodology for extracting universal, domain neutral, architectural design patterns from the analysis of biological cognition. This will render a set of design principles and design patterns oriented towards the construction of better machines. Bio- inspiration cannot be a one step process if we we are going to to build robust, dependable autonomous agents; we must build solid theories first, departing from natural systems, and supporting our designs of artificial ones

The evolutionary origins of volition

It appears to be a straightforward implication of distributed cognition principles that there is no integrated executive control system (e.g. Brooks 1991, Clark 1997). If distributed cognition is taken as a credible paradigm for cognitive science this in turn presents a challenge to volition because the concept of volition assumes integrated information processing and action control. For instance the process of forming a goal should integrate information about the available action options. If the goal is acted upon these processes should control motor behavior. If there were no executive system then it would seem that processes of action selection and performance couldn’t be functionally integrated in the right way. The apparently centralized decision and action control processes of volition would be an illusion arising from the competitive and cooperative interaction of many relatively simple cognitive systems. Here I will make a case that this conclusion is not well-founded. Prima facie it is not clear that distributed organization can achieve coherent functional activity when there are many complex interacting systems, there is high potential for interference between systems, and there is a need for focus. Resolving conflict and providing focus are key reasons why executive systems have been proposed (Baddeley 1986, Norman and Shallice 1986, Posner and Raichle 1994). This chapter develops an extended theoretical argument based on this idea, according to which selective pressures operating in the evolution of cognition favor high order control organization with a ‘highest-order’ control system that performs executive functions

Consciousness, Action Selection, Meaning and Phenomenic Anticipation

Phenomenal states are generally considered the ultimate sources of intrinsic motivation for autonomous biological agents. In this article, we will address the issue of the necessity of exploiting these states for the design and implementation of robust goal-directed artificial systems. We will provide an analysis of consciousness in terms of a precise definition of how an agent "understands" the informational flows entering the agent and its very own action possibilities. This abstract model of consciousness and understanding will be based in the analysis and evaluation of phenomenal states along potential future trajectories in the state space of the agents. This implies that a potential strategy to follow in order to build autonomous but still customer-useful systems is to embed them with the particular, ad hoc phenomenality that captures the system-external requirements that define the system usefulness from a customer-based, requirements-strict engineering viewpoint

Reasoning with BDI robots: from simulation to physical environment – implementations and limitations

In this paper an overview of the state of research into cognitive robots is given. This is driven by insights arising from research that has moved from simulation to physical robots over the course of a number of sub-projects. A number of major issues arising from seminal research in the area are explored. In particular in the context of advances in the field of robotics and a slowly developing model of cognition and behaviour that is being mapped onto robot colonies. The work presented is ongoing but major themes such as the veracity of data and information, and their effect on robot control architectures are explored. A small number of case studies are presented where the theoretical framework has been used to implement control of physical robots. The limitations of the current research and the wider field of behavioral and cognitive robots are explored

Cerebral and Behavioural Asymmetries in Animal Social Recognition

Evidence is here summarized that animal species belonging to distant taxa show forms of social recognition, a sophisticated cognitive ability adaptive in most social interactions. The paper then proceeds to review evidence of functional lateralization for this cognitive ability. The main focus of this review is evidence obtained in domestic chickens, the animal model employed in the authors' laboratories, but we also discuss comparisons with data from species ranging from fishes, amphib ians and reptiles, to other birds and mammals. A consistent pattern emerges, pointing toward a right hemisphere dominance, in particular for discrimination of social companions and individual (or familiarity-based) recognition, whereas the left hemisphere could be specialized for "category-based" distinctions (e.g., conspecifics versus heterospecifics). This pattern of results is discussed in relation to a more general specialization and processing styles of the two sides of the brain, with the right hemisphere predisposed for developing a detailed, global and contextual representation of objects, and the left hemisphere predisposed for rapid assignment of a stimulus to a category, for processing releaser stimuli and for control of responses