Truthful Online Scheduling with Commitments

We study online mechanisms for preemptive scheduling with deadlines, with the goal of maximizing the total value of completed jobs. This problem is fundamental to deadline-aware cloud scheduling, but there are strong lower bounds even for the algorithmic problem without incentive constraints. However, these lower bounds can be circumvented under the natural assumption of deadline slackness, i.e., that there is a guaranteed lower bound $s > 1$ on the ratio between a job's size and the time window in which it can be executed. In this paper, we construct a truthful scheduling mechanism with a constant competitive ratio, given slackness $s > 1$. Furthermore, we show that if $s$ is large enough then we can construct a mechanism that also satisfies a commitment property: it can be determined whether or not a job will finish, and the requisite payment if so, well in advance of each job's deadline. This is notable because, in practice, users with strict deadlines may find it unacceptable to discover only very close to their deadline that their job has been rejected

Quality of Service Contract Specification, Establishment, and Monitoring for Service Level Management

This paper describes a Quality of Service (QoS) management approach and architecture as well as a case study for Service Level Management (SLM). Our approach brings in a new perspective to the SLM probem by using QoS management and QoS Contract specification, establishment, and monitoring. In SLM, the service consumer side and the service provider side must share a common understanding of QoS characteristics and use a common language for specifying desired QoS parameters in the form of QoS contracts. A service consumer must negotiate with the service provider to establish mutually agreed QoS contracts for an interaction session. When establising a new QoS contract, the service provider must consider both QoS contracts already agreed upon with existing consumers and system resource conditions. Similarly, a service consumer must be prepared in revising its contract with the service provider as conditions change over time. Once a QoS contract is established, SLM must monitor QoS status to make sure that the service quality is provided at the agreed range. If necessary, SLM must activate adaptation mechanisms to bring the service quality to the desired level. A case study is presented in this paper to validate the QoS contract management design approach and architecture for SLM.

Aerospace Medicine and Biology: A continuing bibliography with indexes (supplement 314)

This bibliography lists 139 reports, articles, and other documents introduced into the NASA scientific and technical information system in August, 1988

Society-in-the-Loop: Programming the Algorithmic Social Contract

Recent rapid advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning have raised many questions about the regulatory and governance mechanisms for autonomous machines. Many commentators, scholars, and policy-makers now call for ensuring that algorithms governing our lives are transparent, fair, and accountable. Here, I propose a conceptual framework for the regulation of AI and algorithmic systems. I argue that we need tools to program, debug and maintain an algorithmic social contract, a pact between various human stakeholders, mediated by machines. To achieve this, we can adapt the concept of human-in-the-loop (HITL) from the fields of modeling and simulation, and interactive machine learning. In particular, I propose an agenda I call society-in-the-loop (SITL), which combines the HITL control paradigm with mechanisms for negotiating the values of various stakeholders affected by AI systems, and monitoring compliance with the agreement. In short, `SITL = HITL + Social Contract.'Comment: (in press), Ethics of Information Technology, 201

Determinants of supply chain structure

This dissertation is a contribution to the study of manufacturing subcontracting, with particular reference to the European Automotive industrial sector. It takes as its central theme, the structure of supply chains - the way in which value addition is split amongst members of the chain. The thesis addresses a central question: What factors determine optimum structure and practice in modem-day industrial supply chains? This devolves into a number of derivative questions to which various parts of the study are addressed. With reference to 24 case study supply chains the investigation first tests whether existing theory can fully explain the changing structures. From the results of these tests a new model is postulated and then further work is carried out to validate the model. It was found that the concentration in existing theory on primarily dyadic relationships meant that when taken alone, current theory was insufficient to explain the changes in supply chain structure in the European automotive industry in the mid to late 1990s. It is felt that the work is novel in that it addresses the whole supply chain, and demonstrates the clear link between the physical structure and other determining success factors. Two methods for recording and systematically comparing both the structure and management practices in supply chains were developed - termed 'Fixed Reference Benchmark' and 'Hierarchical Structure Mapping'. These two models were tested, and used in the comparison of 24 European automotive supply chains. The results of this analysis showed the dominant factors that most heavily influenced the structure of supply chains in the European Automotive Industry to be: Criticality of component (which in turn affects the acceptability of risk), the level, and pace of development of technology for the component or system of the supply chain (which is strongly linked to bargaining power), the desire to reduce the complexity of logistics (which is also linked to acceptability of risk), the desire to reduce the cost of demand fluctuations, and the capital intensity of the production process. It is felt that this study of supply chain structures is valuable in its contribution to new knowledge on three levels. At a theoretical level, it analyses the current theory, exposing gaps and anomalies. At an empirical level it presents contemporary data that in some parts simply substantiates and in others adds to the current theory. On a practical level it aims to present a picture which is of use to practitioners making decisions on the future of individual supply chains

Detecting collusion in timber auctions : an application to Romania

Romania was one of the first transition countries in Europe to introduce auctions for allocating standing timber (stumpage) in public forests. In comparison with the former system in the country-administrative allocation at set prices-timber auctions offer several potential advantages: greater revenue generation for the government, a higher probability that tracts will be allocated to the firms that value them most highly, and stronger incentives for technological change within industry and efficiency gains in the public sector. Competition is the key to realizing these advantages. Unfortunately, collusion among bidders often limits competition in timber auctions, including in well-established market economies such as the United States. The result is that tracts sell below their fair market value, which undermines the advantages of auctions. This paper examines the Romanian auction system, with a focus on the use of econometric methods to detect collusion. It begins by describing the historical development of the system and the principal steps in the auction process. It then discusses the qualitative impacts of various economic and institutional factors, including collusion, on winning bids in different regions of the country. This discussion draws on information from a combination of sources, including unstructured interviews conducted with government officials and company representatives during 2003. Next, the paper summarizes key findings from the broader research literature on auctions, with an emphasis on empirical studies that have developed econometric methods for detecting collusion. It then presents an application of such methods to timber auction data from two forest directorates in Romania, Neamt and Suceava. This application confirms that data from Romanian timber auctions can be used to determine the likelihood of collusion, and it suggests that collusion reduced winning bids in Suceava in 2002 and perhaps also in Neamt. The paper concludes with a discussion of actions that the government can take to reduce the incidence of collusion and minimize its impact on auction outcomes.Forestry,Wildlife Resources,Markets and Market Access,Access to Markets,Technology Industry

Mechanism Design for Demand Response Programs

Demand Response (DR) programs serve to reduce the consumption of electricity at times when the supply is scarce and expensive. The utility informs the aggregator of an anticipated DR event. The aggregator calls on a subset of its pool of recruited agents to reduce their electricity use. Agents are paid for reducing their energy consumption from contractually established baselines. Baselines are counter-factual consumption estimates of the energy an agent would have consumed if they were not participating in the DR program. Baselines are used to determine payments to agents. This creates an incentive for agents to inflate their baselines. We propose a novel self-reported baseline mechanism (SRBM) where each agent reports its baseline and marginal utility. These reports are strategic and need not be truthful. Based on the reported information, the aggregator selects or calls on agents to meet the load reduction target. Called agents are paid for observed reductions from their self-reported baselines. Agents who are not called face penalties for consumption shortfalls below their baselines. The mechanism is specified by the probability with which agents are called, reward prices for called agents, and penalty prices for agents who are not called. Under SRBM, we show that truthful reporting of baseline consumption and marginal utility is a dominant strategy. Thus, SRBM eliminates the incentive for agents to inflate baselines. SRBM is assured to meet the load reduction target. SRBM is also nearly efficient since it selects agents with the smallest marginal utilities, and each called agent contributes maximally to the load reduction target. Finally, we show that SRBM is almost optimal in the metric of average cost of DR provision faced by the aggregator

This Name is Your Name: Public Landmarks, Private Trademarks, and Our National Parks

To generations of Americans, Yosemite National Park and its landmarks have symbolized the core democratic ideals of the United States—spaces truly owned by the people and open to all. For those who created our national parks, “[t]he purpose of preserving this land was to cultivate a kind of rare experience [they] saw as endangered by a social world that turned every thing, moment, and human being to profit.” It is striking, then, that Yosemite, one of the nation’s first national parks, has become the focus of a battle over whether our landmarks and their names belong to us all or to a select few. In 2016, several Yosemite National Park landmarks were renamed due to an ongoing trademark dispute between a concessions company and the National Park Service (NPS). At the end of its contract with the park, the departing concessions company demanded compensation for the trademarks to the words “The Ahwahnee,” “Wawona,” “Badger Pass,” “Curry Village,” and perhaps most shockingly, “Yosemite National Park” itself. During its contractual relationship with the NPS—and apparently unbeknownst to NPS administrators—the concessions company filed for and received trademarks for use of these landmark names in hospitality and merchandising contexts. Allowing short-term concessionaires to trademark the names of publicly owned and culturally treasured assets implicates key trademark principles in several ways. The oft-recited aims of trademark law are providing information to the consumer, promoting competition, and avoiding dilution of brands by protecting accrued goodwill. Allowing short-term concessionaires to register national park landmark names conflicts with each of these aims, as this Note explains. A limited contractual relationship fits poorly with the enduring cultural value of well-known landmarks and raises complex questions about business operations and intellectual property in the national park context. This Note contends that principles of trademark law and policy are undermined if federal contractors can establish long term proprietary rights over national park landmark names. To provide a comprehensive picture of the Yosemite case, Part I will further explore the facts surrounding the trademarks and landmarks in question, as well as the contractual relationship between DNC Parks & Resorts at Yosemite, Inc. (DNCY) and the NPS. Part II considers the NPS’s claims for cancellation of the Yosemite-linked trademarks under existing U.S. trademark law. Part III argues that concessionaire registrations are inconsistent with the baseline goals of trademark law. Finally, Part IV suggests that legislation, similar to a statute recently enacted in California, represents a possible solution to the issues surrounding private trademarking of public landmark names. This Note asserts that the purposes of trademark law support taking the names of national parks and landmarks off the bargaining table and out of would-be profiteers’ reach, and that providing our national park landmark names with statutory protection from commercial interests fits perfectly within the American tradition of preserving the parks themselves