4 research outputs found
Odnosi jugoslovenskih republika i pokrajina
Odnosi izmeΔu republiΔkih i pokrajinskih partijskih i βdrΕΎavnihβ rukovodstava tokom osamdesetih sve su jasnije ukazivali na nedostatak meΔusobnog povjerenja u jugoslavenskoj federaciji. Na historijskoj sceni su poΔeli dominirati procesi Δiji je cilj bio zatvaranje u republiΔke okvire, s jedne strane, ali su se razvijale i ambicije objedinjavanja pojedinih nacionalnih zajednica preko republiΔkih granica, s druge strane. PokuΕ‘aji saradnje na kulturnom polju u okviru meΔurepubliΔkih zajednica kulture, kojima bi se nacionalne politike drΕΎale izvan glavne politiΔke scene, nisu urodili plodom. Na nivou drΕΎavne zajednice, jugoslavenski federalno-konfederalni ustroj iziskivao je beskrajno strpljenje u βusaglaΕ‘avanju stavovaβ republika i pokrajina i krajnje racionalno rezonovanje o prednostima, a ne samo ograniΔenjima koje takva drΕΎavna zajednica pruΕΎa. Kako su odmicale osamdesete bilo je sve manje tog strpljenja i sve manje spremnosti za takvo racionalno promiΕ‘ljanje. Proporcionalno rastu krize povjerenja meΔu republikama jaΔao je nacionalizam, koji Δe u drugoj polovici osamdesetih snaΕΎno zahvatiti i vladajuΔi Savez komunista, te se krajem osamdesetih preliti na ulice i na kraju dovesti do ruΕ‘enja drΕΎave u krvavim ratovima
Image of Africa in Yugoslavia: (1945-1991)
Π£ ΡΠ΅Π·ΠΈ ΡΠ΅ ΠΎΠ±ΡΠ°ΡΡΡΠ΅ ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΎΠΌΠ΅Π½ ΠΈΠΌΠ°Π³ΠΈΠ½Π°ΡΠ½Π΅ Π³Π΅ΠΎΠ³ΡΠ°ΡΠΈΡΠ΅ ΠΏΠΎΡΡ-ΠΊΠΎΠ»ΠΎΠ½ΠΈΡΠ°Π»Π½Π΅ ΠΡΡΠΈΠΊΠ΅ Ρ ΡΠΎΡΠΈΡΠ°Π»ΠΈΡΡΠΈΡΠΊΠΎΡ, Π½Π΅ΡΠ²ΡΡΡΠ°Π½ΠΎΡ ΠΡΠ³ΠΎΡΠ»Π°Π²ΠΈΡΠΈ. ΠΠΎΡΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΡΠΈ ΠΈΠ·Π²ΠΎΡΠ΅ ΠΏΠΎΡ
ΡΠ°ΡΠ΅Π½Π΅ Ρ Π°ΡΡ
ΠΈΠ²ΠΈΠΌΠ°, ΡΡΠ°ΠΌΠΏΡ, ΠΏΡΡΠΎΠΏΠΈΡΠ΅, ΠΏΡΠ±Π»ΠΈΡΠΈΡΡΠΈΠΊΡ, Π΄ΡΡΡΡΠ²Π΅Π½Π΅ Π½Π°ΡΠΊΠ΅, ΡΠΎΡΠΎΠ³ΡΠ°ΡΠΈΡΡ, ΡΠΈΠ»ΠΌ ΠΈ ΡΡΠΌΠ΅Π½Π΅ ΠΈΠ½ΡΠ΅ΡΠ²ΡΡΠ΅, ΠΈΡΠΏΠΈΡΡΡΠ΅ ΡΠ΅ ΡΠ»ΠΈΠΊΠ° ΠΡΡΠ³ΠΎΠ³ Ρ ΠΎΠ΄Π½ΠΎΡΡ Π½Π° Π°ΡΡΠΈΡΠΊΠ΅ Π·Π΅ΠΌΡΠ΅, Π½Π°ΡΠΎΠ΄Π΅ ΠΈ ΠΏΠΎΡΠ΅Π΄ΠΈΠ½ΡΠ΅. ΠΠΎΡΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΡΠΈ ΠΌΠ΅ΡΠΎΠ΄ΠΎΠ»ΠΎΠ³ΠΈΡΡ ΠΈΠΌΠ°Π³ΠΎΠ»ΠΎΠ³ΠΈΡΠ΅ ΠΈ ΠΏΠΎΡΡΠΊΠΎΠ»ΠΎΠ½ΠΈΡΠ°Π»Π½ΠΈΡ
ΡΡΡΠ΄ΠΈΡΠ° ΠΈΠ·Π΄Π²Π°ΡΠ°ΡΡ ΡΠ΅ ΠΈ Π°Π½Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·ΠΈΡΠ°ΡΡ ΡΠ»ΠΈΠΊΠ΅ ΡΡΠ²ΠΎΡΠ΅Π½Π΅ Π½Π° ΠΏΠΎΠ»Ρ-ΠΊΠΎΠ»Π΅ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΠΎΠΌ Π½ΠΈΠ²ΠΎΡ ΠΊΠΎΠ΄ ΡΠ΅ΡΠΈΡΠΈ Π΄Π΅Π»Π° ΡΡΠ³ΠΎΡΠ»ΠΎΠ²Π΅Π½ΡΠΊΠΎΠ³ Π΄ΡΡΡΡΠ²Π° β ΠΏΠΎΠ»ΠΈΡΠΈΡΠΊΠ΅ Π΅Π»ΠΈΡΠ΅, ΡΡΡΡΡΡΠ°ΠΊΠ°, ΠΊΡΠ»ΡΡΡΠ½Π΅ Π΅Π»ΠΈΡΠ΅ ΠΈ ΠΎΠ±ΠΈΡΠ½ΠΈΡ
ΡΡΠ΄ΠΈ.
Π£ ΡΠ°Π΄Ρ ΡΠ΅ Π΄ΠΎΠΊΠ°Π·ΡΡΠ΅ Π΄Π° ΡΠ΅ ΠΡΡΠΈΠΊΠ° ΠΈΠΌΠ°Π»Π° ΡΠΏΠ΅ΡΠΈΡΠΈΡΠ½ΠΎ ΠΈ Π²Π°ΠΆΠ½ΠΎ ΠΌΠ΅ΡΡΠΎ Ρ ΡΡΠ³ΠΎΡΠ»ΠΎΠ²Π΅Π½ΡΠΊΠΎΡ ΡΠ»ΠΈΡΠΈ ΡΠ²Π΅ΡΠ°, ΠΏΡΠ΅ ΡΠ²Π΅Π³Π° Π·Π°Ρ
Π²Π°ΡΡΡΡΡΠΈ ΠΏΠΎΠ»ΠΈΡΠΈΡΠΈ Π½Π΅ΡΠ²ΡΡΡΠ°Π½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ ΠΈ Π΄ΡΡΡΡΠ²Π΅Π½ΠΎΡ ΠΊΠ»ΠΈΠΌΠΈ ΠΊΠΎΡΡ ΡΠ΅ ΠΎΠ½Π° ΡΡΠ²ΠΎΡΠΈΠ»Π° Π·Π° ΠΏΡΠΈΡ
Π²Π°ΡΠ°ΡΠ΅ ΠΡΡΠ³ΠΎΠ³. Π£ ΡΠ°Π΄Ρ ΡΠ΅ ΠΎΠ΄Π±Π°ΡΡΡΡ ΡΠΈΠΌΠΏΠ»ΠΈΡΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π° ΠΎΠ±ΡΠ°ΡΡΠ΅ΡΠ° ΠΎ ΡΡΠ³ΠΎΡΠ»ΠΎΠ²Π΅Π½ΡΠΊΠΎΡ ΠΏΠΎΡΡΠ°Π·ΠΈ Π·Π° ΡΡΠ°ΡΡΡΠΎΠΌ Ρ ΠΡΡΠΈΡΠΈ ΠΈ ΠΊΡΠΈΠΏΡΠΎ ΠΊΠΎΠ»ΠΎΠ½ΠΈΡΠ°Π»ΠΈΠ·ΠΌΡ, ΠΈ ΠΏΠΎΠ΄Π²Π»Π°ΡΠΈ ΡΠ΅ Π΄ΠΈΡΠΊΡΡΡ ΡΠΎΠ»ΠΈΠ΄Π°ΡΠ½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ, Π°Π½ΡΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ»ΠΎΠ½ΠΈΡΠ°Π»ΠΈΠ·ΠΌΠ° ΠΈ Π°Π½ΡΠΈΡΠ°ΡΠΈΠ·ΠΌΠ°.
ΠΠ° ΡΡΠ²Π°ΡΠ°ΡΠ΅ ΡΠ»ΠΈΠΊΠ΅ ΠΡΡΠΈΠΊΠ΅ Π½Π°ΡΠ²ΠΈΡΠ΅ ΡΠ΅ ΡΡΠΈΡΠ°Π»Π° ΠΏΠΎΠ»ΠΈΡΠΈΡΠΊΠ° Π΅Π»ΠΈΡΠ° ΠΡΠ³ΠΎΡΠ»Π°Π²ΠΈΡΠ΅, ΠΊΠΎΡΠ° ΡΠ΅ Π·Π°Π΄Π°Π»Π° Π³Π»Π°Π²Π½Π΅ ΠΎΠΊΠ²ΠΈΡΠ΅ ΡΠ΅ΠΏΡΠ΅Π·Π΅Π½ΡΠ°ΡΠΈΡΠ΅ ΠΊΠΎΠ½ΡΠΈΠ½Π΅Π½ΡΠ°, Π½Π°ΡΠΎΡΠΈΡΠΎ Ρ ΠΎΠ΄Π½ΠΎΡΡ Π½Π° ΠΊΡΡΡΠ½Π΅ ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΎΠΌΠ΅Π½Π΅ ΠΊΠΎΠ»ΠΎΠ½ΠΈΡΠ°Π»ΠΈΠ·ΠΌΠ°, ΡΠ°ΡΠΈΠ·ΠΌΠ° ΠΈ ΠΏΠΎΡΡ-ΠΊΠΎΠ»ΠΎΠ½ΠΈΡΠ°Π»Π½ΠΎΠ³ ΡΡΠ°ΡΠ°. Π‘ΡΡΡΡΡΠ°ΡΠΈ, ΠΊΠΎΡΠΈ ΡΡ ΠΌΠ°Ρ
ΠΎΠΌ ΠΎΠ΄Π»Π°Π·ΠΈΠ»ΠΈ Π½Π° ΡΠ°Π΄ Ρ ΠΡΡΠΈΠΊΡ, ΡΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ²ΠΎΠ²Π°Π»ΠΈ ΡΡ Ρ ΠΏΡΠΎΡΠ΅ΡΡ Π°ΡΡΠΈΠΊΠ°Π½ΠΈΠ·Π°ΡΠΈΡΠ΅, ΡΠ°Π·Π²ΠΎΡΠ° Π°Π»ΠΈ ΠΈ ΡΠΎΡΠΈΡΠ°Π»ΠΈΡΡΠΈΡΠΊΠ΅ ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅ΡΠ½ΠΈΠ·Π°ΡΠΈΡΠ΅ Ρ Π°ΡΡΠΈΡΠΊΠΈΠΌ Π΄ΡΠΆΠ°Π²Π°ΠΌΠ°, Π° ΡΠΈΡ
ΠΎΠ²ΠΈ ΠΈΠ·Π²Π΅ΡΡΠ°ΡΠΈ ΡΠ° ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π½Π° ΠΏΠΎΠΊΠ°Π·Π°Π»ΠΈ ΡΡ ΡΠΈΡΠΎΠΊ ΡΠ°ΡΠΏΠΎΠ½ ΡΠ»ΠΈΠΊΠ° ΠΊΠΎΡΠΈΠΌΠ° ΡΠ΅ Π·Π°ΡΠ΅Π΄Π½ΠΈΡΠΊΠΈ Π±ΠΈo ΡΠΎΡΠΈΠΎΡΠ΅Π½ΡΡΠΈΠ·Π°ΠΌ, ΠΎΠ΄Π½ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎ Π²Π΅ΡΠ° Ρ ΠΌΠΎΠ³ΡΡΠ½ΠΎΡΡ ΠΈ ΠΏΠΎΡΡΠ΅Π±Ρ ΠΡΡΠΈΠΊΠ°Π½Π°ΡΠ° Π΄Π° ΡΠ΅ Π½Π°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π°Π»Π½ΠΎ Π΅ΠΌΠ°Π½ΡΠΈΠΏΡΡΡ ΠΈ ΡΡΠ°Π½ΡΡΠΎΡΠΌΠΈΡΡ ΠΈΠ· ΠΊΠΎΠ»ΠΎΠ½ΠΈΡΠ°Π»Π½ΠΈΡ
ΠΏΠΎΠ΄Π°Π½ΠΈΠΊΠ° Ρ Π±ΠΎΡΡΠ΅, ΡΠ°Π΄Π½ΠΈΠΊΠ΅, ΡΠ΅ΡΠ°ΠΊΠ΅, ΡΡΡΠ΄Π΅Π½ΡΠ΅. ΠΡΠ»ΡΡΡΠ½Π° Π΅Π»ΠΈΡΠ° ΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΠ³ΡΠ°Π»Π° ΡΠ΅ Π²Π°ΠΆΠ½Ρ ΡΠ»ΠΎΠ³Ρ Ρ ΡΡΠ·Π±ΠΈΡΠ°ΡΡ ΡΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅ΠΎΡΠΈΠΏΠ° ΠΎ ΠΡΡΠΈΡΠΈ, ΠΈ ΠΏΠΎΡΡΠ΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°Π»Π° ΡΠ΅ Ρ ΡΠΏΠΎΠ·Π½Π°Π²Π°ΡΡ Π°ΡΡΠΈΡΠΊΠΈΡ
ΠΊΡΠ»ΡΡΡΠ° Ρ ΠΡΠ³ΠΎΡΠ»Π°Π²ΠΈΡΠΈ. ΠΠΎΠ΄ ΠΎΠ±ΠΈΡΠ½ΠΈΡ
ΡΡΠ΄ΠΈ ΡΠ΅ Π΄ΠΎΠΌΠΈΠ½ΠΈΡΠ°Π»Π° ΡΠ»ΠΈΠΊΠ° ΠΡΡΠΈΠΊΠ°Π½ΡΠ° ΠΊΠ°ΠΎ Π»ΠΈΠ΄Π΅ΡΠ°, Π±ΠΎΡΡΠ° ΠΈ ΡΡΡΠ΄Π΅Π½ΡΠ°, ΠΏΠΎΠ΄Π²ΡΡΠ΅Π½Π° Π΄ΠΈΡΠΊΡΡΡΠΎΠΌ ΡΠΎΠ»ΠΈΠ΄Π°ΡΠ½ΠΎΡΡΠΈThis thesis deals with the question of imaginary geography as it pertains to post-colonial Africa in the global imaginary of socialist, nonaligned Yugoslavia. Using archival sources, print and electronic media, social sciences, film, photography and oral history, we examine the image of the Other in relation to African lands, nations and individuals. Using the methodology of imagology and postcolonial studies we analyze images created on the semi-collective level of four groups within the Yugoslav society : political elites, experts, cultural elite and ordinary people.
This thesis proves that Africa had a specific and important place in the Yugoslav image of the world, which was initiated by the politics of nonalignment and the societal relations it created for the acceptance of the African Other. We reject simplified explanations regarding Yugoslav quest for status or crypto colonialism and we emphasize the discourse of solidarity, anticolonialism and antiracism.
The image of Africa in Yugoslavia was mostly shaped by the political elite, which outlined the mental map of the continent, especially regarding key phenomena of colonialism, racism and the post-colonial state. Experts were a part of the process of africanisation, development and socialist modernization in African states. Their reports showed a large assortment of images, underlined by sociocentrism which expected the African to be transformed from the colonized subjects to fighters, workers, students and peasants. Cultural elite was important in the rebuffing stereotypes about Africa via direct contact with African cultural production. Ordinary people viewed Africa through the lens of solidarity, which fortified the images of the African as a fighter, leader and studen
Foreign policy of Yugoslavia 1948-1956. and the "Balkan pact" issue
ΠΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ°ΡΠΈΡΠ° ΡΠ΅ Π±Π°Π²ΠΈ ΡΠΏΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠΌ ΠΏΠΎΠ»ΠΈΡΠΈΠΊΠΎΠΌ ΠΡΠ³ΠΎΡΠ»Π°Π²ΠΈΡΠ΅ ΠΎΠ΄ 1948. Π΄ΠΎ 1956. Π³ΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΠ½Π΅ ΠΏΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠ΄ΠΎΠΌ ΠΠ°Π»ΠΊΠ°Π½ΡΠΊΠΎΠ³ ΠΏΠ°ΠΊΡΠ° 1953/4. Π‘ΠΏΠΎΡΠ½ΠΈ ΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠΎΡΠΈ ΠΊΠΎΡΠΈ ΡΡΠΈΡΡ Π½Π° Π΄ΡΠΆΠ°Π²Ρ Π²Π΅Π»ΠΈΡΠΈΠ½Π΅ ΠΡΠ³ΠΎΡΠ»Π°Π²ΠΈΡΠ΅ ΡΠ΅ΡΡ ΠΎΠ΄ ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π½Π΅ Π²Π°ΠΆΠ½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ, ΠΊΠ°ΠΎ ΠΈ ΡΠΏΠΎΡΠ½Π° ΠΏΠΎΠ»ΠΈΡΠΈΠΊΠ° ΠΡΡΠΊΠ΅ ΠΈ Π’ΡΡΡΠΊΠ΅ ΠΈ ΡΠΈΡ
ΠΎΠ²ΠΈ Π±ΠΈΠ»Π°ΡΠ΅ΡΠ°Π»Π½ΠΈ ΠΈ ΡΡΠΈΠ»Π°ΡΠ΅ΡΠ°Π»Π½ΠΈ ΠΎΠ΄Π½ΠΎΡΠΈ ΡΠ° ΠΡΠ³ΠΎΡΠ»Π°Π²ΠΈΡΠΎΠΌ, ΠΏΠ° ΡΡ ΠΈ ΡΠΏΠΎΡΠ½Π° ΠΏΠΎΠ»ΠΈΡΠΈΠΊΠ° Π‘ΠΠ ΠΈ Π‘Π‘Π‘Π -Π° Ρ Π²Π΅Π·ΠΈ ΡΠ° ΠΠ°Π»ΠΊΠ°Π½ΠΎΠΌ Ρ ΠΈΡΡΡΠ°ΠΆΠΈΠ²Π°ΡΠΊΠΎΠΌ ΠΏΠΎΡΡ. ΠΠ½ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ±ΠΈΡΠΎ, ΠΊΠ°ΠΎ ΠΎΡΠ³Π°Π½ΠΈΠ·Π°ΡΠΈΡΠ° ΠΊΠΎΡΠ° ΡΠ΅ ΠΎΠΊΡΠΏΡΠ°Π»Π° ΠΊΠΎΠΌΡΠ½ΠΈΡΡΠΈΡΠΊΠ΅ ΠΏΠ°ΡΡΠΈΡΠ΅ ΠΊao ΠΈΠ½ΡΡΡΡΠΌΠ΅Π½Ρ ΠΠΎΡΠΊΠ²Π΅, ΠΈΠ· ΠΊΠΎΡΠ΅ ΡΠ΅ ΡΡΠΊΠΎΠ± ΡΠ° ΠΠ΅ΠΎΠ³ΡΠ°Π΄ΠΎΠΌ ΠΏΠΎΡΠ΅ΠΊΠ°ΠΎ 1948. Π³ΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΠ½Π΅, ΠΊΠ°ΠΎ ΠΌΠΎΠ³ΡΡΠΈ ΠΏΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠ΄ Π²ΠΎΡΠ½Π΅ ΠΈΠ½Π²Π°Π·ΠΈΡΠ΅, ΡΠ°ΠΊΠΎΡΠ΅ ΡΠ΅ Π²Π°ΠΆΠ°Π½. ΠΠ΄ΡΠ΅ΠΊ ΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠ³ ΡΡΠΊΠΎΠ±Π° ΠΈ ΡΠΏΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠΏΠΎΠ»ΠΈΡΠΈΡΠΊΠ΅ ΠΏΠΎΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΈΡΠ΅ ΡΡ ΡΡΡΡΠΈΠ½Π° Π΄ΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ°ΡΠΈΡΠ΅.
Π’ΡΡΠΌΠ°Π½ΠΎΠ²Π° Π΄ΠΎΠΊΡΡΠΈΠ½Π° ΠΈ, ΠΊΠ°ΡΠ½ΠΈΡΠ΅, ΠΡΠ·Π΅Π½Ρ
Π°ΡΠ΅ΡΠΎΠ²Π° ΠΏΠΎΠ»ΠΈΡΠΈΠΊΠ° ΡΡ ΡΠ· Π΄Π΅Π»ΠΎΠ²Π°ΡΠ΅ ΠΠΠ’Π-Π° ΠΊΠ°ΠΎ ΠΌΠ΅ΡΡΠ½Π°ΡΠΎΠ΄Π½Π΅ ΠΎΡΠ³Π°Π½ΠΈΠ·Π°ΡΠΈΡΠ΅ Ρ ΠΠ²ΡΠΎΠΏΠΈ ΠΈΠ½Π΄ΠΈΠΊΠ°ΡΠΈΠ²Π½Π΅. ΠΠ°ΠΎΠΊΡΠ΅Ρ ΡΠΏΠΎΡΠ½Π΅ ΠΏΠΎΠ»ΠΈΡΠΈΠΊΠ΅ ΠΡΠ³ΠΎΡΠ»Π°Π²ΠΈΡΠ΅ ΠΎΠ΄ Π²Π»Π°Π΄Π΅ Π’ΠΈΡΠΎβΠ¨ΡΠ±Π°ΡΠΈΡ Π΄ΠΎ ΡΠ²ΠΎΡΠ΅ΡΠ° ΡΠ΅Π΄Π½ΠΎΠΏΠ°ΡΡΠΈΡΡΠΊΠΎΠ³ ΡΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΠΌΠ° ΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ΅ Π²Π°ΠΆΠ½ΠΎ Π·Π° ΠΈΡΡΡΠ°ΠΆΠΈΠ²Π°ΡΠ΅ ΠΡΠ³ΠΎΡΠ»Π°Π²ΠΈΡΠ΅ ΠΊΠΎΡΠ° ΡΠ΅ Π±ΠΈΠ»Π° ΡΠ»Π°Π±ΠΎ ΡΠ°Π·Π²ΠΈΡΠ΅Π½Π°, ΠΏΠΎΡΠΎΠΏΡΠΈΠ²ΡΠ΅Π΄ΠΈ ΠΎΠΊΡΠ΅Π½ΡΡΠ° Π·Π΅ΠΌΡΠ°, ΠΎΠΊΡΡΠΆΠ΅Π½Π° Π½Π΅ ΡΠ°ΠΌΠΎ Π³Π΅ΠΎΠΏΠΎΠ»ΠΈΡΠΈΡΠΊΠΈ, Π½Π΅Π³ΠΎ ΠΈ ΠΏΡΠΈΡΠΈΡΠ½ΡΡΠ° ΠΎΡΠΊΡΠ΄ΠΈΡΠΎΠΌ Π½Π° ΡΠΌΠ΅Π»Π΅ ΠΈ Π²Π°ΠΆΠ½Π΅ ΠΎΠ΄Π»ΡΠΊΠ΅.
Π ΡΠΊΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠ΄ΡΡΠ²ΠΎ Ρ ΠΠ΅ΠΎΠ³ΡΠ°Π΄Ρ, Π’ΠΈΡΠΎ ΠΈΠ·Π½Π°Π΄ ΡΠ²ΠΈΡ
, Π½ΠΈΡΠ΅ ΠΈΠΌΠ°ΠΎ ΠΌΠΎΠ³ΡΡΠ½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ Π΄Π° ΠΏΡΠΈΡΡΡΠΈ ΡΠ»Π°Π±ΠΎΡΡ ΠΈ Π²Π»Π°Π΄Π°ΠΎ ΡΠ΅ ΡΠ²ΡΡΡΠΎΠΌ ΡΡΠΊΠΎΠΌ ΡΠ΅Ρ ΡΠ΅ ΡΠ΅Π³ΠΎΠ²Π° ΠΏΠ°ΡΡΠΈΡΠ° ΠΈΠΌΠ°Π»Π° ΠΌΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΊΠΎΠ½ΠΊΡΡΠ΅Π½Π°ΡΠ° Π·Π° Π²Π»Π°ΡΡ Ρ ΡΠ°ΠΌΠΎΡ Π·Π΅ΠΌΡΠΈ, Π΅ΡΠ½ΠΈΡΠΊΠΈΡ
ΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠ½Π° Π»ΠΎΡΠ°Π»Π½ΠΈΡ
ΡΡΡΠ΅Π΄ΡΡΠ²Ρ ΠΈ Π‘ΡΠ°ΡΠΈΠ½Π°, ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠ΅ ΡΡ Π½Π΅ΠΊΠΈ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΡΠ½ΠΈΡΡΠΈ ΠΈΠ· ΠΠΠ Π±ΠΈΠ»ΠΈ ΠΎΠ΄Π°Π½ΠΈ. ΠΡΡ
ΠΎΠ΄ Π΄Π° ΡΠ΅ Π’ΠΈΡΠΎ ΡΠ½Π°ΡΠ°ΠΎ ΡΠΊΠ»ΠΎΠΏΠΈΠ²ΡΠΈ ΡΠΏΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠΏΠΎΠ»ΠΈΡΠΈΡΠΊΠΈ ΡΠ°Π²Π΅Π· ΠΡΠ³ΠΎΡΠ»Π°Π²ΠΈΡΠ΅ ΡΠ° Π΄Π²Π΅ ΠΈΠ΄Π΅ΠΎΠ»ΠΎΡΠΊΠΈ Π΄ΡΡΠ³Π°ΡΠΈΡΠ΅ Π΄ΡΠΆΠ°Π²Π΅, ΡΠ»Π°Π½ΠΈΡΠ΅ ΠΠΠ’Π-Π°, ΡΠ°Π΄ΠΈ Π·Π°ΡΠ΅Π΄Π½ΠΈΡΠΊΠ΅ ΠΎΠ΄Π±ΡΠ°Π½Π΅ ΡΠ΅ Π½Π°ΡΠ²Π°ΠΆΠ½ΠΈΡΠΈ Π΄Π΅ΠΎ ΡΠ»Π°Π³Π°Π»ΠΈΡΠ΅ ΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠ³ ΠΈΡΡΡΠ°ΠΆΠΈΠ²Π°ΡΠ°,
Π£ΡΠ²ΡΡΡΠΈΠ²Π°ΡΠ΅ Π½Π° Π²Π»Π°ΡΡΠΈ Π₯ΡΡΡΡΠΎΠ²Π° ΠΏΠΎΡΠ»Π΅ Π‘ΡΠ°ΡΠΈΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π΅ ΡΠΌΡΡΠΈ ΡΠ΅Π»Π°ΠΊΡΠΈΡΠ°Π»ΠΎ ΡΠ΅ ΠΎΠ΄Π½ΠΎΡΠ΅ ΠΠ΅ΠΎΠ³ΡΠ°Π΄Π° ΠΈ ΠΠΎΡΠΊΠ²Π΅, ΡΠΈΠΌΠ΅ ΡΠ΅ ΠΠ°Π»ΠΊΠ°Π½ΡΠΊΠΎΠΌ ΠΏΠ°ΠΊΡΡ ΡΠΌΠ°ΡΠ΅Π½ Π·Π½Π°ΡΠ°Ρ, Π° Π½Π΅ΡΡΠ³Π»Π°ΡΠΈΡΠ°ΠΌΠ° ΠΡΡΠΊΠ΅ ΠΈ Π’ΡΡΡΠΊΠ΅ ΡΡΠ°Π²ΡΠ΅Π½ Ρ ΡΡΡΠ°Π½Ρ. ΠΠ°Π»ΠΊΠ°Π½ΡΠΊΠΈ ΠΏΠ°ΠΊΡ ΠΏΠΎΠΊΠ°Π·ΡΡΠ΅ ΡΠ½Π°Π»Π°ΠΆΡΠΈΠ²ΠΎΡΡ ΠΈ ΠΎΠ΄Π»ΡΡΠ½ΠΎΡΡ ΡΠΏΠΎΡΠ½Π΅ ΠΏΠΎΠ»ΠΈΡΠΈΠΊΠ΅ ΠΡΠ³ΠΎΡΠ»Π°Π²ΠΈΡΠ΅, ΡΠΈΡΠ΅ ΡΠ΅ ΠΎΠ²ΠΎ ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΠΎ Π΄ΠΎΠ±Π°.The dissertation is about foreign policy of Yugoslavia from 1948 to 1956 regarding the Balkan pact of 1953/4. External factors that affect a country of Yugoslavias size are essential, as well as the foreign policy of Greece and Turkey and their bilateral and trilateral relations with Yugoslavia, therefore foreign policy of USSR and the USA regarding Balkans are also within the research. Informbiro, as an organization that gathered the communist parties as an instrument of Moscow, from which the dispute with Belgrade arose in 1948 was important as Π° possible pretext for military invasion. The echo of this conflict and its foreign policy consequences are the essence of this dissertation.
Truman doctrine and subsequent Eisenhower policies with NATO plans in Europe, as an international organization, are indicative. Foreign policy revolve in Yugoslavia from Tito-Ε ubaΕ‘iΔ government through the introduction of a one-party system is important for the study of Yugoslavia, which was underdeveloped agricultural country surrounded not only by geopolitics but also pressured with shortages to daring and important decisions.
Authority in Belgrade, namely Tito could not afford weakness and ruled with an iron fist since his party had a lot of competitors for power in the country, ethnic minorities loyal to the neighboring countries, and Stalin to whom some communists of CPY were loyal. The result was that Tito managed, as the most important piece of the puzzle, to form a foreign policy alliance as a joint defense of Yugoslavia with two ideologically different states, members of NATO.
Rise to power of Khrushchev after Stalins death relaxed relations of Belgrade and Moscow, which has reduced the importance of the Balkan pact and with disagreements of Turkey and Greece was put aside. Balkan pact shows the mastery and determination of Yugoslav foreign policy whose formative period this was