Fast Iterative Combinatorial Auctions via Bayesian Learning

Iterative combinatorial auctions (CAs) are often used in multi-billion dollar domains like spectrum auctions, and speed of convergence is one of the crucial factors behind the choice of a specific design for practical applications. To achieve fast convergence, current CAs require careful tuning of the price update rule to balance convergence speed and allocative efficiency. Brero and Lahaie (2018) recently introduced a Bayesian iterative auction design for settings with single-minded bidders. The Bayesian approach allowed them to incorporate prior knowledge into the price update algorithm, reducing the number of rounds to convergence with minimal parameter tuning. In this paper, we generalize their work to settings with no restrictions on bidder valuations. We introduce a new Bayesian CA design for this general setting which uses Monte Carlo Expectation Maximization to update prices at each round of the auction. We evaluate our approach via simulations on CATS instances. Our results show that our Bayesian CA outperforms even a highly optimized benchmark in terms of clearing percentage and convergence speed.Comment: 9 pages, 2 figures, AAAI-1

PALS/PRISM Software Design Description (SDD): Ver. 0.51

This Software Design Description (SDD) provides detailed information on the architecture and coding for the PRISM C++ library (version 0.51). The PRISM C++ library supports consistent information sharing and in- teractions between distributed components of networked embedded systems, e.g. avionics. It is designed to reduce the complexity of the networked sys- tem by employing synchronous semantics provided by the architectural pat- tern called a Physically-Asynchronous Logically-Synchronous (PALS) system.unpublishednot peer reviewe

Predictable migration and communication in the Quest-V multikernal

Quest-V is a system we have been developing from the ground up, with objectives focusing on safety, predictability and efficiency. It is designed to work on emerging multicore processors with hardware virtualization support. Quest-V is implemented as a ``distributed system on a chip'' and comprises multiple sandbox kernels. Sandbox kernels are isolated from one another in separate regions of physical memory, having access to a subset of processing cores and I/O devices. This partitioning prevents system failures in one sandbox affecting the operation of other sandboxes. Shared memory channels managed by system monitors enable inter-sandbox communication. The distributed nature of Quest-V means each sandbox has a separate physical clock, with all event timings being managed by per-core local timers. Each sandbox is responsible for its own scheduling and I/O management, without requiring intervention of a hypervisor. In this paper, we formulate bounds on inter-sandbox communication in the absence of a global scheduler or global system clock. We also describe how address space migration between sandboxes can be guaranteed without violating service constraints. Experimental results on a working system show the conditions under which Quest-V performs real-time communication and migration.National Science Foundation (1117025

How to Allocate R&D (and Other) Subsidies: An Experimentally Tested Policy Recommendation

This paper evaluates how R&D subsidies to the business sector are typically awarded. We identify two sources of ine_ciency: the selection based on a ranking of individual projects, rather than complete allocations, and the failure to induce competition among applicants in order to extract and use information about the necessary funding. In order to correct these ine_- ciencies we propose mechanisms that include some form of an auction in which applicants bid for subsidies. Our proposals are tested in a simulation and in controlled lab experiments. The results suggest that adopting our proposals may considerably improve the allocation

A Bayesian Clearing Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions

We cast the problem of combinatorial auction design in a Bayesian framework in order to incorporate prior information into the auction process and minimize the number of rounds to convergence. We first develop a generative model of agent valuations and market prices such that clearing prices become maximum a posteriori estimates given observed agent valuations. This generative model then forms the basis of an auction process which alternates between refining estimates of agent valuations and computing candidate clearing prices. We provide an implementation of the auction using assumed density filtering to estimate valuations and expectation maximization to compute prices. An empirical evaluation over a range of valuation domains demonstrates that our Bayesian auction mechanism is highly competitive against the combinatorial clock auction in terms of rounds to convergence, even under the most favorable choices of price increment for this baseline.Comment: 9 pages, 4 figures, AAAI-1