Meaning Use and Determination: The Underdetermination of Meaning by Use

In section 189 of Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein’s interlocutor asks: “But are the steps then not determined by the algebraic formula?” And Wittgenstein replies, “the question contains a mistake.” In the first part of this essay, I will argue that this question is a consequence of Wittgenstein’s attempt to elucidate the absurdity of the default idea of determination — Platonic determination — which suggests that an algebraic formula determines its infinite applications objectively for all time. Here I shall expose the problems with the Platonic conception of determination. Now if a question asked contains a mistake, then it should follow that at least one illicit assumption is necessary to asking it. In the second part of this essay I will try to make explicit this assumption. I will argue that Wittgenstein’s response to the question is a product of his attempt to articulate a conception of determination — naturalistic determination — independent of Platonic associations, and lying somewhere between the extremes of Platonism and conventionalism.' In the main, I hope to show that for Wittgenstein applications of a word might indeed be determined by its meaning. But I hope to illustrate that for Wittgenstein words can only be naturalistically determined. Though they may not be determined in virtue of their objective essence or inherent meaning, words can nonetheless determine future application in virtue of use, learning, norms and human nature. Wittgenstein’s position therefore hangs in the middle — between Platonism and conventionalism

What Defines Merit with Regards to Equality of Opportunity?

It is not uncommon to hear explanations such as “we hired this candidate because they were the most deserving of the job” or that “the particular student chosen for this scholarship was the most worthy candidate.” However, there is little consensus as to what defines merit or desert in this context. This essay defends Tom Scanlon’s view that for merit to be a valid basis of selection for positions of advantage, it must be defined in the institution-dependent sense. This means that merit or talent must be based on how well an individual fits the goals or aims which the institution plans to promote, provided that the institution’s aims are normatively justified. The first section of this essay successfully shows the theoretical validity of Scanlon’s argument for the institution-dependant sense of merit. This is done by first analyzing how institutions generate inequalities in a just fashion, relying on John Rawls’ concept of the original position. The essay then shows that for these inequalities to be justified, they must be distributed according to the institutional account of procedural fairness. The first section concludes by providing a definition of talent that fits with the institutional account of procedural fairness and the Rawlsian original position, this being the institutiondependent notion of merit. The second and third sections of the essay assess the logical strength of Scanlon’s argument against a rebuttal from Ronald Dworkin, and the real-world implications of the institution-dependent definition of merit on equality of opportunity, in the context of affirmative action programs. The final section of the essay highlights some potential problems and unanswered questions with regards to the institution-dependent definition of merit and provides some potential solutions while also provoking more exploration of the topic of merit and equality of opportunity. An appendix is also provided to show the logical validity of Scanlon’s argument with formal logic. All of this will cumulatively show that T. M. Scanlon is correct in asserting that for merit to be a valid basis of selection, it must be defined in the institution-dependent sense

The Moral Status of Medical Assistance in Dying (MAID): Should Cases of Treatment Resistant Depression Qualify?

This paper contains two parts. In Part I, I argue that the provision of medical assistance in dying (MAID) to competent patients with an irremediable illness-causing great suffering is of no greater moral concern than the practice of refusing life-sustaining treatment, as they are both supported by the same fundamental bioethical principles. In Part II, I argue that although MAID is morally permissible in many cases, we should not yet allow MAID for treatment-resistant clinical depression. We currently lack criteria to determine with reasonable certainty if any case of depression is irremediable or not due to missing data and publication bias in the available research evidence on the effectiveness of typical treatment methods. These issues might mislead physicians and patients to judge a given case of depression irremediable when it is not, leading to a premature death which deprives the patient of a real chance of recovery, which constitutes maleficence

ESCAPING FROM THE MORASS: A CRITICAL SURVEY OF RELATIVISM AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

A prima facie look at relativism, even from the perspective of the most honest inquirer, often appears to be quite the seducer. The aim of this paper is to present a defence of a realist position pertaining to knowledge to show that relativism is in fact self-referentially incoherent and cannot be defended objectively; furthermore, my focus shall be a criticism of relativism in general but, more specifically, relativism in the landscape of epistemology.&nbsp