Scalable and Secure Sharing of Personal Health Records in Cloud Computing using Attribute-Based Encryption

Abstract: Personal health record (PHR) is an emerging patient-centric model of health information exchange, which is often outsourced to be stored at a third party, such as cloud providers. However, there have been wide privacy concerns as personal health information could be exposed to those third party servers and to unauthorized parties. To assure the patients' control over access to their own PHRs, it is a promising method to encrypt the PHRs before outsourcing. Yet, issues such as risks of privacy exposure, scalability in key management, flexible access and efficient user revocation, have remained the most important challenges toward achieving fine-grained, cryptographically enforced data access control. In this paper, we propose a novel patient-centric framework and a suite of mechanisms for data access control to PHRs stored in semi-trusted servers. To achieve fine-grained and scalable data access control for PHRs, we leverage attribute based encryption (ABE) techniques to encrypt each patient's PHR file. Different from previous works in secure data outsourcing, we focus on the multiple data owner scenario, and divide the users in the PHR system into multiple security domains that greatly reduces the key management complexity for owners and users. A high degree of patient privacy is guaranteed simultaneously by exploiting multi-authority ABE. Our scheme also enables dynamic modification of access policies or file attributes, supports efficient on-demand user/attribute revocation and break-glass access under emergency scenarios. Extensive analytical and experimental results are presented which show the security, scalability and efficiency of our proposed scheme

Securely Launching Virtual Machines on Trustworthy Platforms in a Public Cloud

In this paper we consider the Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) cloud model which allows cloud users to run their own virtual machines (VMs) on available cloud computing resources. IaaS gives enterprises the possibility to outsource their process workloads with minimal effort and expense. However, one major problem with existing approaches of cloud leasing, is that the users can only get contractual guarantees regarding the integrity of the offered platforms. The fact that the IaaS user himself or herself cannot verify the provider promised cloud platform integrity, is a security risk which threatens to prevent the IaaS business in general. In this paper we address this issue and propose a novel secure VM launch protocol using Trusted Computing techniques. This protocol allows the cloud IaaS users to securely bind the VM to a trusted computer configuration such that the clear text VM only will run on a platform that has been booted into a trustworthy state. This capability builds user confidence and can serve as an important enabler for creating trust in public clouds. We evaluate the feasibility of our proposed protocol via a full scale system implementation and perform a system security analysis

ShareABEL: Secure Sharing of mHealth Data through Cryptographically-Enforced Access Control

Owners of mobile-health apps and devices often want to share their mHealth data with others, such as physicians, therapists, coaches, and caregivers. For privacy reasons, however, they typically want to share a limited subset of their information with each recipient according to their preferences. In this paper, we introduce ShareABEL, a scalable, usable, and practical system that allows mHealth-data owners to specify access-control policies and to cryptographically enforce those policies so that only parties with the proper corresponding permissions are able to decrypt data. The design (and prototype implementation) of this system makes three contributions: (1) it applies cryptographically-enforced access-control measures to wearable healthcare data, which pose different challenges than Electronic Medical Records (EMRs), (2) it recognizes the temporal nature of mHealth data streams and supports revocation of access to part or all of a data stream, and (3) it departs from the vendor- and device-specific silos of mHealth data by implementing a secure end-to-end system that can be applied to data collected from a variety of mHealth apps and devices

The Irrefutable History of You: Distributed Ledgers and Semantics for Ubiquitous Personal Ratings

A recurring theme in the science-fiction series Black Mirror is the consequence for society of an over-focus on social networking. The episode Nosedive imagines a future in which every public interaction a person has is rated by the other parties, and every aspect of ones life depends on the overall rating computed from these. In this paper, we show how such a scenario is already technically possible using existing technologies such as distributed ledgers, and discuss means by which the negative possibilities may be ameliorated using semantic approaches

Privacy Enhanced Access Control by Means of Policy Blinding

Traditional techniques of enforcing an access control policy\ud rely on an honest reference monitor to enforce the policy. However, for\ud applications where the resources are sensitive, the access control policy\ud might also be sensitive. As a result, an honest-but-curious reference monitor would glean some interesting information from the requests that it\ud processes. For example if a requestor in a role psychiatrist is granted access to a document, the patient associated with that document probably\ud has a psychiatric problem. The patient would consider this sensitive in-\ud formation, and she might prefer the honest-but-curious reference monitor\ud to remain oblivious of her mental problem.\ud We present a high level framework for querying and enforcing a role\ud based access control policy that identifies where sensitive information\ud might be disclosed. We then propose a construction which enforces a\ud role based access control policy cryptographically, in such a way that the\ud reference monitor learns as little as possible about the policy. (The reference monitor only learns something from repeated queries). We prove\ud the security of our scheme showing that it works in theory, but that it\ud has a practical drawback. However, the practical drawback is common\ud to all cryptographically enforced access policy schemes. We identify several approaches to mitigate the drawback and conclude by arguing that\ud there is an underlying fundamental problem that cannot be solved. We\ud also show why attribute based encryption techniques do not not solve the\ud problem of enforcing policy by an honest but curious reference monitor