Open problem: Tightness of maximum likelihood semidefinite relaxations

We have observed an interesting, yet unexplained, phenomenon: Semidefinite programming (SDP) based relaxations of maximum likelihood estimators (MLE) tend to be tight in recovery problems with noisy data, even when MLE cannot exactly recover the ground truth. Several results establish tightness of SDP based relaxations in the regime where exact recovery from MLE is possible. However, to the best of our knowledge, their tightness is not understood beyond this regime. As an illustrative example, we focus on the generalized Procrustes problem

The Random-Query Model and the Memory-Bounded Coupon Collector

We study a new model of space-bounded computation, the random-query model. The model is based on a branching-program over input variables x_1,…,x_n. In each time step, the branching program gets as an input a random index i ∈ {1,…,n}, together with the input variable x_i (rather than querying an input variable of its choice, as in the case of a standard (oblivious) branching program). We motivate the new model in various ways and study time-space tradeoff lower bounds in this model. Our main technical result is a quadratic time-space lower bound for zero-error computations in the random-query model, for XOR, Majority and many other functions. More precisely, a zero-error computation is a computation that stops with high probability and such that conditioning on the event that the computation stopped, the output is correct with probability 1. We prove that for any Boolean function f: {0,1}^n → {0,1}, with sensitivity k, any zero-error computation with time T and space S, satisfies T ⋅ (S+log n) ≥ Ω(n⋅k). We note that the best time-space lower bounds for standard oblivious branching programs are only slightly super linear and improving these bounds is an important long-standing open problem. To prove our results, we study a memory-bounded variant of the coupon-collector problem that seems to us of independent interest and to the best of our knowledge has not been studied before. We consider a zero-error version of the coupon-collector problem. In this problem, the coupon-collector could explicitly choose to stop when he/she is sure with zero-error that all coupons have already been collected. We prove that any zero-error coupon-collector that stops with high probability in time T, and uses space S, satisfies T⋅(S+log n) ≥ Ω(n^2), where n is the number of different coupons

Implementation in Advised Strategies: Welfare Guarantees from Posted-Price Mechanisms When Demand Queries Are NP-Hard

State-of-the-art posted-price mechanisms for submodular bidders with $m$ items achieve approximation guarantees of $O((\log \log m)^3)$ [Assadi and Singla, 2019]. Their truthfulness, however, requires bidders to compute an NP-hard demand-query. Some computational complexity of this form is unavoidable, as it is NP-hard for truthful mechanisms to guarantee even an $m^{1/2-\varepsilon}$-approximation for any $\varepsilon > 0$ [Dobzinski and Vondr\'ak, 2016]. Together, these establish a stark distinction between computationally-efficient and communication-efficient truthful mechanisms. We show that this distinction disappears with a mild relaxation of truthfulness, which we term implementation in advised strategies, and that has been previously studied in relation to "Implementation in Undominated Strategies" [Babaioff et al, 2009]. Specifically, advice maps a tentative strategy either to that same strategy itself, or one that dominates it. We say that a player follows advice as long as they never play actions which are dominated by advice. A poly-time mechanism guarantees an $\alpha$-approximation in implementation in advised strategies if there exists poly-time advice for each player such that an $\alpha$-approximation is achieved whenever all players follow advice. Using an appropriate bicriterion notion of approximate demand queries (which can be computed in poly-time), we establish that (a slight modification of) the [Assadi and Singla, 2019] mechanism achieves the same $O((\log \log m)^3)$-approximation in implementation in advised strategies

Lower Bounds for (Non-Monotone) Comparator Circuits

Comparator circuits are a natural circuit model for studying the concept of bounded fan-out computations, which intuitively corresponds to whether or not a computational model can make "copies" of intermediate computational steps. Comparator circuits are believed to be weaker than general Boolean circuits, but they can simulate Branching Programs and Boolean formulas. In this paper we prove the first superlinear lower bounds in the general (non-monotone) version of this model for an explicitly defined function. More precisely, we prove that the n-bit Element Distinctness function requires ?((n/ log n)^(3/2)) size comparator circuits

Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules: On Large Manipulating Sets and Cover-Consistence

We consider the manipulability of tournament rules, in which n teams play a round robin tournament and a winner is (possibly randomly) selected based on the outcome of all binom{n}{2} matches. Prior work defines a tournament rule to be k-SNM-? if no set of ? k teams can fix the ? binom{k}{2} matches among them to increase their probability of winning by >? and asks: for each k, what is the minimum ?(k) such that a Condorcet-consistent (i.e. always selects a Condorcet winner when one exists) k-SNM-?(k) tournament rule exists? A simple example witnesses that ?(k) ? (k-1)/(2k-1) for all k, and [Jon Schneider et al., 2017] conjectures that this is tight (and prove it is tight for k=2). Our first result refutes this conjecture: there exists a sufficiently large k such that no Condorcet-consistent tournament rule is k-SNM-1/2. Our second result leverages similar machinery to design a new tournament rule which is k-SNM-2/3 for all k (and this is the first tournament rule which is k-SNM-(<1) for all k). Our final result extends prior work, which proves that single-elimination bracket with random seeding is 2-SNM-1/3 [Jon Schneider et al., 2017], in a different direction by seeking a stronger notion of fairness than Condorcet-consistence. We design a new tournament rule, which we call Randomized-King-of-the-Hill, which is 2-SNM-1/3 and cover-consistent (the winner is an uncovered team with probability 1)

Information Value of Two-Prover Games

We introduce a generalization of the standard framework for studying the difficulty of two-prover games. Specifically, we study the model where Alice and Bob are allowed to communicate (with information constraints) - in contrast to the usual two-prover game where they are not allowed to communicate after receiving their respective input. We study the trade-off between the information cost of the protocol and the achieved value of the game after the protocol. In particular, we show the connection of this trade-off and the amortized behavior of the game (i.e. repeated value of the game). We show that if one can win the game with at least (1 - epsilon)-probability by communicating at most epsilon bits of information, then one can win n copies with probability at least 2^{-O(epsilon n)}. This gives an intuitive explanation why Raz\u27s counter-example to strong parallel repetition [Raz2008] (the odd cycle game) is a counter-example to strong parallel repetition - one can win the odd-cycle game on a cycle of length $m$ by communicating O(m^{-2})-bits where m is the number of vertices. Conversely, for projection games, we show that if one can win n copies with probability larger than (1-epsilon)^n, then one can win one copy with at least (1 - O(epsilon))-probability by communicating O(epsilon) bits of information. By showing the equivalence between information value and amortized value, we give an alternative direction for further works in studying amortized behavior of the two-prover games. The main technical tool is the "Chi-Squared Lemma" which bounds the information cost of the protocol in terms of Chi-Squared distance, instead of usual divergence. This avoids the square loss from using Pinsker\u27s Inequality

Optimal Single-Choice Prophet Inequalities from Samples

We study the single-choice Prophet Inequality problem when the gambler is given access to samples. We show that the optimal competitive ratio of $1/2$ can be achieved with a single sample from each distribution. When the distributions are identical, we show that for any constant $\varepsilon > 0$, $O(n)$ samples from the distribution suffice to achieve the optimal competitive ratio ($\approx 0.745$) within $(1+\varepsilon)$, resolving an open problem of Correa, D\"utting, Fischer, and Schewior.Comment: Appears in Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS) 202

Outlaw distributions and locally decodable codes

Locally decodable codes (LDCs) are error correcting codes that allow for decoding of a single message bit using a small number of queries to a corrupted encoding. Despite decades of study, the optimal trade-off between query complexity and codeword length is far from understood. In this work, we give a new characterization of LDCs using distributions over Boolean functions whose expectation is hard to approximate (in~$L_\infty$~norm) with a small number of samples. We coin the term `outlaw distributions' for such distributions since they `defy' the Law of Large Numbers. We show that the existence of outlaw distributions over sufficiently `smooth' functions implies the existence of constant query LDCs and vice versa. We give several candidates for outlaw distributions over smooth functions coming from finite field incidence geometry, additive combinatorics and from hypergraph (non)expanders. We also prove a useful lemma showing that (smooth) LDCs which are only required to work on average over a random message and a random message index can be turned into true LDCs at the cost of only constant factors in the parameters.Comment: A preliminary version of this paper appeared in the proceedings of ITCS 201

Robust Algorithms for the Secretary Problem

In classical secretary problems, a sequence of n elements arrive in a uniformly random order, and we want to choose a single item, or a set of size K. The random order model allows us to escape from the strong lower bounds for the adversarial order setting, and excellent algorithms are known in this setting. However, one worrying aspect of these results is that the algorithms overfit to the model: they are not very robust. Indeed, if a few "outlier" arrivals are adversarially placed in the arrival sequence, the algorithms perform poorly. E.g., Dynkin’s popular 1/e-secretary algorithm is sensitive to even a single adversarial arrival: if the adversary gives one large bid at the beginning of the stream, the algorithm does not select any element at all. We investigate a robust version of the secretary problem. In the Byzantine Secretary model, we have two kinds of elements: green (good) and red (rogue). The values of all elements are chosen by the adversary. The green elements arrive at times uniformly randomly drawn from [0,1]. The red elements, however, arrive at adversarially chosen times. Naturally, the algorithm does not see these colors: how well can it solve secretary problems? We show that selecting the highest value red set, or the single largest green element is not possible with even a small fraction of red items. However, on the positive side, we show that these are the only bad cases, by giving algorithms which get value comparable to the value of the optimal green set minus the largest green item. (This benchmark reminds us of regret minimization and digital auctions, where we subtract an additive term depending on the "scale" of the problem.) Specifically, we give an algorithm to pick K elements, which gets within (1-ε) factor of the above benchmark, as long as K ≥ poly(ε^{-1} log n). We extend this to the knapsack secretary problem, for large knapsack size K. For the single-item case, an analogous benchmark is the value of the second-largest green item. For value-maximization, we give a poly log^* n-competitive algorithm, using a multi-layered bucketing scheme that adaptively refines our estimates of second-max over time. For probability-maximization, we show the existence of a good randomized algorithm, using the minimax principle. We hope that this work will spur further research on robust algorithms for the secretary problem, and for other problems in sequential decision-making, where the existing algorithms are not robust and often tend to overfit to the model.ISSN:1868-896