A Bug Bounty Perspective on the Disclosure of Web Vulnerabilities

Bug bounties have become increasingly popular in recent years. This paper discusses bug bounties by framing these theoretically against so-called platform economy. Empirically the interest is on the disclosure of web vulnerabilities through the Open Bug Bounty (OBB) platform between 2015 and late 2017. According to the empirical results based on a dataset covering nearly 160 thousand web vulnerabilities, (i) OBB has been successful as a community-based platform for the dissemination of web vulnerabilities. The platform has also attracted many productive hackers, (ii) but there exists a large productivity gap, which likely relates to (iii) a knowledge gap and the use of automated tools for web vulnerability discovery. While the platform (iv) has been exceptionally fast to evaluate new vulnerability submissions, (v) the patching times of the web vulnerabilities disseminated have been long. With these empirical results and the accompanying theoretical discussion, the paper contributes to the small but rapidly growing amount of research on bug bounties. In addition, the paper makes a practical contribution by discussing the business models behind bug bounties from the viewpoints of platforms, ecosystems, and vulnerability markets.Comment: 17th Annual Workshop on the Economics of Information Security, Innsbruck, https://weis2018.econinfosec.org

Don’t shoot the messenger! A criminological and computer science perspective on coordinated vulnerability disclosure

In the computer science field coordinated vulnerability disclosure is a well-known practice for finding flaws in IT-systems and patching them. In this practice, a white-hat hacker who finds a vulnerability in an IT-system reports that vulnerability to the system’s owner. The owner will then resolve the problem, after which the vulnerability will be disclosed publicly. This practice generally does not focus on potential offenders or black-hat hackers who would likely exploit the vulnerability instead of reporting it. In this paper, we take an interdisciplinary approach and review the current coordinated vulnerability disclosure practice from both a computer science and criminological perspective. We discuss current issues in this practice that could influence the decision to use coordinated vulnerability disclosure versus exploiting a vulnerability. Based on different motives, a rational choice or cost–benefit analyses of the possible reactions after finding a vulnerability will be discussed. Subsequently, implications for practice and future research suggestions are included

Supporting data-driven software development life-cycles with bug bounty programmes

A growing number of organisations are utilising the skills of a global base of white-hat hackers in order to identify pre- and post-deployment vulnerabilities. Despite the widespread adoption of bug bounty programmes, there remain many uncertainties regarding the efficacy of this relatively novel security activity, especially when considering their adoption alongside existing software development lifecycles. This dissertation explores how bug bounty programmes can be used to support data-driven software development lifecycles. To achieve this outcome, the dissertation presents four distinct contributions. The first contribution concerns the usage of Crowdsourced Vulnerability Discovery (CVD) (of which bug bounty programmes are a part) within organisations. This includes the presentation of expert opinion pertaining to the benefits and shortcomings of existing approaches, and identification of the extent to which CVD programmes are used in software development lifecycles. The second contribution explores the benefits and drawbacks of hosting a programme on a bug bounty platform (a centralised repository of programmes operated by a third party). Empirical analysis of operating characteristics helps address concerns around the long-term viability of programme operation, and allows for a comparison to be made between the cost of expanding a security team and the cost of running a programme. The third contribution examines the extent to which participating in the search for vulnerabilities is a viable long-term strategy for hackers based on bug bounty platforms. The results demonstrate that participation is infeasible, even on a short-term basis, for significant numbers of hackers, highlighting the shortcomings of the current approach used by platforms. Building on the first three, the fourth contribution explores CVD programme policies, and the extent to which pertinent information, particularly in reference to legal constraints, is communicated to hackers. A systematic review reveals the commonplace elements that form current policy documents, enabling organisations to identify gaps within their own programme policies and form policies that are consistent with peers

Developing a gamified peer-reviewed bug bounty programme

Bug bounty processes have remained broadly unchanged since their inception. Existing literature recognises that current methods generate intensive resource demands, impacting upon programme effectiveness. This paper proposes a novel implementation which aims to alleviate resource demands and mitigate inherent issues through gamification. This incorporates the use of additional crowdsourcing of vulnerability verification and reproduction by peers, allowing the client organisation to reduce overheads at the cost of rewarding participants. The system has the potential to be used in Higher Education Institutions which typically face resource and budget constraints

Is the Road to Hell Paved with Good Intentions? A Criminological and Criminal Law Analysis of Prospective Regulation for Ethical Hacking in Italy and the EU

The article aims to contribute to the current research on regulatory frameworks and best practices for ethical hacking, from the perspective of criminology and criminal law, providing insights into the Italian legal system that may also inform EU-wide regulations in this domain. The research employs a multidisciplinary approach by: (i) conducting a historical and criminological analysis of the contemporary “renaissance” of ethical hacking, which includes analyzing the rules of engagement in BBPs and the key factors influencing hackers’ choices between responsible disclosure and malicious exploitation of vulnerabilities; (ii) addressing the prevailing uncertainty about the legal qualification of ethical hacking, by assessing the criminal regime that might still be applicable to “well-intentioned” computer intrusions in Italy; (iii) providing a comparative perspective on EU legal systems that have decriminalized or otherwise incentivized ethical hacking practices as pivotal tools for enhancing a holistic notion of cybersecurity

Freedom to Hack

Swaths of personal and nonpersonal information collected online about internet users are increasingly being used in sophisticated ways to manipulate them based on that information. This represents a new trend in the exploitation of data, where instead of pursuing direct financial gain based on the face value of the data, actors are seeking to engage in data analytics using advanced artificial intelligence technologies that would allow them to more easily access individuals’ cognition and future behavior. Although in recent years the concept of online manipulation has received some academic and policy attention, the desirable relationship between the data-breach law and online manipulation is not yet well-appreciated. In other words, regulators and courts are yet to realize the power of existing legal mechanisms pertaining to data breaches in mitigating the harm of online manipulation. This Article provides an account of this relationship, by looking at online manipulation achieved through psychographic profiling. It submits that the volume, efficacy, and sophistication of present online manipulation techniques pose a considerable and immediate danger to autonomy, privacy, and democracy. Internet actors, political entities, and foreign adversaries fastidiously study the personality traits and vulnerabilities of potential voters and, increasingly, target each such voter with an individually tailored stream of information or misinformation with the intent of exploiting the weaknesses of these individuals. While new norms and regulations will have to be enacted at a certain point to address the problem of manipulation, data-breach law could provide a much-needed backdrop for the challenges presented by online manipulation, while alleviating the sense of lawlessness engulfing current misuses of personal and nonpersonal data. At the heart of this Article is the inquiry of data-breach law’s ability to recognize the full breadth of potential misuse of breached personal information, which today includes manipulation for political purposes. At present, data-breach jurisprudence does very little to recognize its evolving role in regulating misuses of personal information by unauthorized parties. It is a jurisprudence that is partially based on a narrow approach that seeks to remedy materialized harm in the context of identity theft or fraud. This approach contravenes the purpose of data-breach law – to protect individuals from the externalities of certain cyber risks by bridging informational asymmetries between corporations and consumers. This Article develops the theoretical connection between data-breach law and online manipulation, providing for a meaningful regulatory solution that is not currently used to its full extent

Cybersecurity Information Sharing: Analysing an Email Corpus of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure

Cybersecurity Information Sharing: Analysing an Email Corpus of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure. K Sridhar, A Householder, JM Spring, DW Woods. The 20th Workshop on the Economics of Information Security (WEIS 2021

Friendly Hackers to the Rescue: How Organizations Perceive Crowdsourced Vulnerability Discovery

Over the past years, crowdsourcing has increasingly been used for the discovery of vulnerabilities in software. While some organizations have extensively used crowdsourced vulnerability discovery, other organizations have been very hesitant in embracing this method. In this paper, we report the results of a qualitative study that reveals organizational concerns and fears in relation to crowdsourced vulnerability discovery. The study is based on 36 key informant interviews with various organizations. The study reveals a set of pre-adoption fears (i.e., lacking managerial expertise, low quality submissions, distrust in security professionals, cost escalation, lack of motivation of security professionals) as well as the post-adoption issues actually experienced. The study also identifies countermeasures that adopting organizations have used to mitigate fears and minimize issues. Implications for research and practice are discussed