8,874 research outputs found
Cyber-security for embedded systems: methodologies, techniques and tools
L'abstract è presente nell'allegato / the abstract is in the attachmen
Model-Checking Speculation-Dependent Security Properties: Abstracting and Reducing Processor Models for Sound and Complete Verification
Spectre and Meltdown attacks in modern microprocessors represent a new class of attacks that have been difficult to deal with. They underline vulnerabilities in hardware design that have been going unnoticed for years. This shows the weakness of the state-of-the-art verification process and design practices. These attacks are OS-independent, and they do not exploit any software vulnerabilities. Moreover, they violate all security assumptions ensured by standard security procedures, (e.g., address space isolation), and, as a result, every security mechanism built upon these guarantees. These vulnerabilities allow the attacker to retrieve leaked data without accessing the secret directly. Indeed, they make use of covert channels, which are mechanisms of hidden communication that convey sensitive information without any visible information flow between the malicious party and the victim. The root cause of this type of side-channel attacks lies within the speculative and out-of-order execution of modern high-performance microarchitectures. Since modern processors are hard to verify with standard formal verification techniques, we present a methodology that shows how to transform a realistic model of a speculative and out-of-order processor into an abstract one. Following related formal verification approaches, we simplify the model under consideration by abstraction and refinement steps. We also present an approach to formally verify the abstract model using a standard model checker. The theoretical flow, reliant on established formal verification results, is introduced and a sketch of proof is provided for soundness and correctness. Finally, we demonstrate the feasibility of our approach, by applying it on a pipelined DLX RISC-inspired processor architecture. We show preliminary experimental results to support our claim, performing Bounded Model-Checking with a state-of-the-art model checker
Instruction-Level Abstraction (ILA): A Uniform Specification for System-on-Chip (SoC) Verification
Modern Systems-on-Chip (SoC) designs are increasingly heterogeneous and
contain specialized semi-programmable accelerators in addition to programmable
processors. In contrast to the pre-accelerator era, when the ISA played an
important role in verification by enabling a clean separation of concerns
between software and hardware, verification of these "accelerator-rich" SoCs
presents new challenges. From the perspective of hardware designers, there is a
lack of a common framework for the formal functional specification of
accelerator behavior. From the perspective of software developers, there exists
no unified framework for reasoning about software/hardware interactions of
programs that interact with accelerators. This paper addresses these challenges
by providing a formal specification and high-level abstraction for accelerator
functional behavior. It formalizes the concept of an Instruction Level
Abstraction (ILA), developed informally in our previous work, and shows its
application in modeling and verification of accelerators. This formal ILA
extends the familiar notion of instructions to accelerators and provides a
uniform, modular, and hierarchical abstraction for modeling software-visible
behavior of both accelerators and programmable processors. We demonstrate the
applicability of the ILA through several case studies of accelerators (for
image processing, machine learning, and cryptography), and a general-purpose
processor (RISC-V). We show how the ILA model facilitates equivalence checking
between two ILAs, and between an ILA and its hardware finite-state machine
(FSM) implementation. Further, this equivalence checking supports accelerator
upgrades using the notion of ILA compatibility, similar to processor upgrades
using ISA compatibility.Comment: 24 pages, 3 figures, 3 table
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