A budget feasible mechanism for hiring doctors in e-healthcare

(c) 2018 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other users, including reprinting/ republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted components of this work in other works.Throughout the past decade, there has been an extensive research on scheduling the hospital resources such as the operation theatre(s) (OTs) and the experts (such as nurses, doctors etc.) inside the hospitals. With the technological growth, mainly advancement in communication media (such as smart phones, video conferencing, smart watches etc.) one may think of taking the expertise by the doctors (distributed around the globe) from outside the in-house hospitals. Earlier this interesting situation of hiring doctors from outside the hospitals has been studied from monetary (with patient having infinite budget) and non-monetary perspectives in strategic setting. In this paper, the more realistic situation is studied in terms of hiring the doctors from outside the hospital when a patient is constrained by budget. Our proposed mechanisms follow the two pass mechanism design framework each consisting of allocation rule and payment rule. Through simulations, we evaluate the performance and validate our proposed mechanisms.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

A budget feasible mechanism for hiring doctors in e-healthcare

(c) 2018 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other users, including reprinting/ republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted components of this work in other works.Throughout the past decade, there has been an extensive research on scheduling the hospital resources such as the operation theatre(s) (OTs) and the experts (such as nurses, doctors etc.) inside the hospitals. With the technological growth, mainly advancement in communication media (such as smart phones, video conferencing, smart watches etc.) one may think of taking the expertise by the doctors (distributed around the globe) from outside the in-house hospitals. Earlier this interesting situation of hiring doctors from outside the hospitals has been studied from monetary (with patient having infinite budget) and non-monetary perspectives in strategic setting. In this paper, the more realistic situation is studied in terms of hiring the doctors from outside the hospital when a patient is constrained by budget. Our proposed mechanisms follow the two pass mechanism design framework each consisting of allocation rule and payment rule. Through simulations, we evaluate the performance and validate our proposed mechanisms.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

A mechanism design framework for hiring experts in e-healthcare

We investigate the problem of hiring experts (motivated socially and monetarily) from outside of the hospital(s) in e-healthcare through the lens of mechanism design with and without money. This paper presents the mechanisms that handle the following scenarios: 1) Multiple patients and multiple experts with patients having zero budget, 2) Single or multiple patients and multiple experts with patient(s) having some positive budget. In this paper, for the first scenario, we have proposed algorithms based on the theory of mechanism design without money that satisfies several economic properties such as truthfulness, pareto optimality, and core allocation. Considering the second scenario, the truthful and budget feasible mechanisms are proposed. Through simulations, we evaluate the performance and validate our proposed mechanismsPeer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

Paying for Language Services in Medicare: Preliminary Options and Recommendations

Discusses how the federal government could design payment systems for language services in Medicare, and offers preliminary recommendations for implementing such programs

Health Reform 2007: Impact on the Valley

Provides a summary of California's health reform debate, background information on recent legislative action, and an overview of the major healthcare proposals pending in the state

Public-Private Partnership, Contracting Arrangements and Managerial Capacity to Strengthen RCH Programme Implementation

Strengthening management capacity and meeting the need for Reproductive and Child Health (RCH) services is a major challenge for the national RCH programme in India. Central and state governments are working through multiple options to meet this challenge, responding to the complexity of issues in RCH which cut across social, cultural and economic factors, as well as reflecting the immense geographical barriers to access for remote and rural populations. Other barriers are also being addressed, including lessening financial burdens and creating Public - Private Partnerships (PPP) to expand access. For example, the NRHM has been initiated with particular focus on rural population. However, there are a number constraints faced by departments of health in implementing these initiatives. In this paper we focus on one key area: the development of management capacity for working with the private sector. A synthesis of the learning from three case studies of public-private partnerships in the RCH area is discussed. Two case studies pertain to state level initiatives in Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh and third study focuses on the national level mother NGO scheme. The objective of these case studies was to investigate how management capacity was developed through the implementation of these three public-private partnerships initiatives and contracting out of RCH services. The case studies also focused on the partnership in service delivery setting by examining the structure and process of partnership experiences, understanding the management capacity and competency in make-up of various public-private partnership initiatives in RCH, and identify pathways towards developing management capacity of partners to address key challenges in implementation.

The Emergent Logic of Health Law

The American health care system is on a glide path toward ruin. Health spending has become the fiscal equivalent of global warming, and the number of uninsured Americans is approaching fifty million. Can law help to divert our country from this path? There are reasons for deep skepticism. Law governs the provision and financing of medical care in fragmented and incoherent fashion. Commentators from diverse perspectives bemoan this chaos, casting it as an obstacle to change. I contend in this Article that pessimism about health law’s prospects is unjustified, but that a new understanding of health law’s disarray is urgently needed to guide reform. My core proposition is that the law of health care provision is best understood as an emergent system. Its contradictions and dysfunctions cannot be repaired by some master design. No one actor has a grand overview—or the power to impose a unifying vision. Countless market players, public planners, and legal and regulatory decisionmakers interact in oft-chaotic ways, clashing with, reinforcing, and adjusting to each other. Out of these interactions, a larger scheme emerges—one that incorporates the health sphere’s competing interests and values. Change in this system, for worse and for better, arises from the interplay between its myriad actors. By quitting the quest for a single, master design, we can better focus our efforts on possibilities for legal and policy change. We can and should continuously survey the landscape of stakeholders and expectations with an eye toward potential launching points for evolutionary processes—processes that leverage current institutions and incentives. What we cannot do is plan or predict these evolutionary pathways in precise detail; the complexity of interactions among market and government actors precludes fine-grained foresight of this sort. But we can determine the general direction of needed change, identify seemingly intractable obstacles, and envision ways to diminish or finesse them over time. Dysfunctional legal doctrines, interest group expectations, consumers’ anxieties, and embedded institutional and cultural barriers can all be dealt with in this way, in iterative fashion. This Article sets out a strategy for doing so. To illustrate this strategy, I suggest emergent approaches to the most urgent challenges in health care policy and law—the crises of access, value, and cost