A Combinatorial Polynomial Algorithm for the Linear Arrow-Debreu Market

We present the first combinatorial polynomial time algorithm for computing the equilibrium of the Arrow-Debreu market model with linear utilities.Comment: Preliminary version in ICALP 201

A Combinatorial Polynomial Algorithm for the Linear {Arrow-Debreu} Market

We present the first combinatorial polynomial time algorithm for computing the equilibrium of the Arrow-Debreu market model with linear utilities

On Processability of Lemke’s Algorithm

Lemke’s algorithm is a pivotal kind of algorithm which is developed based on principal pivot transform. We consider several matrix classes to study the relationship among them in the context of linear complementarity problem. These classes are important from Lemke’s algorithmic point of view. In this article we discuss about the processability of Lemke’s algorithm with respect to some selective matrix classes

Improved Balanced Flow Computation Using Parametric Flow

We present a new algorithm for computing balanced flows in equality networks arising in market equilibrium computations. The current best time bound for computing balanced flows in such networks requires $O(n)$ maxflow computations, where $n$ is the number of nodes in the network [Devanur et al. 2008]. Our algorithm requires only a single parametric flow computation. The best algorithm for computing parametric flows [Gallo et al. 1989] is only by a logarithmic factor slower than the best algorithms for computing maxflows. Hence, the running time of the algorithms in [Devanur et al. 2008] and [Duan and Mehlhorn 2015] for computing market equilibria in linear Fisher and Arrow-Debreu markets improve by almost a factor of $n$

Computing Equilibria in Markets with Budget-Additive Utilities

We present the first analysis of Fisher markets with buyers that have budget-additive utility functions. Budget-additive utilities are elementary concave functions with numerous applications in online adword markets and revenue optimization problems. They extend the standard case of linear utilities and have been studied in a variety of other market models. In contrast to the frequently studied CES utilities, they have a global satiation point which can imply multiple market equilibria with quite different characteristics. Our main result is an efficient combinatorial algorithm to compute a market equilibrium with a Pareto-optimal allocation of goods. It relies on a new descending-price approach and, as a special case, also implies a novel combinatorial algorithm for computing a market equilibrium in linear Fisher markets. We complement these positive results with a number of hardness results for related computational questions. We prove that it is NP-hard to compute a market equilibrium that maximizes social welfare, and it is PPAD-hard to find any market equilibrium with utility functions with separate satiation points for each buyer and each good.Comment: 21 page

An Improved Combinatorial Polynomial Algorithm for the Linear Arrow-Debreu Market

We present an improved combinatorial algorithm for the computation of equilibrium prices in the linear Arrow-Debreu model. For a market with $n$ agents and integral utilities bounded by $U$, the algorithm runs in $O(n^7 \log^3 (nU))$ time. This improves upon the previously best algorithm of Ye by a factor of \tOmega(n). The algorithm refines the algorithm described by Duan and Mehlhorn and improves it by a factor of \tOmega(n^3). The improvement comes from a better understanding of the iterative price adjustment process, the improved balanced flow computation for nondegenerate instances, and a novel perturbation technique for achieving nondegeneracy.Comment: to appear in SODA 201

Auction algorithms for market equilibrium with weak gross substitute demands and their applications

We consider the Arrow-Debreu exchange market model where agents' demands satisfy the weak gross substitutes (WGS) property. This is a well-studied property, in particular, it gives a sufficient condition for the convergence of the classical tâtonnement dynamics. In this paper, we present a simple auction algorithm that obtains an approximate market equilibrium for WGS demands. Such auction algorithms have been previously known for restricted classes of WGS demands only. As an application of our technique, we obtain an efficient algorithm to find an approximate spendingrestricted market equilibrium for WGS demands, a model that has been recently introduced as a continuous relaxation of the Nash social welfare (NSW) problem. This leads to a polynomial-time constant factor approximation algorithm for NSW with budget separable piecewise linear utility functions; only a pseudopolynomial approximation algorithm was known for this setting previously

On Computability of Equilibria in Markets with Production

Although production is an integral part of the Arrow-Debreu market model, most of the work in theoretical computer science has so far concentrated on markets without production, i.e., the exchange economy. This paper takes a significant step towards understanding computational aspects of markets with production. We first define the notion of separable, piecewise-linear concave (SPLC) production by analogy with SPLC utility functions. We then obtain a linear complementarity problem (LCP) formulation that captures exactly the set of equilibria for Arrow-Debreu markets with SPLC utilities and SPLC production, and we give a complementary pivot algorithm for finding an equilibrium. This settles a question asked by Eaves in 1975 of extending his complementary pivot algorithm to markets with production. Since this is a path-following algorithm, we obtain a proof of membership of this problem in PPAD, using Todd, 1976. We also obtain an elementary proof of existence of equilibrium (i.e., without using a fixed point theorem), rationality, and oddness of the number of equilibria. We further give a proof of PPAD-hardness for this problem and also for its restriction to markets with linear utilities and SPLC production. Experiments show that our algorithm runs fast on randomly chosen examples, and unlike previous approaches, it does not suffer from issues of numerical instability. Additionally, it is strongly polynomial when the number of goods or the number of agents and firms is constant. This extends the result of Devanur and Kannan (2008) to markets with production. Finally, we show that an LCP-based approach cannot be extended to PLC (non-separable) production, by constructing an example which has only irrational equilibria.Comment: An extended abstract will appear in SODA 201