Outsiders in economic integration: The case of a transition economy

We use a spatial model of endogenous growth to investigate the likely impact of discriminatory integration among two advanced countries on their own welfare as well as on the welfare of an outsiders transition economy. On the one side, since per capita income convergence depends on relative market access and local market size, piece-wise integration causes insider-outsider divergence. This phenomenon is exacerbated by slow transition. On the other side, simultaneous exclusion from the integration process and ongoing transition have unpredictable effects on the structural adjustment, which might even exhibit swinging behaviour. Since in practice such swings imply large adjustment costs, careful integration design is required. Under this respect, the asymmetric phasing out of trade barriers built in the Europe Agreements works in the right direction.We use a spatial model of endogenous growth to investigate the likely impact of discriminatory integration among two advanced countries on their own welfare as well as on the welfare of an outsiders transition economy. On the one side, since per capita income convergence depends on relative market access and local market size, piece-wise integration causes insider-outsider divergence. This phenomenon is exacerbated by slow transition. On the other side, simultaneous exclusion from the integration process and ongoing transition have unpredictable effects on the structural adjustment, which might even exhibit swinging behaviour. Since in practice such swings imply large adjustment costs, careful integration design is required. Under this respect, the asymmetric phasing out of trade barriers built in the Europe Agreements works in the right direction.Refereed Working Papers / of international relevanc

Should Banking Supervision and Monetary Policy Tasks be Given to Different Agencies?

This paper adds some new arguments to the thesis that the responsibility for banking supervision should be assigned to an agency formally separated by the Central bank. We also provide some additional evidence on the macro and microeconomic performance of OECD countries whose banking systems are classified according to the regulatory regime in place. We find that the inflation rate is considerably higher and more volatile in countries where the Central bank acts as a monopolist in banking supervision. Besides, although banks seem to be more profitable when Central banks supervise them, they incur into higher costs and rely more on deposits with respect to more sophisticated liabilities as a funding source. The data are not definitively in favor of functional separation. However, we argue that the evolution of financial intermediaries, moral hazard problems and especially cost accountability seem to suggest that separation would be a better solution for industrialized countries. We also critically discuss the current arrangement of financial regulation and supervision in the EMU: our proposal is to establish an independent European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) structured similarly to the ESCB.This paper adds some new arguments to the thesis that the responsibility for banking supervision should be assigned to an agency formally separated by the Central bank. We also provide some additional evidence on the macro and microeconomic performance of OECD countries whose banking systems are classified according to the regulatory regime in place. We find that the inflation rate is considerably higher and more volatile in countries where the Central bank acts as a monopolist in banking supervision. Besides, although banks seem to be more profitable when Central banks supervise them, they incur into higher costs and rely more on deposits with respect to more sophisticated liabilities as a funding source. The data are not definitively in favor of functional separation. However, we argue that the evolution of financial intermediaries, moral hazard problems and especially cost accountability seem to suggest that separation would be a better solution for industrialized countries. We also critically discuss the current arrangement of financial regulation and supervision in the EMU: our proposal is to establish an independent European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) structured similarly to the ESCB.Refereed Working Papers / of international relevanc

Two Experiments to Test a Model of Herd Behaviour

We carry out two experiments to test a model of herd behaviour based on the work of Banerjee (1992). He shows that herding occurs as a result of people observing the actions of others and using this information in their own decision rule. However, in our experiments herding does not occur as frequently as Banerjee predicts. Contrary to his results, the subjects' behaviour appears to depend on the probabilities of receiving a signal and of this signal being correct. Furthermore, he finds that the pattern of decision making over a number of rounds of the game is volatile whereas we find that decision making is volatile within rounds.We carry out two experiments to test a model of herd behaviour based on the work of Banerjee (1992). He shows that herding occurs as a result of people observing the actions of others and using this information in their own decision rule. However, in our experiments herding does not occur as frequently as Banerjee predicts. Contrary to his results, the subjects' behaviour appears to depend on the probabilities of receiving a signal and of this signal being correct. Furthermore, he finds that the pattern of decision making over a number of rounds of the game is volatile whereas we find that decision making is volatile within rounds.Refereed Working Papers / of international relevanc

A Simple Approach to International Monetary Policy Coordination

This paper analyzes the strategic interaction between the monetary policies of two countries, in an intertemporal general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities and imperfect competition. It offers an excursus on non-cooperative towards cooperative solutions. All the results can be read by comparing the strength of the two biases: the monopolistic distortions and the terms of trade externalities. In the best feasible allocation, the larger country retains some monopolistic distortions while the smaller country reaches the competitive level.This paper analyzes the strategic interaction between the monetary policies of two countries, in an intertemporal general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities and imperfect competition. It offers an excursus on non-cooperative towards cooperative solutions. All the results can be read by comparing the strength of the two biases: the monopolistic distortions and the terms of trade externalities. In the best feasible allocation, the larger country retains some monopolistic distortions while the smaller country reaches the competitive level.Non-Refereed Working Papers / of national relevance onl

In Search of Monetary Policy Measures: the Case of Italy in the 90s

In this paper we present a structural VAR analysis of monetary policy in Italy. A monetary policy operating regime based on the control of the overnight rate seems to fit the data better than alternative quantitative monetary regimes. The model allows us to derive an overall indicator of the monetary policy stance that is able to highlight the major episodes of monetary contraction in the sample.In this paper we present a structural VAR analysis of monetary policy in Italy. A monetary policy operating regime based on the control of the overnight rate seems to fit the data better than alternative quantitative monetary regimes. The model allows us to derive an overall indicator of the monetary policy stance that is able to highlight the major episodes of monetary contraction in the sample.Non-Refereed Working Papers / of national relevance onl

Managing the Public Debt in Fiscal Stabilizations: the Evidence

This paper provides evidence on the behavior of public debt managers during fiscal stabilizations in OECD countries over the last two decades. We find that debt maturity tends to lengthen the more credible is the program, the lower is the long-term interest rate and the higher is the volatility of short-term interest rates. We show that this debt issuing strategy is consistent with optimal debt management if information bewteen the government and private investors is asymmetric, as it is usually the case at the outset of a stabilization attempt when private investors may lack full confidence in the announced budget cuts.This paper provides evidence on the behavior of public debt managers during fiscal stabilizations in OECD countries over the last two decades. We find that debt maturity tends to lengthen the more credible is the program, the lower is the long-term interest rate and the higher is the volatility of short-term interest rates. We show that this debt issuing strategy is consistent with optimal debt management if information bewteen the government and private investors is asymmetric, as it is usually the case at the outset of a stabilization attempt when private investors may lack full confidence in the announced budget cuts.Non-Refereed Working Papers / of national relevance onl