Tricks with the lorenz curve

This note develops, for the Gini coefficient of inequality, a very simple generalization that directly incorporates judgments on ‘relative inter-group inequality aversion' by making the inequality measure sensitive to the skewness of the Lorenz curve. The resulting family of inequality indices can be seen as complements to the Gini coefficient: some members of the family reflect ‘left-leaning', and others ‘right-leaning', distributional values relative to the ‘centrist' position assumed by Gini.Lorenz Curve, Gini coefficient, skewness

Lock, Stock, and Barrel: A Comprehensive Assessment of the Determinants of Terror

We assess the robustness of previous findings on the determinants of terrorism. Using extreme bound analysis, the three most comprehensive terrorism datasets, and focusing on the three most commonly analyzed aspects of terrorist activity, i.e., location, victim, and perpetrator, we re-assess the effect of 65 proposed correlates. Evaluating around 13.4 million regressions, we find 18 variables to be robustly associated with the number of incidents occurring in a given country-year, 15 variables with attacks against citizens from a particular country in a given year, and six variables with attacks perpetrated by citizens of a particular country in a given year.causes of terrorism, poverty and terrorism, panel estimations, extreme bounds analysis

Voice of the diaspora: An analysis of migrant voting behavior

This paper utilizes a unique dataset on votes cast by Czech and Polish migrants in recent national elections in their home countries. The political preferences of migrants as manifested by their voting behavior are strikingly different from those of their home-country counterparts. In addition, there are important differences in voting patterns across migrants living in different countries. We examine three explanations of migrant voting behavior: adaptive learning; economic self-selection; and political self-selection. Our results suggest that migrant voting behavior is affected by the institutional environment of the host countries, in particular the democratic tradition and the extent of economic freedom. There is little evidence that differences in migrants' political attitudes are caused by pre-migration self-selection with regard to political attitudes, or with regard to economic considerations. The results indicate that the political preferences of migrants change significantly in the wake of migration as migrants adapt to the norms and values prevailing in the host country. This change away from home could be the catalyst of a corresponding change at home. --Voting,election,migration,political resocialization,transition

Global Inequality:Relatively Lower, Absolutely Higher

This paper measures trends in global interpersonal inequality during 1975–2010 using data from the most recent version of the World Income Inequality Database (WIID). The picture that emerges using ‘absolute,’ and even ‘centrist’ measures of inequality, is very different from the results obtained using standard ‘relative’ inequality measures such as the Gini coefficient or Coefficient of Variation. Relative global inequality has declined substantially over the decades. In contrast, ‘absolute’ inequality, as captured by the Standard Deviation and Absolute Gini, has increased considerably and unabated. Like these ‘absolute’ measures, our ‘centrist’ inequality indicators, the Krtscha measure and an intermediate Gini, also register a pronounced increase in global inequality, albeit, in the case of the latter, with a decline during 2005 to 2010. A critical question posed by our findings is whether increased levels of inequality according to absolute and centrist measures are inevitable at today's per capita income levels. Our analysis suggests that it is not possible for absolute inequality to return to 1975 levels without further convergence in mean incomes among countries. Inequality, as captured by centrist measures such as the Krtscha, could return to 1975 levels, at today's domestic and global per capita income levels, but this would require quite dramatic structural reforms to reduce domestic inequality levels in most countries

Inequality, Poverty, Two Invariance Conditions, and a Product Rule

Full Text / Article completTwo axioms in the measurement of inequality and poverty which are widely perceived to be innocuous and unexceptionable - although they have both been challenged in the literature - are the Scale Invariance Axiom and the Replication Invariance Axiom. These axioms have endorsed an essentially relative approach (with respect to income-size and population-size respectively) to the measurement of inequality and poverty. The present paper is an expository essay which aims to clarify the logical and ethical limitations of either a purely relative or a purely absolute approach to distributional measurement. In the process, it also reviews two proposals - due to Manfred Krtscha and Eduardo Arriaga respectively - for ‘intermediate’ measures of inequality and poverty, which moderate the ‘extreme’ values underlying relative and absolute measures by combining these opposing values in a simple product formula.Les axiomes d’échelle invariante et de réplication invariante, sont deux axiomes de la mesure de l'inégalité et de la pauvreté largement perçus comme inoffensifs et irrécusables, bien qu'ils aient tous deux été contestés dans la littérature. Ces axiomes ont appuyé une approche essentiellement relative (par rapport au revenu et à la population, respectivement) de l'inégalité et de la pauvreté. Cet article vise à clarifier les limites logiques et éthiques d’une mesure soit purement relative, soit purement absolue. Il examine également deux propositions - suivant Manfred Krtscha et Eduardo Arriaga respectivement - des mesures «intermédiaires» de l'inégalité et de la pauvreté, qui modèrent les valeurs «extrêmes» des mesures sous-jacentes relatives et absolues en combinant ces valeurs opposées dans une formule simple

The determinants of ideological moderation in the South African party systems: 1994-2014

This Dissertation, written at the Department of Political Studies in the School of Social Sciences, is submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D), to the Faculty of Humanities at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, September 2017The purpose of this study is to examine the causes of ideological moderation in the South African party system in the post-1994 period. Previous research stresses the non-left-right feature of politics and when it recognises the centrist feature of major parties and moderation of the party system, the causes of the latter are unexplained. The deficiency in previous research is that moderation and limited left-right disagreements as fundamental causes of broader political dynamics are overlooked — moderate systems foster political consensus and democratic stability. In this study I critically examine three theoretical causal variables that account for moderation: the electoral system, the electorate, and the dominant party. This study relies on a measurement of party system fragmentation, and voter and party system polarisation, as well as an intensive qualitative assessment of the ANC. The evidence is based on a number of nationally representative surveys that measure public opinion; interviews with political party leaders and representatives, and officials from labour and business; and document analysis. The finding is that the ANC as the dominant party is the main driver of moderation in the party system. Coupled with electoral dominance, the centripetal, non-dogmatic, pragmatic and flexible tendencies that characterise the ANC permit the party to induce and stabilise party system moderation. This study: develops a causal framework for understanding moderation; builds on previous research about the centrism of major parties and the moderation of the party system (both quantitatively and qualitatively); departs from the argument about the fragmented and rightist nature of the opposition bloc and the race-based approach to the electorate; and extends the debate about the ANC by arguing that left-right movement occurs within centrist terrain, and that the party is not an amorphous or client entity but a clearly defined one. I also add to: the growing body of knowledge that finds no necessary connection between proportionalism, extremist party positioning and polarisation; the idea that party system polarisation is less reflective of voter polarisation; and concur with previous research that argues that the role of a pivotal centre party is critical for the party system.XL201

Why Doesn't Capitalism Flow to Poor Countries?

We find anecdotal evidence suggesting that governments in poor countries have a more left wing rhetoric than those in OECD countries. Thus, it appears that capitalist rhetoric doesn't flow to poor countries. A possible explanation is that corruption, which is more widespread in poor countries, reduces more the electoral appeal of capitalism than that of socialism. The empirical pattern of beliefs within countries is consistent with this explanation: people who perceive corruption to be high in their country are also more likely to lean left ideologically (and to declare support for a more intrusive government in economic matters). Finally, we present a model explaining the corruption-left connection. It exploits the fact that an act of corruption is more revealing about the fairness type of a rich capitalist than of a poor bureaucrat. After observing corruption, voters who care about fairness react by increasing taxes and moving left. There is a negative ideological externality since the existence of corrupt entrepreneurs hurts good entrepreneurs by reducing the electoral appeal of capitalism.

Public Choice: an Overview

Public Choice begins with the observation that in politics, as in economics, individuals and institutions compete for scarce resources and that, therefore, the same methods of analyses used by economists to explain the behaviour of consumers and producers might also serve well to explain the behaviour of governments and other (allegedly) “public-spirited” organisations . As Tullock (1988) succinctly put it, Public Choice is "the invasion of politics by economics". Public Choice derives its rationale from the fact that, in many areas, 'political' and 'economic' considerations interact so that a proper understanding of issues in one field requires a complementary understanding of issues in the other. Although the incursion of the analytical methods of economics into political science - which is the hall-mark of Public Choice - began in the 1950s, it was not until at least three decades later that the trickle became a flood. This chapter provides an overview of this field

Does the Constitution Provide More Ballot Access Protection for Presidential Elections Than for U.S. House Elections?

Both the U.S. Constitution and The Federalist Papers suggest that voters ought to have more freedom to vote for the candidate of their choice for the U.S. House of Representatives than they do for the President or the U.S. Senate. Yet, strangely, for the last thirty-three years, the U.S. Supreme Court and lower courts have ruled that the Constitution gives voters more freedom to vote for the candidate of their choice in presidential elections than in congressional elections. Also, state legislatures, which have been writing ballot access laws since 1888, have passed laws that make it easier for minor-party and independent candidates to get on the ballot for President than for the U.S. House. As a result, voters in virtually every state invariably have far more choices on their general election ballots for the President than they do for the House. This Article argues that the right of a voter to vote for someone other than a Democrat or a Republican for the House is just as important as a voter’s right to do so for President, and that courts should grant more ballot access protection to minor-party and independent candidates for the House