Fantasy proneness and counterfactual thinking

Counterfactual thinking (CFT; mentally simulating alternatives to reality) is central to learning and motivation. Two studies explored the relationship between CFT and fantasy proneness, a personality trait typified by excessive fantasies hard to distinguish from reality. In study1, participants completed a fictional diary entry which was used to measure spontaneous CFT and the Creative Experiences Questionnaire measure of fantasy proneness. Fantasy proneness was significantly correlated with the generation of counterfactual thoughts. Both CFT and fantasy proneness have been independently associated with low mood and study2 included a measure of negative emotional state (the Depression, Anxiety and Stress scale) in addition to the CEQ and CFT. Fantasy proneness and negative emotion both predicted CFT, but no interaction between them was observed. The results suggest that individuals high in fantasy proneness have a general tendency to think counterfactually. © 2012 Elsevier Ltd

Creationism and evolution

In Tower of Babel, Robert Pennock wrote that “defenders of evolution would help their case immeasurably if they would reassure their audience that morality, purpose, and meaning are not lost by accepting the truth of evolution.” We first consider the thesis that the creationists’ movement exploits moral concerns to spread its ideas against the theory of evolution. We analyze their arguments and possible reasons why they are easily accepted. Creationists usually employ two contradictive strategies to expose the purported moral degradation that comes with accepting the theory of evolution. On the one hand they claim that evolutionary theory is immoral. On the other hand creationists think of evolutionary theory as amoral. Both objections come naturally in a monotheistic view. But we can find similar conclusions about the supposed moral aspects of evolution in non-religiously inspired discussions. Meanwhile, the creationism-evolution debate mainly focuses — understandably — on what constitutes good science. We consider the need for moral reassurance and analyze reassuring arguments from philosophers. Philosophers may stress that science does not prescribe and is therefore not immoral, but this reaction opens the door for the objection of amorality that evolution — as a naturalistic world view at least — supposedly endorses. We consider that the topic of morality and its relation to the acceptance of evolution may need more empirical research

Knowledge and Blameworthiness

Blameworthiness of an agent or a coalition of agents is often defined in terms of the principle of alternative possibilities: for the coalition to be responsible for an outcome, the outcome must take place and the coalition should have had a strategy to prevent it. In this article we argue that in the settings with imperfect information, not only should the coalition have had a strategy, but it also should have known that it had a strategy, and it should have known what the strategy was. The main technical result of the article is a sound and complete bimodal logic that describes the interplay between knowledge and blameworthiness in strategic games with imperfect information

Hume, the Philosophy of Science and the Scientific Tradition

Although the main focus of Hume’s career was in the humanities, his work also has an observable role in the historical development of natural sciences after his time. To show this, I shall center on the relation between Hume and two major figures in the history of the natural sciences: Charles Darwin (1809–1882) and Albert Einstein (1879–1955). Both of these scientists read Hume. They also found parts of Hume’s work useful to their sciences. Inquiring into the relations between Hume and the two scientists shows that his philosophical positions had a partial but constructive role in the formation of modern biology and physics. This is accordingly a clear indication of Hume’s impact on the scientific tradition. Before proceeding to analyze Hume’s contribution to the history of science, it is important to address his broader role in the history of philosophy of science. Hume’s discussions concerning the topics of causation, induction, the distinction between mathematical and empirical propositions, and laws of nature have been important for the philosophy of science of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries

Seeing, Knowing, doing : case studies in modal logic

Dans le domaine des jeux vidéos par exemple, surtout des jeux de rôles, les personnages virtuels perçoivent un environnement, en tirent des connaissances puis effectuent des actions selon leur besoin. De même en robotique, un robot perçoit son environnement à l'aide de capteurs/caméras, établit une base de connaissances et effectuent des mouvements etc. La description des comportements de ces agents virtuels et leurs raisonnements peut s'effectuer à l'aide d'un langage logique. Dans cette thèse, on se propose de modéliser les trois aspects "voir", "savoir" et "faire" et leurs interactions à l'aide de la logique modale. Dans une première partie, on modélise des agents dans un espace géométrique puis on définit une relation épistémique qui tient compte des positions et du regard des agents. Dans une seconde partie, on revisite la logique des actions "STIT" (see-to-it-that ou "faire en sorte que") qui permet de faire la différence entre les principes "de re" et "de dicto", contrairement à d'autres logiques modales des actions. Dans une troisième partie, on s'intéresse à modéliser quelques aspects de la théorie des jeux dans une variante de la logique "STIT" ainsi que des émotions contre-factuelles comme le regret. Tout au long de cette thèse, on s'efforcera de s'intéresser aux aspects logiques comme les complétudes des axiomatisations et la complexité du problème de satisfiabilité d'une formule logique. L'intégration des trois concepts "voir", "savoir" et "faire" dans une et une seule logique est évoquée en conclusion et reste une question ouverte.Agents are entities who perceive their environment and who perform actions. For instance in role playing video games, ennemies are agents who perceive some part of the virtual world and who can attack or launch a sortilege. Another example may concern robot assistance for disabled people: the robot perceives obstacles of the world and can alert humans or help them. Here, we try to give formal tools to model knowledge reasoning about the perception of their environment and about actions based, on modal logic. First, we give combine the standard epistemic modal logic with perception constructions of the form (agent a sees agent b). We give a semantics in terms of position and orientation of the agents in the space that can be a line (Lineland) or a plane (Flatland). Concerning Lineland, we provide a complete axiomatization and an optimal procedure for model-checking and satisfiability problem. Concerning Flatland, we show that both model-checking and satisfiability problem are decidable but the exact complexities and the axiomatization remain open problems. Thus, the logics of Lineland and Flatland are completely a new approach: their syntax is epistemic but their semantics concern spatial reasoning. Secondly, we study on the logic of agency ``see-to-it-that'' STIT made up of construction of the form [J]A standing for ``the coalition of agents J sees to it that A''. Our interest is motivated: STIT is strictly more expressive that standard modal logic for agency like Coalition Logic CL or Alternating-time Temporal Logic ATL. In CL or ATL the ``de re'' and ``de dicto'' problem is quite difficult and technical whereas if we combine STIT-operators with epistemic operators, we can solve it in a natural way. However this strong expressivity has a prize: the general version of STIT is undecidable. That is why we focus on some syntactic fragments of STIT: either we restrict the allowed coalitions J in constructions [J]A or we restrict the nesting of modal STIT-operators. We provide axiomatizations and complexity results. Finally, we give flavour to epistemic modal logic by adding STIT-operators. The logic STIT is suitable to express counterfactual statements like ``agent a could have choosen an action such that A have been true''. Thus we show how to model counterfactual emotions like regret, rejoicing, disappointment and elation in this framework. We also model epistemic games by adapting the logic STIT by giving explicitely names of actions in the language. In this framework, we can model the notion of rational agents but other kind of behaviour like altruism etc., Nash equilibrium and iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies

Before Turning into Ashes: A Study of Entrepreneurial Cognition, Learning, and Exit

Entrepreneurial practices such as discovery, evaluation, and exploitation of opportunities, decision-making, and problem solving are influenced by mental processes and cognitive mechanisms. Decision-making studies in the field of entrepreneurship confirm that entrepreneurs have strong tendency to use cognitive mechanisms such as biases and heuristics to simplify their decision-making processes. Compared to non-entrepreneurs, entrepreneurs show higher levels of cognitive bias. By focusing on cognitive mechanisms of entrepreneurs, this study answers the question of why some individuals insist on continuing their entrepreneurial journey while failure-related phenomena such as critical setbacks and counterfactual thoughts exist. Unlike the prior research that have focused on the antecedents of failure and learning outcomes of failure, the current research takes a different approach and studies failure and learning as entrepreneurial journeys rather than simply considering them as incidents or outcomes of a new venture. Therefore, instead of studying ventures that are rising from the ashes, the author investigates the behavior of entrepreneurs before their ventures turn into ashes

Epistemic virtues, metavirtues, and computational complexity

I argue that considerations about computational complexity show that all finite agents need characteristics like those that have been called epistemic virtues. The necessity of these virtues follows in part from the nonexistence of shortcuts, or efficient ways of finding shortcuts, to cognitively expensive routines. It follows that agents must possess the capacities – metavirtues –of developing in advance the cognitive virtues they will need when time and memory are at a premium