42 research outputs found

    Law Enforcement and Illegal Trafficking of Waste: Evidence from Italy

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    The illegal trafficking of waste has become one of the fastest growing areas of crime and one of the most lucrative industries among organized criminal activities, which has infiltrated both the Italian urban and hazardous waste management cycle. In this study, we aim to investigate the determinants of the organized activities for the illegal trafficking of waste (art. 260 of the Environmental Code) using waste, economic, and enforcement data in a panel analysis over the period 2002-2013. Our main findings reveal that in most of the Italian regions enforcement activities do not exert significant deterrence on criminal behaviors; a negative relationship between enforcement and illegal trafficking of waste can be identified only for very high levels of enforcement efforts. Moreover, we find that the major determinants of the illegal trafficking of waste rate differ between northern-central and southern regions, confirming the existence of a regional dualism. In particular, while in the North-Centre area the crime rate is positively related to level of education and negatively to the adoption of environmentally sound policies, in southern regions the organized activities for the illegal trafficking are negatively related to the education attainment and positively to the endowment of waste management plants

    Investigating Discretionary Environmental Enforcement: a pilot experiment

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    In this work, we conducted a laboratory experiment in order to test the findings of a theoretical environmental enforcement model played as a strategic game where the firm’s behavior is influenced by the course of actions discretionally undertaken by both the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). Our experimental findings suggest that the presence of the DOJ can be counterproductive in increasing social welfare, since it implies solely additional enforcement costs, which, in turn, might reduce the probability of conducting inspections by the EPA without affecting the probability of firm’s compliance.classroom experiments, environmental enforcement, environmental economics

    Discretionary Enforcement and Strategic Interactions Between Firms, Regulatory Agency and Justice Department: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation

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    This paper presents a game theoretic morphological analysis of the U.S. environmental authorities’ (i.e., EPA and DOJ) behavioural mechanisms, based on strategic interactions among the players. The models explore the role of discretion that such authorities enjoy, either in deciding how to pursue environmental violations (investigative and prosecutorial discretion) or in judging them (judicial discretion). The purpose is to identify both the optimal firms’ behaviour in terms of compliance, and the DOJ’s and EPA’s optimal strategies in terms of enforcement actions to undertake. Consistent with the setting of the game theory models, the role of EPA and DOJ in deterring firms from polluting is, then, empirically tested, by means of a laboratory experiment. Laboratory evidence on compliance behaviour of firms when faced with enforcement conditions predicted by the theoretical models set up is discussed for the different experimental treatments performed

    Political ecology of health in the Land of Fires: a hotspot of environmental crimes in the south of Italy

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    Environmental crimes, if they are perceived as victimless, have not received the appropriate governmental response and have been frequently ranked low on the law enforcement priority list, punished with lenient or no administrative sanctions. This has contributed to an underestimation of the immediate consequences of environmental crimes, which can go undetected for lengthy periods. On the contrary, the mismanagement and illegal trafficking of waste in the Land of Fires, an area in the Campania region in the South of Italy, has been experienced as a 'victimful' crime. Using a political ecology of health approach, and integrating qualitative and quantitative methods, we investigate how the perception of being a victim of waste-related environmental crimes has been magnified by evidence of serious disease outcomes . Health concerns have become a central issue in the resurgence of grassroots movements against waste mismanagement in Campania

    Criminal Sanctions for Agricultural Violations of the Clean Water Act

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    Public enforcement of the Clean Water Act (CWA) has been characterized by the increased use of criminal sanctions over the past decade. This sanctioning trend has developed in direct response to the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. New sentencing guidelines were established in 1987 under which courts were required to impose sentences which reflect the seriousness of the offense, provide just punishment for the offense, and afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct. Legal trends are documented for both industrial and agricultural violations as a result of applying the new federal sentencing guidelines to CWA cases. The efficiency implications of the SRA are evaluated in the context of a model of the public enforcement of environmental law. It is concluded that fault-based standards of liability and the use of mixed fine/incarceration sanctions are appropriate for agricultural violations of the CWA.Elsevier - Paper presented at the 43rd Annual Conference of the Western Social Science Association - Reno (Nevada) 18 to 21 April 200

    Air Pollution and Migration in Italy: An Empirical Investigation at Provincial Level

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    Human mobility in relation to climate change and environmental degradation has been gaining increasing prominence in public and policy debates. Though many factors can come into play on mobility decisions, it is suggested that the increased concerns with environmental risks may be influential in shaping internal and external migration pattern

    Investigating Discretionary Environmental Enforcement: a pilot experiment

    Get PDF
    In this work, we conducted a laboratory experiment in order to test the findings of a theoretical environmental enforcement model played as a strategic game where the firm’s behavior is influenced by the course of actions discretionally undertaken by both the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). Our experimental findings suggest that the presence of the DOJ can be counterproductive in increasing social welfare, since it implies solely additional enforcement costs, which, in turn, might reduce the probability of conducting inspections by the EPA without affecting the probability of firm’s compliance

    Blockchain e smart contracts: sfide e opportunitĂ  di un futuro giĂ  presente

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    Questo lavoro analizza i cd. smart contracts, o contratti intelligenti, strumenti che incorporano regole e capacità interpretativa del sistema legale, in un’architettura hardware e software dotata di capacità di esecuzione di un contratto in modo autonomo rispetto alle parti contraenti. Speciale enfasi è dedicata alla caratterizzazione degli smart contracts nell’analisi economica del diritto. La parte iniziale introduce alcune informazioni di contesto sulla tecnologia blockchain, per poi proseguire con la caratterizzazione degli smart contracts nell’analisi economica del diritto e con una loro puntuale definizione normativa. Viene evidenziato, inoltre, il legame tecnologico tra smart contracts e blockchain, insieme ad alcune prospettive di sviluppo legate alla Internet of Things. Dopo un rapido cenno alle tipologie di atti interessati dagli smart contracts e la presentazione di un breve modello di codice, utilizzato per fornire un esempio di implementazione concreta di tali contratti, si passano in rassegna alcuni aspetti critici relativi alla loro applicazione, osservati sotto il profilo degli operatori professionali del diritto. In ultimo, si accenna al vasto dibattito esistente sugli aspetti etici e sociali relativi alla diffusione e all’applicazione della tecnologia blockchain, uno dei paradigmi più rilevanti dell’era digitale in corso e sugli smart contracts, in particolare

    Discretionary enforcement and strategic interactions between enforcement agencies and firms: a theoretical and laboratory investigation

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    This paper presents a game theoretic morphological analysis of the strategic interactions between environmental enforcement authorities and polluting firms. The models explore the role of discretion that such authorities enjoy, either in deciding how to pursue environmental violations (investigative and prosecutorial discretion) or in judging them (judicial discretion). The purpose is to identify both the optimal firms’ behaviour in terms of compliance, and the enforcement authorities’ optimal strategies in terms of enforcement actions to undertake. Consistent with the setting of the game theoretic models, the role of the enforcement agencies in deterring firms from polluting is, then, empirically tested by means of laboratory experiments. Laboratory evidence on compliance behaviour of firms when faced with enforcement conditions predicted by the theoretical models set up is discussed for the different experimental treatments performed. Overall, we suggest that making environmental enforcement less predictable for the firms, and thus creating a degree of uncertainty for the violators, can actually encourage deterrence and, thus, improve compliance. Thus, a partly unpredictable enforcement strategy may generate more compliance than an environmental policy that is known with certainty in advance
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