Learning about learning as systemic practice in the context of environmental decision-making

This paper has been written as the author is beginning a new phase of researching learning, investigating what supports people in their environmental decision making. This process of inquiry has arisen partly as a result of the development and teaching of the UK Open University’s Masters ’ level course Environmental decision making – a systems approach. The implications of approaching an inquiry with a view of ‘learning as systemic practice ’ is considered, drawing on insights into practice, skilled behaviour and learning systems from Lave, Wenger, Schon, Varela, Ison and Russell, among others. The relevance of various action research approaches for learning about learning as systemic practice is discussed. The paper finishes by identifying and exploring three focuses, that seem both challenging and important to the author to take account of as the research progresses. They are the needs for (i) systemic praxis (ii) an awareness of distinctions made by those who participate in the process of inquiry and (iii) using an approach with an epistemological dimension

Blurring the Lines: Strategic Deception and Self-Deception in Markets

Building on the results of a participant observation in a Chinese IT-sector company located in the northern part of China, this paper aims to clarify the nature of deception in markets. Contrary to the position of information economics and game theoretical approaches to trust, the paper argues that deception is not reducible to a question of opportunism or sending signals in order to create trustworthiness. Deception, in fact, may coexist and even be strictly entangled with self-deception, which builds on the conception of an agent whose rationality can fail or whose cognition can be biased. This paper argues that rationality failures and cognitive biases are not driven by psychological mechanisms alone. They have to be related to the social structure in which economic actors operate. In particular, the paper focuses on anticipatory socialization as one source of self-deception and the deception of others. Both types of deception are associated with a gap between aspirations and the available resources necessary for attaining them.Ausgehend von einer teilnehmenden Beobachtung in einem chinesischen IT-Unternehmen in Nordchina zielt dieser Artikel darauf ab, das Wesen der Täuschung in Märkten zu ergründen. Im Gegensatz zu der Position der Informationsökonomie und dem spieltheoretischen Ansatz in der Vertrauensforschung wird in diesem Artikel davon ausgegangen, dass Täuschung nicht auf Fragen des Opportunismus und der Signalsendung, die dem Aufbau von Vertrauen dient, reduziert werden kann. Täuschung kann zusammen mit Selbsttäuschung auftreten und sogar stark mit ihr verbunden sein. Selbsttäuschung baut auf dem Konzept eines Akteurs auf, dessen Rationalität versagen oder dessen Wahrnehmung verzerrt sein kann. In diesem Papier wird argumentiert, dass Rationalitätsversagen und Wahrnehmungsverzerrung nicht nur von psychologischen Mechanismen hervorgerufen werden, sondern mit der Sozialstruktur verbunden sind, in der der wirtschaftliche Akteur operiert. Im Besonderen konzentriert sich der Artikel auf antizipatorische Sozialisation als eine Quelle für Selbsttäuschung und Täuschung von anderen. Beide Typen der Täuschung entstehen aus der Kluft zwischen Wunschvorstellungen und den verfügbaren Ressourcen, die für ihre Realisierung notwendig sind.Introduction The nature of deception Method The company and the entrepreneurs Strategic deception Self-deception and anticipatory socialization Conclusions Reference

Interconnecting Ecolutionary, Institutional and Cognitive Economics: Six Steps towards Understanding the Six Links

Many students of evolutionary, institutional, and cognitive economics have been aware that important links among these fields exist, and several authors have worked on bringing these links to light. Nevertheless, large parts of these links still remain poorly understood. Low interest in inter-field cooperation may be one reason, but difficulties in making these links accessible to meaningful analysis appear more constraining. After surveying the links, this paper proposes six steps towards overcoming these difficulties. It then examines how the three fields together may affect methods and results of economic analysis, in particular those concerning certain basic policy issues.Institutions; evolutions; unequally bounded cognition; program-based behaviors; information accounting; basic policy issues

These confabulations are guaranteed to improve your marriage! Toward a teleological theory of confabulation

Confabulation is typically understood to be dysfunctional. But this understanding neglects the phenomenon’s potential benefits. In fact, we think that the benefits of non-clinical confabulation provide a better foundation for a general account of confabulation. In this paper, we start from these benefits to develop a social teleological account of confabulation. Central to our account is the idea that confabulation manifests a kind of willful ignorance. By understanding confabulation in this way, we can provide principled explanations for the difference between clinical and non-clinical cases of confabulation and the extent to which confabulation is rational

Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance

We study players interacting under the veil of ignorance, who have—coarse—beliefs represented as subsets of opponents' actions. We analyze when these players follow max⁡min or max⁡max decision criteria, which we identify with pessimistic or optimistic attitudes, respectively. Explicitly formalizing these attitudes and how players reason interactively under ignorance, we characterize the behavioral implications related to common belief in these events: while optimism is related to Point Rationalizability, a new algorithm—Wald Rationalizability—captures pessimism. Our characterizations allow us to uncover novel results: (i) regarding optimism, we relate it to wishful thinking á la Yildiz (2007) and we prove that dropping the (implicit) “belief-implies-truth” assumption reverses an existence failure described therein; (ii) we shed light on the notion of rationality in ordinal games; (iii) we clarify the conceptual underpinnings behind a discontinuity in Rationalizability hinted in the analysis of Weinstein (2016)

Before \u27It\u27 Happens Again: Identifying Financial Fragility in the Financial Sector

The project builds extensively on the theoretical foundations of Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis. A Minskian framework is integrated with both behavioral and human rights theory. The goal is to develop a more holistic view of market dynamics which includes psychological and human rights considerations. In developing this framework, we establish an indicator that can be used to track fragility at the sector and firm levels. This work can be applied to macroprudential policy to more adequately equip regulators whose responsibility it is to tame an unpredictable market

Credal Encroachment in a Two-stage Model

On a traditional, “purist,” epistemological picture, the epistemic status of mental states and attitudes depends solely on alethic factors. Pragmatic encroachment is the thesis that rejects this picture. Here I defend a particular version of pragmatic encroachment called “credal encroachment.” Specifically, credal encroachment arises in a plausible model of credence formation. I also argue that this account can respond to some outstanding objections to credal encroachment. Finally, I will close with a discussion of a neighboring but competing account based on similar empirical considerations