383,420 research outputs found
A Neglected Additament: Peirce on Logic, Cosmology, and the Reality of God
Two different versions of the ending of the first additament to C. S. Peirce's 1908 article, "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God," appear in the Collected Papers but were omitted from The Essential Peirce. In one, he linked the hypothesis of God's Reality to his entire theory of logic as semeiotic, claiming that proving the latter would also prove the former. In the other, he offered a final outline of his cosmology, in which the Reality of God as Ens necessarium is indispensable to both the origin and order of our existing universe of Signs. Exploring these passages, as well as the unpublished manuscript drafts of the article, provides important insights into the key concepts of instinct and continuity within Peirce's comprehensive system of thought
Kantâs Robust Theory of Grace
In this paper I argue against two prevailing views of Kantâs Religion. Against commentators such as Michalson and Quinn, who have argued that Kantâs project in Religion is riddled with inconsistencies and circularities, I show that a proper understanding of Kantâs views on grace reveals these do not exist. And contra commentators that attribute to Kant at best a minimalist conception of grace, I show that Kantâs view of it is remarkably robust. I argue that Kant works with three different conceptions of grace. These are: a) grace and the God within, b) grace and the transformation of the fundamental orientation, and c) grace that can be laid hold of; the first and the last play a significant role in his philosophy of religion
Immanuel Kant's Idea of Time vs. Norbert Eliasâ Critique on his Conception
Abstract: In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant describes time as the formal condition on which all phenomena are based upon. He considers it as a one-dimensional subject, that is not an empirical perception, which is given a priori and nothing else but the form of an inner sense. Elias contradicts this, as he differentiates between a social time and a physical time. He demands an understanding for the relation between time in âsociety' and in ânature'. Elias states that languages (he specifically mentions German) often don't have a word that would be equivalent to the English term âtiming". For Elias âtime' is part of the fifth dimension, the dimension of symbols, of experience, of awareness. Only this makes it possible to find out and know what time really is in a social context, a specific synthesis of occurrences, that has to be learned in higher developed societies that are based on the division of labour. Elias mentions âtime', but he states that it's only a synchronisation of positions in the seriatim of events
The impossibility of sympathy
Copyright © 2010 University of Pennsylvania Press. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations used for purposes of scholarly citation, none of this work may be reproduced in any form by any means without written permission from the publisher. For information address the University of Pennsylvania Press, 3905 Spruce Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104-4112.This article questions the status of sympathy in eighteenth century studies. It argues that sympathy can be seen as an economy of two persistent idealizations: the untouchableâthat touches everything. Tracing the genealogy of fellow feeling as a militant Puritan concept of exclusion that is still marked by its theological and political past, the sympathy advocated by Hutcheson, Hume and Smith appears as an idealization confronted by its own impossibility. The eighteenth century is a century in search of an absent and insufficient sympathy, a sympathy that is already preoccupied with its own limitations and excesses: a meta-discourse on sympathy still eludes us
On Arthur Eddington's Theory of Everything
From 1929 to his death in 1944, A. Eddington worked on developing a highly
ambitious theory of fundamental physics that covered everything in the physical
world, from the tiny electron to the universe at large. His unfinished theory
included abstract mathematics and spiritual philosophy in a mix which was
peculiar to Eddington but hardly intelligible to other scientists. The
constants of nature, which he claimed to be able to deduce purely
theoretically, were of particular significance to his project. Although highly
original, Eddington's attempt to provide physics with a new foundation had to
some extent parallels in the ideas of other British physicists, including P.
Dirac and E. A. Milne. Eddington's project was however a grand failure in so
far that it was rejected by the large majority of physicists. A major reason
was his unorthodox view of quantum mechanics.Comment: 20 pages, 4 figure
Logic and Existence: Deleuze on the âConditions of the Realâ
Logique et existenceDeleuze Ă propos des « conditions du rĂ©el »Pour Deleuze, lâun des problĂšmes fondamentaux dâune thĂ©orie de la pensĂ©e est de savoir comment la pensĂ©e peut quitter la sphĂšre du possible pour penser le rĂ©el, câest-Ă dire pour penser lâexistence elle-mĂȘme. La position du rĂ©el semble ĂȘtre hors du concept. Des prĂ©-kantiens comme Leibniz approchaient ce problĂšme par le biais de la distinction entre vĂ©ritĂ©s dâessence et vĂ©ritĂ©s dâexistence, alors que des post-kantiens comme Maimon lâapprochaient par la distinction entre les conditions de lâexpĂ©rience possible et celles de lâexpĂ©rience rĂ©elle. La logique classique dĂ©finit la sphĂšre du possible par trois principes logiques â lâidentitĂ©, la non-contradiction et le tiers-exclu â et la prĂ©sente Ă©tude examine les trois grandes trajectoires qui, dans cette histoire de la philosophie, ont tentĂ© dâutiliser lâun de ces trois principes classiques pour pĂ©nĂ©trer lâexistence ellemĂȘme : 1) Leibniz cherchait Ă Ă©tendre le principe de dâidentitĂ© Ă lâexistence entiĂšre ; 2) Hegel cherchait Ă Ă©tendre le principe de non-contradiction Ă la totalitĂ© de lâexpĂ©rience ; et 3) le groupe des penseurs appelĂ©s de maniĂšre assez large « existentialistes » cherchait Ă Ă©tendre le principe du tiers-exclu Ă la totalitĂ© de lâexistence. La conclusion examine les raisons pour lesquelles Deleuze a Ă©tĂ© fascinĂ© par chacune de ces tentatives philosophiques pour « penser lâexistence », tout en pensant nĂ©anmoins quâelles ont toutes Ă©chouĂ© ; et pourquoi aussi il a fini par dĂ©velopper sa propre rĂ©ponse au problĂšme en faisant appel Ă un principe de diffĂ©rence.Logica e EsistenzaLe âCondizioni del realeâ in DeleuzePer Deleuze, uno dei problemi fondamentali per una teoria del pensiero Ăš: come puĂČ il pensiero abbandonare la sfera del possibile per pensare il reale, ossia, pensare lâesistenza stessa? La posizione del reale sembra essere fuori dal concetto. Prekantiani come Leibniz affrontano questo problema in termini di distinzione fra veritĂ dellâessenza e veritĂ dellâesistenza, mentre post-kantiani come Maimon affrontano il problema in termini di distinzione fra condizioni dellâesperienza possibile e condizioni dellâesperienza reale. La logica classica ha definito la sfera del possibile secondo tre principi logici â identitĂ , non-contraddizione, terzo escluso â e questo saggio analizza tre grandi âparaboleâ della storia della filosofia che hanno tentato di usare uno di questi tre principi della logica per penetrare lâesistenza stessa: Leibniz hanno tentato di estendere il principio di identitĂ a tutta lâesistenza; Hegel hanno tentato di estendere il principio di non-contraddizione a tutta lâesistenza; il gruppo di pensatori chiamati âesistenzialistiâ ha tentato di estendere il principio del terzo escluso allâesistenza. La conclusione analizza sia le ragioni per le quali Deleuze era affascinato da ciascuno di questi tentativi filosofici di âpensare lâesistenzaâ nonostante fosse convinto che essi avessero fallito, sia i motivi per cui egli in conclusione traccia la propria risposta al problema facendo appello al principio della differenz
The Concept of Experience in Husserl's Phenomenology and James' Radical Empiricism
In this paper, I develop a comparison between the philosophies of Husserl and James in relation to their concepts of experience. Whereas various authors have acknowledged the affinity between Jamesâ early psychology and Husserlâs phenomenology, the late development of Jamesâ philosophy is often considered in opposition to Husserlâs transcendental phenomenology. This is because Jamesâ radical empiricism achieves a non-dual dimension of experience that precedes the functional division into subject and object, thus contrasting with the phenomenological analysis of the dual structure of intentionality. However, I argue that the later âgeneticâ development of phenomenology converges with some central aspects of Jamesâ radical
empiricism. This is because genetic phenomenology leads us to conceive of the flow of primal impressions as a fundamental dimension of experience that precedes the subject-object duality and is at the base of the process of co-constitution of the subject and the object in reciprocal dependence. At the same time, Husserl conceives of the impressional core of experience as structured by formal conditions that depend on the
concrete constitution of an embodied subject. For this reason, I argue that Husserlâs genetic phenomenology can complement Jamesâ radical empiricism, thus leading to the development of the doctrine of pure experience as a form of empirical and not metaphysical realism
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