PEP4Django - A Policy Enforcement Point for Python Web Applications

Traditionally, access control mechanisms have been hard-coded into application components. Such approach is error-prone, mixing business logic with access control concerns, and affecting the flexibility of security policies, as is the case with IFRN SUAP Django-based system. The externalization of access control rules allows their decoupling from business logic, through the use of authorization servers where access control policies are stored and queried for computing access decisions. In this context, this paper presents an approach that allows a Django Web application to delegate access control decisions to an external authorization server. The approach has been integrated into an enterprise level system, which has been used for experimentation. The results obtained indicate a negligible overhead, while allowing the modification of access control policies without interrupting the system

Failure detection and identification for a reconfigurable flight control system

Failure detection and identification logic for a fault-tolerant longitudinal control system were investigated. Aircraft dynamics were based upon the cruise condition for a hypothetical transonic business jet transport configuration. The fault-tolerant control system consists of conventional control and estimation plus a new outer loop containing failure detection, identification, and reconfiguration (FDIR) logic. It is assumed that the additional logic has access to all measurements, as well as to the outputs of the control and estimation logic. The pilot may also command the FDIR logic to perform special tests

GEM: a Distributed Goal Evaluation Algorithm for Trust Management

Trust management is an approach to access control in distributed systems where access decisions are based on policy statements issued by multiple principals and stored in a distributed manner. In trust management, the policy statements of a principal can refer to other principals' statements; thus, the process of evaluating an access request (i.e., a goal) consists of finding a "chain" of policy statements that allows the access to the requested resource. Most existing goal evaluation algorithms for trust management either rely on a centralized evaluation strategy, which consists of collecting all the relevant policy statements in a single location (and therefore they do not guarantee the confidentiality of intensional policies), or do not detect the termination of the computation (i.e., when all the answers of a goal are computed). In this paper we present GEM, a distributed goal evaluation algorithm for trust management systems that relies on function-free logic programming for the specification of policy statements. GEM detects termination in a completely distributed way without disclosing intensional policies, thereby preserving their confidentiality. We demonstrate that the algorithm terminates and is sound and complete with respect to the standard semantics for logic programs.Comment: To appear in Theory and Practice of Logic Programming (TPLP

RelBAC: Relation Based Access Control

TheWeb 2.0, GRID applications and, more recently, semantic desktop applications are bringing the Web to a situation where more and more data and metadata are shared and made available to large user groups. In this context, metadata may be tags or complex graph structures such as file system or web directories, or (lightweight) ontologies. In turn, users can themselves be tagged by certain properties, and can be organized in complex directory structures, very much in the same way as data. Things are further complicated by the highly unpredictable and autonomous dynamics of data, users, permissions and access control rules. In this paper we propose a new access control model and a logic, called RelBAC (for Relation Based Access Control) which allows us to deal with this novel scenario. The key idea, which differentiates RelBAC from the state of the art, e.g., Role Based Access Control (RBAC), is that permissions are modeled as relations between users and data, while access control rules are their instantiations on specific sets of users and objects. As such, access control rules are assigned an arity which allows a fine tuning of which users can access which data, and can evolve independently, according to the desires of the policy manager(s). Furthermore, the formalization of the RelBAC model as an Entity-Relationship (ER) model allows for its direct translation into Description Logics (DL). In turn, this allows us to reason, possibly at run time, about access control policies

Relationship-based access control: its expression and enforcement through hybrid logic

Access control policy is typically de ned in terms of attributes, but in many applications it is more natural to de- ne permissions in terms of relationships that resources, systems, and contexts may enjoy. The paradigm of relationshipbased access control has been proposed to address this issue, and modal logic has been used as a technical foundation. We argue here that hybrid logic { a natural and wellestablished extension of modal logic { addresses limitations in the ability of modal logic to express certain relationships. Also, hybrid logic has advantages in the ability to e ciently compute policy decisions relative to a relationship graph. We identify a fragment of hybrid logic to be used for expressing relationship-based access-control policies, show that this fragment supports important policy idioms, and study its expressiveness. We also capture the previously studied notion of relational policies in a static type system. Finally, we point out that use of our hybrid logic removes an exponential penalty in existing attempts of specifying complex relationships such as \at least three friends"

Time Dependent Policy-Based Access Control

Access control policies are essential to determine who is allowed to access data in a system without compromising the data\u27s security. However, applications inside a distributed environment may require those policies to be dependent on the actual content of the data, the flow of information, while also on other attributes of the environment such as the time. In this paper, we use systems of Timed Automata to model distributed systems and we present a logic in which one can express time-dependent policies for access control. We show how a fragment of our logic can be reduced to a logic that current model checkers for Timed Automata such as UPPAAL can handle and we present a translator that performs this reduction. We then use our translator and UPPAAL to enforce time-dependent policy-based access control on an example application from the aerospace industry