Frontiers of reason: on epistemology and mystery

This thesis has two parts. The first part is a development of Dionysius the Areopagites' theophanic notion of being, what I call his notion of the mystery of being-as-ikon, in relation to his epistemology and theory of language. The second part is an application of this notion to certain epistemological and linguistic issues in western philosophy. The purpose of the thesis is to develop a Dionysian philosophical theology through the notion of being-as-ikon in dialogue with western philosophy

Aristotle\u27s Theory of Principles: A Rationalistic-Empirical Bipolarity

Primarily, this paper attempts to analyze Aristotle\u27s notion of principle as it is uniquely applied throughout his works. Principle is a basic notion; and it is, moreover, the basic notion in Aristotle\u27s philosophy. The purpose here is to establish as precisely as possible the meaning of \u27principle\u27 and the role that it plays in Aristotelian thought. It is shown that the meaning of principle involves a certain bipolar tension which strains between a logico-epistemic pole and an on tic pole. This tension grounds a philosophy which constantly vacillates between a rationalistic idealism and an empirically oriented naturalism. The Greek term under consideration is ἀρχή although it should be noted that Aristotle does not aIways use the term in a technical sense; and, at times, when he refers to principle in a technical sense, he may not always use ἀρχή. In Chapter I, we claim that Aristotle\u27s basic and primary assumption-that there is a real world which is intelligible--necessarily involves a notion of principles that somehow connects the real world with intelligible expressions of it. In other words, principles manifest a bipolar condition of being both mental (the intelligible expression) and real (objectively grounded in the world). Descartes is seen as the first philosopher to challenge seriously the objective pole of principles. For Descartes, philosophical inquiry begins with principles of knowledge rather than with principles of being. The Cartesian assault on Aristotle\u27s principles may be unwarranted if it is realized that his (Aristotle\u27s) search after principles of being included the cognitional pole so that being is never really separated from one\u27s clear and distinct understanding of it. Chapter II investigates the bipolarity of Aristotelian principles in the realm of perishable entities. Through his notion of principles, Aristotle attempts to solve an enigma of being and knowing. How can sensible entities be individual and yet definable, unique and yet intelligible? How can a world of particulars be admitted when knowledge is of the universal ? Principles provide both the concrete unity and the ground for universal understanding in Aristotle\u27s attempt to solve the problem. It is the ontic pole of principles that is explanatory of the concreteness and unity of individuals, while it is the logico-epistemic pole which serves as the basis for univers ·ality and intelligibility. Four specific characteristics of principles as applied to perishable entities are then revealed. Principles are seen to be as: 1) referential or relational; 2} potential for universality; 3) irreducible contraries; and 4) analogous. Concerning the first, principles are to be viewed not as entities or things but rather as certain ways whereby things are known. The second characteristic pursues in specific detail the problem of universal knowledge versus individual entities. From the point of view of a being\u27s potentiality, one may realize a universal ground of being many things. From the point of view of a being\u27s actuality, one grasps the individual entity in an immediate sensory awareness. The third characteristic remolds the pre-Socratic and Platonic notions of contrariety. The pre-Socratic notion of archai as contraries (according to Aristotle) cannot be true principles, since being material elements they are not basic and irreducible. Plato\u27s contrary forms cannot be true principles since they are separate from what they purport to explain. Aristotle\u27s bipolar principles can be irreducible and contrary and yet be simultaneously in things (e.g., act-potency). The fourth characteristic allows both sameness and difference to permeate the various levels of being so that any hierarchy of being is freed from an uncompromising fixity or rigidity. Analogous principles explain a hierarchy of horizontal levels of classes with a vertical continuity running through the class structures (i.e., the genera and species). In Chapter III, Aristotle\u27s imperishable realm (ἄφθαρτος) is compared with his sublunar realm. The two realms are seen to be different and yet similar, and it is analogous principles that effect these differences and similarities. Aristotle\u27s application of the same principles to both realms allows him to include both perishables and imperishables under the realm of nature. This spanning of the whole range of nature by principles warrants a transcendental character of principles that is contrasted with Aristotle\u27s search in the Physics and the Metaphysics for a Transcendent One. Again, a bipolarity is indicated which strains between a rationalistic tendency toward a Transcendent Being which might explain the whole of reality and a tendency toward more naturalistic explanations in terms of transcendental principles. The last Chapter traces the role of principles in the realm of reason where archaiare applied to Aristotle\u27s theory of demonstration and his general notion of science. Two basic kinds of demonstration are seen as permeating Aristotle\u27s theory of methodology. The first we label axiomatic demonstration. This is demonstration in the strict sense of deducing certain and necessary conclusions from self-evident principles. These worthy and noble first principles (ἀξιώματα) are the source of intellectual delight and contain more intrinsic worth than the conclusions that are drawn from them. The second kind of demonstration is termed hypothetical demonstration. This is demonstration in a looser sense in which principles are difficult to know and demonstration proceeds from hypotheses and postulates. Conclusions arrived at by means of this type of deduction tend toward probability rather than certitude. Concerning the problem of how one acquires knowledge of the first principles, we again maintain that Aristotle vacillates between the poles of rationalism and realism. The former pole involves an analytic intuition in which the world of experience is shunned and a mere analysis of terms and concepts reveals the primary axioms. The latter advocates an inductive intuition in which experience plays a necessary role in one\u27s grasping of the principles. Finally, it is shown that there is more than one meaning to Aristotle\u27s concept of science (ἐπιστήμη)

Human experience and Triune God: Theological exploration of the relevance of human experience for Trinitarian theology

The overarching aim of this work is to develop a new account of the doctrine of the Trinity that is more attentive to human experience. It will be argued that such an approach is overdue because contemporary trinitarian theology pays insufficient attention to the fact that theology as linguistic discourse is inescapably embedded in human experience. This neglect is particularly worrying because many theologians who favour a kind of social doctrine of the Trinity claim that the Trinity is a doctrine with practical consequences for human life. The main thrust of this project, therefore, is to link the doctrine of the Trinity more creatively with human experience and to develop an understanding of how and who the triune God is in relation to human life as it is lived and experienced by human beings. The discussion is divided into five chapters. Chapter One highlights the need for a new approach engaging in a critical discussion with some trinitarian theologians. By giving close attention to the concepts of experience and revelation and their embeddedness in language. Chapter Two aims at establishing an understanding of experience that underlies all human linguistic discourse. This account will lead to the conclusion that trinitarian discourse must pay proper attention to both the human condition as experienced by human beings and religious experience which is expressed in biblical narratives. Consequently, while Chapter Three, drawing on contributions from contemporary literature, the human sciences (Franki, Weizsäcker) and philosophy (Lévinas), gives an account of what it is to be human. Chapter Four, engaging with biblical narratives, tries to spell out how biblical experience might inform Trinitarian discourse. In conclusion, Chapter Five offers an interstitial trinitarian theology that maintains such discourse as creative tension. An account of the Trinity in relation to human life will emerge and draw the whole argument to a close

A Unifying Field in Logics: Neutrosophic Logic.

The author makes an introduction to non-standard analysis, then extends the dialectics to “neutrosophy” – which became a new branch of philosophy. This new concept helps in generalizing the intuitionistic, paraconsistent, dialetheism, fuzzy logic to “neutrosophic logic” – which is the first logic that comprises paradoxes and distinguishes between relative and absolute truth. Similarly, the fuzzy set is generalized to “neutrosophic set”. Also, the classical and imprecise probabilities are generalized to “neutrosophic probability”

Sin as a problem of twentieth century systematic theology

The argument of my thesis concerns the understanding of the doctrine of sin in systematic theology, and, as a corollary of this, the scope of the doctrine in terms of its content. My argument is that the doctrine of sin is particularly prone to being defined with a strictness or narrowness which causes it to lose much of its meaning; that such limiting treatment tends to be accompanied by distorted relationships with, or over-determination by, other key doctrines, particularly that of salvation; and that it is helpful to see this tendency as a failure to see sin as a symbol with a complex of meanings, this complex being essential to the doctrine. A brief introductory survey of the usual perspectives on sin and of recent monographs firstly indicates the major issues raised by sin. Then more detailed analysis of the work of Barth, Brunner, Rahner, Pannenberg and Ricoeur provides examples of different methods of dealing with sin and leads to the conclusion that the tension between freedom and inevitability is essential to the doctrine of sin: it is part of sin's meaning and attempts to suppress, explain or relocate it lead to unacceptable tensions elsewhere. The use of Ricoeur's analysis of the symbolism of evil as a critical tool demonstrates the significance of the Adamic narrative for Christian doctrine, and the way in which its neglect can lead to the acquisition of ideas characteristic of non-Christian mythologies. The positive suggestion of the thesis is that sin should be seen as a tensive symbol incorporating a wide complex of meanings and involving a specific mythology of "the beginning" and that its paradoxical nature should be maintained as indicating a conflict within humanity, and seen in relationship to the suffering of God in Christ

Fichte and Schelling: the Spinoza connection

The influence of Spinoza on Post-Kantian Idealism has been acknowledged by virtually all commentators in the area. Much research on the influence of Spinoza on Hegel has been already carried out by many of Hegel's commentators in both the Continental and Anglo- American tradition, and Hegel himself wrote a great deal on Spinozism. Detailed research and study on the influence of Spinoza on Fichte and Schelling, however, is still to be carried out in the Anglo-American tradition; and this situation is in contrast to the current scenario in Germany, where much effort has been devoted to this topic. Commentators in the Anglo-American tradition acknowledge the influence of some of Spinoza's views on Fichte's and Schelling's respective projects but fail to provide a detailed account of this influence. This thesis will attempt to help fill in the gap in this area by providing a detailed study of the influence of Spinozism on Fichte and Schelling. This will be done by drawing parallels and by demonstrating similarities between some of their philosophical views, as well as referring to textual evidence where Fichte and Schelling acknowledge, overtly or not, their debt to Spinoza. This thesis is divided into three parts. In Part I I shall provide the context or background to this thesis. This part focus on the reception of Spinoza's writings in the Netherlands and Germany (chap. 1), the Enlightenment and Romantic movement as well as the Enlightenment crises (chap. 2), and Kant's attempt to solve the crises (chap. 3). In Part II and III I deal with Fichte's and Schelling's Spinozism respectively. Part II is divided into three chapters, which are entitled: "Metaphysics, Knowledge and Freedom" (chap. 4), "Theology and Religion" (chap. 5)， and "Ethics" (chap. 6). Part III is also divided into three chapters, which are entitled: "From Kant to Fichte to Schelling: Spinoza's contribution to Absolute Idealism" (chap. 7), "Pantheism and God" (chap. 8), and finally "Deep Ecology" (chap. 9). Finally, in this abstract I find it important to draw the reader's attention to a few issues. My sympathies with, or antipathies to, the various positions taken by the authors I discuss will no doubt be apparent as the thesis unfolds. And it could be said that this thesis is primarily intended as an exercise in the history, influence and study of some conceptual views particular to Spinozism, and as such it shall be of great interest to metaphysicians. But in doing so this thesis will also set the background for a proper understanding of Fichte's and Schelling's philosophical systems - this is an important point as there is a tendency in philosophical and academic circles to 'box in' philosophical systems as if these systems were self-contained and bore no connection with previous philosophical systems; moreover, there is also a tendency in these circles not to appreciate the legacy of philosophical systems either. As such, this thesis aims to help correcting this situation insofar as Spinoza, Fichte and Schelling are concerned - but it can be also viewed as a template for similar research in connection to other philosophical systems. It is also intended that the interpretations of Fichte and Schelling in the light of their Spinozism, which I propose will be useful to other scholars in their attempt to critically appraise the writings of these important figures

A UNIFYING FIELD IN LOGICS: NEUTROSOPHIC LOGIC. NEUTROSOPHY, NEUTROSOPHIC SET, NEUTROSOPHIC PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS

In 1960s Abraham Robinson has developed the non-standard analysis, a formalization of analysis and a branch of mathematical logic, which rigorously defines the infinitesimals

Hegel’s Theory of Quality

This article assesses the opening three chapters of Hegel\u27s monumental Science of Logic, a work largely unknown in the United States but recognized in Europe as the foundation of Hegel\u27s impressive philosophical edifice. Hegel\u27s task was to develop a foundation-free philosophy, in which the inherent contradictions in concepts caused the self-destruction of the concept and the generation of a new, improved concept. Hegel begins his work by examining the concept of Pure Being. Being itself shows to be finite, however. Being repeals itself and propels itself into thought. Reality therefore gives way to ideality. Upon entering the realm of the Ideal, Being eventually becomes quantity--content-free being. The opening chapters of the Science of Logic are controversial. Carlson, however, defends Hegel against the various objections that have been raised Hegel\u27s opening moves

Being human

[Introduction]:"What a piece of work is a man, how noble in reason, how infinite in faculties, in form and moving how express and admirable, in action how like an angel, in apprehension how like a god: the beauty of the world, the paragon of animals! And yet to me what is this quintessence of dust?"In his angry and depressed state, Hamlet finds no consolation in his fellow human beings, but that's not to say that he doesn't attribute them with many fine qualities. But what are we to make of this 'quintessence of dust'? What a piece of work is a (hu)man? How are we to understand ourselves? What's more to the point perhaps is, why should we try? One reason springs to mind immediately that we can point to in order to justify an attempt at such understanding. It is surely true that by way of a greater understanding of ourselves we can come to a more complete understanding of 'the way things are' per se. By coming to a greater and more complete understanding of being a human being we can start to see how what we are informs the way we are and vice versa. For instance, the sort of beings that we are as human beings allows us to experience the world around us in a particular way, it may 'open' the world up to us in some respects, whilst 'closing' it off in others. The kind of understanding that I am aiming for involves an exploration and clarification of what it is to be human; what it is to exist as a human being and if there is anything unique about being a human being.If we look for a dictionary definition of 'human being' we find something like the following: "Of or belonging to the genus Homo ... any man or woman or child of the species Homo Sapiens., Defining human beings in this way places them firmly in the 'natural order' of things, it makes them one species amongst many. Admittedly human beings are probably the most complex species in the natural world, but nevertheless they are open to understanding in just the same way as any other species be it an oyster, a cat or a chimpanzee. If we are to take this 'speciesistic', biological line then, we should aim to understand human beings in purely natural, materialistic terms supplied by the 'best' theory that science can offer to us at the time of investigation. In doing this though we might worry that we are missing out on something 'special' about human beings, surely there is something that sets human beings apart from the rest of the animal kingdom, for instance the fact that human beings possess the kind of consciousness that they do. In fact this worry goes deeper than just worrying about human beings being 'special' in some way and whether or not they are the only species that possess such consciousness. Indeed, we might think that there is in general something special about each animal species; namely that each one possesses a distinctive viewpoint upon the world and that this is only accessible if one is a member of that species. This is precisely the sort of worry aired by Nagel. Of course if Nagel is right, then human beings should have no problem with access to what it is like to be human beings, but he also argues that such access can never be explained in purely scientific, naturalistic terms.His argument focuses on attempts to capture experience from the objective perspective of science and he claims that "no matter how the form may vary, the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means, basically that there is something it is like to be that organism.' This being the case, if a scientific naturalist account is to succeed '''something it is like to be' features must be given a physicalist account." Nagel denies that this is a possibility, he claims that:"Every subjective phenomenon is, essentially, connected with a single point of view, and it seems inevitable that an objective, physical theory will abandon that point of view."According to Nagel, materialist philosophies rest on the fundamental principle that the whole of reality can be described in objective physical terms. The physically objective world is the only world there is and it exists independently of subjective human or animal perspectives.He describes the materialist conception of reality as saying that underneath the different appearances of things there must lie a reality that is independent of how things appear to human beings or any other animals. The world would exist even if there were no human or other observers in it; hence its true nature must be detachable from how it seems to any observers. This means that according to materialist philosophies, if we wish to reach a conception of the world as it objectively is we have to not think of it from an individual point of view or perspective, and not think of it from a general human perspective. The physical world as it is in itself contains no points of view and nothing that can appear only to one particular point of view. Whatever it contains can be apprehended by a general rational consciousness divorced from the sensory organs of particular individuals or species. Although this conception of reality has been immensely useful in the development of physics, Nagel believes that it cannot be the whole story. He argues that the subjective perceptual points of view which are left out of the objective account continue to exist, furthermore they are the necessary conditions of human beings acquiring evidence about the physical world. Human beings cannot collect evidence except from their spatio-temporal location and this means they must have a perspective; as well as this, the objective conception of the world is formed by mental activity. For Nagel then, a complete explanation of reality will have to take account of these things because they are also part of reality.In his arguments against a scientific, objective conception of reality, Nagel appears to take an overly positivistic view of science and of philosophical analyses that take science seriously. However, I think Nagel is correct though in his attack on materialist theories of mind (and by implication, human beings) even if there are some problems with his arguments.7 In the next chapter I will show how materialist, conventionally naturalistic theories of human beings miss out on essential features of them, and also how non-naturalist accounts miss out on much the same sort of features. Much of this is due to both of them working with the same sort of disengaged view of the world, just the sort of view that Nagel is so critical of. I don't believe that Nagel's criticisms should make us give up on a naturalist programme altogether though. Rather what we need to do is to draw it in as inclusive a way as possible, a way that takes into account not just the 'objective' features of the world, but also the 'subjective' features of human experience of the world. In Chapter 2, I outline just such an inclusive, broad framework.Such a framework provides us with the opportunity to explore the continuity between human beings and other non-human animals, whilst at the same time preserving the uniqueness of being human without having to resort to any form of unnecessary or distorting humanism. In other words, it allows us to place human beings alongside other non-human animals firmly in the 'natural order' whilst at the same time recognising human beings unique characteristics. The most interesting of these characteristics is human beings' 'personhood', which I will explore in Chapter 6. However, human beings are also uniquely 'social' beings and I shall look at this fact in Chapter 4 and show how being a social being is an essential feature of being human. This sociality depends in part upon the 'lived' nature of the human beings bodies and I shall look in detail at this in Chapter 3. However, I believe we also need to guard against any unwarranted humanism whereby human beings are overly distanced from other non-human animals. To this end I shall show how human beings can be regarded as unique but at the same time as continuous with the rest of the 'animal kingdom' in Chapter 5.In the course of this thesis, my primary aim is not to provide conclusive or damning arguments against either conventional naturalism or non-naturalism; rather I hope to weave together the components of an alternative picture, one that presents a more convincing, persuasive and plausible alternative - broad naturalism. As Sherlock Holmes says:"One's ideas must be as broad as Nature if they are to interpret Nature."In other words I intend to show that to come to anything like a full understanding of what it is like to be a human being we have to adopt a broadly naturalistic framework. Conventional naturalism and non-naturalism will be shown to be lacking because they cannot fully account for human beings' experience of the world or of how they are 'at home' in their world. However, at the same time by taking the broad approach we can accept that there are 'truths' in both conventional pictures and weave these into a cohesive whole that can account for the experience of being a human being. Most of all though a broadly naturalistic account will allow us to see what a wonderful 'piece of work' a human being truly is