Optimization distribution of activity based costing using agent based technologies

The article describes a distribution of cost with base the activities that will result from the negotiations with the salesmen with base the use agent based technology. The purpose is to solve the optimization problem, taking into account constraints such as the salesmen capacity and income increase in a uniform way and the company’s turnover increase. In this approach a Sales schedule (ABC activity costing) is developed dynamically by all of the concerned participants. The negotiation methodology used allows agents to negotiate with other agents in a certain geographical area based on their sales capacity, commission percentage and the area’s sales turnover. A simulation model based on Repast3 has been developed to evaluate the algorithm accuracy and the system’s convergence. By executing this prototype with various utility functions, interesting results have been achieved showing a convergence in total company’s turnover, salesmen capacity and salesman income.peer-reviewe

Essays in Mechanism Design

This thesis addresses problems in the area of mechanism design. In many settings in winch collective decisions are made, individuals' actual preferences are not publicly observable. As a result, individuals should be relied on to reveal this information. We are interested in an important application of mechanism design, which is the construction of desirable procedures for deciding upon resource allocation or task assignment. We make two main contributions. First, we propose a new mechanism for allocating a divisible commodity between a number of buyers efficiently and fairly. Buyers are assumed to behave as price-anticipators rather than as price-takers. The proposed mechanism is as parsimonious as possible, in the sense that it requires participants to report a one-dimensional message (scalar strategy) instead of an entire utility function, as required by Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms. We show that this mechanism yields efficient allocations in Nash equilibria and moreover, that these equilibria are envy-free. Additionally, we present distinct results that this mechanism is the only simple scalar strategy mechanism that both implements efficient Nash equilibria and satisfies the no envy axiom of fairness. The mechanism's Nash equilibria are proven to satisfy the fairness properties of both Ranking and Voluntary Participation. Our second contribution is to develop optimal VCG mechanisms in order to assign identical economic "bads" (for example, costly tasks) to agents. An optimal VCG mechanism minimizes the largest ratio of budget imbalance to efficient surplus over all cost profiles. The optimal non-deficit VCG mechanism achieves asymptotic budget balance, yet the non-deficit requirement is incompatible with reasonable welfare bounds. If we omit the non-deficit requirement, individual rationality greatly changes the behavior of surplus loss and deficit loss. Allowing a slight deficit, the optimal individually rational VCG mechanism becomes asymptotically budget balanced. Such a phenomenon cannot be found in the case of assigning economic "goods.

Kooperationsanreize für autonome Einheiten in selbst-organisierenden Informationssystemen

Für Informationssysteme haben die Selbstorganisation und Autonomie der Teilnehmer große Bedeutung gewonnen, da hier die Inbetriebnahme mit sehr geringen Kosten verbunden ist und die Betriebskosten durch Verzicht auf Infrastruktur entfallen. Allerdings können sich die Einheiten des Informationssystems untereinander betrügen, indem sie sich versprochene Dienstleistungen nicht erbringen. In dieser Arbeit wird ein Verfahren entworfen und evaluiert, das solches Betrugsverhalten unterbindet. Die Hauptpunkte des Entwurfes sind die typbasierte Glaubensbildung, die verfügbare Informationen probabilistisch richtig berücksichtigt, und das Empfehlungssystem, dem nicht-abstreitbare Beweismittel zugrunde liegen. Die simulative Evaluation ist auf das Szenario universitärer Ad-hoc Netze ausgerichtet und weist die Effektivität des Entwurfs darin nach