Institutional Design of the Member States for the Ex Post Subsidiarity Scrutiny

Abstract

This paper analyses subsidiarity action introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon and the adjustment of national provisions to accommodate this new competence of national Parliaments. According to Article 8 of Protocol No. 2 to the Treaty of Lisbon, Member States may notify an infringement of the principle of subsidiarity on behalf of national Parliament according to the their legal order. As this paper claims, however, the procedures for lodging the subsidiarity action vary at the national level, depending on the parliament – government relations in EU affairs. The paper begins by outlining the adjustments of national Parliaments for effective participation in European integration. Further, the paper explores the subsidiarity action of national Parliaments under the Subsidiarity Protocol and advances the argument that subsidiarity action is not very innovative from the perspective of Article 263 TFEU, yet the core issue is the reference to the national legal order regulation of the notification process by the Member States. The paper then examines and compares national level arrangements for subsidiarity action, depending on the strength of a national Parliament in EU affairs in relation to its government. The paper concludes by maintaining that there is a divergence in national regulations of subsidiarity action, but evidently the design of ex post subsidiarity review at the national level does not enhance the role of weak national Parliaments.This paper analyses subsidiarity action introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon and the adjustment of national provisions to accommodate this new competence of national Parliaments. According to Article 8 of Protocol No. 2 to the Treaty of Lisbon, Member States may notify an infringement of the principle of subsidiarity on behalf of national Parliament according to the their legal order. As this paper claims, however, the procedures for lodging the subsidiarity action vary at the national level, depending on the parliament – government relations in EU affairs. The paper begins by outlining the adjustments of national Parliaments for effective participation in European integration. Further, the paper explores the subsidiarity action of national Parliaments under the Subsidiarity Protocol and advances the argument that subsidiarity action is not very innovative from the perspective of Article 263 TFEU, yet the core issue is the reference to the national legal order regulation of the notification process by the Member States. The paper then examines and compares national level arrangements for subsidiarity action, depending on the strength of a national Parliament in EU affairs in relation to its government. The paper concludes by maintaining that there is a divergence in national regulations of subsidiarity action, but evidently the design of ex post subsidiarity review at the national level does not enhance the role of weak national Parliaments.Refereed Working Papers / of international relevanc