Identity in Limbo

To answer the question of personal identity, philosophers generally examine two possible criteria: the criterion of continuity of memory and the criterion of continuity of body. Some argue that personal identity is independent of the body and that all that is needed to account for personal identity is the continuity of memory. Others, however, argue that continuity of memory alone is an insufficient criterion for personal identity; they maintain that humans intuitively value their physical make-up to such an extent that a criterion of continuity of body must also be taken into account. In this essay, I will examine and weigh important arguments from both camps and show how personal identity requires something much more than either criterion on its own. I will argue, then, that both memory and body are crucial elements of personal identity. Further, I will illustrate how, in some cases, human intuition gives emphasis to memory over body and, in other cases, body over memory

New Thoughts on Consciousness

I will attempt to introduce some new ideas to the equation in the hopes of sparking new life and ideas in the debate. The views of Ned Block, from his paper Concepts of Consciousness, will be examined and taken as a rough example (given that it’s all I’m looking at) of current Philosophy of the Mind. It has the benefit of looking at consciousness in a variety of ways which will be analysed. Some phenomenological ideas from the late Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception will be used as a new approach to consciousness, particularly the notion of generality and his thoughts on sensations. I will also argue that Block’s view of consciousness assumes too much under that notion. We will begin with a treatment of his concepts of consciousness

MORE HUMAN THAN HUMAN: A Philosophical Exploration of Artificial Intelligence

In this essay, I explore the philosophical implications of Artificial Intelligence through an examination of Rene Descartes. Taking influence from Ridley Scott's classic science-fiction film Blade Runner, I ask if it is possible for a machine to become "more human than human". I provide an overview of Descarte's Axiom of Existence, mind-body dualism, functionalism, and mechanical philosophy as a basis for my argument regarding the potential 'person-hood' of androids. While Descartes himself argues against such a phenomenon, modern scientific advancements beg the following questions. What does it mean to possess the level of consciousness allowing one to be labelled as a ‘person’, and why do Artificially Intelligent androids fall short of this? Should "Rights for Robots" exist to protect androids from their human creators? Ultimately, the advancement of Artificial Intelligence forces us to question what it means to be human, and if it is possible to be "more human than human"?   &nbsp

T.M. Scanlon: Contractualism, Reasonableness, and Moral Intuition

In his article “Contractualism and Utilitarianism”, T. M. Scanlon formulates a contractualist account of moral wrongness. For Scanlon, a morally permissible principle is one that cannot be reasonably rejected within the context of an “informed, unforced general agreement.”1 Scanlon posits a hypothetical situation between agents who share a mutual recognition of each other’s value as persons. These persons are assumed to be rational individuals who are capable of formulating their own particular visions of the good; this situation is the figurative space in which a principle can be held up to the standard of reasonable rejection. Scanlon’s formulation of moral wrongness hinges on this notion of reasonableness. If we are to use it as a standard of rejection, it must be clear what Scanlon considers reasonableness to be. The goal of this paper is to clarify the meaning of reasonableness in Scanlon’s contractualism, consider how it functions within the hypothetical space of mutual recognition, and challenge its sufficiency as a standard of moral wrongness in relation to our moral intuition

Plastic “Perfection”: Examining the Role of Autonomy in Cosmetic Surgery

The concepts of individual autonomy and freedom of choice are prevailing trademarks of Western postmodernity. Using Michel Foucault’s concept of the manifestations of power in conjunction with Susan Bordo’s critique of postmodernity, I will argue that the postmodern concept of “choice” is not the product of pure individual autonomy. Rather, societal norms, history, and hegemonic power structures play an insidious part in forming the choices people make. In applying these concepts to cultural standards of beauty and the increasingly normalized practice of cosmetic surgery, I shall provide an examination of how power structures coercively maintain women’s subordination and oppression through a veil of absolute self-determination and choice