20,866 research outputs found

    Projector - a partially typed language for querying XML

    Get PDF
    We describe Projector, a language that can be used to perform a mixture of typed and untyped computation against data represented in XML. For some problems, notably when the data is unstructured or semistructured, the most desirable programming model is against the tree structure underlying the document. When this tree structure has been used to model regular data structures, then these regular structures themselves are a more desirable programming model. The language Projector, described here in outline, gives both models within a single partially typed algebra and is well suited for hybrid applications, for example when fragments of a known structure are embedded in a document whose overall structure is unknown. Projector is an extension of ECMA-262 (aka JavaScript), and therefore inherits an untyped DOM interface. To this has been added some static typing and a dynamic projection primitive, which can be used to assert the presence of a regular structure modelled within the XML. If this structure does exist, the data is extracted and presented as a typed value within the programming language

    Performance and Optimization Abstractions for Large Scale Heterogeneous Systems in the Cactus/Chemora Framework

    Full text link
    We describe a set of lower-level abstractions to improve performance on modern large scale heterogeneous systems. These provide portable access to system- and hardware-dependent features, automatically apply dynamic optimizations at run time, and target stencil-based codes used in finite differencing, finite volume, or block-structured adaptive mesh refinement codes. These abstractions include a novel data structure to manage refinement information for block-structured adaptive mesh refinement, an iterator mechanism to efficiently traverse multi-dimensional arrays in stencil-based codes, and a portable API and implementation for explicit SIMD vectorization. These abstractions can either be employed manually, or be targeted by automated code generation, or be used via support libraries by compilers during code generation. The implementations described below are available in the Cactus framework, and are used e.g. in the Einstein Toolkit for relativistic astrophysics simulations

    CUP: Comprehensive User-Space Protection for C/C++

    Full text link
    Memory corruption vulnerabilities in C/C++ applications enable attackers to execute code, change data, and leak information. Current memory sanitizers do no provide comprehensive coverage of a program's data. In particular, existing tools focus primarily on heap allocations with limited support for stack allocations and globals. Additionally, existing tools focus on the main executable with limited support for system libraries. Further, they suffer from both false positives and false negatives. We present Comprehensive User-Space Protection for C/C++, CUP, an LLVM sanitizer that provides complete spatial and probabilistic temporal memory safety for C/C++ program on 64-bit architectures (with a prototype implementation for x86_64). CUP uses a hybrid metadata scheme that supports all program data including globals, heap, or stack and maintains the ABI. Compared to existing approaches with the NIST Juliet test suite, CUP reduces false negatives by 10x (0.1%) compared to the state of the art LLVM sanitizers, and produces no false positives. CUP instruments all user-space code, including libc and other system libraries, removing them from the trusted code base

    THE IMPACT OF PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES ON THE SOFTWARE’S SECURITY

    Get PDF
    Security is usually defined as the ability of a system to protect itself against accidental or deliberate intrusion1. Ensuring integrity, confidentiality, availability, and accountability requirements even in the presence of a determined, malicious opponent is essential for computer security. Sensitive data has to be manipulated and consulted by authorized users only (integrity, confidentiality). Furthermore, the system should resist “denial of service” attacks that attempt to render it unusable (availability). Also the system has to ensure the inability to deny the ownership of prior actions (accountability).security
    • …
    corecore