mFish Alpha Pilot: Building a Roadmap for Effective Mobile Technology to Sustain Fisheries and Improve Fisher Livelihoods.

In June 2014 at the Our Ocean Conference in Washington, DC, United States Secretary of State John Kerry announced the ambitious goal of ending overfishing by 2020. To support that goal, the Secretary's Office of Global Partnerships launched mFish, a public-private partnership to harness the power of mobile technology to improve fisher livelihoods and increase the sustainability of fisheries around the world. The US Department of State provided a grant to 50in10 to create a pilot of mFish that would allow for the identification of behaviors and incentives that might drive more fishers to adopt novel technology. In May 2015 50in10 and Future of Fish designed a pilot to evaluate how to improve adoption of a new mobile technology platform aimed at improving fisheries data capture and fisher livelihoods. Full report

Key technologies for safe and autonomous drones

Drones/UAVs are able to perform air operations that are very difficult to be performed by manned aircrafts. In addition, drones' usage brings significant economic savings and environmental benefits, while reducing risks to human life. In this paper, we present key technologies that enable development of drone systems. The technologies are identified based on the usages of drones (driven by COMP4DRONES project use cases). These technologies are grouped into four categories: U-space capabilities, system functions, payloads, and tools. Also, we present the contributions of the COMP4DRONES project to improve existing technologies. These contributions aim to ease drones’ customization, and enable their safe operation.This project has received funding from the ECSEL Joint Undertaking (JU) under grant agreement No 826610. The JU receives support from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme and Spain, Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands. The total project budget is 28,590,748.75 EUR (excluding ESIF partners), while the requested grant is 7,983,731.61 EUR to ECSEL JU, and 8,874,523.84 EUR of National and ESIF Funding. The project has been started on 1st October 2019

Ethical Control of Unmanned Systems: lifesaving/lethal scenarios for naval operations

Prepared for: Raytheon Missiles & Defense under NCRADA-NPS-19-0227This research in Ethical Control of Unmanned Systems applies precepts of Network Optional Warfare (NOW) to develop a three-step Mission Execution Ontology (MEO) methodology for validating, simulating, and implementing mission orders for unmanned systems. First, mission orders are represented in ontologies that are understandable by humans and readable by machines. Next, the MEO is validated and tested for logical coherence using Semantic Web standards. The validated MEO is refined for implementation in simulation and visualization. This process is iterated until the MEO is ready for implementation. This methodology is applied to four Naval scenarios in order of increasing challenges that the operational environment and the adversary impose on the Human-Machine Team. The extent of challenge to Ethical Control in the scenarios is used to refine the MEO for the unmanned system. The research also considers Data-Centric Security and blockchain distributed ledger as enabling technologies for Ethical Control. Data-Centric Security is a combination of structured messaging, efficient compression, digital signature, and document encryption, in correct order, for round-trip messaging. Blockchain distributed ledger has potential to further add integrity measures for aggregated message sets, confirming receipt/response/sequencing without undetected message loss. When implemented, these technologies together form the end-to-end data security that ensures mutual trust and command authority in real-world operational environments—despite the potential presence of interfering network conditions, intermittent gaps, or potential opponent intercept. A coherent Ethical Control approach to command and control of unmanned systems is thus feasible. Therefore, this research concludes that maintaining human control of unmanned systems at long ranges of time-duration and distance, in denied, degraded, and deceptive environments, is possible through well-defined mission orders and data security technologies. Finally, as the human role remains essential in Ethical Control of unmanned systems, this research recommends the development of an unmanned system qualification process for Naval operations, as well as additional research prioritized based on urgency and impact.Raytheon Missiles & DefenseRaytheon Missiles & Defense (RMD).Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

SciTokens: Capability-Based Secure Access to Remote Scientific Data

The management of security credentials (e.g., passwords, secret keys) for computational science workflows is a burden for scientists and information security officers. Problems with credentials (e.g., expiration, privilege mismatch) cause workflows to fail to fetch needed input data or store valuable scientific results, distracting scientists from their research by requiring them to diagnose the problems, re-run their computations, and wait longer for their results. In this paper, we introduce SciTokens, open source software to help scientists manage their security credentials more reliably and securely. We describe the SciTokens system architecture, design, and implementation addressing use cases from the Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory (LIGO) Scientific Collaboration and the Large Synoptic Survey Telescope (LSST) projects. We also present our integration with widely-used software that supports distributed scientific computing, including HTCondor, CVMFS, and XrootD. SciTokens uses IETF-standard OAuth tokens for capability-based secure access to remote scientific data. The access tokens convey the specific authorizations needed by the workflows, rather than general-purpose authentication impersonation credentials, to address the risks of scientific workflows running on distributed infrastructure including NSF resources (e.g., LIGO Data Grid, Open Science Grid, XSEDE) and public clouds (e.g., Amazon Web Services, Google Cloud, Microsoft Azure). By improving the interoperability and security of scientific workflows, SciTokens 1) enables use of distributed computing for scientific domains that require greater data protection and 2) enables use of more widely distributed computing resources by reducing the risk of credential abuse on remote systems.Comment: 8 pages, 6 figures, PEARC '18: Practice and Experience in Advanced Research Computing, July 22--26, 2018, Pittsburgh, PA, US

The future of UAS: standards, regulations, and operational experiences [workshop report]

This paper presents the outcomes of "The Future of UAS: Standards, Regulations and Operational Experiences" workshop, held on the 7th and 8th of December, 2006 in Brisbane, Queensland, Australia. The goal of the workshop was to identify recent international activities in the Unmanned Airborne Systems (UAS) airspace integration problem. The workshop attracted a broad cross-section of the UAS community, including: airspace and safety regulators, developers, operators and researchers. The three themes of discussion were: progress in the development of standards and regulations, lessons learnt from recent operations, and advances in new technologies. This paper summarises the activities of the workshop and explores the important outcomes and trends as perceived by the authors

Engineering Resilient Space Systems

Several distinct trends will influence space exploration missions in the next decade. Destinations are becoming more remote and mysterious, science questions more sophisticated, and, as mission experience accumulates, the most accessible targets are visited, advancing the knowledge frontier to more difficult, harsh, and inaccessible environments. This leads to new challenges including: hazardous conditions that limit mission lifetime, such as high radiation levels surrounding interesting destinations like Europa or toxic atmospheres of planetary bodies like Venus; unconstrained environments with navigation hazards, such as free-floating active small bodies; multielement missions required to answer more sophisticated questions, such as Mars Sample Return (MSR); and long-range missions, such as Kuiper belt exploration, that must survive equipment failures over the span of decades. These missions will need to be successful without a priori knowledge of the most efficient data collection techniques for optimum science return. Science objectives will have to be revised ‘on the fly’, with new data collection and navigation decisions on short timescales. Yet, even as science objectives are becoming more ambitious, several critical resources remain unchanged. Since physics imposes insurmountable light-time delays, anticipated improvements to the Deep Space Network (DSN) will only marginally improve the bandwidth and communications cadence to remote spacecraft. Fiscal resources are increasingly limited, resulting in fewer flagship missions, smaller spacecraft, and less subsystem redundancy. As missions visit more distant and formidable locations, the job of the operations team becomes more challenging, seemingly inconsistent with the trend of shrinking mission budgets for operations support. How can we continue to explore challenging new locations without increasing risk or system complexity? These challenges are present, to some degree, for the entire Decadal Survey mission portfolio, as documented in Vision and Voyages for Planetary Science in the Decade 2013–2022 (National Research Council, 2011), but are especially acute for the following mission examples, identified in our recently completed KISS Engineering Resilient Space Systems (ERSS) study: 1. A Venus lander, designed to sample the atmosphere and surface of Venus, would have to perform science operations as components and subsystems degrade and fail; 2. A Trojan asteroid tour spacecraft would spend significant time cruising to its ultimate destination (essentially hibernating to save on operations costs), then upon arrival, would have to act as its own surveyor, finding new objects and targets of opportunity as it approaches each asteroid, requiring response on short notice; and 3. A MSR campaign would not only be required to perform fast reconnaissance over long distances on the surface of Mars, interact with an unknown physical surface, and handle degradations and faults, but would also contain multiple components (launch vehicle, cruise stage, entry and landing vehicle, surface rover, ascent vehicle, orbiting cache, and Earth return vehicle) that dramatically increase the need for resilience to failure across the complex system. The concept of resilience and its relevance and application in various domains was a focus during the study, with several definitions of resilience proposed and discussed. While there was substantial variation in the specifics, there was a common conceptual core that emerged—adaptation in the presence of changing circumstances. These changes were couched in various ways—anomalies, disruptions, discoveries—but they all ultimately had to do with changes in underlying assumptions. Invalid assumptions, whether due to unexpected changes in the environment, or an inadequate understanding of interactions within the system, may cause unexpected or unintended system behavior. A system is resilient if it continues to perform the intended functions in the presence of invalid assumptions. Our study focused on areas of resilience that we felt needed additional exploration and integration, namely system and software architectures and capabilities, and autonomy technologies. (While also an important consideration, resilience in hardware is being addressed in multiple other venues, including 2 other KISS studies.) The study consisted of two workshops, separated by a seven-month focused study period. The first workshop (Workshop #1) explored the ‘problem space’ as an organizing theme, and the second workshop (Workshop #2) explored the ‘solution space’. In each workshop, focused discussions and exercises were interspersed with presentations from participants and invited speakers. The study period between the two workshops was organized as part of the synthesis activity during the first workshop. The study participants, after spending the initial days of the first workshop discussing the nature of resilience and its impact on future science missions, decided to split into three focus groups, each with a particular thrust, to explore specific ideas further and develop material needed for the second workshop. The three focus groups and areas of exploration were: 1. Reference missions: address/refine the resilience needs by exploring a set of reference missions 2. Capability survey: collect, document, and assess current efforts to develop capabilities and technology that could be used to address the documented needs, both inside and outside NASA 3. Architecture: analyze the impact of architecture on system resilience, and provide principles and guidance for architecting greater resilience in our future systems The key product of the second workshop was a set of capability roadmaps pertaining to the three reference missions selected for their representative coverage of the types of space missions envisioned for the future. From these three roadmaps, we have extracted several common capability patterns that would be appropriate targets for near-term technical development: one focused on graceful degradation of system functionality, a second focused on data understanding for science and engineering applications, and a third focused on hazard avoidance and environmental uncertainty. Continuing work is extending these roadmaps to identify candidate enablers of the capabilities from the following three categories: architecture solutions, technology solutions, and process solutions. The KISS study allowed a collection of diverse and engaged engineers, researchers, and scientists to think deeply about the theory, approaches, and technical issues involved in developing and applying resilience capabilities. The conclusions summarize the varied and disparate discussions that occurred during the study, and include new insights about the nature of the challenge and potential solutions: 1. There is a clear and definitive need for more resilient space systems. During our study period, the key scientists/engineers we engaged to understand potential future missions confirmed the scientific and risk reduction value of greater resilience in the systems used to perform these missions. 2. Resilience can be quantified in measurable terms—project cost, mission risk, and quality of science return. In order to consider resilience properly in the set of engineering trades performed during the design, integration, and operation of space systems, the benefits and costs of resilience need to be quantified. We believe, based on the work done during the study, that appropriate metrics to measure resilience must relate to risk, cost, and science quality/opportunity. Additional work is required to explicitly tie design decisions to these first-order concerns. 3. There are many existing basic technologies that can be applied to engineering resilient space systems. Through the discussions during the study, we found many varied approaches and research that address the various facets of resilience, some within NASA, and many more beyond. Examples from civil architecture, Department of Defense (DoD) / Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) initiatives, ‘smart’ power grid control, cyber-physical systems, software architecture, and application of formal verification methods for software were identified and discussed. The variety and scope of related efforts is encouraging and presents many opportunities for collaboration and development, and we expect many collaborative proposals and joint research as a result of the study. 4. Use of principled architectural approaches is key to managing complexity and integrating disparate technologies. The main challenge inherent in considering highly resilient space systems is that the increase in capability can result in an increase in complexity with all of the 3 risks and costs associated with more complex systems. What is needed is a better way of conceiving space systems that enables incorporation of capabilities without increasing complexity. We believe principled architecting approaches provide the needed means to convey a unified understanding of the system to primary stakeholders, thereby controlling complexity in the conception and development of resilient systems, and enabling the integration of disparate approaches and technologies. A representative architectural example is included in Appendix F. 5. Developing trusted resilience capabilities will require a diverse yet strategically directed research program. Despite the interest in, and benefits of, deploying resilience space systems, to date, there has been a notable lack of meaningful demonstrated progress in systems capable of working in hazardous uncertain situations. The roadmaps completed during the study, and documented in this report, provide the basis for a real funded plan that considers the required fundamental work and evolution of needed capabilities. Exploring space is a challenging and difficult endeavor. Future space missions will require more resilience in order to perform the desired science in new environments under constraints of development and operations cost, acceptable risk, and communications delays. Development of space systems with resilient capabilities has the potential to expand the limits of possibility, revolutionizing space science by enabling as yet unforeseen missions and breakthrough science observations. Our KISS study provided an essential venue for the consideration of these challenges and goals. Additional work and future steps are needed to realize the potential of resilient systems—this study provided the necessary catalyst to begin this process

Secure Data Sharing With AdHoc

In the scientific circles, there is pressing need to form temporary and dynamic collaborations to share diverse resources (e.g. data, an access to services, applications or various instruments). Theoretically, the traditional grid technologies respond to this need with the abstraction of a Virtual Organization (VO). In practice its procedures are characterized by latency, administrative overhead and are inconvenient to its users. We would like to propose the Manifesto for Secure Sharing. The main postulate is that users should be able to share data and resources by themselves without any intervention on the system administrator's side. In addition, operating an intuitive interface does not require IT skills. AdHoc is a resource sharing interface designed for users willing to share data or computational resources within seconds and almost effortlessly. The AdHoc application is built on the top of traditional security frameworks, such as the PKI X.509 certificate scheme, Globus GSI, gLite VOMS and Shibboleth. It enables users rapid and secure collaboration