ITIL-Based IT Service Support Process Reengineering

The Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) supports best practices, reengineering activities and IT service support processes. ITIL framework only provides recommendations, and companies need to utilize this framework to improve their IT service support processes and establish best practices. This study provides a methodology on how to apply the ITIL framework for evaluating the IT service support processes, its reengineering and alignment to best practices, and subsequent integration into a decision support system framework. A case study approach was used to identify a set of Key Performance Indicators (KPI) which were monitored by a decision support system (DSS) for triggering on-going reengineering of IT service support processes. This paper focuses on the implementation of the ITIL guidelines at the operational level, improvement of the service desk, and incident, problem, change, release, and configuration management. It also presents the implementation of the ITIL guidelines at the tactical level for the improvement of the service level, capacity, IT service continuity, service availability, and security management. We conclude by providing recommendations for future research

DSS Based IT Service Support Process Reengineering Using ITIL: A Case Study

The Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) is readily available for establishing the best practices, reengineering and improving the IT service support process. However, the ITIL framework only provides recommendations, and a company needs to explore a methodology for improving the IT service support process and adopting the best guidelines of ITIL framework. To this end, this chapter investigates upon how to apply the ITIL framework can be used for evaluating the current IT service support process and its reengineering. A set of Key Performance Indicators (KPI) were established which are monitored by a decision support system (DSS) for triggering on-going reengineering of IT service support process. A case study methodology is used for an effective reengineering of IT service support process. This chapter focuses on implementing the ITIL guidelines at an operational level, improving the service desk, incident management, problem management, change management, release management, and configuration. It also focuses on implementing the ITIL guidelines at a tactical level, improving the service level management, capacity management, IT service continuity management, service availability, and security management. The chapter describes a methodology and an experience in implementing process reengineering techniques following ITIL framework

Mitigating Information security risks during the Transition to Integrated Operations: Models & Data

This research studies the change of information security risks during the transition toIntegrated Operations (an operation extensively utilize advanced information communicationtechnology to connect offshore facilities and onshore control centers and even vendors.) inNorsk Hydro, a Norwegian oil and gas company. The specific case for this study is a pilotplatform in transition to Integrated Operations, Brage: twenty traditional work processes areto be replaced by new work processes. The operators on the Brage platform have to build uprelevant new knowledge to work effectively with new work processes. The new workprocesses, new knowledge and their interrelationship all affect information security risks.The management of Norsk Hydro is concerned with the problem of the increasinginformation security risks, which might cause incidents with severe consequences. We lookfor policies that support a successful (smooth and fast) operation transition.System dynamics is adopted in this research to model the causal structure (mechanism) ofthe operation transition. We chose system dynamics because operation transition is a processrich in feedback, delays, nonlinearity and tradeoffs. All these features are captured by systemdynamics models. Moreover, system dynamics models can be used to simulate variousscenarios. The analyses of these scenarios can lead to insights on policy rules. Wespecifically investigate policies concerning transition speed, resource allocation during thetransition to Integrated Operations and investment rules in incident response capability.Since historical time series data about incidents and information security risks are scarce, weuse following model-based interventions to elicit structural information from our client andexperts:May 2005 First group model-building workshop Problem articulationSep 2005 Second group model-building workshop Model conceptualizationDec 2005 Model-based interview Model formulationYear 2006 Series of model-based meetings Model refinementNov 2008 Model-based interview Model validationThe Brage model was developed and validated through these model-based interventions. Theanalyses of various simulation results lead to the following policy insights: 1. Transition speed. The operation transition should be designed with a speed that allowsthe operators not only to get familiar with new work processes, but also to build up thedetailed knowledge supporting these work processes. The relevance of such knowledge,which is mostly tacit, is sometimes underrated. If the operators only know what to do,but not how to do it effectively, the benefit of the new technology (embedded in the newwork processes) will not be fully realized, and the platform will be more vulnerable toinformation security threats.2. Resource allocation. Resources (operators’ time) are needed to learn new work processesand to acquire related knowledge. Generally, the operators will first put their time intoachieving the production target. Investment on learning activities will not be prioritizedif these activities hinder reaching the production target, even if the operators know thisshort-term performance drop is the cost for obtaining long-term higher performance.Nevertheless strategic decision should never be influenced by operative goals and highlevel managements should be responsible to make decisions on whether focusing onlong-term profits and accept short-term performance drop as a trade-off.3. Investment in incident response capability. The management in Norsk Hydro is aware ofthe increasing information security risks changing from unconnected platforms tointegrated ones. However, investment in incident response capability to handleincreasing incidents is not made proactively. Only if the frequency of incidents hasincreased or severe incidents has occurred or the incident cost have been proved high,will the management decide to invest more on incident response capability. The Bragemodel simulations illustrate that these reactive decision rules will trap the managementinto ignoring the early signs of increasing information security risks, and causeunderinvestment, which results in inadequate incident response capability, andsubsequently leads to severe consequence. Proactive decision rules work effectively inreducing severity of incidents.This work helps our client in two ways. First, the model-based communication helps themanagement in Norsk Hydro clarify the problem it is facing and understand the underlyingmechanism causing the problem. There is an increased insight into the relevance of newknowledge acquisition. Second, the Brage model offers the management a tool to investigatethe long-term operation results under different policies, thus, helping improve themanagement decision process. This work contributes to the information security literature in three ways. First, previousresearch in information security is mostly on risk assessment methodology and informationsecurity management checklist. The dynamics of information security risks during theoperation transition period has not been well studied before. In this fast changing society,this aspect of changing information security risks is of importance. Second, we introduce adynamic view with the long-term perspective of information security. Although incidentshappen in random manner, the underlying mechanism that leads to such incidents oftenexists for a period. Understanding such mechanism is the key to prevent incidents. Last, butnot least, we demonstrate how formal modeling and simulation can facilitate the building oftheories on information security management. Information security management involvesnot only “hard” aspects, such as work processes and technology, but also “soft” aspects, suchas people’s awareness, people’s perception, and the cultural environment, - and all of whichchange over time. These soft aspects are sometimes the major factors affecting informationsecurity.This work also contributes to the system dynamics literature by adding examples of howmodel-based interventions are used to identify problems, conceptualize and validate models.The activities of group model-building workshops and model validation interviews arecarefully documented and reflected. It is an important step towards the accumulation ofknowledge in model-based intervention

Implementation of the National Incident Management System (NIMS)/Incident Command System (ICS) in the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center(FRMAC) - Emergency Phase

Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-5 requires all federal departments and agencies to adopt a National Incident Management System (NIMS)/Incident Command System (ICS) and use it in their individual domestic incident management and emergency prevention, preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation programs and activities, as well as in support of those actions taken to assist state and local entities. This system provides a consistent nationwide template to enable federal, state, local, and tribal governments, private-sector, and nongovernmental organizations to work together effectively and efficiently to prepare for, prevent, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity, including acts of catastrophic terrorism. This document identifies the operational concepts of the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center's (FRMAC) implementation of the NIMS/ICS response structure under the National Response Plan (NRP). The construct identified here defines the basic response template to be tailored to the incident-specific response requirements. FRMAC's mission to facilitate interagency environmental data management, monitoring, sampling, analysis, and assessment and link this information to the planning and decision staff clearly places the FRMAC in the Planning Section. FRMAC is not a mitigating resource for radiological contamination but is present to conduct radiological impact assessment for public dose avoidance. Field monitoring is a fact-finding mission to support this effort directly. Decisions based on the assessed data will drive public protection and operational requirements. This organizational structure under NIMS is focused by the mission responsibilities and interface requirements following the premise to provide emergency responders with a flexible yet standardized structure for incident response activities. The coordination responsibilities outlined in the NRP are based on the NIMS/ICS construct and Unified Command (UC) for management of a domestic incident. The NRP Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex (NUC) further provides requirements and protocols for coordinating federal government capabilities to respond to nuclear/radiological Incidents of National Significance (INS) and other radiological incidents. When a FRMAC is established, it operates under the parameters of NIMS as defined in the NRP. FRMAC and its operations have been modified to reflect NIMS/ICS concepts and principles and to facilitate working in a Unified Command structure. FRMAC is established at or near the scene of the incident to coordinate radiological monitoring and assessment and is established in coordination with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS); the coordinating agency; other federal agencies; and state, local, and tribal authorities. However, regardless of the coordinating agency designation, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) coordinates radiological monitoring and assessment activities for the initial phases of the offsite federal incident response through the Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) and FRMAC assets. Monitoring and assessment data are managed by FRMAC in an accountable, secure, and retrievable format. Monitoring data interpretations, including exposure rate contours, dose projections, and any requested radiological assessments are to be provided to the DHS; to the coordinating agency; and to state, local, and tribal government agencies

Draft Guidance: Response, Restoration, and Recovery Checklist for Biologically Contaminated Facilities

The Checklist for Facility Response, Restoration, and Recovery presented in this document is principally focused on the Consequence Management Phase of a biothreat agent (i.e., Bacillus anthracis) release at a large facility, such as an airport or subway. Information in this document conforms to the National Response Plan (NRP) (DHS 2004) and the National Incident Management System (NIMS 2004). Under these two guidance documents, the personnel responsible for managing biological response and recovery efforts--that is, the decision-makers--are members of an Incident Command (IC), which is likely to transition to a Unified Command (UC) in the event of a biological warfare agent attack. A UC is used when more than one agency has incident jurisdiction or when incidents cross political jurisdictions. The location for primary, tactical-level command and management is referred to as the Incident Command Post (ICP), as described in the NRP. Thus, regardless of whether an IC or an UC is used, the responsible entities are located at an ICP. Agencies work together through designated members of the UC to establish their designated Incident Commanders at a single ICP and to establish a common set of objectives and strategies and a single Incident Action Plan. Initially during the Crisis Management Phase, the Incident Commander is likely to be the Chief of the fire department that serves the affected facility. As life-safety issues are resolved and the Crisis Management Phase shifts to the Consequence Management Phase, the work of characterization, decontamination, and facility clearance begins. There will likely be a coincident transition in organizational structure as well, and new restoration-focused groups, units, and personnel will be added as restoration needs are anticipated. Depending on the specific facility and type of incident, the responsible individual (Incident Commander or Unified Commander) within the UC during the Consequence Management Phase could be the Facility Manager, the Facility Emergency Operations Manager, or their designee. In an incident involving large-scale biological contamination, the Governor of the state would typically request, and the President of the United States would likely declare, an emergency under the Stafford Act (1974; amended 2002). The Secretary of Homeland Security would likely determine that the event is an Incident of National Significance on the basis of criteria established in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), ''Management of Domestic Incidents''. Incidents of National Significance are those high-impact events that require a coordinated and effective response by an appropriate combination of Federal, state, local, tribal, private-sector, and nongovernmental entities to save lives, minimize damage, and provide the basis for long-term community recovery and mitigation activities. If facility authorities request outside assistance, or if an emergency is declared under the Stafford Act, then other members of the UC could include local and state agencies as well as Federal agencies, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA). If an Incident of National Significance is declared, a Principal Federal Official will be appointed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to facilitate Federal support to the UC structure. The following Checklist for Facility Response, Restoration, and Recovery presents the critical steps that would be taken by organizations involved in responding to a biological incident. It is intended for use by key decision-makers in the event that an incident occurs and steps must be taken immediately and systematically. The organizations would follow the Incident Command System (ICS). See Appendix A for more information on the ICS and how the responsible personnel identified in the checklist map into the consequence management organizational structure. The Notification and First-Response Phases are cursorily addressed in the checklist, whereas the main focus is on consequence management actions. The order of actions is generally sequential. However, depending on the specifics of an event and how the response is implemented, actions may be reordered. For example, preparing a Remediation Action Plan (RAP) is identified in the checklist as a critical step of the Remediation Phase. However, it is likely that preparation of the RAP would begin before completing all actions identified in the Characterization Phase. In addition to the actions recommended in the checklist, any emergency response conducted at a major metropolitan facility should comply with notification and response procedures established by the facility, as well as applicable procedures established by the jurisdictional responding agencies

Risk mitigation decisions for it security

Enterprises must manage their information risk as part of their larger operational risk management program. Managers must choose how to control for such information risk. This article defines the flow risk reduction problem and presents a formal model using a workflow framework. Three different control placement methods are introduced to solve the problem, and a comparative analysis is presented using a robust test set of 162 simulations. One year of simulated attacks is used to validate the quality of the solutions. We find that the math programming control placement method yields substantial improvements in terms of risk reduction and risk reduction on investment when compared to heuristics that would typically be used by managers to solve the problem. The contribution of this research is to provide managers with methods to substantially reduce information and security risks, while obtaining significantly better returns on their security investments. By using a workflow approach to control placement, which guides the manager to examine the entire infrastructure in a holistic manner, this research is unique in that it enables information risk to be examined strategically. © 2014 ACM

The Role of Transportation in Campus Emergency Planning, MTI Report 08-06

In 2005, Hurricane Katrina created the greatest natural disaster in American history. The states of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama sustained significant damage, including 31 colleges and universities. Other institutions of higher education, most notably Louisiana State University (LSU), became resources to the disaster area. This is just one of the many examples of disaster impacts on institutions of higher education. The Federal Department of Homeland Security, under Homeland Security Presidential Directive–5, requires all public agencies that want to receive federal preparedness assistance to comply with the National Incident Management System (NIMS), which includes the creation of an Emergency Operations Plan (EOP). Universities, which may be victims or resources during disasters, must write NIMS–compliant emergency plans. While most university emergency plans address public safety and logistics management, few adequately address the transportation aspects of disaster response and recovery. This MTI report describes the value of integrating transportation infrastructure into the campus emergency plan, including planning for helicopter operations. It offers a list of materials that can be used to educate and inform campus leadership on campus emergency impacts, including books about the Katrina response by LSU and Tulane Hospital, contained in the report´s bibliography. It provides a complete set of Emergency Operations Plan checklists and organization charts updated to acknowledge lessons learned from Katrina, 9/11 and other wide–scale emergencies. Campus emergency planners can quickly update their existing emergency management documents by integrating selected annexes and elements, or create new NIMS–compliant plans by adapting the complete set of annexes to their university´s structures

Training of Crisis Mappers and Map Production from Multi-sensor Data: Vernazza Case Study (Cinque Terre National Park, Italy)

This aim of paper is to presents the development of a multidisciplinary project carried out by the cooperation between Politecnico di Torino and ITHACA (Information Technology for Humanitarian Assistance, Cooperation and Action). The goal of the project was the training in geospatial data acquiring and processing for students attending Architecture and Engineering Courses, in order to start up a team of "volunteer mappers". Indeed, the project is aimed to document the environmental and built heritage subject to disaster; the purpose is to improve the capabilities of the actors involved in the activities connected in geospatial data collection, integration and sharing. The proposed area for testing the training activities is the Cinque Terre National Park, registered in the World Heritage List since 1997. The area was affected by flood on the 25th of October 2011. According to other international experiences, the group is expected to be active after emergencies in order to upgrade maps, using data acquired by typical geomatic methods and techniques such as terrestrial and aerial Lidar, close-range and aerial photogrammetry, topographic and GNSS instruments etc.; or by non conventional systems and instruments such us UAV, mobile mapping etc. The ultimate goal is to implement a WebGIS platform to share all the data collected with local authorities and the Civil Protectio

Why We Cannot (Yet) Ensure the Cybersecurity of Safety-Critical Systems

There is a growing threat to the cyber-security of safety-critical systems. The introduction of Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) software, including Linux, specialist VOIP applications and Satellite Based Augmentation Systems across the aviation, maritime, rail and power-generation infrastructures has created common, vulnerabilities. In consequence, more people now possess the technical skills required to identify and exploit vulnerabilities in safety-critical systems. Arguably for the first time there is the potential for cross-modal attacks leading to future ‘cyber storms’. This situation is compounded by the failure of public-private partnerships to establish the cyber-security of safety critical applications. The fiscal crisis has prevented governments from attracting and retaining competent regulators at the intersection of safety and cyber-security. In particular, we argue that superficial similarities between safety and security have led to security policies that cannot be implemented in safety-critical systems. Existing office-based security standards, such as the ISO27k series, cannot easily be integrated with standards such as IEC61508 or ISO26262. Hybrid standards such as IEC 62443 lack credible validation. There is an urgent need to move beyond high-level policies and address the more detailed engineering challenges that threaten the cyber-security of safety-critical systems. In particular, we consider the ways in which cyber-security concerns undermine traditional forms of safety engineering, for example by invalidating conventional forms of risk assessment. We also summarise the ways in which safety concerns frustrate the deployment of conventional mechanisms for cyber-security, including intrusion detection systems