Workers’ Effort: A Comparison Between Capitalist and Cooperative Firms

The purpose of this paper is to establish a comparison between capitalistic and cooperative firms by focusing on workers’ effort during productive activity in a model in which owners and/or managers suffer from information asymmetries. In our model agency relations do not mainly concern the design of incentive mechanisms but the setting of an optimal form of monitoring, centered on management control (albeit incomplete) on workers' effort during production. By using a principal-­‐agent framework, we show that in the presence of information asymmetries on the actual effort offered by each worker, the cooperative firm requires less monitoring to achieve an optimal level of worker effort. Being also owners of the firm and choosing the person responsible for management functions inside their circle, cooperative workers develop relations based on solidarity and forms of ‘peer monitoring’ which reduce monitoring costs. Consequently, the manager of the cooperative firm can devote more of his/her effort to organizational activity which increases the efficiency of the production process. Hence, in terms of working effort, governance in the cooperative firm is more efficient than in the capitalist firm. However, the opposite result is achieved when the purchasing cost of capital in the two kinds of firm is taken into consideration. Therefore, the financial constraints to the purchase of capital reduce the production efficiency of the cooperative relatively to the capitalistic firm. In addition, such constraints represent an obstacle to achieving an optimal rate of long-­‐term growth for the cooperative firm and benefiting from the related virtuous circle between increases in the level of employment and growth rate.The purpose of this paper is to establish a comparison between capitalistic and cooperative firms by focusing on workers’ effort during productive activity in a model in which owners and/or managers suffer from information asymmetries. In our model agency relations do not mainly concern the design of incentive mechanisms but the setting of an optimal form of monitoring, centered on management control (albeit incomplete) on workers' effort during production. By using a principal-­‐agent framework, we show that in the presence of information asymmetries on the actual effort offered by each worker, the cooperative firm requires less monitoring to achieve an optimal level of worker effort. Being also owners of the firm and choosing the person responsible for management functions inside their circle, cooperative workers develop relations based on solidarity and forms of ‘peer monitoring’ which reduce monitoring costs. Consequently, the manager of the cooperative firm can devote more of his/her effort to organizational activity which increases the efficiency of the production process. Hence, in terms of working effort, governance in the cooperative firm is more efficient than in the capitalist firm. However, the opposite result is achieved when the purchasing cost of capital in the two kinds of firm is taken into consideration. Therefore, the financial constraints to the purchase of capital reduce the production efficiency of the cooperative relatively to the capitalistic firm. In addition, such constraints represent an obstacle to achieving an optimal rate of long-­‐term growth for the cooperative firm and benefiting from the related virtuous circle between increases in the level of employment and growth rate.Refereed Working Papers / of international relevanc

Recenti evoluzioni nella dialettica tra public e private enforcement: i programmi di clemenza e le decisioni con impegni

La normativa oggetto di indagine: i programmi di clemenza. Programmi di clemenza e gli incentivi sotto il profilo dl public enforcement. Il difficile equilibrio con i diritti dei terzi: la dicotomia con il private antitrust enforcement. La normativa con oggetto di indagine: le decisioni con impegni. Le interferenze tra decisioni con impegni e private antitrust enforcement.La normativa oggetto di indagine: i programmi di clemenza. Programmi di clemenza e gli incentivi sotto il profilo dl public enforcement. Il difficile equilibrio con i diritti dei terzi: la dicotomia con il private antitrust enforcement. La normativa con oggetto di indagine: le decisioni con impegni. Le interferenze tra decisioni con impegni e private antitrust enforcement.LUISS PhD Thesi

Regions and Subsidiarity after Lisbon: Overcoming the "Regional Blindness"?

The Treaty of Lisbon has strengthened the territorial dimension of the European Union by calling for respect of the regional and local self-government and by recognizing, for the first time, the role of regional parliaments in the subsidiarity control mechanism. Regional chambers with legislative competences have been given the possibility to participate in the so called ‘early warning system’ (EWS) in which national parliaments scrutinize EU legislative proposals in terms of their compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. This article takes stock of the recent experience of regional parliaments under the EWS in order to determine to what extent, if at all, the new subsidiarity provisions have enhanced the regional involvement in EU policy-making. It analyzes two opportunity structures through which regions can participate in EU policy-control, i.e. the national parliamentary channel and the Subsidiarity Monitoring Network of the Committee of the Regions. The findings reveal that regional participation in the EWS is considerably limited and disproportionate both between and within the Member States, thus bringing to light new challenges for the implementation of a multilevel inter-parliamentary cooperation in European affairs.The Treaty of Lisbon has strengthened the territorial dimension of the European Union by calling for respect of the regional and local self-government and by recognizing, for the first time, the role of regional parliaments in the subsidiarity control mechanism. Regional chambers with legislative competences have been given the possibility to participate in the so called ‘early warning system’ (EWS) in which national parliaments scrutinize EU legislative proposals in terms of their compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. This article takes stock of the recent experience of regional parliaments under the EWS in order to determine to what extent, if at all, the new subsidiarity provisions have enhanced the regional involvement in EU policy-making. It analyzes two opportunity structures through which regions can participate in EU policy-control, i.e. the national parliamentary channel and the Subsidiarity Monitoring Network of the Committee of the Regions. The findings reveal that regional participation in the EWS is considerably limited and disproportionate both between and within the Member States, thus bringing to light new challenges for the implementation of a multilevel inter-parliamentary cooperation in European affairs.Refereed Working Papers / of international relevanc

L'arbitrato amministrato

Le fonti dell’arbitrato amministrato. Il processo amministrato. L'istituzione arbitrale come soggetto.Le fonti dell’arbitrato amministrato. Il processo amministrato. L'istituzione arbitrale come soggetto.LUISS PhD Thesi

Is it time to relocate? An empirical investigation on the effects of institutions and economic crises on Headquarter mobility

Problem statement. Aims of the study. Literature review. Theoretical framework and hypotheses. Methodology. Descriptive section. Analysis and results.Problem statement. Aims of the study. Literature review. Theoretical framework and hypotheses. Methodology. Descriptive section. Analysis and results.LUISS PhD Thesi

Arbitrato e fallimento

Gli effetti del fallimento sulla convenzione di arbitrato. La capacità di stipulare la convenzione di arbitrato: i poteri del curatore. L'art. 83 bis della legge fallimentare. Fallimento di una delle parti: sospensione o interruzione del procedimento arbitrale? L'ipotesi di fallimento dopo la pronuncia del lodo arbitrale. Il compenso degli arbitri in caso di applicazione dell'art. 83 bis L.F. Il ruolo del curatore nel processo arbitrale: le impugnazioni. Il caso pratico: Lodo arbitrale 1.07.2010 (M. Delli Priscoli - pres.; E. Stajano - arb.)Gli effetti del fallimento sulla convenzione di arbitrato. La capacità di stipulare la convenzione di arbitrato: i poteri del curatore. L'art. 83 bis della legge fallimentare. Fallimento di una delle parti: sospensione o interruzione del procedimento arbitrale? L'ipotesi di fallimento dopo la pronuncia del lodo arbitrale. Il compenso degli arbitri in caso di applicazione dell'art. 83 bis L.F. Il ruolo del curatore nel processo arbitrale: le impugnazioni. Il caso pratico: Lodo arbitrale 1.07.2010 (M. Delli Priscoli - pres.; E. Stajano - arb.)LUISS PhD Thesi

A Schumpeterian Analysis of the Credit Market

Schumpeter shows that bank credit acts as money-­‐capital and, therefore, constitutes the necessary premise for the realization of the innovative processes planned by entrepreneurs. This makes it important to specify the debt contracts between each bank and entrepreneurs during the prosperity phase of Schumpeter’s cyclical development. The present paper aims to point out the achievements and the limits of Schumpeter’s monetary theory with respect to this point, that is the debt contract design. On the side of the limits, I maintain that Schumpeter’s approach, although representing one of the most stimulating contributions in the history of economic analysis, ask for refinements as regard to the objective-­‐function of the individual banks, the determination of the interest rates, and the usableness of the credit demand and supply curves. Schumpeter’s posthumous treatise on money provides stimulating insights for the definition of these refinements.Schumpeter shows that bank credit acts as money-­‐capital and, therefore, constitutes the necessary premise for the realization of the innovative processes planned by entrepreneurs. This makes it important to specify the debt contracts between each bank and entrepreneurs during the prosperity phase of Schumpeter’s cyclical development. The present paper aims to point out the achievements and the limits of Schumpeter’s monetary theory with respect to this point, that is the debt contract design. On the side of the limits, I maintain that Schumpeter’s approach, although representing one of the most stimulating contributions in the history of economic analysis, ask for refinements as regard to the objective-­‐function of the individual banks, the determination of the interest rates, and the usableness of the credit demand and supply curves. Schumpeter’s posthumous treatise on money provides stimulating insights for the definition of these refinements.Refereed Working Papers / of international relevanc

Fringe Law and Economics

Google, Competition Policy and the Hegel's Owl. Competition Law in developing Countries: India, A Case Study. Economics of Failure in Movies after the Big Crisis.Google, Competition Policy and the Hegel's Owl. Competition Law in developing Countries: India, A Case Study. Economics of Failure in Movies after the Big Crisis.LUISS PhD Thesi

Sistemi specializzati di risoluzione stragiudiziale delle controversie bancarie e finanziarie

La tutela della clientela nella regolamentazione bancaria e finanziaria: le linee guida. I sistemi di ADR del settore bancario e finanziario nel diritto dell'Unione Europea. L'Ombudsman: Giurì bancario. La camera di conciliazione e di arbitrato presso la Consob. L’arbitro bancario e finanziario.La tutela della clientela nella regolamentazione bancaria e finanziaria: le linee guida. I sistemi di ADR del settore bancario e finanziario nel diritto dell'Unione Europea. L'Ombudsman: Giurì bancario. La camera di conciliazione e di arbitrato presso la Consob. L’arbitro bancario e finanziario.LUISS PhD Thesi

Institutional Design of the Member States for the Ex Post Subsidiarity Scrutiny

This paper analyses subsidiarity action introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon and the adjustment of national provisions to accommodate this new competence of national Parliaments. According to Article 8 of Protocol No. 2 to the Treaty of Lisbon, Member States may notify an infringement of the principle of subsidiarity on behalf of national Parliament according to the their legal order. As this paper claims, however, the procedures for lodging the subsidiarity action vary at the national level, depending on the parliament – government relations in EU affairs. The paper begins by outlining the adjustments of national Parliaments for effective participation in European integration. Further, the paper explores the subsidiarity action of national Parliaments under the Subsidiarity Protocol and advances the argument that subsidiarity action is not very innovative from the perspective of Article 263 TFEU, yet the core issue is the reference to the national legal order regulation of the notification process by the Member States. The paper then examines and compares national level arrangements for subsidiarity action, depending on the strength of a national Parliament in EU affairs in relation to its government. The paper concludes by maintaining that there is a divergence in national regulations of subsidiarity action, but evidently the design of ex post subsidiarity review at the national level does not enhance the role of weak national Parliaments.This paper analyses subsidiarity action introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon and the adjustment of national provisions to accommodate this new competence of national Parliaments. According to Article 8 of Protocol No. 2 to the Treaty of Lisbon, Member States may notify an infringement of the principle of subsidiarity on behalf of national Parliament according to the their legal order. As this paper claims, however, the procedures for lodging the subsidiarity action vary at the national level, depending on the parliament – government relations in EU affairs. The paper begins by outlining the adjustments of national Parliaments for effective participation in European integration. Further, the paper explores the subsidiarity action of national Parliaments under the Subsidiarity Protocol and advances the argument that subsidiarity action is not very innovative from the perspective of Article 263 TFEU, yet the core issue is the reference to the national legal order regulation of the notification process by the Member States. The paper then examines and compares national level arrangements for subsidiarity action, depending on the strength of a national Parliament in EU affairs in relation to its government. The paper concludes by maintaining that there is a divergence in national regulations of subsidiarity action, but evidently the design of ex post subsidiarity review at the national level does not enhance the role of weak national Parliaments.Refereed Working Papers / of international relevanc