Deontic Epistemic stit Logic Distinguishing Modes of `Mens Rea\u27

Most juridical systems contain the principle that an act is only unlaw- ful if the agent conducting the act has a `guilty mind\u27 (`mens rea\u27). Dif- ferent law systems distinguish different modes of mens rea. For instance, American law distinguishes between `knowingly\u27 performing a criminal act, `recklessness\u27, `strict liability\u27, etc. I will show we can formalize several of these categories. The formalism I use is a complete stit-logic featuring operators for stit-actions taking effect in `next\u27 states, S5-knowledge op- erators and SDL-type obligation operators. The different modes of `mens rea\u27 correspond to the violation conditions of different types of obligation definable in the logic

Business model design for sustainable society: Therapy for the consumerist mindset

We address the problem of unsustainable business in the consumerist society with a reframing of the purpose of business, in recognition of the power of higher purpose for the company and contribution to society as the primary stakeholder. In this, the business model operated is crucial, but is generally under-invested, both conceptually unclear and usually more implicit than explicit, and thus lacking in guiding influence on the way a company performs. Despite the apparent significance of why and how a business operates, business model design is only in its infancy. A framework for business model design is outlined. We conclude with a discussion and proposed research agenda

Inducing breach of contract: one tort or two?

IT is said to be a tort for D intentionally to induce C to break C’s contract with P. Where this occurs, P has an action in tort against D, quite apart from P’s action for breach of contract against C. But the rationale for this tort is controversial, and its legitimacy has been doubted by a number of commentators

A Logic of Knowing How

In this paper, we propose a single-agent modal logic framework for reasoning about goal-direct "knowing how" based on ideas from linguistics, philosophy, modal logic and automated planning. We first define a modal language to express "I know how to guarantee phi given psi" with a semantics not based on standard epistemic models but labelled transition systems that represent the agent's knowledge of his own abilities. A sound and complete proof system is given to capture the valid reasoning patterns about "knowing how" where the most important axiom suggests its compositional nature.Comment: 14 pages, a 12-page version accepted by LORI

The Hidden Love of God and the Imaging Defense

J. L. Schellenberg has recently argued that there is a logical incompatibility between God’s being perfectly loving and there being non-resistant nonbelievers in the proposition that God exists. In this paper I highlight the parallel between this claim and the claim made by the logical problem of evil. Following Plantinga’s strategy in undermining the logical problem of evil, I argue that all that is needed to undermine the alleged incompatibility of divine love with non-resistant non-belief is a counterexample showing how the two might possibly co-exist. But whereas most attempts to show this have been grounded anthropologically, by drawing on forms of love-relationship that God and humans have in common, I offer a defense of the compatibility of perfect divine love with human non-resistant non-belief in God’s existence grounded theologically, in the unique sort of love relationship that God wants with us, which is the relationship of “imaging.

Knowledge and Blameworthiness

Blameworthiness of an agent or a coalition of agents is often defined in terms of the principle of alternative possibilities: for the coalition to be responsible for an outcome, the outcome must take place and the coalition should have had a strategy to prevent it. In this article we argue that in the settings with imperfect information, not only should the coalition have had a strategy, but it also should have known that it had a strategy, and it should have known what the strategy was. The main technical result of the article is a sound and complete bimodal logic that describes the interplay between knowledge and blameworthiness in strategic games with imperfect information

Ceticismo e reconhecimento : outras mentes, racionalidade e linguagem

Esta tese de doutorado é uma investigação do conceito de reconhecimento e das suas conexões com o problema do conhecimento de outras mentes e de outras vontades. Este conceito é oferecido como uma forma de dissolver o problema cético de outras mentes, mas na mesma medida em que ele dissolve o problema, tal conceito abre um rico campo de exploração filosófica. O conceito de reconhecimento resulta do fracasso das tentativas de atender a demanda cética por certeza da existência de outras mentes. O fracasso desta empreitada epistemológica implica um recuo onde se passa a analisar as bases da significatividade do conceito de mente. Uma vez analisadas as condições de sua significatividade, o problema cético será compreendido na sua origem e passarei a investigar os diferentes modos de relação com o outro. O resultado será a possibilidade de conhecimento de outras mentes, não como função do conceito de certeza, mas como forma do reconhecimento do outro. A partir de então passo a investigar a gramática do fenômeno de reconhecimento — sua unidade, a lógica pronominal que a compõe, as formas autênticas de reconhecimento por contraste com as formas projetivas do eu e finalmente a conexão entre conhecer outras mentes e o reconhecimento do outro como um ser dotado de vontade.This dissertation investigates de concept of recognition and its connections with the problem of other minds and other wills. This concept is presented as a way to dissolve the skeptical problem of other minds, and as a further consequence it also opens a rich field of philosophical investigation. The concept of recognition is first grasped in the responses to the skeptic’s demand for certainty about the existence of other minds. The modern epistemological enterprise’s failure conduced philosophers to step back from the original problem and motivated a new posture in the analysis of the concept of mind. Once this task was accomplished, the skeptical problem is understood in its origins and this enables the investigation of the different modes of relation to the other. The result will be the possibility of knowledge of other minds, however not as a function of the concept of certainty, but as a form of recognition of other minds. This dissertation will also seek the understanding of the grammar of recognition — its unity, the pronouns that constitute its logic, the authentic forms of recognition and finally the connection between knowing other minds and the acknowledgment of the other as a being gifted with his/her own will

Unconstitutionally obtained evidence in Ireland: protectionism, deterrence and the winds of change

Introduction: The law on the admissibility of improperly obtained evidence in Ireland was first authoritatively considered and decided upon by the Supreme Court in the mid-1960s.While later courts have revisited, and to some extent refined, the law in this area, the original formulation of the so-called exclusionary rule largely remains in place today. The law on improperly obtained evidence in Ireland is thus well established, however, it is not without its detractors, and recent times have seen both criticism of the exclusionary rule from the bench, and calls for change from an independent advisory group set up by the Department of Justice.This group, the Balance in the Criminal Law Review Group ('the Group'), recommended that the stringent Irish rule in relation to the exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence, specifically, ought to be replaced by a rule which allows discretion to the trial judge to admit or exclude such evidence based on the totality of the circumstances, with particular regard to the rights of the victim. While the Group put forward a number of interesting arguments for change, the main focus of this article is the claim that 'radical changes in the nature of policing in recent years' have superseded 'any contention that the [current] rule is necessary to ensure that the police comply with the relevant legal requirements'. It is submitted within this article that any suggestion that there might be a necessity or opportunity for change in the law on the exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence in Ireland on the basis of recent innovations and advances in garda accountability and discipline involves a misperception of the reasoning behind the law on exclusion as formulated by the Irish courts. This article outlines the development and application of the exclusionary rule in Ireland and, importantly, clarifies the rationale for the specific rule in relation to unconstitutionally obtained evidence. The article then looks to developments in the United States where a change to the exclusionary rule has recently come about and finally concludes on the question of altering the Irish rule due to recent improvements in garda accountability and discipline

A survey on the nature, reasons for compliance and emergence of social norms

The aim of the paper is to offer a critical review of some of the most important contributions on the subject of social norms. The analysis will hinge upon a fundamental distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding reasons to action, which are supposed to represent two basic types of motivations making up the individual system of rational deliberation. Such a dichotomy will make it possible to divide the account of rules of behaviour in three categories, depending on the weight accorded to one rather than the other reason to action. The narrower concept is given by what will be called strictly-conceived convention, which coincides with Lewis's classical account of a convention. In this case, it is the self-regarding motive that actually provides an underpinning of such a regularity of behaviour, making it possible to build a system of convergent mutual expectations. The next category, that of broadly-conceived conventions are based on Sugden's earliest works on the subject; in this case, the self-regarding motive is still the crucial one, but conventions are not necessarily mutually beneficial, thus coming down to a standard Nash equilibrium, or evolutionary stable strategy, notion. Finally, with the final category of norms a decisive shift out of the self-interested justification is accomplished. In fact, these regularities are grounded on some forms of other-regarding behaviour, as Sudgen's model of normative expectations sets out clearly. The cognitive structure needed in order to generate such type of expectations leading to norms is then critically examined, reaching the conclusion that the account of norms provided in the received theory does not prove thoroughly satisfactory. Particularly, the notion of "empirical" expectation, as opposed to that of "causal" expectation, is deemed as the relevant one in order to build a system of mutual expectation in the case of norms; however, this concept does not help to explain how a norm comes out as an equilibrium of the social interaction, thus making the whole explanation arguably circular. We finally argue for the importance to ground the concept of norm on the dynamic evolution of expectations.