15 research outputs found

    A Discrete and Bounded Envy-free Cake Cutting Protocol for Four Agents

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    We consider the well-studied cake cutting problem in which the goal is to identify a fair allocation based on a minimal number of queries from the agents. The problem has attracted considerable attention within various branches of computer science, mathematics, and economics. Although, the elegant Selfridge-Conway envy-free protocol for three agents has been known since 1960, it has been a major open problem for the last fifty years to obtain a bounded envy-free protocol for more than three agents. We propose a discrete and bounded envy-free protocol for four agents

    On the Complexity of Chore Division

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    We study the proportional chore division problem where a protocol wants to divide an undesirable object, called chore, among nn different players. The goal is to find an allocation such that the cost of the chore assigned to each player be at most 1/n1/n of the total cost. This problem is the dual variant of the cake cutting problem in which we want to allocate a desirable object. Edmonds and Pruhs showed that any protocol for the proportional cake cutting must use at least Ω(nlogn)\Omega(n \log n) queries in the worst case, however, finding a lower bound for the proportional chore division remained an interesting open problem. We show that chore division and cake cutting problems are closely related to each other and provide an Ω(nlogn)\Omega(n \log n) lower bound for chore division

    Chore Cutting: Envy and Truth

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    We study the fair division of divisible bad resources with strategic agents who can manipulate their private information to get a better allocation. Within certain constraints, we are particularly interested in whether truthful envy-free mechanisms exist over piecewise-constant valuations. We demonstrate that no deterministic truthful envy-free mechanism can exist in the connected-piece scenario, and the same impossibility result occurs for hungry agents. We also show that no deterministic, truthful dictatorship mechanism can satisfy the envy-free criterion, and the same result remains true for non-wasteful constraints rather than dictatorship. We further address several related problems and directions.Comment: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:2104.07387 by other author

    Non-Exploitable Protocols for Repeated Cake Cutting

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    We introduce the notion of exploitability in cut-and-choose protocols for repeated cake cutting. If a cut-and-choose protocol is repeated, the cutter can possibly gain information about the chooser from her previous actions, and exploit this information for her own gain, at the expense of the chooser. We define a generalization of cut-and-choose protocols - forced-cut protocols - in which some cuts are made exogenously while others are made by the cutter, and show that there exist non-exploitable forced-cut protocols that use a small number of cuts per day: When the cake has at least as many dimensions as days, we show a protocol that uses a single cut per day. When the cake is 1-dimensional, we show an adaptive non-exploitable protocol that uses 3 cuts per day, and a non-adaptive protocol that uses n cuts per day (where n is the number of days). In contrast, we show that no non-adaptive non-exploitable forced-cut protocol can use a constant number of cuts per day. Finally, we show that if the cake is at least 2-dimensional, there is a non-adaptive non-exploitable protocol that uses 3 cuts per day

    Fair Division of Mixed Divisible and Indivisible Goods

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    We study the problem of fair division when the resources contain both divisible and indivisible goods. Classic fairness notions such as envy-freeness (EF) and envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) cannot be directly applied to the mixed goods setting. In this work, we propose a new fairness notion envy-freeness for mixed goods (EFM), which is a direct generalization of both EF and EF1 to the mixed goods setting. We prove that an EFM allocation always exists for any number of agents. We also propose efficient algorithms to compute an EFM allocation for two agents and for nn agents with piecewise linear valuations over the divisible goods. Finally, we relax the envy-free requirement, instead asking for ϵ\epsilon-envy-freeness for mixed goods (ϵ\epsilon-EFM), and present an algorithm that finds an ϵ\epsilon-EFM allocation in time polynomial in the number of agents, the number of indivisible goods, and 1/ϵ1/\epsilon.Comment: Appears in the 34th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 202

    An Algorithmic Framework for Strategic Fair Division

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    We study the paradigmatic fair division problem of allocating a divisible good among agents with heterogeneous preferences, commonly known as cake cutting. Classical cake cutting protocols are susceptible to manipulation. Do their strategic outcomes still guarantee fairness? To address this question we adopt a novel algorithmic approach, by designing a concrete computational framework for fair division---the class of Generalized Cut and Choose (GCC) protocols}---and reasoning about the game-theoretic properties of algorithms that operate in this model. The class of GCC protocols includes the most important discrete cake cutting protocols, and turns out to be compatible with the study of fair division among strategic agents. In particular, GCC protocols are guaranteed to have approximate subgame perfect Nash equilibria, or even exact equilibria if the protocol's tie-breaking rule is flexible. We further observe that the (approximate) equilibria of proportional GCC protocols---which guarantee each of the nn agents a 1/n1/n-fraction of the cake---must be (approximately) proportional. Finally, we design a protocol in this framework with the property that its Nash equilibrium allocations coincide with the set of (contiguous) envy-free allocations
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